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Ben-Gurion University
[BGU, Politics] Neve Gordon / "The dire cost of domestic rivalries": The Israeli government doesn't care about its citizens and is worse than Hamas

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/dec/29/israelandthepalestinians-middleeast

The dire cost of domestic rivalries
Israel seems more concerned with electoral politics and restoring its
military reputation than stopping the Qassam rockets


Neve Gordon
guardian.co.uk, Monday 29 December 2008 13.00 GMT

 

The first bombardment took three minutes and 40 seconds. Sixty Israeli F-16
fighter jets bombed 50 sites in Gaza, killing more than 200 Palestinians,
and wounding close to 1,000 more.

A few hours after the deadly strike, Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert
convened a press conference in Tel-Aviv. With foreign minister Tzipi Livni
sitting on his right and defence minister Ehud Barak on his left, he
declared: "It may take time, and each and every one of us must be patient
so we can complete the mission."

But what exactly, one might ask, is Israel's mission?

Although Olmert did not say as much, the "mission" includes four distinct
objectives.

The first is the destruction of Hamas, a totally unrealistic goal. Even
though the loss of hundreds of cadres and some key leaders will no doubt
hurt the organisation, Hamas is a robust political movement with widespread
grassroots support, and it is unlikely to surrender or capitulate to
Israeli demands following a military assault. Ironically, Israel's attempt
to destroy Hamas using military force has always ended up strengthening the
organisation, thus corroborating the notion that power produces its own
vulnerability.

The second objective has to do with Israel's coming elections. The assault
on Gaza is also being carried out to help Kadima and Labour defeat Likud
and its leader Binyamin Netanyahu, who is currently ahead in the polls. It
is not coincidental that Netanyahu's two main competitors, Livni and Barak,
were invited to the press conference – since, after the assault, it will
be more difficult for Netanyahu to characterise them as "soft" on the
Palestinians. Whether or not the devastation in Gaza will help Livni defeat
Netanyahu or help Barak gain votes in the February elections is difficult
to say, but the strategy of competing with a warmonger like Netanyahu by
beating the drums of war says a great deal about all three major
contenders.

The third objective involves the Israeli military. After its notable
humiliation in Lebanon during the summer of 2006, the IDF has been looking
for opportunities to re-establish its global standing. Last spring it used
Syria as its laboratory and now it has decided to focus on Gaza.
Emphasising the mere three minutes and 40 seconds it took to bomb 50 sites
is just one the ways the Israeli military aims to restore its international
reputation.

Finally, Hamas and Fatah have not yet reached an agreement regarding how to
proceed when Mahmoud Abbas ends his official term as president of the
Palestinian National Authority on January 9. One of the outcomes of this
assault is that Abbas will remain in power for a while longer since Hamas
will be unable to mobilise its supporters in order to force him to resign.

What is clearly missing from this list of Israeli objectives is the attempt
to halt the firing of Qassam rockets into Israel's southern towns. Unlike
the objectives I mentioned, which are not discussed by government
officials, this one is presented by the government as the operation's
primary objective. Yet, the government is actively misleading the public,
since Israel could have put an end to the rockets a long time ago. Indeed,
there was relative quiet during the six-months truce with Hamas, a quiet
that was broken most often as a reaction to Israeli violence: that is,
following the extra-judicial execution of a militant or the imposition of a
total blockade which prevented basic goods, like food stuff and medicine,
from entering the Gaza Strip. Rather than continuing the truce, the Israeli
government has once again chosen to adopt strategies of violence that are
tragically akin to the ones deployed by Hamas; only, the Israeli ones are
much more lethal.

If the Israeli government really cared about its citizens and the country's
long term ability to sustain itself in the Middle East, it would abandon
the use of violence and talk with its enemies.
 
 

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