29.06.23
Editorial Note
Earlier this month, the book, The Pure Essence of Things”? Contingency, Controversy, and the Struggle to Define Antisemitism and Islamophobia was published by Prof. David Feldman, director of the Institute for the Study of Antisemitism at Birkbeck College, University of London, and Dr. Marc Volovici, lecturer at the Department of Jewish History, University of Haifa, and both co-edited the book.
The book discusses definitions of antisemitism and Islamophobia, “two relatively recent terms conveying a lengthy history of animosity and violence.” According to the editors, both have been subjected to “controversy” over their meanings and, as a result, “function in political and legal efforts to combat the spread of bigoted prejudice in society.”
The editors believe that the dynamic nature of the two definitions “stems not only from changing views of the phenomena, but also from the fact that definitions perform a rhetorical function, serving at times to discredit political opponents.” Therefore, the authors “propose three, interrelated, historical trajectories to understand the politics of definition: the long view, which situates the question of definition within a history of political engagements which have aimed to define Jews, Muslims, and the prejudice against them; the short view, focusing on how key events of the twentieth century affected the nature and political role of definitions of racist prejudice in different contexts; and a critical examination of present-day political efforts to advance definition as a purported key to suppress antisemitism and Islamophobia.”
The editors conclude that capturing the “’essence’ of antisemitism and Islamophobia without reckoning with the concepts’ historical and political load neither promotes understanding of the phenomena nor does it effectively help to combat them.”
The volume represents the newest round of advocacy writing popular among activist academics such as Feldman. This time around, the fight is against the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) Working Definition of antisemitism.
Actually, Feldman is not new to this field. In 2016, in an article in the Guardian, Feldman argued that the term antisemitism was first popularized in Germany, in the late 1870s. “It carries memories of discrimination, violence and genocide.” Yet, Feldman stresses, “now the term also operates in a context created both by the formation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the consequence of its military victory in 1967. Israeli Palestinians possess citizenship rights within the country’s internationally recognized boundaries. Nevertheless, Israel’s relations with the Palestinians have also been characterized by discrimination and occupation, annexation and expropriation.”
Feldman is plainly worried about the IHRA Definition: “there is a danger that the overall effect will place the onus on Israel’s critics to demonstrate they are not antisemitic.”
Feldman moves on to discuss politics and argues that because Amb David Friedman, President Trump’s ambassador to Israel, denounced the “two-state” solution, “The prospect of continued Israeli dominion over disenfranchised Palestinians, supported by a US president whose noisome electoral campaign was sustained by nods and winks to anti-Jewish prejudice, is changing the dynamic of Jewish politics in Israel and across the world. In this new context, the greatest flaw of the IHRA definition is its failure to make any ethical and political connections between the struggle against antisemitism and other sorts of prejudice. On behalf of Jews it dares to spurn solidarity with other groups who are the targets of bigotry and hatred. In the face of resurgent intolerance in the UK, in Europe, the United States and in Israel, this is a luxury none of us can afford.”
For Feldman, antisemitism and Islamophobia are similar, like two branches of the same tree.
In 2020, Feldman published another article in the Guardian against the IHRA Definition of Antisemitism. “We all know how the path to hell is paved,” he wrote, because in Britain, “the secretary of state for education intends to rid universities in England of antisemitism, but his intervention not only threatens to provoke strife and confusion – it also places academic freedom and free speech on campus at risk.”
Feldman argued that this was “misguided” because “structural racism in universities is profound, and racial harassment on campus is widespread. These are problems that universities must address. The imposed adoption of the IHRA working definition will not meet this challenge.”
For Feldman, the IHRA Definition “privilege one group over others by giving them additional protections, and in doing so will divide minorities against each other.”
For Feldman, “universities already have some tools to deal with antisemitism. Universities operate under the Equality Act; they also have internal policies and procedures designed to address discrimination, harassment and victimisation… instead of demanding that universities review and improve their toolkit to address racism in all its dimensions, the secretary of state insists they use a niche widget for antisemitism alone.”
Feldman’s real concern about the IHRA Definition is revealed at the end of the article, “According to the working definition, one example of behavior that ‘could’ be antisemitic is ‘applying double standards’ to Israel… This is consequential for universities because a portion of students and staff support the boycott movement.” In other words, the extensive BDS movement in British universities would be hampered by IHRA.
At the time of that writing, Feldman did not know that the British Government is now working on passing legislation against all forms of BDS.
If Feldman’s strident pro-BDS advocacy is bad enough, the arguments in the co-edited book are worse because they misrepresent the history of antisemitism and Islamophobia. These terms are not “relatively recent,” as the book asserts. The formulation serves Feldman’s goal of producing an epistemic equivalent in the same way that the Nakba and the Holocaust are posited. Nothing could be further from the truth. Over the ages, antisemitism was responsible for countless attacks on Jews, their legal and civic marginalization, and, of course, the murder of six million in the Holocaust. The term Islamophobia first appeared following the 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda and the brutal terrorism of ISIS. Unlike antisemitism, Muslims in the West did not suffer legal and civic disabilities, nor were they murdered en masse. The anti-terror policies enacted aimed to protect the population from terror attacks, not to punish individual Muslims. Ironically, the number of attacks on Jews in the United States far exceeds the number of attacks on Muslims.
In 2021, the Pears Foundation, which sponsored the Institute for the Study of Antisemitism at Birkbeck, withdrew its name from the Institute because of Feldman’s writings.
References:
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-16266-4_1
“The Pure Essence of Things”? Contingency, Controversy, and the Struggle to Define Antisemitism and Islamophobia
- Chapter
- First Online: 06 June 2023
Part of the Palgrave Critical Studies of Antisemitism and Racism book series (PCSAR)
Abstract
This chapter examines the value and limits of definitions in addressing antisemitism and Islamophobia, two relatively recent terms conveying a lengthy history of animosity and violence. Both terms have been subject in recent decades to controversy over their meaning and function in political and legal efforts to combat the spread of bigoted prejudice in society. We trace the various, constantly shifting, meanings of the two terms and point to the contingent political contexts that propelled these shifts over time. The dynamic nature of definitions, we argue, stems not only from changing views of the phenomena, but also from the fact that definitions perform a rhetorical function, serving at times to discredit political opponents. Drawing on the chapters collected in this volume, we propose three, interrelated, historical trajectories to understand the politics of definition: the long view, which situates the question of definition within a history of political engagements which have aimed to define Jews, Muslims, and the prejudice against them; the short view, focusing on how key events of the twentieth century affected the nature and political role of definitions of racist prejudice in different contexts; and a critical examination of present-day political efforts to advance definition as a purported key to suppress antisemitism and Islamophobia. We argue that the wish to capture the “essence” of antisemitism and Islamophobia without reckoning with the concepts’ historical and political load neither promotes understanding of the phenomena nor does it effectively help to combat them.
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https://www.jewishnews.co.uk/pears-foundation-removes-name-from-antisemitism-institute/Pears Foundation removes name from antisemitism institute
Charitable trust confirmed the move in wake of an article by the Birkbeck institute’s director, Prof. David Feldman, which criticised the ‘confusing and divisive’ IHRA definition
By LEE HARPIN April 7, 2021, 3:34 pm
The Pears Foundation has withdrawn its name from the Institute for the Study of Antisemitism at Birkbeck.
A statement from the charitable trust confirmed that from May 4 the Institute will no longer bear the Foundation’s name – although it will continue to be one of its funders.
The decision follows the publication of article by the director of the Pears Institute for the Study of Antisemitism at Birkbeck, Professor David Feldman in the Guardian which openly criticised what was described as the “confusing and divisive” IHRA definition of antisemitism.
While the Foundation’ statement did not directly refer to December’s article or name the Professor, it did reference “challenging and divisive issues.”
Amongst those to criticise Professor Feldman over the issue was Dave Rich, the Community Security Trust’s director of policy.
Mr Rich attacked the academic’s criticism of IHRA saying it was “the nuances in the definition’s language that make it so useful.”
In a further debate at the Limmud conference at the end of December Lord Mann, the government’s independent adviser on antisemitism, launched an outspoken attack on Professor Feldman.
He said Professor Feldman had repeatedly said that IHRA “chills free speech”, which was “a myth”.
In 2010 Birkbeck, University of London and Pears Foundation had together established the Pears Institute for the Study of Antisemitism.
It was the first academic institute of its kind in the UK.
But a March 23 statement from the Foundation confirmed: “As the Institute increasingly tackles challenging and divisive issues in the public sphere, the Foundation’s Trustees have decided that continuing to be so closely associated with the Institute is no longer in the Foundation’s best interests.
“The Trustees of Pears Foundation and Birkbeck have, therefore, agreed that going forward the Pears name will no longer be directly associated with the Institute. The Foundation will continue to support its work as one of several funders.”
The Goldsmiths academic and campaigner against antisemitism David Hirsh told the Jewish News: “The institute hosts an infinite debate between those who study antisemitism and those who confer academic legitimacy onto antisemitism.
“People who libel the IHRA definition as a dirty trick to silence criticism of Israel cite the institute’s director as an authority. He supports a wrecking declaration which explicitly legitimises what are in the real world the key elements of contemporary antisemitism, calling them ‘not in and of themselves’ antisemitic.
“If Pears wanted to support the scholarly study of antisemitism, they’ve been wasting their money.”
But Yair Wallach, lecturer in Israel studies at SOAS, accused the Foundation of a “sharp departure” from the principle of not intervening in academic decisions.
Mr Wallach added it was “all but obvious that the Foundation was displeased by a specific intervention of the Institute’s director, Prof David Feldman – his recent Guardian op-ed.”
The Jewish News has contacted the Pears Foundation for comment.
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The government should not impose a faulty definition of antisemitism on universities
This article is more than 2 years old
The IHRA ‘working definition’ is confusing and divisive. Forcing its adoption will not help protect Jewish students and staff
David Feldman is director of the Pears Institute for the Study of Antisemitism at Birkbeck, University of London
Wed 2 Dec 2020 06.00 GMT
We all know how the path to hell is paved. But it is a warning worth repeating for Gavin Williamson. The secretary of state for education intends to rid universities in England of antisemitism, but his intervention not only threatens to provoke strife and confusion – it also places academic freedom and free speech on campus at risk.
In October, Williamson wrote to all university vice-chancellors “requesting” they adopt a particular definition of antisemitism: the “working definition” promulgated by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) in 2016. Williamson is not the first minister to write to universities on this matter, but he has been more forceful than his predecessors. His letter demands action by Christmas, and threatens swingeing measures against refusenik institutions that later suffer antisemitic incidents. He threatens to remove funding and the power to award degrees from universities that do not share his faith in the efficacy of the IHRA working definition.
This is misguided, for a number of reasons. First, it misconceives the task universities face. As shown in a report released last week by Universities UK – Tackling Racial Harassment in Higher Education – structural racism in universities is profound, and racial harassment on campus is widespread. These are problems that universities must address. The imposed adoption of the IHRA working definition will not meet this challenge. It will, however, privilege one group over others by giving them additional protections, and in doing so will divide minorities against each other. For this reason alone, Williamson should pause and consider how best to protect students and university staff from racism broadly as well as from antisemitism.
Williamson’s strategically ill-considered letter to vice-chancellors is based on two mistaken assumptions about the fight against antisemitism. First, it asserts the IHRA working definition provides a “straightforward” way for universities to show that they do not tolerate antisemitism. Second, it claims that universities that fail to adopt the definition reveal they are willing to tolerate antisemitism. Neither of these claims is true. The IHRA working definition is anything but straightforward, and universities already have some tools to deal with antisemitism.
Universities operate under the Equality Act; they also have internal policies and procedures designed to address discrimination, harassment and victimisation. The damning verdict of the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s recent report on the Labour party provided a clear demonstration that the universalist principles gathered in the Equality Act can be used to hold powerful institutions to account. But instead of demanding that universities review and improve their toolkit to address racism in all its dimensions, the secretary of state insists they use a niche widget for antisemitism alone: one that even its friends concede is not a precision instrument.
It is a puzzling choice, but one that becomes comprehensible once we see that the IHRA working definition acquired symbolic importance in the struggle over antisemitism in the Labour party. Labour’s initial rejection of the definition has led many to regard the working definition as a symbol – a litmus test of whether or not an individual or an organisation really opposes antisemitism or just plays lip service to the goal. Symbols are important, but they are no substitute for carefully constructed measures to combat antisemitism and other racisms.
In fact, the IHRA working definition “was never intended to be a campus hate-speech code”, as one of its original authors has explained. It was drafted as a tool for data collectors, although it has rarely been used in this way. But it is one thing for monitoring agencies to adopt the working definition as a rule of thumb; imposing it on universities, which have a duty under law to uphold academic freedom and free speech within the law, is something altogether different.
The working definition chiefly consists of a woolly core statement – “antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred of Jews” – and a list of examples that “could, taking into account the overall context”, be instances of antisemitism. The examples cover a range of topics, but six of the 11 deal with discourse on Israel. And it is the emphasis on Israel that is the focus of criticism from the definition’s critics and enthusiasm from its advocates.
The pros and cons of the working definition have been debated on many occasions. For some it provides helpful guidelines; for others it inhibits legitimate criticism of Israel’s policies and practices. But in the light of the secretary of state’s letter, the key point is that it is impossible to know which of these interpretations is correct. And in this context, uncertainty brings danger.
According to the working definition, one example of behaviour that “could” be antisemitic is “applying double standards” to Israel. Some prominent advocacy organisations and political figures accuse those who support a boycott against Israel of doing just this. This is consequential for universities because a portion of students and staff support the boycott movement. So, taking this as a case in point, are boycotts of Israel inherently antisemitic, according to the IHRA working definition?
Unfortunately, the working definition itself doesn’t provide us with a definite answer – and if we turn to the leading public bodies for guidance we find confusing and contradictory advice. The Antisemitism Policy Trust is one such organisation. Esteemed internationally and in the UK, among other functions it provides a special adviser to John Mann, the government’s antisemitism tsar. Earlier this year the trust issued a policy briefing in which it declared, “boycotts are not covered by IHRA”. Some will have been reassured by this, others alarmed.
But in its guide to the IHRA working definition, also published in 2020, the trust leans heavily in the opposite direction. Here, in cloudy prose, it suggests that either boycotts against Israel are antisemitic unless they also condemn all other states that commit similar misdeeds, or that boycott movements are under an obligation to “prove” they are not antisemitic – or both.
If the Antisemitism Policy Trust is in a muddle over the IHRA working definition, how can anyone else be certain what it means? Universities, like everyone else, are sorely in need of good and clear guidance on when speech on Israel or Zionism becomes antisemitic. Sadly, this is not what the working definition provides. In these circumstances, its imposition by the secretary of state appears reckless and brings real dangers.
The working definition’s indeterminacy will provide a standing invitation to individuals and organisations to bring allegations of antisemitism against students and lecturers. Not least because some individuals and advocacy groups genuinely and passionately believe that the movement to boycott Israel is inherently antisemitic.
In the absence of further aggravating factors, the individuals who are the subject of these complaints may not run afoul of university policies and procedures. But the chilling impact on students, on academic and professional staff and on institutions dedicated to debate and robust discussion, will be corrosive and long lasting.
Antisemitism does arise in Britain’s universities. On occasion driven by ideology, this largely reflects a reservoir of images and narratives accumulated over centuries and deeply embedded in our culture. Antisemitism on campus comprises one part of a mosaic of harms and harassment suffered by racial and religious minorities. Jewish students and staff deserve protection, but imposing the working definition will add nothing useful to secure it. The secretary of state’s intervention divides Jews from other minorities. In doing so, he helps neither but instead risks splitting the struggle against antisemitism from the liberal values that have provided its most secure home. Let us hope he will think again.
David Feldman is director of the Pears Institute for the Study of Antisemitism at Birkbeck, University of London
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https://www.jmberlin.de/en/talk-relationship-between-antisemitism-and-islamophobiaWHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA?
Lectures by David Feldman and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum (video recording available, in German and English)
For several years now, scientists have been discussing the hypothesis of whether the roles of Antisemitism during the formation of nation states in the 19th century and racism against Muslims during the process of European integration can be compared.
The British historian David Feldman searches in his lecture for parallels past and present between Antisemitism and anti-Muslim racism. Against the backdrop of the current shift to the right in Europe, does it make sense to politically address these two phenomena together? Which opportunities for future Jewish-Muslim alliances does this give rise to? Stefanie Schüler-Springorum from the Center for Research on Antisemitism will comment on the lecture from a German perspective.
Moderation: Yasemin Shooman, Head of the Academy Programs.
recording available
Where
W. M. Blumenthal Academy,
Klaus Mangold Auditorium
Fromet-und-Moses-Mendelssohn-Platz 1, 10969 Berlin (Opposite the Museum)
Where, when, what?
Video recording of the lectures What is the Relationship Between Antisemitism and Islamophobia?; 20 March 2018, in German and Englisch; Jewish Museum Berlin 2018
David Feldman
Prof. David Feldman teaches at the University of London Birkbeck College and is director of the Pears Institute for the Study of Antisemitism. He researches the history of minorities from 1600 to the present day.
Google translate
May 24, 2018
Lecture by David Feldman and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum (in German and English) on March 20, 2018
For several years, academics have been discussing whether the role of anti-Semitism in the formation of nation states in the 19th century can be compared with the role played by racism towards Muslims in the course of European integration.
In his lecture, the British historian David Feldman asks about historical and current parallels between anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim racism. Against the background of the current shift to the right in Europe, does it make sense to address both phenomena together politically? What opportunities for future Jewish-Muslim alliances arise from this? Stefanie Schüler-Springorum from the Center for Research on Antisemitism comments on the lecture from a German perspective. Moderator: Yasemin Shooman, Head of Academy Programs.
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Will Britain’s new definition of antisemitism help Jewish people? I’m sceptical
This article is more than 6 years old
While some consensus is needed in this debate, I fear this definition is imprecise, and isolates antisemitism from other forms of bigotry
Wed 28 Dec 2016 11.26 GMT
Antisemitism is anathema. From Ken Livingstone to Ephraim Mirvis, the chief rabbi, no one has a good word to say for it. For some there has been a crisis in 2016, for others there has been a witch-hunt. Everyone is against antisemitism: we just can’t agree on how to recognise it.
This year there have been no less than three inquiries and reports on antisemitism: Janet Royall’s presented in May, Shami Chakrabarti’s at the end of June (I served as one of the vice-chairs to this inquiry, although the resulting report was Chakrabarti’s alone) and the home affairs committee report published in October. All dealt exclusively or significantly with the issue of antisemitism in the Labour party.
Now, at year’s end, the prime minister has announced that the government has adopted the definition of antisemitism recommended by an inter-governmental body, the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). Theresa May heralded a single standard with which we can identify and call out antisemitism. The Labour party quickly fell into line and British Jewish leaders welcomed the initiative. Does this promise a new year in which the politics of antisemitism will be less divisive? Or are the issues bound up in antisemitism too complex to be solved by fiat?
The text carries dangers. It trails a list of eleven examples. Some of the points are sensible, some are not
Much of the rancorous debate around antisemitism this year has circulated around three disputed terms: antisemitism, Zionism and anti-racism.
The term antisemitism was first popularised in Germany in the late 1870s. It is closely bound up with the experiences of Jews as a minority group. It carries memories and knowledge of discrimination, violence and genocide. Yet now the term also operates in a context created both by the formation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the consequence of its military victory in 1967. Israeli Palestinians possess citizenship rights within the country’s internationally recognised boundaries. Nevertheless, Israel’s relations with the Palestinians have also been characterised by discrimination and occupation, annexation and expropriation. Those who make Israel the target of criticism for these actions are now denounced as antisemitic by Israel’s leaders and by their supporters around the world.
In this way antisemitism is a term that does service both as a defence of minority rights, and in the context of support for a discriminatory and illiberal state power. Little wonder the word provokes so much disagreement.
At times the debate over antisemitism has been a surrogate for another quarrel: whether the Labour party should be a comfortable place for Zionists. In parts of the left the terms “Zionism” and “Zio” have become part of the lexicon of invective. Zionism and anti-Zionism encompass a range of positions, but in debate they get defined by opponents according to their maximalist connotations: religious and ethnic privilege, occupation and settlement are ascribed to one side, refusal to assent to the legitimacy of the state of Israel by the other. The facts provide a different picture. Many people who think of themselves as Zionists are at the forefront of protest against Israel’s policies. Many who conceive of themselves as anti-Zionists accept the state’s right to exist while they oppose its objectionable laws and policies.
Anti-racism too has generated conflict, not least in the Labour party. Chakrabarti provided a cautious assessment of the extent of antisemitism within Labour. But it is not only the proven incidence of antisemitism that should concern us but also the well of support that exists for people who reveal prejudice or callous insensitivity towards Jews. The last year has been punctuated by a handful of headline-grabbing incidents of this sort.
These incidents provoke debate over individuals. However, the problem also lies in political culture. The commonplace idea that racism expresses relations of power too often leads to the belief that it expresses only that. But racism can inform acts of resistance and solidarity as well as domination. If we fail to recognise this we will be poorly equipped to identify racism when it is directed against a group that is relatively affluent, coded as “white”, and most of whose members feel attached to the strongest power in the Middle East. It will increase the chances that we are blind to bigotry and myth when it is directed against British Jews.
So does the IHRA definition that Britain has adopted provide the answer? I am sceptical. Here is the definition’s key passage: “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred towards Jews.” This is bewilderingly imprecise.
The text also carries dangers. It trails a list of 11 examples. Seven deal with criticism of Israel. Some of the points are sensible, some are not. Crucially, there is a danger that the overall effect will place the onus on Israel’s critics to demonstrate they are not antisemitic. The home affairs committee advised that the definition required qualification “to ensure that freedom of speech is maintained in the context of discourse on Israel and Palestine”. It was ignored.
The IHRA definition has been circulating for over a decade and has already been buried once. It is almost identical to the European Union monitoring commission’s working definition, formulated in 2005 as part of the global response to the second intifada in the early 2000s. The definition was never accorded any official status by the EUMC and was finally dropped by its successor body, the Fundamental Rights Agency.
The definition has been resurrected just as we are moving to new times. David Friedman, who will soon become President Trump’s ambassador to Israel, has denounced the “two-state” solution. The prospect of continued Israeli dominion over disenfranchised Palestinians, supported by a US president whose noisome electoral campaign was sustained by nods and winks to anti-Jewish prejudice, is changing the dynamic of Jewish politics in Israel and across the world.
In this new context, the greatest flaw of the IHRA definition is its failure to make any ethical and political connections between the struggle against antisemitism and other sorts of prejudice. On behalf of Jews it dares to spurn solidarity with other groups who are the targets of bigotry and hatred. In the face of resurgent intolerance in the UK, in Europe, the United States and in Israel, this is a luxury none of us can afford.
israel-academia-monitor.com 