10.02.22

Editorial Note

A recent Haaretz article discusses findings of History Professor Gadi Algazi of Tel Aviv University on the issue of Bedouins in the Negev. 

Algazi is a specialist in the social and intellectual history of European Judaism. His latest academic work pertains to the Mutina Hebraica Project which, “proposes a dialogue between the digital humanities, the history of knowledge and Jewish history,” using new archival investigations and the development of computer tools for the automated reading of manuscripts by applying artificial intelligence to the analysis of texts.

Outside observers may be puzzled why a professor of the history of European Jewry should present himself as an expert on Israeli Bedouins. But Algazi is part of a group of activists who uses his academic perch to advocate for issues outside his academic field. He was hired to teach and research in his field of expertise then switched to political activism disguised as academics.  According to the article, Algazi provided an expert report to the Israeli court.

The illogic of Algazi is glaring. There are two problems with the article, Algazi discusses a letter written by the South Commander, General Moshe Dayan, who raised the possibility of moving Bedouins and compensating them. Algazi then moves to juxtapose the court case of al-Arakib (Araqib), where the Bedouin claimants failed to prove ownership, as the Supreme Court dismissed the case in 2015. Clearly, Algazi has an agenda, by connecting Moshe Dayan’s memo on moving Bedouins from one place to another – not particularly the al-Arakib Bedouins – to the claimants’ lack of proof of ownership and the shacks they built that have been destroyed hundreds of times by the police. 

The article purports to influence another Bedouin court case, as it states, something the Israeli public would consider unethical.

The al-Arakib court case pertains to the Bedouins’ efforts to establish ownership of approx. 2000 dunam.  Their case was rejected because the claimants failed to prove they cultivated such a large territory of the so-called Mewat Land, a land which under the rules of the Ottoman Empire could not be owned. Their ownership was neither established under the British Mandate nor later by Israel. Had the claimants claimed a land size they could cultivate, their case might have been accepted.

As the article indicates, Forensic Architecture provided the digital imaging of al-Arakib, headed by another anti-Israel Israeli activist, Prof. Eyal Weizman, from Goldsmiths University of London. Still, no imaging can provide a continuous presence in al-Arakib. Bedouins are nomadic and roam many areas during a year.  

In the verdict of the al-Arakib case by the Supreme Court in 2015, Aref Al-Aref, a historian and governor of the Beer Sheva District during the British Mandate period, was cited. He wrote in 1933, “The Bedouin had extended periods of time during which they had no interest whatsoever in land. Moreover, they looked down on anyone connected with working the land, because they perceived that as a disruption and a distraction to the life of wandering and brigandage. It is possible that the foundation of their hatred of farmers and their lifestyle can be found here. However, at present [1933] the situation has changed and the Bedouin have begun leaning towards agriculture.” 

Algazi is an academic with a pro-Palestinian agenda. As such, he is not a neutral researcher.

Algazi has a long history of political activism. IAM published a post last year identifying Algazi as Israel’s first conscript objector who wrote in 2001 a chapter that praises draft dodging. Moreover, the Netherlands radio program “Vox Humana” interviewed Algazi, who said, “At the age of 12, he had already decided that he would refuse the inevitable military service in the occupied territories that would eventually be expected of him. And at 18, when he became the first Israeli to publicly refuse to serve there, he was used as an example by the establishment. For years, every time he was called up for service and refused, he was imprisoned.” 

While it is his right to have an opinion or refuse army service and face the consequences, his academic career would not have been possible without the strong support of several backers. Possibly, one of them was the late Leon Sheleff, a professor of law and sociology at Tel Aviv University whom Algazi thanked at the end of the draft-dodging chapter.   An obituary of Sheleff in Haaretz in 2003 stated that “Professor Sheleff was a moral and conscientious man who specialized in the relation between law and society,” a close colleague said. “The South African born Sheleff was a member of the Habonim, a socialist-Zionist movement, who became a passionate peace advocate upon immigrating to Israel.  He wrote a book dealing with the circumstances in which refusing military service is possible.”  It would not be beyond the realm of imagination to assume that Sheleff helped Algazi, the celebrated draft dodger, to obtain his position at Tel Aviv University. 

Another possible backer is Gerardo Leibner, a professor in the Department of History at TAU.  A highly activist academic who became involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In 2002 Algazi and Leibner submitted an article to a Palestinian anti-Israel propaganda outlet based in Ramallah. They detailed how they and their friends support the Palestinians and oppose Israel. 

In the recent article on the Bedouins, Algazi minimizes the Army’s concerns about the radicalization of the Bedouin community.  It is well known that Palestinians have tried to destabilize the situation in the Negev, a situation that would impose new security challenges.   For example, The New Arab newspaper based in London reported on February 01, 2022, that “Historical archive reveals Israel’s plans to expel Negev Palestinians.” Another pro-Palestinian media outlet, Middle East Eye, published an article on January 31, 2022, “Historical documents reveal Israel’s plan to empty Negev of Palestinians.”   This new propaganda line aims to persuade the Bedouins that they share the same fate as the Palestinians. 

Turning the Bedouin community into a “mini Palestine” is a major concern for Israel’s security, but for pro-Palestinian Algazi, Israel’s interests are not on the agenda.

References

https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-documents-reveal-israel-s-intent-to-forcibly-expel-bedouin-from-their-lands-1.10579891
Documents Reveal Israel’s Intent to Forcibly Expel the Bedouin From Their Lands

Published by “If Americans Knew“

1951 Documents Reveal Israel’s Intent to Ethnically Cleanse Bedouin from their Lands

 CONTACT@IFAMERICANSKNEW.ORG FEBRUARY 8, 2022

New research has uncovered an Israeli military operation commanded by Moshe Dayan, whose goal was to forcibly remove Bedouin Palestinians from their lands. ‘Transferring the Bedouin to new territories would annul their rights as landowners and make them tenants on government lands,’ wrote Dayan in 1951. The documents show an orderly state expulsion plan…

Israel has evicted the Bedouin from the Negev village of Al-Arakib dozens of times, but they keep coming back. Israeli forces then demolish their homes again

To a large extent, Al-Arakib’s story is that of the entire Negev Bedouin community. Israel doesn’t recognize as theirs the tens of thousands of dunams they once lived on and where they still live…

By Netael Bandel, reposted from Ha’aretz (video below translated and added by IAK)

It’s quiet in the unrecognized Negev Bedouin village of Al-Arakib. It was even quiet a month ago, when stormy protests against the Jewish National Fund’s tree planting were taking place some 30 kilometers away.

But another issue could prove even more explosive, perhaps much more. And it stems from this quiet village.

At first glance, there’s nothing special about what Justice Ministry officials are calling the “national strategy case.” It’s just another Bedouin lawsuit over ownership of Negev lands that the state expropriated after the 1948 War of Independence.

Bedouin have testified previously that soldiers forcibly expelled them. For the first time, however, Algazi’s research seems to provide evidence of an orderly state expulsion plan

It will most likely fail in court, just like all its predecessors. And the Justice Ministry thinks it will be the last of its kind – that the state’s victory in this case would preclude any further Bedouin suits.

However, an appendix to this suit might change the outcome, albeit unlikely. It’s an opinion by Prof. Gadi Algazi, a historian from Tel Aviv University. His in-depth research has uncovered a military operation commanded by Moshe Dayan whose goal, the documents show, was to forcibly expel Bedouin from their lands.

“Transferring the Bedouin to new areas will revoke their rights as landowners and the land will be leased as government land,” wrote Dayan, then head of the army’s Southern Command, in a letter Algazi discovered. And a document written by the military government predicted that if the Bedouin, who refused to leave, didn’t move voluntarily, the army “would have to move them,” Algazi’s opinion added.

The Justice Ministry still thinks this case will end like all the others. Nevertheless, there’s a chance this historical material could set a legal precedent with implications far beyond recognizing Bedouin ownership of this one village.

What’s left of Al-Arakib is easy to reach. Head south on Route 40, turn right after the Lehavim Junction and you’ll see what looks like ruins. An ancient cemetery may be the clearest evidence of the life still here. At the moment, there’s a tent and two vans here. One van serves more as shelter from the weather than as a means of transportation.

The state has already evicted the Bedouin from Al-Arakib’s roughly 2,000 dunams dozens of times, but they keep coming back and reassemble. Israel then demolishes their homes again.

To a large extent, Al-Arakib’s story is that of the entire Negev Bedouin community. The state doesn’t recognize as theirs the tens of thousands of dunams they once lived on and where they still live.

‘The research proves that what David Ben-Gurion explicitly denied in the Knesset actually happened, and how. There was an organized transfer of Bedouin citizens’

Officially, the Bedouin left during the war and didn’t return, so the state expropriated the land. Then, the Land Acquisition Law of 1953 made this situation permanent. The law states that expropriated land would become state property if its Arab owners, despite still living in Israel, didn’t return to it between May 15, 1948 and April 1, 1952, and if the land was expropriated for “essential development needs” and still served those needs.

The state expropriated 247,000 dunams in the Negev, but 66,000 of them remain unutilized to this day. That underutilization has sparked a wave of Bedouin lawsuits, but the courts have rejected them time after time.

“Given the unique nature of the Acquisition Law and the unique historical circumstances leading to its enactment, there’s no room today for challenging the constitutionality of the expropriations carried out under it,” the Supreme Court wrote in three separate rulings. In one, then-Justice Asher Grunis wrote that even though the courts have authority to hear all these cases, “the decision, practically speaking, is largely moot.”

Nevertheless, “largely” isn’t the same as “always,” especially since the Bedouin are now raising a new argument – that the expropriation itself was illegal. Granted, Bedouin have testified previously that soldiers forcibly expelled them. For the first time, however, Algazi’s research seems to provide evidence of an orderly state expulsion plan.

‘Move away for a little while’

Ismail Mohammed Salem Abu Madiam was born in Al-Arakib in 1939, a scion of a family that had lived there for many years. They grew various crops, including wheat, barley and corn. They also raised camels, horses, donkeys and sheep. When he was a child, during the British Mandate, he would go to Be’er Sheva with his uncle to sell the sheep.

“I was 9 when the war broke out in 1948,” he said in an affidavit to the court. “We feared attacks by the army, so the neighbors’ families moved to our plot to be less vulnerable. They returned to their lands when the end ended.”

When he was 14, he said, the military governor came to the village to speak with his grandfather. “He ordered us to move away for a little while. We were told the army was planning maneuvers in the area and we could come back afterward.”

‘I scrolled down the screen in the archive and the file got stuck on page 999. It was probably just a simple technical error – somebody didn’t think there’d be files any longer than that’

They were moved to a site around 300 meters from their land. They eventually returned to Al-Arakib and he bought a house in Rahat, not far from his family’s lands.

“Throughout this period, I never knew the state claimed that the land wasn’t ours or that it had been expropriated,” he said. But when the repeated evictions began, he and other villagers realized that the state viewed the land as no longer theirs.

Over the past decade, Al-Arakib has become the standard bearer for the Bedouin’ fight for recognized ownership of Negev lands. The state has evicted the residents – who consider themselves the owners but are called squatters – dozens of times.

The narrow opening left by Grunis’ ruling encouraged the Abu Madiam and Abu Freih families now to sue for ownership of Al-Arakib’s 2,000 dunams. They are represented in the Be’er Sheva District Court by attorneys Michael Sfard and Carmel Pomerantz.

Another local tribe filed a similar petition and lost, but that petition lacked Algazi’s findings.

“Even if we don’t win, heaven forbid, I’ve achieved my goal,” said Dr. Awad Abu Freih, the head Sapir College’s biotechnology department and the lead plaintiff. “The history has been told, and also written. My story, that of my father and my grandfather, won. This isn’t just another case, just another name. This is Al-Arakib, which has insisted on continuing to live and refused to die, even if they buried us alive.”

Algazi’s research reveals for the first time the large-scale operation to evict the Bedouin and move them elsewhere in the Negev that Southern Command launched in November 1951, with approval from Chief of Staff Yigael Yadin. The eviction had security justifications, but it also had another goal – severing the Bedouin’s ties with their lands.

“The research proves that what David Ben-Gurion explicitly denied in the Knesset actually happened, and how,” Algazi told Haaretz, referring to Israel’s first prime minister. “There was an organized transfer of Bedouin citizens from the northwestern Negev eastward to barren areas, with the goal of taking over their lands. They carried out this operation using a mix of threats, violence, bribery and fraud.”

Letter from Moshe Dayan, the head of the Southern Command, to the deputy chief of staff, dated Sept. 25, 1951.

He said his opinion shows how the operation was carried out, down to the level of the notes exchanged by military government officers implementing it. The most senior of them knew it was an illegal operation, and that’s why it was important to them not to give the Bedouin written “transfer” orders, he added.

Another discovery was “the Bedouin resistance and protests, the stubbornness with which they tried to hold onto their land, even at the cost of hunger and thirst, not to mention the army’s threats and violence,” he said. Yet another finding was the way the official story was drafted. “It shows how they censored and edited the reports step by step, until the version in which the Bedouin moved ‘voluntarily’ was accepted,” Algazi said.

For years, Algazi has been an active participant in the Bedouin’s struggle in general and in that of Al-Arakib’s residents in particular. He began his current research in 2011 by delving into documents in the archives of the Defense Ministry and the Negev kibbutzim. “I had heard things and wanted to see if there was any truth to them,” he explained.

“I found a treasure trove in the kibbutzim’s archives. Sometimes I found myself with an archivist who had devoted years to collecting and organizing the material. Other times I was simply sent to dig through an old cupboard. But in any case, I never imaged this would gradually turn into research that would keep me busy for eight years.”

Algazi’s research led to the letter Dayan sent to the General Staff on September 25, 1951. “It’s now possible to transfer most of the Bedouin in the vicinity of [Kibbutz] Shoval to areas south of the Hebron-Be’er Sheva road,” he wrote. “Doing so will clear around 60,000 dunams in which we can farm and establish communities. After this transfer, there will be no Bedouin north of the Hebron-Be’er Sheva road.”

Dayan raised security considerations in favor of moving the Bedouin to the area of the Jordanian border, but security was not the only consideration. “Transferring the Bedouin to new territories will annul their rights as landowners and they will become tenants on government lands.” Dayan made a similar statement a year earlier, in June 1950, during a meeting of Mapai. “The party’s policy should be aimed at seeing this community of 170,000 Arabs as if their fate has yet to be sealed. I hope that in the coming years, we will be able to transfer these Arabs out of the Land of Israel.” A year after expressing this aspiration, the documents reveal, he partially executed his plan, moving them within but not outside the state’s borders.

Dayan’s letter was not easy to find, says Algazi. “In November 2017, a huge, disorganized file of correspondence of the military government, containing 1037 pages, was released for viewing,” he recalls. “The scanned file was once a big fat, disorderly folder lying on a dusty shelf somewhere full of correspondence, some interesting, some boring. I scrolled down the screen in the archive and the file got stuck on page 999. It was probably just a simple technical error – somebody didn’t think there’d be files any longer than that.”

Algazi was told the file would be fixed. Two years later, he was informed it was. “Dayan’s letter turned up in the final 40 pages along with another two parts of the correspondence that completed the missing puzzle pieces,” he recalls. “I was sitting in the archives, and I could hear Dayan speaking. In his unique style, he said openly things that others would wrap in cellophane paper: ‘Transferring the Bedouin to new territories would annul their rights as landowners and make them tenants on government lands.’ Clear and simple.”

But, adds Algazi, the cunning Dayan, in charge of Southern Command, thought he had managed to arrange the transfer with the Bedouin’s agreement and was making sure not to explain exactly how he achieved that agreement. “Dayan cooked it up, and it failed,” he says. “When it transpired that there was no agreement, the pressure and violence began. Indeed, right after Dayan’s letter, I found in the same file a report by the military government concerning the Bedouin’s refusal to move – and what needs to be done to meet the goal.” This time, the author is the acting military governor of the Negev, Major Moshe Bar-On. He wrote: “We received orders from the head of Southern Command to pressure the Bedouin tribes in the northern region, even going so far as to say that if they don’t move of their own free will, the army will be forced to move them.”

The means of ‘persuasion’

There were many means of persuasion, but some of the information remains censored. For example, Maj. Misha Hanegbi described in his report on November 21, 1951, a patrol in the region that was aimed at “hastening” the transfer of Bedouin when it ran into “stiff resistance from the locals to leaving their lands.” The report stated that only “after negotiations” was the transfer carried out. However, an entire paragraph is then blacked out – one that could shed light on the means used to “persuade.”

However, testimonies submitted by locals as court affidavits reveal some details. “I remember how the army ordered my family to leave Al-Arakib and head northward,” recalls 80-year-old Hussein Ibrahim Hussein. “Some people who resisted the deportation were arrested. We were told the lands were being confiscated for a few months for military purposes. The Military Police turned up, tied up our things, and told them to move.” They moved but tried to return. It didn’t end well. “I was arrested. My uncle was arrested, we were all arrested” he states. “We would go in to see, the army would detain us for a day or two and then release us.”

Not everyone in the military supported the operation. The Negev governor, Lt. Col. Michael Hanegbi, wrote to the chiefs of staff that “the presence of the Bedouin in the area serves as a buffer against attacks by infiltrators from the east against our settlements along that line. The fact is that our settlements in this area hardly suffer from attacks, which are very frequent in other areas.” He also warned that the alternative lands designated for the Bedouin were barren and that “the problem of water is the eastern region was getting worse.” On another occasion, Hanegbi reported that “despite restrictions prohibiting the use of violence, attempts were made, with the agreement of command, to try and force them to move.” He added: “A military government unit took down a number of tents and loaded them on to a vehicle. The tent owners did not leave and did not join their families who had been transferred.”

Additional testimonies to events were received from residents of nearby kibbutzim. The area “was surrounded by police and military government in military vehicles,” Yosef Tzur of Kibbutz Shuval wrote to kibbutz movement leaders. “People fled, tents were taken down and those who were caught were piled into vehicles and taken to Tel Arad.” A little of what happened when the uniformed officers turned up was revealed by Sheikh Suleiman Al-Okbi in an interview with Yedioth Aharonoth in 1975. “Military units began turning up on our lands from time to time and they would shoot in the air,” he told Yedioth. “People were scared and the women were frightened to work in the field and graze the animals.”

Lieutenant Colonel Hanegbi wrote in one of his letters that “the transfers were conducted primarily through persuasion and economic pressure.” He went on to reveal more. “We had no legal foundation and we were also under orders not to use force, so we had to behave cautiously in our actions and without becoming entangled in legal problems.”

Algazi found evidence of this economic pressure in a note written by the prime minister’s advisor on Arab affairs back then, Yehoshua Palmon (who, the researcher says, was “the most senior figure in setting policy toward Israel’s Arab citizens”). Palmon wrote that the military government prevented the Bedouin from sowing their lands to pressure them into agreeing to move. There was evidence of this practice on the ground. Kibbutz Shuval wrote to the Mapam Party on January 28, 1952, that “the military government forced the Bedouin to leave their lands. Their food supplies were stopped.” According to the kibbutz residents, food supplies were stopped over a period of months.

Other methods of harassing the Bedouin were employed according to an affidavit submitted to the courts by Hussein Ibrahim al-Touri, who was born in 1942. He described how the military “would come and harass us, take us to prison, and so on.” He stated: “The soldiers would take a rope, tie a tent to a command car and demolish it. We were told to move and that if we were to return they would burn our homes down and take us to Jordan.” Abed Hasin Abu-Sakut, a fellow villager, said that after leaving their lands, they returned occasionally, but then “the soldiers would shoot or arrest us and fine us.”

They didn’t just return to their lands of their own accords. Algazi says the state gave the Bedouin the impression they were only being temporarily evacuated. In a letter from the time, Captain Avraham Shemesh wrote that he had allowed evacuated Bedouin to return from time to time to work the soil “until the Beni Okba tribe was allowed to return to its lands.” According to the testimony of local Bedouin similar statements were repeatedly made to them. “The elders said the military governor gave my uncle a letter saying that the army needs the land for six months, after which we would return,” Ahmad Salam Mahmoud al-Okbi testified in court. “I remember how a year after the deportation in 1951, my uncle returned to the land with others. I was there and grazed sheep. One day, a military officer by the name of Sasson Bar Zvi who I knew turned up. He said that if we didn’t leave, he would take us to jail.”

The document reveals that the area kibbutzim raised objections on several occasions to the policy. In late 1951, Kibbutz Mishmar Hanegev, Kibbutz Shuval and Kibbutz Safiach (Beit Kama) wrote a letter to the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee protesting the transfer of Bedouin, arguing that they helped settlement.

“We felt a duty to emphasize that this was being done through conspiracy, bribery, and pressure,” they wrote, reporting that “some tents were moved by force.” The kibbutzim’s protest led Mapan to investigate the matter in November 1952. Lieutenant Colonel Hanegbi testified that he had only carried out the orders given him, but confirmed that the army’s intention was to “undermine the status of the tribes being transferred, so they would leave the country.” As part of the operation, he said, “scare tactics and bribery were used, but not always.” Hanegbi contended that military personnel had behaved “cruelly and crudely” toward the Bedouin. As a result, a recommendation was made to annul his party membership.

Algazi says that while there have been a number of studies in recent year about the period of military rule, “there was no study or affirmation until today that the 1951 deportation took place.”

A matter of timing

Throughout the hearings, the state and the prosecution did not deny the operation’s existence but argued that against Algazi’s opinion emphasized the civilian considerations of the transfer while playing down the security considerations. The state also raised a claim concerning the operation’s timetable. They argued that operation began before the law was passed, so Dayan could not have known what criteria would be set for seizing land. However, some could argue that Dayan possibly knew about long-term political plans because of his position and standing.

Another issue concerns how long Al-Arakib has existed. The state denied the claim that there was a permanent settlement on Al-Arakib’s lands. The petitioners assert there had been a Bedouin settlement at the site prior to the state’s establishment, based on an opinion provided by Forensic Architecture, a research group at the University of London. Forensic Architecture, headed by Prof. Eyal Weizman, combined digital tools with maps and reconnaissance of Al-Arakib to reach that conclusion. The opinion will take on greater significance if the claimants manage to progress to the second stage of the hearing on proof of ownership.

The state argues the court should reject the claim due to a delay of decades in filing it. But the Bedouin also have a response for that: They were never told the lands were appropriated and the state misled them into thinking the lands had been taken away only temporarily. A letter received in 2000 from the Israel Lands Administration stated that “no appropriation has taken place” on the lands.

One way or the other, all parties are waiting to hear from the court. Meanwhile, Algazi expects to make further findings. “The difficulty is in reconstructing an operation carried out by people who knew it was not really legal, and therefore made sure not to put down certain things in writing,” he tells Haaretz. “In addition, although we are talking about events that took place 70 years ago, only some of the documents have been revealed. We are waiting for the day when we will be able to study all of them.”

****

Netael Bandel is an attorney who writes for Ha’aretz

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https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/archive-reveals-israels-plans-expel-negev-palestinians
Historical archive reveals Israel’s plans to expel Negev Palestinians

MENA2 min read
The New Arab Staff
01 February, 2022
Newly researched documents dating back to 1951 support Palestinian Bedouins’ claims to lands in the Negev Desert, where protests have been going on for the past month over lands targeted for seizure.

Newly studied archives showing Israel’s intention to forcibly displace thousands of Palestinians from the Negev Desert (also known as the Naqab) could help Bedouins claim back their lands, Israeli media reported on Monday.

Professor Gadi Algazi, a historian from Tel Aviv University, uncovered archives documenting a 1951 Israeli military operation to forcibly expel Palestinian Bedouins from their lands in the Negev, a large desert historically inhabited and cultivated by Bedouin tribes.  

The archival materials were originally released in 2017.  

They include a letter written by Moshe Dayan, then head of the Israeli army’s Southern Command, and a document written by the military government in the area. According to Algazi’s research, the two documents prove the army’s intention to forcibly move the Bedouins from their lands in order to seize them.

“There was an organized transfer of Bedouin citizens from the northwestern Negev eastward to barren areas, with the goal of taking over their lands. They carried out this operation using a mix of threats, violence, bribery and fraud,” Algazi told the Israeli daily Haaretz.

Some believe the documents could shift the balance in favour of displaced Negev Palestinians in various lawsuits against the Israeli government, and create a legal precedent.

Bedouins from the Negev have testified for years that Israeli soldiers expelled them but this is the first time historical research provides evidence of an orderly state expulsion plan.

Israel’s official stand on the Negev is that Palestinian Bedouins left their land following Israel’s 1948 declaration of independence, and never returned.

Known as the Nakba – or Catastrophe – by Palestinians, this dramatic event witnessed the flight of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from massacres committed by Zionist militias, who seized their villages and towns.

In 1953, Israel passed laws expropriating all land whose owners had been absent and not returned by April 1952, effectively seizing the property of Palestinians who left during the Nakba.

The new archival revelations come as protests continue in the Negev against an afforestation plan led by the controversial Jewish National Fund (JNF), a quasi-state organ whose aim is to buy a maximum amount of land on behalf of Israeli Jews. The protests began in early January.

The Israeli Land Authority assigned some 1,300,000 square metres of land belonging to a Bedouin tribe to the JNF, with 370,000 square metres being allocated for forest planting.

Several protests have taken place across Palestine in solidarity with Negev residents. The latest one took place on Sunday in Jerusalem.

Israeli forces have arrested dozens of activists and demonstrators, including several children, since the start of their campaign to “Save the Negev”.

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 https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-negev-palestinians-empty-plans-revealed-new-documentsHistorical documents reveal Israel’s plan to empty Negev of Palestinians

Documents cited in a legal challenge against the Israeli government acknowledge that officials knew operation was ‘illegal’ post-1948

By MEE staff
Published date: 31 January 2022 17:02 UTC | Last update: 5 days 18 hours ago

Newly unearthed Israeli historical records reveal officials’ relentless efforts to forcibly empty Palestinian lands of their Bedouin inhabitants in the Negev during the 1950s.

Haaretz reported that the records were revealed as part of a legal case over land ownership pursued by Palestinian citizens of Israel in al-Araqeeb, one of the dozens of villages deemed illegal by Israel and barred from water, electricity and transportation services, among others.

Araqeeb was demolished 197 times by Israel, which seized its lands, and its Palestinian inhabitants have long challenged the Israeli government in courts over the issue.

Haaretz reported on Monday that the Israeli government is considering the case as of “national strategic” importance to set the bar of other lawsuits filed by Palestinian citizens of Israel contesting the confiscation of their lands.

However, Araqeeb’s case has been followed with an opinion and appendix by Gadi Algazi, an Israeli history professor at Tel Aviv University, who spent the past eight years studying the government memos, records and letters regarding the Negev, the largest region in the country.

Algazi had revealed documents as part of the legal case of numerous plans to push Palestinians, who remained in what became Israel after the 1948 war, out of their lands.

A military operation was set up by Moshe Dayan, the southern region commander, in November 1951 to kick out Palestinian Bedouins from areas in the northwest of the Negev to the east and from north of Hebron-Beer Sheva road to the south of it.

This would turn Palestinians who became citizens of Israel into tenants.

“The transfer of the Bedouins to new territories will nullify their right as landowners and they will be [treated] as tenants of government lands,” Dayan wrote in a letter, first reported by Haaretz.

Dayan’s plan was then approved by Israel’s army chief of staff Yigael Yadin, which also suggested that if the Palestinians were not “voluntarily transferred”, the Israeli fledgling forces would “be forced to transfer them” and forcibly remove them from their lands.

Officials at Israel’s Ministry of Justice believe that Araqeeb’s case would end like its predecessor, in other words, in favour of the government. Still, these historical documents unearthed by Algazi could have legal implications, Haaretz said.

The village of Araqeeb spread over 200 dunams (200,000 square metres), and what remained of it, which Israel continuously demolished, has been rebuilt repeatedly.

Palestinian lands in Araqeeb were seized, like many other villages, according to the 1953 Land Acquisition Law.

Israel said that lands in the Negev, which Palestinian owners did live on between 15 May 1948 and 1 April 1952, belonged to the Israeli government that had expropriated 247,000 dunams in the Negev.

The new historical records reveal that Palestinians in that period were forcibly deported by Israeli forces deploying threats, violence, bribery and fraud, Haaretz reported.

‘Discrimination and neglect’

Algazi told Haaretz that senior Israeli officials knew that the operation to deport Palestinians from the Negev was “illegal”, thus they avoided giving them “written eviction orders”.

He also said that the records attested to a resistance undertaken by Palestinian Bedouins against the Israeli plan to move them out of their lands.

“[It was] a revelation the stubbornness with which they tried to hold on to their land, even at the cost of hunger and thirst, not to mention threats and military violence,” Algazi told Haaretz.

In recent weeks, hundreds of Palestinian citizens of Israel in the Negev have protested against a forestation plan in their villages led by the Jewish National Fund (JNF), which they see as a way to deprive them of their lands.

On Sunday, almost 200 of them demonstrated outside Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s office in Jerusalem against the plan, calling it a “policy of discrimination and neglect”.

About 300,000 Palestinian citizens live in the Negev; 100,000 live in 35 unrecognised villages and lack essential public services

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https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=EnglishVerdicts12200042v29&fileName=12042200.V29&type=2

The Supreme Court sitting as a Civil Appeals Court

CA 4220/12

Before:                                      The Honorable Deputy President E. Rubinstein

                                                  The Honorable Justice S. Joubran

                                                  The Honorable Justice E. Hayut

The Appellants:                        1.       The Late Saliman Muhammed Al-Uqbi

                                                  2.       Saeed Ali Al-Uqbi

                                                  3.       Majed Ali Saliman Al-Uqbi

                                                  4.       Maher Ali Al-Uqbi

                                                  5.       Fatma Al-Navari Al-Uqbi

                                                  6.       Noel Al-Aasem Al-Uqbi

                                                  7.       Dalal Al-Uqbi

                                                  8.       Tamam Al-Uqbi

                                                  9.       Raja Al-Uqbi

                                                  10.     Khasan (Nouri) Saliman Al-Uqbi

                                                  11.     Anwar Saliman Al-Uqbi

                                                  12.     Ibrahim Saliman Al-Uqbi

                                                  13.     Saeed Saliman Al-Uqbi

                                                  14.     Khalil Saliman Al-Uqbi

                                                  15.     Rakhab Saliman Al-Uqbi

                                                  16.     Khalma Saliman Al-Uqbi

                                                      v e r s u s

The Respondent:                     The State of Israel

Appeal on the judgment of the Beer Sheva District Court in CC 7161/06, CC 7275/06, CC 7276/06, CC 1114/07, CC 1115/07 and CC 5278/08, that was delivered on March 15, 2012 by the Honorable Deputy President S. Dovrat

Date of Session:                                   4^th of Sivan, 5774 (June 2, 2014)

On behalf of the Appellants:  Adv. Michael Sefarad; Adv. Adar Grayevsky

On behalf of the Respondent: Adv. Moshe Golan; Adv. Havatzelet Yahel

J U D G M E N T

Justice E. Hayut:

An appeal on the judgment of the Beer Sheva District Court (the Honorable Deputy President S. Dovrat) dated March 15, 2012. The judgment was delivered in a consolidated manner for six land settlement cases (CC 7161/06, CC 7275/06, CC 7276/06, CC 1114/07, CC 1115/07 and CC 5278/08) and denied the Appellants’ claims of ownership of various land lots in the northern Negev, and accepted the State’s claim that the ownership of such lots should be registered in its name and in the name of the Development Authority.

The Background and the District Court’s Judgment

1.      In 1971 a land settlement proceeding, pursuant to the Land Rights Settlement [New Version] Ordinance, 5729-1969 (hereinafter: the “Settlement Ordinance“), began with respect to lands in the Northern Negev. In the framework of this proceeding, Appellant 1 claimed ownership of three land lots south of Rahat (known as Araqib 2, Araqib 6 and Araqib 60) and of three land lots north of Netivot (known as Sharia 132, Sharia 133 and Sharia 134) (hereinafter: the “Araqib Lots” and the “Sharia Lots“, respectively, and jointly, the “Lots“). The State, for its part, also claimed ownership of said Lots, and in its claim primarily relied on the fact that the Lots are located within the boundaries of the blocks in that area which had been expropriated in their entirety in 1954 by virtue of the Acquisition of Land (Confirmation of Deeds and Compensations) Law, 5713-1953 (hereinafter: the “Acquisition Law“). The settlement proceeding, which relates, inter alia, to the discussed Lots, was not completed for many years, and in 2006, Appellant 1’s heirs (Appellants 2-16) filed six claims to the court of first instance, in which they petitioned that they be declared owners of the Lots and that the Lots be registered in their name.

2.      The six claims were consolidated and, as stated in its judgment dated March 15, 2102, the court of first instance rejected these claims with instructions that the blocks in which these Lots, among others, are located, be registered in the name of the State and the Development Authority (Blocks numbered 400367, 400369, 400371, 400526 and 400527). The court first examined the validity of the expropriation executed by the State in 1954 pursuant to the Acquisition Law. Upon rejecting a series of arguments raised by the Appellants against the validity of such expropriation, the court concluded that the expropriation was lawfully performed, and that the Appellants’ claim survey, in which they claimed ownership of the Lots, should be rejected. However, the court of first instance ruled, in reliance upon the case-law that was adjudicated in CA 4067/07 Jabareen v. The State of Israel (January 3, 2010) (hereinafter: the “Jabareen Case”), that the fact of a valid expropriation does not nullify the need to address the matter of the rights, if any, held by Appellants prior to the expropriation, in order to rule regarding any compensation deriving therefrom. In addressing this matter, the court of first instance analyzed the provisions of the Land Law, 5729-1969 (hereinafter: the “Land Law“), including Sections 152-156 of the Law, and ruled that the main acts of legislation upon which the matter of the rights held by the Appellants prior to the 1954 expropriation should be examined, are: The Ottoman Land Code of 1274 to the Hijra (1858) (hereinafter: the “Ottoman Land Code” or the “Land Code “) and the (Mewat) Land Ordinance, 1921 (hereinafter: the “Mewat Ordinance“), which were in force and effect on the effective date (1954). This is in light of the provision of Section 156 of the Land Law, which prescribes that the provisions of Sections 152-155, which abolish the classification of the lands that were in effect pursuant to Ottoman legislation, do not derogate from land rights that existed prior to the legislation of the Land Law.

3.      The court examined the Appellants’ rights in and to the Lots on the effective date (1954) in accordance with the provisions of the Land Code and the Mewat Ordinance. It concluded that on the effective date, these lands were State-owned Mewat lands. In reaching this conclusion, the District Court relied primarily on the State’s expert opinion by Prof. Ruth Kark, which it preferred over that of the Appellants’ expert opinion, Prof. Oren Yiftachel. The court rejected the Appellants’ argument that the Lots in dispute are “Miri” lands which had been possessed and cultivated ab antiquo by the Al-Uqbi tribe, to which they belong (hereinafter: the “Al-Uqbi Tribe” or the “Tribe“). Additionally, it rejected the Appellants’ argument that even if the land at issue is Mewat land, they acquired such rights by virtue of cultivation and revival. The court further rejected the Appellants’ argument that at some stage, and in accordance with internal arrangements that were made among the members of the Tribe, the ownership rights regarding such Lots were acquired by the Appellants’ family. In this context, the court did not accept the Appellants’ argument that during the Ottoman period and the subsequent period of the British Mandate the Bedouin tribes, including the Al-Uqbi Tribe, benefitted from autonomy such that the governing authorities recognized internal arrangements made by the members of the Tribe with respect to the lands in the Negev as valid arrangements reflecting property rights, even if such rights were not registered in the Land Registry (the “Tabu“).

The court of first instance elaborated that in order for land to be considered Miri land pursuant to the Ottoman Land Code, it must be demonstrated that at some point it was assigned to some person by the authorities. The court of first instance ruled that the Appellants had not proven that the Lots were assigned at any time whatsoever by the authorities to their family or to any other person, and therefore they had not proven that the land at issue is Miri land. On the other hand, the court ruled that the Lots should be classified as State-owned Mewat land from the date of the expropriation, since, as emerges from Prof. Kark’s opinion, in the year in which the Ottoman Land Code was legislated (1858), the Lots stood barren and uncultivated and were more than a mile and half (2.2185 km) away from a permanent town. Thus, the conditions prescribed in the Land Code for classifying land as Mewat land were met. In the factual dispute between the parties regarding the Lots’ distance from a place of settlement at the time of the legislation of the Land Code, the court of first instance ruled that the Appellants did not meet the burden to prove the existence of a permanent town within a mile and half of the Lots, and also did not prove that the Tribe ever settled on the Lots in dispute. In this matter, the court of first instance adopted the opinion of the State’s expert, Prof. Ruth Kark, who testified that until the end of the First World War (1918) there were no permanent towns in the area of the Lots and these Lots were barren and uncultivated, preferring this opinion over that of the Appellants’ expert, Prof. Oren Yiftachel, who claimed that the Tribe established towns on the Lots and had cultivated them ab antiquo. The court of first instance elaborated on the fact that Prof. Kark’s opinion was detailed and thorough and relied on reliable historical sources from which it emerges that the Lots were barren wild areas at the relevant time. On the other hand, the court ruled, Prof. Yiftachel’s conduct left an uncomfortable feeling and compromised his credibility. The court of first instance elaborated on the fact that during his cross examination, it was discovered that Prof. Yiftachel relied on sources without having read them, cited some of the sources upon which he relied in a tendentious manner and ignored sources which did not support the conclusion he wished to present. As for the possibility of acquiring rights in and to Mewat lots by way of cultivation and revival, the court ruled that this possibility was eliminated upon the legislation of the Mewat Ordinance in 1921, and therefore, the Appellants must prove that they cultivated and revived the Lots prior to 1921. Based on Prof. Kark’s opinion and testimony, the court of lower instance reached the conclusion that the Lots were also barren and uncultivated when the Mewat Ordinance was legislated in 1921. Therefore, it ruled that the Lots have always been Mewat land, in and to which the State is granted ownership, and that at no stage were the conditions that are required for changing its classification from Mewat to Miri, and for acquiring private ownership therein and thereto by the Appellants’ family, fulfilled.

4.      The court of first instance further ruled that the additional opinions that were filed by the Appellants regarding the Lots’ condition during the years preceding the establishment of the State also do not come to the aid. With regard to the opinion of Mr. Shlomo Ben Yosef (hereinafter: “Ben Yosef“), the aerial photograph interpreter on behalf of the Appellants, the court ruled that it cannot substantiate the Appellants’ argument as to the cultivation and possession of the Lots during the relevant years, given the fact that it is based on one sole aerial photograph from 1945. The court of first instance emphasized that according to Ben Yosef’s testimony, it emerges from the aerial photograph that in 1945 the Lots were cultivated in a very sparse manner, and that Ben Yosef’s claim, that in that year there was a Bedouin rural town on the Lots’ area, is unfounded and refers to the presence of a thin population spread over an area of 30,000 dunams. With regard to the opinion of Mr. Abu Friecha, the surveyor on behalf of the Appellants (hereinafter: “Abu Friecha“), the court of lower instance elaborated on the fact that, except for one, all of the sites that were marked by him on the map, and with respect to which it was argued that they attest to the existence of an ancient Bedouin town in the area of the Lots, are outside of the area of the Lots. Additionally, the court of first instance stated that Abu Friecha admitted in his testimony that he did not measure the area of the Lots at all, and only marked sites on the map to which Appellants referred him. Additionally, Abu Friecha confirmed in his testimony that some of the sites that were marked on the map that he presented are not in fact located where they were marked. Therefore, the court of first instance ruled that this opinion also does not substantiate the Appellants’ argument regarding the existence of a permanent town within a mile and a half of the Lots at the relevant period of time, or that they were cultivated prior to the legislation of the Mewat Ordinance in 1921.

5.   In addition, the court of first instance rejected the Appellants’ argument that nomadic or semi-nomadic settlements (meaning, settlements that move within a single tract of land in accordance with the seasons of the year), can also, pursuant to the Ottoman Land Code, be considered a “town” such that the lands adjacent thereto would not be considered Mewat lands. The court of first instance elaborated on the fact that according to the interpretation of the Land Code that was given in case-law, a town for which the surrounding lands shall not be considered Mewat lands is a permanent town that is grounded in one place throughout the entire year. Therefore, the court of first instance ruled that even if the Al-Uqbi Tribe roamed in the area of the Lots between 1858 and 1921, this does not grant them ownership of the Lots. As was already stated, the court rejected the Appellants’ argument that even if the Lots at any stage were classified as Mewat, they acquired ownership of the Lots due to cultivating and reviving them. In this context, the court further ruled that even had the Appellants’ argument regarding cultivating and reviving the Lots not been rejected on a factual level, the cultivation and revival thereof alone would not have been sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the Appellants became owners of the Lots. This is because neither the Lots nor any part thereof were ever registered in the Land Registry (the “Tabu“) in their name, in the name of Appellant 1 who is the testator thereof or in the name of the person from whom Appellant 1 allegedly inherited the rights therein and thereto. In this context, the court mentioned the provisions of Section 2 of the Mewat Ordinance pursuant to which a person who cultivated Mewat land before the ordinance was published is required to register as the owners of the rights within two months from the date of its publication, otherwise he will lose his rights in and to the land. The court of first instance further rejected the Appellants’ argument that the Tribe is not required to register the Lots in its name in the Land Registry (the “Tabu“) in order to acquire rights therein since the Ottoman administration and the British Mandate government granted the Bedouin autonomy in the Negev areas and granted legal validity to rights that were acquired in and to the land pursuant to traditional Bedouin law. The court of first instance also adopted Prof. Kark’s opinion in this matter, pursuant to which both during the Ottoman period and the British Mandate period there was no sweeping recognition of the Bedouin’s ownership of lands in the Negev, and preferred it over the opinion of Prof. Yiftachel who posited that the Ottoman administration and the British Mandate government granted legal validity to rights that were acquired pursuant to traditional Bedouin law, even without being registered in the Land Registry (the “Tabu“). In this context, the court of first instance rejected the Appellants’ argument that their position is supported by the declaration voiced by Winston Churchill, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a meeting he held with the High Commissioner in 1921, that the British will not harm the special rights and customs of the Bedouin (Official Report, 29 March 1921, Great Britain Public Record Office, C.O. 733/2/77; hereinafter: the “Churchill Declaration“). In this matter, the court of first instance ruled that one cannot attribute a legal status to the said declaration without it having been anchored in explicit acts of legislation, and that had the British been interested in granting binding legal status to the Bedouin land ownership system, it can be assumed that they would have expressed this in official legislation. Additionally, the court of first instance ruled that it is not at all clear what Churchill meant in the said declaration, and therefore one cannot rely on this declaration in order to create legal rights ex nihilo.

6.      The court of first instance further stated that the Appellants’ argument that they are exempt from registering their rights in and to the Lots in the Land Registry (the “Tabu“), is not consistent with various contracts that were presented by them as testimony. For example, in contracts C/1 and C/13, which relate to the Araqib 2 and Sharia 132 Lots, the seller undertakes to register the lot in the name of the purchaser. The court of first instance elaborated on the fact that had the members of the Tribe believed that purchasing rights in accordance with traditional Bedouin law was sufficient in order to grant legal validity to their ownership of the land, it can be assumed that they would not have bothered to stipulate the registration of the lot in the Land Registry (the “Tabu“), in the sale agreement. As to the contracts themselves, the court of first instance stated that they do not state the origin of the Lots’ sellers’ rights in and to the land, and that in the absence of registration of the sellers’ rights in the Land Registry (the “Tabu“), these contracts cannot constitute evidence that rights therein and thereto were lawfully acquired. Additionally, the court of lower instance ruled that contracts between private parties do not bind the authorities or grant them rights in and to the land, when rights were not lawfully acquired therein and thereto to begin with.

7.      After ruling that the Appellants’ family did not acquire rights in and to the Lots by virtue of cultivation and revival, the court of first instance examined whether they have a claim by virtue of a period of prescription. In this context, the court of first instance elaborated on the fact that the Ottoman land laws do not allow acquiring rights in and to Mewat lands by virtue of prescription, and therefore, once it was determined that the Lots are Mewat classified lands, the Appellants do not have a prescription claim. Above and beyond that which was necessary, the court of first instance also rejected the Appellants’ claim of acquired rights in and to the Lots by virtue of a period of prescription on its merits. The court ruled that, pursuant to the Ottoman Land Code and Section 22 of the Prescription Law, 5718-1958 (hereinafter: the “Prescription Law“), insofar as at issue is possession that began before 1943, continuous possession of the land for the duration of 15 years is required in order to acquire rights in and to land by virtue of a period of prescription. In the case at hand, the court of first instance ruled, the majority of the documents that the Appellants presented with respect to the Lots relate to the years between 1943 and 1951 (when the Appellants claim they were expelled from the land) and the earliest document they presented with respect to the Lots was a tithe payment certificate from 1937. The court of first instance therefore ruled that the Appellants did not meet the burden of proving that they held the Lots continuously for the period of time required by the above-mentioned laws.

8.      An additional claim that was raised by the Appellants related to the rights in and to the Lots by virtue of indigenousness and transitional justice. In this matter, the court of first instance ruled that this is a weighty matter that the legislature should address, but further ruled that the existing law does not recognize rights by virtue of indigenousness and therefore it is inappropriate to address this claim. Furthermore, the court of first instance stated that it doubts whether the Al-Uqbi Tribe can be considered an indigenous group under international law since they themselves claim that they arrived in the Negev after it was already controlled by the Ottoman Empire, and therefore they are not an indigenous minority which was conquered by a foreign administration that arrived to its land.

For all of these reasons, the court of first instance rejected the Appellants’ claim of rights in and to the Lots and ordered that they be registered in the name of the State and the Development Authority. Additionally, and in light of the conclusions it so reached, the court of lower instance did not find it appropriate to rule that the Appellants are entitled to compensation due to the expropriation of the Lots, pursuant to the Acquisition Law.

The Appellants’ Arguments

9.      The Appellants do not accept the District Court’s judgment and in the appeal before us they claim that their family has been living in the Negev for centuries, and that despite this the court of first instance ruled that during that entire time it did not acquire any rights whatsoever in and to its lands. According to the Appellants, this is an unjust and unreasonable outcome that derives from the adoption of an historical and legal doctrine, rooted in case-law, by virtue of which the Bedouin tribes are dispossessed of their historical lands. The Appellants dispute the court of first instance’s factual findings, including, inter alia, the rulings that the Lots were barren and uncultivated between 1858 and 1921 and were further than a mile and half from a town. Additionally, the Appellants dispute the legal conclusion that the court of lower instance reached, that the Lots are State-owned Mewat land. Finally, the Appellants claim that the court of first instance’s findings and conclusions with respect to the validity of the State’s expropriation in 1954 pursuant to the Acquisition Law are also erroneous and warrant intervention.

10.  On a factual-historical level, the Appellants claim that the court chose to ignore substantiated evidence that was presented before it and that relies on various research and historical sources which prove that the Al-Uqbi Tribe had been settled on the Lots and had cultivated them since as early as 1807. In this context, the Appellants refer, inter alia, to the opinion of Prof. Yiftachel, and the annexes thereto, to the opinion of the surveyor Abu Friecha, to the opinion of the aerial photographs interpreter Ben Yosef, and to the testimonies of the Tribe’s elders (hereinafter: the “Tribe’s Elders“), who allegedly delivered a first-hand version as to the condition of the Lots at the relevant time. Additionally, the Appellants refer to various official publications of the Mandate government and of the State of Israel in the years following the establishment of the State, which, according to them, prove that the Tribe was settled on the Lots and cultivated them. The Appellants claim that given the many pieces of evidence as to the possession and cultivation of the Lots by the Tribe throughout generations, the court of first instance erred when preferring Prof. Kark’s opinion to that of Prof. Yiftachel. It is argued that contrary to Prof. Yiftachel, who visited the area of the Lots and who, in addition to the historical-theoretical research, also elaborated on the physical evidence of the existence of an ancient Bedouin town in the said Lots, Prof. Kark’s opinion relied exclusively on the journey literature of various 19^th century European travelers, missionaries and researchers who passed through the Negev areas on their journeys. According to the Appellants, the travel literature upon which Prof. Kark relied should not be considered credible, since their authors did not come to the Negev in order to research the Bedouin population and their entire reference to such population was incidental and is suffused with western prejudice. In addition, the Appellants argue that even if it would have been appropriate to trust the testimonies of the 19^th century researchers who visited the area of the Lots, Prof. Kark’s opinion ignored testimonies and letters of many Negev researchers who were mentioned in Prof. Yiftachel’s opinion and who reported on extensive Bedouin agriculture and settlement in the Negev.

11.  Alongside the appeal they filed, the Appellants are also petitioning to submit an additional piece of evidence at the appeal stage, which relates to the Tribe’s possession and cultivation of the Lots. At issue is a document which is alleged to be a report that was prepared by the Hachsharat Hayishuv company in 1920, which includes a survey regarding the condition of the Negev lands. In this survey, it is argued, areas that were possessed and cultivated by the Appellants’ testators were appraised, and it proves their rights in and to the Lots. This evidence, it is argued, was discovered at the last stages of conducting the proceeding at the court of first instance, as a result of research that was conducted by Prof. Yiftachel together with additional researchers in order to write a joint article. According to the Appellants, its submission at the appeal stage should be allowed in light of its importance and in light of the fact that at hand is a case addressing a matter of principle. I shall begin by stating that I do not find it appropriate to allow the evidence to be submitted at the appeal stage, based on the criteria outlined in this matter in case-law. It has been ruled that leave to submit new evidence in appeal shall be granted sparingly and only in cases in which the evidence that is being requested to be added is simple and conclusive and bears significant importance relating to the core of the dispute between the parties (CA 105/05 Dahan v. Michele Kason, paragraph 4 of Justice E. Arbel‘s judgment (November 10, 2005); CA 1773/06 Aleph v. Kibbutz Ayelet Hashachar, paragraph 17 of Justice A. Procaccia‘s judgment (December 19, 2010); CA 679/11 Dardikman v. Nadav, paragraph 29 of Justice U. Shoham‘s judgment (March 27, 2014)). This is not the case in the case at hand. Precedent also establishes that the party requesting to add the evidence must demonstrate that it did not know of its existence when the hearing in the procedural instance was conducted and also could not have discovered it had it acted with proper diligence to do so (see CA 374/08 Katan v. Horenstein, paragraphs 9-10 of Justice Z. Zylbertal‘s judgment (December 25, 2012)). In the case at hand, it emerges from the application itself that the evidence was in the Appellants’ possession at the time the case was being heard in the court of first instance. Despite this the Appellants did not bother to submit it nor do they not provide any explanation whatsoever for such conduct.

12.  At the legal level, the Appellants argue that according to the laws that applied to the Negev area until the establishment of the State, the fact that the Al-Uqbi Tribe had lived and resided on the Lots for generations granted them ownership thereof. The Appellants repeatedly argue that both the Ottoman administration and the British Mandate government granted the Bedouin legal autonomy to manage their property and their lands in accordance with traditional Bedouin law. Therefore, according to the Appellants, the Ottoman Land Code and the Mewat Ordinance did not apply at all to the Negev areas until the establishment of the State and the law that was in effect in the Negev at the relevant time was traditional Bedouin law. According to the Appellants, the court of first instance ignored the many pieces of evidence that were presented attesting to the existence of such autonomy from which the Bedouin tribes benefitted at such time in the Negev expanses and the evidence that was presented regarding the acquisition of rights in and to the Lots by the Appellants’ family in accordance with traditional Bedouin law. In this context, the Appellants emphasize the fact that both during the Ottoman period and the British Mandate period many Bedouin registered land in the Negev in their name and sold them to the Zionist institutions. This fact, it is argued, proves that prior to the establishment of the State the authorities recognized the Bedouin’s rights in and to the Negev lands and allowed them to register these lands in their names, if only they wanted to do so – both before the legislation of the Mewat Ordinance and thereafter.

13.  Alternatively, the Appellants claim that even if their rights in and to the Lots should be examined in accordance with the Ottoman Land Code and the Mandate Mewat Ordinance, the court of first instance erred when ruling that the Lots were State-owned Mewat classified lands rather than Miri lands owned by the Appellants. In this context, the Appellants claim that the court of first instance erred by not transferring the burden of persuasion to the State, given that the State has acted with a material lack of good faith and, for over 30 years, intentionally avoided bringing the conflicting claims that were filed with respect to the Lots in the framework of the settlement proceedings before the court. This conduct, it is argued, caused the Appellants severe evidential damage and severely sabotaged their chances of proving their ownership of the Lots. According to the Appellants, the court of first instance erred by not expressing this in the form of shifting the burden of persuasion, such that instead of the Appellants being required to prove family ownership of the Lots, the burden would transfer to the State to prove that at hand are Mewat lands that were owned thereby.

14.  On the merits of the matter, the Appellants argue that the correct interpretation of the Ottoman Land Code should lead to the conclusion that in the case of the Lots, the conditions required for classifying lands as Mewat lands were not met. First, it was argued that it was proven that the Appellants’ family had been possessing and cultivating the Lots for many years, and therefore they are not abandoned and barren lands which pursuant to the Land Code could be considered Mewat lands; Second, it was argued that the Lots were not more than a mile and half from the location of a town as the Land Code requires. In this context, the Appellants argue that according to its correct interpretation, the Ottoman Land Code also recognized nomadic (or semi-nomadic) settlement of Bedouin in the Negev as a “town” such that the lands adjacent thereto are not Mewat lands. It was argued that this interpretation coincides with that which is stated in other Mandate government acts of legislation in land matters. The Appellants further argue that the said interpretation of the term “town” in the Ottoman Land Code coincides with the purpose of such law to encourage agricultural cultivation of barren lands by way of granting ownership of the cultivated lands that are adjacent to population concentrations. The Appellants further argue in this context that the court of first instance erred when it ruled that even according to the Appellants the Lots were not settled year-round and the towns in which it was alleged that they resided were no more than temporary camping locations that were built on occasion. According to the Appellants, this ruling is an erroneous interpretation that was given by the court of first instance of their claim that the Al-Uqbi Tribe were not nomads, but rather semi-nomads. The meaning of this claim, so it is alleged, is that the members of the Tribe settled in permanent camping sites from which they would roam during the winter season and to which they would return once the rains stopped. It was argued that the Al-Uqbi Tribe had two such permanent camping sites, one in the Araqib Lots and the other in the Sharia Lots. However, the Appellants emphasize, they never argued that the towns that the Tribe built in the Lots existed only during part of the seasons or that they ceased to exist when they went out to graze.

15.  Additionally, the Appellants argue that the interpretation offered by them of the term “town” in the Ottoman Land Code is warranted in the instant circumstance in order to prevent the absurd and discriminatory result that the court of first instance reached, by which areas of livelihood that functioned for centuries as towns for all intents and purposes are not recognized as towns for the purpose of determining the ownership of the land. According to the Appellants, the narrow definition which this court adopted in the past for the term “town” in the Ottoman Land Code, pursuant to which only a permanent town that is built with stone houses is a town which is surrounded by Miri lands, does severe injustice to Bedouin and discriminates them due to their nomadic lifestyle and culture. Therefore, it was argued that the court of first instance erred when it did not consider the interpretation offered by the Appellants of the term “town” in the Ottoman Land Code, and instead adopted the existing case-law in this matter, without reexamination, as requested by the Appellants.

16.  An additional argument raised by the Appellants is that the court of first instance erred when it ruled that the Lots should be classified as privately-owned lands or as Mewat, in accordance with their condition in the year in which the Ottoman Land Code was legislated (1858). According to the Appellants, the court of first instance perceived itself as bound by case-law established by this court. However, the Appellants argue, this is a legal mistake, since terms that are prescribed in an act of legislation should be interpreted at the time they are being implemented in a given case. Therefore, according to the Appellants, one must deviate from existing case-law rules with respect to classifying lands in the Land of Israel pursuant to the law that preceded the Land Law, and rule that the classification of the Lots, as privately-owned lands or as Mewat, should be examined in accordance with their condition at the time the settlement proceedings therein began.

17.  Alternatively, the Appellants argue that even if the Lots should be classified as Mewat lands, it should be ruled that their family acquired ownership therein by virtue of cultivation and revival, as it was proven that the family cultivated these lands for many years. In this context, the Appellants argue that the fact that their family did not act to register the Lots in its name within the period of time prescribed by the Mewat Ordinance does not deny the possibility that it acquired rights therein and thereto by virtue of revival. This approach, it is argued, coincides with the Mandate Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Mewat Ordinance and with the fact that those who did not register their rights in and to cultivated Mewat land within two months following the publication of the ordinance nevertheless succeeded in registering their lands in their name in the framework of the settlement proceedings that followed its legislation. Additionally, the proposed interpretation is consistent with the fact that, even many years after the publication of the ordinance, many Bedouin did not have difficulty registering lands throughout the Negev in their names and selling them to the Zionist movement. Additionally, according to the Appellants, said interpretation coincides with the fact that Section 2 of the Mewat Ordinance was omitted from the “Drayton” Official Compilation of Mandate Acts of Legislation that was published in 1933. Therefore, it was argued that not registering the Appellants’ family’s rights in and to the Lots does not lead to the loss of such rights.

18.  An additional argument by the Appellants is that the Lots should be registered in their name even if they did not acquire rights in and to them pursuant to the Ottoman Land Code and the Mandate Mewat Ordinance that preceded that Land Law. In this context, they point to three normative sources, as follows: the laws of equity, the basic laws and international law. With regard to the laws of equity, the Appellants argue that the Mandate law and case-law recognized that use and possession of land for many years create equity rights therein. Therefore, even if their family did not acquire rights in and to the Lots pursuant to the Ottoman Land Code and the Mandate Mewat Ordinance, it acquired ownership rights therein and thereto by equity, due to the fact that it possessed and cultivated the Lots for generations. With regard to the basic laws, the Appellants argue that the Ottoman Land Code and the Mandate Mewat Ordinance should be interpreted in accordance with the constitutional principles of equality and human dignity. These principles, it is argued, warrant interpreting the land legislation that preceded the Land Law in a modern manner which would prevent discrimination against the Bedouin population and its continued dispossession from its historical areas of livelihood in the Negev. With regard to international law, it was argued that since the Bedouin are an indigenous group on the Negev lands, such laws should be interpreted in a manner that grants them rights in and to their historical lands. The Appellants further argue that the Bedouin have unique protections and rights by virtue of international law which should be considered when ruling on the matter of their ownership of the Lots. Therefore, even if according to the Mandate and Ottoman land legislation that was in effect during the relevant years, they did not acquire rights in and to the Lots, at present there is an obligation to recognize these rights by virtue of international law. According to the Appellants, the court of first instance erred when it ruled that the law in Israel does not recognize rights by virtue of indigenousness. It was further argued that the rights of the Bedouin in and to the Negev lands are grounded in this context in customary international law. Such grounding, it was argued, requires the Israeli courts to consider the rights that the Bedouin acquired in and to their historical lands even if this law was not adopted in an Israeli act of legislation.

19.  Finally, the Appellants raise arguments that relate to the legality of the expropriation orders that were issued to the Lots by virtue of the Acquisition Law. According to them, these orders were issued to Lots based on the erroneous assumption that at hand are barren Mewat lands that are not owned by anyone. However, once it was been proven that the Lots were owned by the Appellants’ family, this case falls within those special and extraordinary cases in which one can appeal that which is stated in the expropriation certificate. It was further argued that the expropriation orders for the Lots should be cancelled on the grounds that since the expropriation, the Lots have stood barren for 58 years and only in the last two years was an attempt made to plant a few groves therein. Therefore, the Appellants argue that the court of first instance erred when it ruled that the purpose for which the Lots were expropriated was realized. This ruling is based on the fact that the expropriation of the Lots was made as part of the expropriation of a larger tract of land, and assumes that if the purposes of the expropriation in part of such tract of land were realized, then it can be said that the purpose of the expropriation was realized with respect to its entirety. However, the fact that other land lots that were expropriated along with the Lots in dispute were used does not mean that the purpose of the expropriation was also realized with respect to those lots which remained barren. The question whether the purpose of the expropriation was realized should be examined with respect to each lot on its own.

The State’s Arguments

20.  The State relies on the judgment of the court of first instance and claims that the appeal should be denied. On a factual level, the State argues that the court of first instance was presented with abundant evidence to the fact that, from the beginning of the 19^th century until after the establishment of the State, the Lots stood barren and uncultivated. With regard to the parties’ expert opinions, the State argues that it was proven to the court of first instance that Prof. Yiftachel’s opinion is tendentious and unfounded and it follows that the court of first instance justifiably preferred Prof. Kark’s opinion and testimony. With regard to the opinion that was submitted by the surveyor Abu Friecha and by the interpreter Ben Yosef, the State claims that it was proven that they were materially flawed and cannot be relied upon as opinions that substantiate the Appellants’ arguments. Therefore, the State claims that the Appellants did not succeed in proving that the Al-Uqbi Tribe settled on the Lots and cultivated them for many years prior to the establishment of the State and that at most it was proven by them that during certain periods of time the Lots served the Tribe for grazing and camping.

21.  The State further argues that the Appellants acted unlawfully, and, in the framework of the appeal, submitted a revised version of Prof. Yiftachel’s opinion without receiving leave, despite the fact that the court of first instance did not permit its submission and instructed that it be ignored. Additionally, in the framework of the appeal, again without receiving leave, the Appellants submitted an article written by Prof. Yiftachel relating the issues emerging in this proceeding and allegedly constituting an adaptation of the opinion that he submitted in the proceedings (the article of Prof. Yiftachel, Sandy Kedar and Ahmad Amara “Re-Examining the ‘Dead Negev Doctrine’: Property Rights in Arab Bedouin Regions” Mishpat U’mimshal 14 7 (2012)). This article was also not presented to the court of first instance. Therefore, the State requests that this Court ignore both the revised version of Prof. Yiftachel’s opinion which the Appellants submitted at the appeal stage, as well the article that he wrote based on this proceeding. The State further argues that some of the professional literature that the Appellants submitted in the framework of the appeal was not submitted thereby in the court of first instance, and it claims that for this reason it should also be ignored. I shall begin by stating in this matter that a review of the article to which the argument refers indicates that it is indeed based on the opinion that Prof. Yiftachel submitted in this proceeding, while adapting the opinion to the format of an academic article, and that the Appellants are using it as an additional opinion on their behalf, and without the article having been submitted with the court of first instance. Additionally, the Appellants cite various sources to which the article refers without them having been submitted with the court of first instance or in the appeal. There is merit to the State’s argument in all that relates to reliance upon the article or upon the new references to which it refers. Additionally, and in accordance with the decision of the court of first instance dated March 7, 2010, that which is stated in Prof. Yiftachel’s third opinion should be ignored insofar as it exceeds referring and responding to Prof. Kark’s opinion.

22.  At the legal level, the State argues that there is no substance to the Appellants’ argument that the Ottoman Land Code and the Mandate Mewat Ordinance should not be applied in this matter due to the autonomy which was granted to the Bedouin in the Negev during the periods of time when the Ottomans and British ruled the area. According to the State, the Bedouin in the Negev never received autonomy as alleged and even if there were periods of time in which the Mandate and Ottoman administrations had difficulty effectively controlling the Negev areas, they always perceived it as part of the sovereign land of the Land of Israel, that is subject to their control, and acted with respect thereto accordingly. It was further argued with respect to the Mandate period that not only is there no reflection of the fact that the Mandate government granted the Bedouin autonomy in the Negev areas and adopted their customs as a legal source of acquisition of rights in and to land, but actually the acts of legislation that were legislated and the Mandate case-law indicate the contrary. As to the Appellants’ argument that the Bedouin managed to register many lands in the Negev areas in their name even after the legislation of the Mewat Ordinance, the State claims that there may be various explanations, but whatever the reason may be, a sweeping conclusion that the ordinance does not apply in the Negev area or that the Bedouin were granted legal autonomy by the Mandate authorities cannot be drawn from such registration of lands in the name of the Bedouin after the legislation of the Mewat Ordinance.

23.  Given the conclusion that the state of the rights in and to the Lots must be examined pursuant to the Ottoman Land Code and the Mandate Mewat Ordinance, the State argues that the ruling of the court of first instance, that the Appellants’ family did not acquire any right whatsoever in and to the Lots, should be adopted. In this context, the State argues, inter alia, that Appellants’ interpretation of the term “town” in the Ottoman Land Code such that it includes Bedouin camps that are populated seasonally, is contrary to the language and the purpose of such law. According to the State, the Bedouin lifestyle was not foreign to the Ottoman Empire, which controlled vast areas in the Arabian Peninsula and Northern Africa. Therefore, had the Ottoman legislator perceived the Bedouin lifestyle as a source for acquiring property rights, it would have explicitly prescribed this in the law. Not doing so is not an inadvertent omission, and the conclusion that should be drawn is that the Ottoman legislator did not intend to grant rights in and to the land by virtue of the Bedouin lifestyle. The State further states that the Ottoman legislator distinguished between Mewat classified land and other classes of land when determining the criterion of distance from the end of a town (a mile and half). This fact also indicates that the Ottoman legislator did not wish to exclude the nomadic tribes’ areas of livelihood from the Mewat definition.

24.  The State further argues that given the conclusion that the Lots were Mewat lands, and given the Appellants did not prove the cultivation or revival of the Lots as required nor that that they received the authorities’ permission for these activities, the court of first instance was correct in ruling that the Lots were Mewat lands when the Mewat Ordinance was legislated in 1921, and remained such thereafter. With respect to the interpretation of the Mewat Ordinance that is offered by the Appellants, the State claims that there is no substance to the Appellants’ argument that Mandate case-law interpreted the ordinance as allowing the acquisition of rights by virtue of revival of Mewat lands, even after its publication in 1921. It was argued that the judgments to which the Appellants refer in support of their argument all ratify the validity of the Mewat Ordinance and hold that after its legislation it is no longer possible to acquire rights in and to Mewat lands by virtue of revival. As to the fact that Section 2 of the Ordinance was omitted from the Drayton legislation arrangement of 1933, the State states that even the Appellants agree that this does not mean that the section is cancelled, and that in any event, this is not sufficient to change that which is prescribed in Section 1 of the ordinance, i.e., that a person who revived Mewat lands without the authorities’ permission will not be entitled to acquire rights therein and thereto. Additionally, the State argues that the court was correct in ruling that the Appellants do not have a claim by virtue of a period of prescription, since this is not possible in Mewat lands. It further argues that in any event the rulings of the court of first instance should also be adopted on their merits, as the Appellants did not prove continuous possession and cultivation of the Lots for the period of time that is required to substantiate a claim of prescription in accordance with the Ottoman Land Code and Section 22 of the Prescription Law. With regard to the Appellants’ argument that rights in and to the Lots were acquired due to the fact that the Al-Uqbi Tribe has been possessing and using them ab antiquo, the State argues that even if this argument had been proven, the meaning thereof is that these are lands that were used in a collective-public manner by the Tribe. The legal conclusion that is derived from that is that these are Matruka-classified lands, and in accordance with Section 154(a) of the Land Law, they should be registered in its name.

25.  As to the burden of evidence, the State claims that, contrary to the Appellants’ arguments, the starting point in land settlement cases is that the person claiming the right in and to the land is required to prove his claim, and if he has not met the burden, the land shall be registered in the name of the State. Additionally, the State posits that there are no grounds for the Appellants’ claim that the delay in the examination in court of their claim to the Lots transfers the burden of evidence to the State to prove that the Lots were not Mewat lands. The State claims in this matter that it avoided filing a claim in relation to the Lots and advancing the examination in court of the rights therein and thereto as a result of its policy to prefer promoting compromises in Negev land settlement claims rather than seeking judicial resolutions. According to the State, this was because of the fact that the Bedouin population does not have legal rights in and to the Negev lands, and it assessed that judicial rulings to this effect would not advance the integration of this population in the life of the State. Therefore, the State preferred to promote unique decisions for the benefit of the Bedouin in the Negev by virtue of which they would be able to receive compensation even in the absence of rights in and to the land. The State adds that in the case at hand it also avoided bringing the Appellants’ matter for judicial ruling because it preferred the path of a compromise, and that it should not be charged with acting in bad faith conduct for doing so. The State further claims that the Appellants refused to any compromise arrangement that was offered to them with respect to the Lots, and emphasizes that if and to the extent the Appellants believed that the delay in completing the settlement proceedings related to the Lots was causing them damage, they had the option of filing a claim to the court at any time they wished, just as they eventually did in 2006. In any event, the State claims, even if it shall be ruled that the burden of evidence in this case lies on it to prove that the Lots are Mewat land, it met this burden in light of the evidence that was presented to the court of first instance.

26.  As is recalled, the Appellants raised additional claims that even if rights in and to the Lots were not acquired under the Ottoman Land Code and the Mewat Ordinance, these rights can be normatively anchored in the laws of equity, the basic laws and international law. In this matter, the State claims that ownership by virtue of laws of equity is no more than a recognition of a legal right, and in the absence of rights pursuant to law, it is inappropriate to adjudicate equity rights. The State further claims that if and to the extent there is substance to the claim that the Appellants’ tribe had been settled on the Lots for many years, then this would have constituted forceful unlawful seizing of lands from the authorities’ possession. Such seizure does not grant equity rights, and internal agreements among the members of the Tribe also do not have the power to grant a legal right in and to land when such a right would not have existed to begin with. With respect to the argument that the Mandate and Ottoman land legislation should be interpreted in the spirit of the basic laws, the State claims that it is inappropriate to interpret acts of legislation that have long been cancelled in a manner that is not true to the language and purpose thereof only in order to grant the Appellants rights that they never acquired in and to the land. The State further argues that accepting the Appellants’ claim to a new interpretation of the Mandate and Ottoman land legislation in the spirit of the basic laws, will prejudice legal stability and certainty, and would mean a retroactive infringement of rights that third parties acquired in and to Negev lands throughout the years pursuant to existing law. With regard to international law, the State claims that the court of lower instance was correct in ruling that Israeli law does not recognize rights of indigenous people, and further claims that the State of Israel did not join the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007 to which the Appellants refer and which does not constitute a binding international norm even among those nations that have signed it. The State further argues that the existence of such a customary norm in international law has not been proven and that there is no comparison to be drawn between indigenous people in countries such as Australia and Canada on the one hand, and the Bedouin population in Israel in general, and the Appellants in particular, on the other. In this context, the State emphasizes that in the countries that recognized the rights of indigenous people that reside in their area, at issue were collective rights that were granted to the entire indigenous population in their area. By contrast, in the case at hand the Appellants are requesting to register the Lots in their name, and to acquire private ownership thereof.

27.  The State does not object to the approach adopted in the judgment which is the subject of the appeal and which, while rejecting the arguments raised by the Appellants with respect to the validity of the expropriation in 1954, further examined whether the Appellants have a right or an interest in the Lots for the purpose of ruling in the matter of compensation to which they might be entitled by virtue of the Acquisition Law as a result of the expropriation. The State does not object even though the Appellants did not raise claims regarding compensation at all and sufficed with claims regarding the rights in and to the Lots to which they are allegedly entitled and regarding the expropriation orders being null and void. Therefore, in the appeal, the State focused its arguments on both of these issues as well. The State’s response to the Appellants’ arguments regarding the rights in and to the Lots to which they are allegedly entitled was detailed above, and with regard to the voidness of the expropriation orders, the State claims that the conclusions of the court of first instance should be adopted. It emphasizes that the possibility of challenging the expropriation orders which were issued by virtue of the Acquisition Law is very narrow to begin with, and is non-existent in the case at hand in light of the fact that the Appellants are challenging the legality of the expropriation of the Lots more than 60 years after the expropriation. On the merits of the matter, the State claims that the question of whether the Lots were privately-owned at the time of their expropriation is not relevant to the legality of the expropriation, since the Acquisition Law allows expropriating privately-owned land if and to the extent it was not in the owners’ possession at the time of the expropriation. As to the Appellants’ argument that the expropriation should be cancelled on the grounds that the purpose of the acquisition was not realized, the State notes that the case-law regarding the cancellation of expropriations in which the purpose was not realized, does not apply to expropriations by virtue of the Acquisition Law. In any event, the State also notes that according to the Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance, 1943 (hereinafter: the “Land Ordinance“) as amended in Amendment no. 3 in 2010, expropriations to which such case-law applies will also be valid even if their purpose was not realized if 25 years have lapsed since the publication of the notice. For this reason as well, the State argues, and given the fact that in the case at hand more than 60 years have lapsed since the expropriation was effected, the claim regarding the purpose of the expropriation not being realized does not aid the Appellants.

Discussion and Ruling

28.  The six consolidated claims which were heard by the District Court addressed conflicting claims of ownership that were raised in the framework of a land settlement proceeding. Although the Appellants’ claims in this matter were pushed to the margins of the appeal, the first issue that must be addressed in this appeal is the issue of the validity of the expropriation pursuant to the Acquisition Law. This is due to the fact that the State’s claim in the settlement proceedings primarily relied on that expropriation, and the ruling in this matter materially projects onto the other issues that were raised in the proceedings (regarding the possibility of objecting to the validity of an expropriation pursuant to the Acquisition Law, by way of an indirect challenge, see CFH 1099/13 The State of Israel v. Abu Friech (April 12, 2015)). If and to the extent I shall reach the conclusion that these claims are to be rejected, it will be necessary to further examine whether the Appellants had any right or interest whatsoever in the Lots prior to the expropriation, including all of the sub-issues that emerge in this context. This examination is necessary in order to rule whether the Appellants were entitled to compensation or to alternative land due to the expropriation. It should be noted that the reference in the judgment which is the subject of the appeal to the matter of the right or interest of the Appellants in and to the Lots prior to the expropriation for the purpose of ruling in the matter of the compensation due to the expropriation was at the initiative of the court of first instance. The court deemed itself obligated to examine the issue in light of that stated in the judgment in the Jabareen Case (paragraphs 38-39 of the judgment). This is despite the fact that the Appellants, on their part, did not raise the said arguments regarding compensation due to the expropriation before the court of lower instance. I posit that it is doubtful whether this is what the judgment in the Jabareen Case intended. However, once the court of first instance chose to take this path, and once the State agreed therewith, and did not raise any in limine argument in this matter, I shall also continue to take this same path if and to the extent I shall reach the conclusion that the arguments in the matter of the voidness of the expropriation should be rejected.

The Expropriation of the Lots

29.  On more than one occasion, this court has addressed the unique characteristics of the Acquisition Law and of the expropriations that were performed by virtue thereof as a law that was intended to retroactively legitimize the seizing by the government of abandoned lands without legal authority, in the years following the establishment of the State (see CA 3535/04 Dinar v. The Minister of Finance (April 27, 2006), in paragraph 6 of the judgment of Justice (as was her title at the time) D. Beinisch (hereinafter: the “Dinar Case”). Section 2 of the Acquisition Law provides that upon the fulfillment of three cumulative conditions which are prescribed in the section “[the property] shall vest in the Development Authority and be regarded as free from any charge, and the Development Authority may forthwith take possession thereof.” These are the terms: (a) on April 1^st 1952, the property was not in the possession of its owners; (b) the property was used or assigned for purposes of essential development, settlement or security during the period between May 14^th, 1948 and April 1^st, 1952; (c) on the date of the expropriation it was still required for any of the said purposes. Section 2 of the Acquisition Law further provides conditions for issuing an expropriation certificate. With respect to these certificates it has been ruled that they constitute conclusive evidence to the veracity of their contents and that the possibility of challenging their legality is very narrow (see HCJ 5/54 Younis v. The Minister of Finance, IsrSC 8 314, 317 (1954); CA 816/81 Gera v. The Development Authority, IsrSC 39(1) 542, 547 (1985); HCJ 84/83 El-Wachili v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 37(4) 173, 179-180 (1983); CA 517/85 The Commissioner of the Waqf of the Maronite Church v. The Development Authority, IsrSC 42(1) 696, 701-702 (1988), as well as the Dinar Case, in paragraph 6). The original owners of the abandoned lands that were seized by the government and expropriated pursuant to the Acquisition Law are entitled, under the law, to compensation or to alternative land in the event that the expropriated land was used for agriculture and was its owners’ main source of livelihood (Section 3 of the Acquisition Law). However, there is no opening whatsoever in the Acquisition Law allowing the return of the expropriated land to its original owners, even if the owners returned thereto. There is no denying that the Acquisition Law severely infringes the right to property that was recognized as a constitutional right in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and the opinion has even been expressed in the past that had the Acquisition Law been legislated at the present time, it would have been appropriate to cancel it due to it being unconstitutional (see the Dinar Case, in paragraph 7). However, it is an old law that is at issue, and the preservation of laws section that is prescribed in Section 10 of the Basic Law, which has its own logic, does not allow harming its validity, despite the constitutional difficulty it raises. Additionally, it had been ruled that in light of the Acquisition Law’s special nature and the unique historical circumstances that led to its legislation, it is inappropriate at the present time to appeal the constitutionality of the expropriations that were effected by virtue thereof or to determine criteria that are more flexible that those that were prescribed in case-law for the purpose of interpreting the conditions for expropriation that are prescribed in Section 2 of the law (see the Jabareen Case, in paragraphs 35-36 of the judgment of Justice Y. Danziger, see also the Dinar Case, in paragraph 7).

30.  In the case at hand, the Appellants do not argue that the conditions prescribed in Section 2 of the Acquisition Law were not fulfilled with respect to the Lots. For example, they are not claiming that they possessed the Lots at the Acquisition Law’s effective date (April 1, 1952). All that the Appellants argue is that the relevant expropriation orders were issued based on the erroneous assumption that the Lots are barren Mewat lands while in fact they were lands that were owned by their family. Even if the Appellants’ claim that they are the owners of the Lots had been accepted, it would not have been sufficient to lead to the expropriation being void. Indeed, according to the condition prescribed in Section 2 of the Acquisition Law, for it to be possible to expropriate it under this law, it was sufficient that the expropriated land not be in its owners’ possession on April 1, 1952, provided that the other two conditions prescribed in the section were also fulfilled.

31.  The additional claim that the Appellants raised regarding the validity of the expropriation is that the orders should be declared void due to the fact that the purpose of the expropriation was not realized. This argument was justly rejected by the court of first instance since it relies on the case-law from HCJ 2390/96 Karasik v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 55(2) 625 (2001) (hereinafter: the “Karasik Case”), which, as has already been decided on more than one occasion, does not apply to expropriations that were effected pursuant to the Acquisition Law (see the Dinar Case, in paragraph 8; and HCJ 840/97 Sabit v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 57(4) 803, 815 (2003)). In any event, it was ruled in the Karasik Case that the application of its case-law rule is meant to be based on legislation that shall implement the principle and shall prescribe the conditions for its application (in this matter also see HCJ 2390/96 Karasik v. The State of Israel (February 9, 2009)). In this context the State correctly referred in its arguments to Amendment no. 3 of the Land Ordinance, pursuant to which the application of the Karasik case-law rule was limited to 25 years from the date of the publication of the expropriation notice. Given the fact that at hand is an expropriation from more than 60 years ago, there is no application to the Karasik case-law rule, even if we were of the opinion that is applies to expropriations pursuant to the Acquisition Law (see in this matter: HCJ 9804/09 Shawahna v. The Development Authority (May 29, 2014), in paragraph 18 of the judgment of Justice D. Barak-Erez; and CA 6288/98 Klil v. The Development Authority (August 11, 2011), in paragraph 9 of the judgment of Justice (as was his title at the time) A. Grunis). It shall be noted, above and beyond that which is necessary, that according to the findings of the court of first instance, the claim that the purpose of the expropriation was not realized, should also not be accepted on its merits. It emerges from the evidence that was presented (the affidavit of Mr. Shlomo Tzizer, Head of the Development Department at the Southern Region of the Israel Lands Authority, which was attached as Exhibit Res/5 in the Appeal), that 4 out of 6 of the Lots in dispute (Sharia 133, Sharia 134, Araqib 6 and Araqib 60) have, for years, been used for agricultural and forestation purposes, and this is sufficient in order to contradict the claim regarding non-realization of the purposes of the expropriation with respect to all of the Lots on its merits (see the case-law rule that in this context, the uses in all of the expropriated area should be examined and not in each lot separately, in HCJFH 4466/94 Nuseibeh v. The Minister of Finance, IsrSC 49(4) 68 (1995), in paragraph 9 of the judgment of Justice E. Goldberg; the Jabareen Case, in paragraph 36).

32.  Once the Appellants’ arguments regarding the validity of the expropriations in 1954 pursuant to the Acquisition Law were rejected, it is inappropriate to intervene in the ruling of the court of first instance that the Lots should be registered in the name of the State and the Development Authority, and the Appellants’ claim for ownership of those Lots was justly rejected. However, in accordance with the course of the discussion that was outlined in paragraph 28 above, we must now examine whether prior to the expropriation the Appellants or their heirs possessed a right or an interest in and to the Lots, entitling them to receive compensation or alternative land due to the expropriation in accordance with that stated in Section 3 of the Acquisition Law.

The Normative Framework for Examining the Appellants’ Rights in and to the Lots

The Autonomy and Traditional Bedouin Law Argument

33.  The question of whether the Appellants or their heirs possessed any right or interest in and to the Lots prior to the expropriation should be examined in accordance with the law that applied to these Lots at such time. At hand is a case of an expropriation from 1954, and the question that arises is what the law was that applied to the Lots at such time which determined the existence of a right or interest therein and thereto. Prior to the legislation of the Land Law in 1969, and even after the establishment of the State, the land laws that had been legislated during the Ottoman period and the Mandate period remained in effect. The Appellants claim that these laws should not be applied to their matter since the Ottoman administration and the subsequent Mandate government granted legal autonomy to the Bedouin in the Negev and allowed them to conduct themselves in accordance with traditional Bedouin law and to acquire rights in and to land by virtue thereof. The Appellants further claim that according to traditional Bedouin law, prior to the expropriation, Appellant 1 and they as his heirs, possessed an ownership right in and to the Lots. A similar claim regarding the special law that relates to the Negev lands and the rights of the Bedouin therein and thereto was raised in the past and rejected by this court in CA 218/74 Huashela v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 38(3) 141 (1984) (hereinafter: the “Huashela Case”), where Justice A. Chalima ruled as follows:

“And the last among the arguments that were voiced on behalf of the appellants claims that the appellants should be granted special treatment due to the special nature of the Negev lands. This claim is not to be recognized in this appeal. If the Ottoman legislator did not find it appropriate (and the Mandate authorities acted in the same way when legislating the 1921 ordinance), to designate special laws in the framework of the law to the Negev lands, which were similar to many and widespread areas in the Ottoman state, it is not the court’s role to grant reliefs such as those that are requested, which do not comply with the legislator’s explicit provisions. This argument shall also not be accepted and is rejected.” (ibid, on page 154)

The Appellants are aware of this court ruling in the Huashela Case, however according to them this is an erroneous ruling and they call for it to be changed. On the other hand, the State claims that it is not appropriate to change that which was ruled in this matter in the Huashela Case. According to it, the District Court justly ruled that the question whether the Appellants’ family acquired any right or interest in and to the Lots should be examined in accordance with the Mandate and Ottoman land laws that were in effect in the Land of Israel prior to the establishment of the State and which remained in effect until their cancellation in 1969, upon the legislation of the Land Law.

34.  After examining the parties’ arguments regarding this matter, I am of the opinion that the Appellants’ arguments regarding the existence of Bedouin autonomy in the Negev area prior to the establishment of the State should be rejected. In this context, the Appellants refer to geographical-historical research in which it was stated that the Ottoman administration and the subsequent Mandate government had difficulty controlling the area of the Negev and the Bedouin tribes that resided therein, and attributed little importance to this area (see Ruth Kark, The Negev During the British Mandate – The Jewish Settlement, page 1 (1974), attached as Supporting Reference 8 of the Appellants’ Supporting References Binder; Ruth Kark, Landownership and Spatial Change in Nineteenth Century Palestine: an Overview, in Transition From Spontaneous To Regulated Spatial Organization, 96 (M. Roscizewsky Ed., 1984) attached as Supporting Reference 9 of the Appellants’ Supporting References Binder; Ruth Kark, The History of the Jewish Frontier Settlement in the Negev 1880-1948, page 33 (2002), attached as Supporting Reference 7 of the Appellants’ Supporting References Binder (hereinafter: “The History of the Settlement“) – I shall parenthetically note that these supporting references, and additional supporting references to which the Appellants referred in their summary arguments, were presented to the court of first instance, contrary the State’s allegation that these supporting references were first submitted at the appeal stage. As shall be specified below, this research does not substantiate the Appellants’ claim that in the years preceding the establishment of the State, the Bedouin were granted autonomy in the Negev which included the authorities’ official recognition of traditional Bedouin law in the sense that the Bedouin were granted property rights in and to the Negev lands.

35.  It emerges from the sources to which the Appellants referred that during the Ottoman period the Ottoman administration perceived the Negev to be an area that is subject to its sovereignty and acted to gain the upper hand over the Bedouin population residing therein. For example, researcher Yasmin Avci states, in her article that was attached as Supporting Reference 10 of the Appellants’ Supporting References Binder, that:

The second half of the nineteenth century was a period when the Ottoman government’s centralization efforts gained momentum. In Southern Palestine, this entailed a struggle for central government to gain the upper hand over the Bedouin tribes. In the 1860’s, the Ottoman government was still using military power to end the internal strife between the Bedouin tribes. However, from the 1890’s on, the government began to use sophisticated means and tactics in order to secure control and encourage the migration of the Bedouin element in the empire. The creation of a new town, namely Beersheba, the changing apparatus of administration, the construction of public buildings in the desert, all meant that the government attempted to penetrate the nomad’s way of life (see Yasmin Avci, The Application of Tanzima in the Desert: the Bedouins and the Creation of a New Town in Southern Palestine (1860-1914), in MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, Vol. 45, No. 6, 969, p. 969 (2009))

Prof. Kark wrote similarly in her book, excerpts of which were attached as Supporting Reference 11 of the Appellants’ Supporting References Binder, where Prof. Kark states that:

The Ottoman period reveals a very robust policy on the part of the Ottoman government to gain firm control over the Negev and its nomadic population. Through registration of land, granting land to local sheikhs inside the municipality, establishing a trading center and market place and establishing a permanent military presence and settled villages on the periphery, the Negev was changed dramatically. In addition the seeds for Bedouin sedenterization were sown. (see Ruth Kark and Seth J. Frantzman, The Negev: Land, Settlement, The Bedouin and Ottoman and British Policy 1871-1948, in BRITISH JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, Vol. 39(1), 53, p. 58 (2012))

The Appellants request to rely on the weakness of the authorities that characterized the Ottoman period with regard to the Negev areas and to interpret it as the granting of autonomy to the Bedouin tribes that resided in that area. However, even if the sources to which the Appellants referred are sufficient to indicate difficulty in controlling this territory, in the absence of explicit evidence to such effect neither the alleged granting of autonomy nor the alleged granting of property rights in and to the Negev areas pursuant to traditional Bedouin law can be inferred therefrom. Such evidence was not presented by the Appellants. It shall be noted that the fact that the sources which the Appellants presented indicate that during the Ottoman period the Bedouin divided the rights in and to the lands of the Negev among themselves, in accordance with traditional Bedouin law, does not constitute sufficient evidence to this end. At most, they are sufficient to prove that at the Bedouin-tribal level there was significance to this division, but they do not prove that it was entitled to official recognition on the part of the Ottoman administration. Thus, the majority of the sources to which the Appellants refer in this context do not at all state that the Ottoman authorities recognized the property rights of the Bedouin that derived from traditional Bedouin law (see Clinton Bailey, Bedouin Law From Sinai And The Negev: Justice Without Government, pp. 263-271 (2009), attached as Supporting Reference 12 of the Appellants’ Supporting References Binder; Chanina Porat, From Wilderness to a Settled Land: Land Acquisition and Settlement in the Negev 1930-1947, on pages 16-17 (1996), attached as Supporting Reference 14 of the Appellants’ Supporting References Binder (hereinafter: “From Wilderness to a Settled Land“)). Some of the sources upon which the Appellants rely explicitly state that the Ottoman administration did not recognize Bedouin ownership of the Negev lands (see Sasson Bar Zvi, The Tradition of Adjudication among the Negev Bedouin – Studies of Encounters with Bedouin Elders, on pages 146-147 (1991), attached as Supporting Reference 15 of the Appellants’ Supporting References Binder). The only source to which the Appellants refer from which such recognition may be implied, is the article by Gideon M. Kressel, Joseph Ben-David and Khalil Abu Rabi’a, Land Ownership Among the Negev Bedouin (Supporting Reference 13 of the Appellants’ Supporting References Binder, on page 41), where the authors state that “after the establishment of Beer Sheva (1903), the official Ottoman institutions recognized the special autonomous arrangements of the Bedouin society, and such recognition is what led to the establishment of the tribal tribunal. […] In hearings that addressed ownership of lots, three [judges] customarily presided…“. However, this general statement is not sufficient to substantiate the Appellants’ claim that the Ottoman administration recognized property rights granted under traditional Bedouin law. In this context it is not superfluous to note that the article’s authors themselves state therein that very little is known about the legal status of the Negev lands at the end of the Ottoman period and that the only information in this matter is indirectly inferred from transactions that the Zionist movement made with the Bedouin regarding such lands (ibid). We shall relate to this below.

36.  The Appellants wish to find support to their claim that the Bedouin were able to acquire rights in and to Negev lands by virtue of traditional Bedouin law in the fact that the Ottoman Empire purchased the lands upon which the city of Beer Sheva was built from the Muhammadeen Tribe (of the Azazma Tribal Confederation). This fact, which was not disputed and was mentioned by the experts on behalf of both of the parties, does not come to the aid of the Appellants, since such purchase does not necessarily attest to the fact that the rights were granted to the Muhammadeen Tribe by virtue of traditional Bedouin law. It is certainly possible that these were rights which were recognized by the Ottoman authorities by virtue of the Ottoman Land Code. For example, collective rights to use Matruka-classified lands for camping and grazing (to which we shall relate more elaborately further below). Support to this position can be found in the fact that the payment that was given to the Muhammadeen Tribe by the Ottoman authorities for the Beer Sheva lands was given to the entire Muhammadeen Tribe and not to certain individuals thereof. To this one must add what is stated in Prof. Kark’s opinion, that in all that relates to the Beer Sheva lands, the Ottoman Empire indeed agreed to pay the Bedouin tribes for purchasing the land, however shortly before then, at the end of the 19^th century, Sultan Abdul Hamid II transferred extended areas in the Negev in which Bedouin roamed, to his private ownership, without paying them anything. This leads to the conclusion that the Sultan deemed these lands to be the Ottoman Empire’s property with respect to which he can act as though they were his own (see Prof. Kark’s opinion dated January 31, 2010, Res/C1, on pages 16-17 and the references therein).

37.  In addition to the purchase of the Beer Sheva lands from the Muhammadeen Tribe, the Appellants wish to infer the Ottoman administration’s recognition of rights acquired by virtue of traditional Bedouin law from the fact that Bedouin from the Al-Atawneh Tribe managed to register Negev lands, in an area then called Jemama, in their name and sell them to the Hachsharat Hayishuv company. These lands were later used to establish Kibbutz Ruchama, and according to the Appellants, this proves that the Ottoman administration recognized the Bedouin’s ownership of the Negev lands, and therefore allowed them to register it in their name and to sell it. The Appellants further state in this context that in her testimony Prof. Kark did not know how to provide another explanation to the fact that these lands, which according to her were Mewat-classified lands, were registered in the name of the members of the Al-Atawneh Tribe (see Prof. Kark’s testimony, on pages 51-52 of the minutes of the hearing dated June 23, 2010), and they find this to also reinforce their position.

I am not of the opinion that one can draw such a sweeping conclusion as the Appellants wish to draw from the private case of the Ruchama lands that were sold to the Hachsharat Hayishuv company by the members of the Al-Atawneh Tribe after they were registered in their names. In her book, The History of the Settlement, to which the Appellants refer, Prof. Kark states that the said case is the only case in the Ottoman period in which lands in the Negev were registered in the name of Bedouin and that in that case it was done so as to enable the sale to Zionist institutions after the authorities had raised obstacles in approving the transaction (ibid, on pages 44-45). As mentioned, sweeping recognition by the Ottoman administration of traditional Bedouin law as entitling rights in and to land cannot be inferred from this single case nor can conclusions be drawn therefrom regarding the Lots that are the subject of the claim.

38.  The Appellants’ claim regarding autonomy that was granted to Bedouin in the Negev during the Mandate period also primarily relies on reports that the Mandate government had difficulty controlling the Negev and the Bedouin tribes residing therein. However, as the State mentions, the Mandate government, similarly to the Ottoman administration, also made efforts to gain the upper hand over the Bedouin tribes in the Negev and legislated special laws to such effect, including: The Prevention of Crimes (Tribes and Factions) Ordinance, 1935 and the Bedouin Control Ordinance, 1942. As was already stated, the difficulty of controlling the Negev areas should not lead to the conclusion that autonomy was granted to the Bedouin tribes residing therein, and the fact that the Mandate government applied efforts to effectively control the Negev and the Bedouin tribes residing therein indicates that it perceived the Negev as its sovereign area and not as area in which the Bedouin have control in the form of autonomy. With regard to the Appellants’ claim that the Churchill Declaration constituted a legal autonomy for the Bedouin tribes in the Negev, I agree with the ruling of the court of first instance that it is not clear what Churchill meant when he undertook towards the heads of the Bedouin tribes that their special customs and rights would not be harmed. This is a general and vague statement, and the Appellants did not present any supporting reference that substantiates the far-reaching meaning they wish to attribute thereto. Therefore, the Appellants’ position that at hand is a declaration that grants Bedouin autonomy in the Negev areas cannot be accepted, particularly given that explicit acts of legislation from the Mandate period rule out this conclusion.

39.  The Appellants further refer to Article 45 of the Palestine Order in Council, 1922 (hereinafter: the “King’s Order in Council“) and wish to find support for their claims regarding the autonomy that was granted to Bedouin during the Mandate period. Article 45 prescribes as follows:

The High Commissioner may by order establish such separate Courts for the district of Beersheba and for such other tribal areas as he may think fit. Such courts may apply tribal custom, so far as it is not repugnant to natural justice or morality.

The Appellants wish to infer the alleged autonomy, and the possibility in the framework thereof to acquire title to the Negev lands that was recognized by the Mandate authorities, from the fact that the Mandate authorities allowed the Bedouin, under said Article 45, to operate in accordance with their traditional laws and even to conduct legal proceedings in special courts of their own. This argument is to be rejected. The establishment of the special courts for the Bedouin population and the powers granted thereto were regulated in the Tribal Courts Regulations, 1937 (hereinafter: the “Tribal Courts Regulations“). Regulation 3 of these regulations instructs that these courts may only address disputes that were transferred thereto by the President of the District Court or the District Clerk (a similar provision also exists in Section 3 of the Order Establishing Certain Courts in Palestine, 1924, that was published in the Official Gazette 120, page 764, 1924), and Regulation 6 of these regulations explicitly instructs that “A tribal court is prohibited from deciding on any matter of ownership of land assets, but it is rather permitted to issue such an order that it shall deem fit in the matter of possession of the land assets“. These provisions indicate that the tribal courts that the Mandate government established were meant to settle internal disputes among the Bedouin themselves, if and to the extent such disputes were transferred to them to be ruled upon with the authorities’ approval, but that these courts were not authorized to decide and rule on anything that relates to property rights in and to the Negev lands. Indeed, the regulations indicate that such power was explicitly denied therefrom. Thus, it can be deduced that the Mandate government wished to maintain the power to address matters that relate to ownership of the Negev lands, and this conclusion clearly contradicts the Appellants’ position in this context. The Appellants refer to the judgment in the matter of Ashour Ghandour v. Abdullah Abuo Ghaban, 1 P.L.R. 458 (1929) and claim that it supports their position that the Mandate government recognized the rulings of the tribal courts regarding rights in and to the Negev lands. A review of this judgment indicates that it too does not support this position, and that all that was ruled therein is that the tribal court may address a dispute regarding the possession of land if the dispute was transferred thereto by the President of the District Court.

40.  The Appellants further refer in their arguments to records (notebooks) which, according to their approach, reflect the traditional Bedouin system of ownerships of the land and the manner by which the Bedouin divided the Negev lands among themselves. The Appellants further claim that the Mandate government recognized the validity of these records as records that attest to their rights in and to those lands. The Appellants did not present any evidence that supports their claim regarding the Mandate government’s official recognition of such alleged traditional ownership system, and in this context it is not superfluous to note that the traditional ownership system alleged by the Bedouin with respect to the Negev lands was not the only unofficial system of rights that that was maintained in the country during the years preceding the establishment of the State. During such period there were a number of communities in the country, including: the settlements of the first wave of immigration (the first “Aliya“) and the Templer colonies, which created internal rights registers. However, the Mandate law did not give any consideration to these registers and did not recognize the rights thereunder insofar as they contradicted the Ottoman title deeds or records (see Sandberg, Land Title Settlement in the Land of Israel, on page 161). Similarly, it is difficult to assume, and in any event, it was not proven, that the internal registers that the Bedouin maintained were treated differently. In this context, it is not superfluous to note that the Correction of Land Registers Ordinance of 1926, allowed the abovementioned internal registers to be incorporated into the new register (ibid, on page 164). Such incorporation was not performed with respect to the unofficial internal records which they allege that the Bedouin maintained with regard to the Negev lands.

41.  The Appellants further claim that during the Mandate period the Bedouin registered many parts of the Negev lands in their names in the Land Registry (the “Tabu“) (the Ottoman register that was recognized as the official register by the Mandate government) and sold them to the Zionist institutions, and they argue that this supports their claim that the Mandate authorities recognized the rights that the Bedouin acquired in and to these lands under traditional Bedouin law. The fact that transactions to purchase land in the Negev between Zionist institutions and Bedouin were registered in the Mandate transaction register does not mean that the Bedouin succeeded in registering ownership of the Negev lands or that the Mandate authorities recognized the Bedouin’s rights in and to these lands. The reason being that during the Mandate period, in the case of land that had not undergone a settlement proceeding – and this was the status of the lands of the Negev at such time (and to a great extent, also at the present time) – the land register was only a register of transactions and did not constitute evidence of ownership of the land (see Moshe Doukhan, The Land Laws in the State of Israel on page 147 (Second Edition, 5713) (hereinafter: “The Land Laws in Israel“); Aharon Ben Shemesh, Land Legislation in the State of Israel, on page 261 (1953) (hereinafter: “Land Legislation in Israel“); Sandberg, Land Title Settlement in the Land of Israel, on pages 180 and 188). Section 9 of the Land Transfer Ordinance, 1920, explicitly states as follows regarding this matter:

No guarantee of title or of the validity of the transaction is implied by the consent of the Administration and the registration of the deed. A person acquiring land under this Ordinance will be subject to any registration which may hereafter be introduced by the Government of Palestine …

42.  Thus, the registration in transactions’ register of the transactions that were made by and between Bedouin and Zionist entities with respect to Negev lands only proves that the Mandate officers agreed to register these transactions, and they did so without this obligating them to recognize the validity thereof or the rights that were acquired thereby. This conclusion is supported by the sources upon which the Appellants rely in their arguments. It emerges from these sources that the Zionist entities that purchased the lands from the Bedouin in the Negev were aware of the fact that the Bedouin’s rights in and to the Negev lands were not yet clarified and that it is possible that this would become a difficulty when they requested to register as the owners of the land (see Kark, The History of the Settlement, on pages 58, 76 and 78; see also Porat, From Wilderness to a Settled Land, on page 16). Additional support of this conclusion can be found in various reports of the Mandate government from which it emerges that even though the Mandate authorities recognized the fact that the Bedouin have certain rights in and to the Negev lands, they were of the opinion that these are not rights of ownership of the land, but rather some sort of collective usage rights (such as grazing rights), and ruled that it would not be possible to determine the precise nature of these rights until the completion of the settlement proceeding of the Negev lands. It further emerges from these reports that the British viewed the traditional Bedouin system of ownership of the land as a way in which the Bedouin divide their areas of livelihood among themselves, and not as a system of laws with legal validity. Thus, for example, in a report that was prepared for the Secretary of Colonies in 1930 regarding the matter of the settlement of lands in the Land of Israel, it was written as follows:

One of the problems of land administration in Palestine lies in the indefinite rights of the Bedouin population. […] The majority of these Bedouin wander over the country in the Beersheba area and the region south and south east of it, but they are found in considerable numbers in the Jordan valley and in smaller numbers in the four other plains. Their rights have never been determined. They claim rights of cultivation and grazing of an indefinite character and over indefinite areas. Mr. Shell recorded that they have established a traditional right to graze their cattle on the fellah’s land after the harvest. In region which they regard as their own, they divide the country among their various tribes, and in the tract recognized as the sphere of the tribe, the Sheikhs or the tribal Elders divide the individual plots among the families of the tribe. The position is unsatisfactory. If, for instance, artesian water were discovered in the Beersheba area, there is little doubt that claims would immediately be urged, by the tribes of the Beersheba tract, to the land commanded by that water. The Bedouin are an attractive and picturesque element in the life of the country, but they are an anachronism wherever close development is possible and desired. At the same time their existence cannot be overlooked. In any solution of the Palestine problem, they are an element which must be recognized. Also in any plans of development it will be necessary carefully to consider, and scrupulously to record and deal with their rights (see Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development, by Sir John Hope-Simpson, C.I.E., p. 73 (1930) in LAND LEGISLATION IN MANDATE PALESTINE, Vol. 7, No. 3, 27, p. 101 (M. Bunton Ed., 2009) (hereinafter: the “Simpson Report“); see also the Mandate Government’s Letter to the Jewish Agency which was attached as Annex 52 of the opinion of Prof. Yiftachel, on page 3).

The court of first instance rightfully found additional significant evidence that members of the Al-Uqbi Tribe did not consider the internal records upon which they claim the ownership system of the Negev lands allegedly relied to be officially valid in the fact that some of the agreements which the Appellants presented with respect to the Lots included stipulations and undertakings to register the transaction in the Land Registry (the “Tabu“).

43.  Interim summary – the Ottoman administration and the subsequent Mandate government perceived the Negev to be part of the sovereign area that is subject to their control. The conclusion that is drawn from all that which is stated in paragraphs 33-43 above is that the Appellants did not succeed in proving the existence of a legal autonomy for the Bedouin in the Negev during the years prior to the establishment of the State in the framework of which said authorities allowed the Bedouin to acquire property rights in and to the Negev lands by virtue of traditional Bedouin law. Therefore, one must further examine whether, under the Mandate and Ottoman land laws that preceded the Land Law, the Appellants’ family acquired any rights whatsoever in and to the Lots which are the subject of this appeal, for which they are entitled to compensation or to alternative land as a result of their expropriation under the Acquisition Law.

I shall now turn to this question.

The Ottoman Land Code and the Mandate Mewat Ordinance

44.  Section 1 of the Ottoman Land Code (as per the translation of the President of the Mandate Lands Court in Jerusalem, Richard C. Tute), prescribes as follows:

Land in the Ottoman Empire is divided into classes as follows:

(I) ‘Mulk” land, that is land possessed in full ownership;

(II) “Mirie” land;

(III) “Mevqufe” land;

(IV) “Metrouke” land;

(V) “Mevat” land.

(see Richard Clifford Tute, THE OTTOMAN LAND LAWS, p. 1 (1927) (hereinafter: “The Ottoman Land Laws“)

“Mulk” is land that is wholly owned by a private individual; “Waqf” is land that was dedicated to G-d; “Miri” is State-owned land, to which a private individual was granted the right of use for certain purposes; “Matruka” is State-owned land, in which the entire public or a certain public was granted collective usage rights for certain purposes; and “Mewat” land is State-owned barren land that was not assigned for anyone’s use (see Frederick M. Goadby & Moses J. Doukhan, THE LAND LAW OF PALESTINE, p. 17, 37, 44, 52 and 69 (1935) (hereinafter: the “Land Laws of Palestine“); Tute, The Ottoman Land Laws, on pages 1-2; Ben Shemesh, Land Legislation in the State of Israel, on pages 28-38; Doukhan, The Land Laws in Israel, on pages 39, 46, 47, 54 and 62; Pliah Albeck and Ran Fleischer, Land Laws in Israel, on pages 40, 47, 68, 79 and 85 (2005) (hereinafter: “Land Laws in Israel“); Eliyahu Cohen, Land Transactions and Registration, on pages 3, 5, 27, 30 and 34 (D. Maimon, Editor, 1988)). The Ottoman Land Code did not create new classes of land but rather only statutorily anchored the land classification that existed across the Ottoman Empire prior to its legislation. However, once legislated, the Land Code defined the various classes of land across the Ottoman Empire in a clear and absolute manner (see Ben Shemesh, Land Legislation in Israel, on page 27). It was not argued, and hence not proven, that the Lots were classified as Mulk or Waqf land. Therefore, the possibilities of classification of the Lets prior to the legislation of the Land Law are narrowed down to the three remaining classes of land (Miri, Mewat or Matruka). According to the Appellants, the land at hand is Miri-classified land, while the State claims that it is Mewat-classified land. As mentioned, the court of first instance rejected the Appellants’ claim that at hand is Miri-classified land and accepted the State’s claim that at hand is Mewat-classified land. Furthermore, the court of first instance rejected the Appellants’ claim that even if at hand is Mewat-classified land, they acquired rights therein and thereto.

Are the Lots Miri-Classified Land?

45.  Section 3 of the Ottoman Land Code prescribes what Miri land is:

State land, the legal ownership of which is vested in the Treasury, comprises arable fields, meadows, summer and winter pasturing grounds, woodland and the like, the enjoyment of which is granted by government. Possession of such land was formerly acquired of sale or being left vacant, by permission of or grant by feudatories (sipahis) of “timars” and “ziamets” as lords of the soil, and later through the “multezims” and “muhassils”. This system was abolished and possession of this kind of immovable property will henceforward be acquired by leave of and grant by the agent of the Government appointed for the purpose. Those who acquire possession will receive a title-deed bearing the Imperial Cypher. The sum paid in advance (muajele) for the right of possession which is paid to the proper Official for the account of the State, is call the Tapu fee (Tute, The Ottoman Lands Laws, on page 7).

As emerges from the section, Miri land is any land in and to which the government granted possession and usage rights to a private individual. Prior to the legislation of the Ottoman Land Code, the rights of possession and usage in and to Miri land were granted by tenants appointed by the Ottoman administration and the tenants were responsible for collecting taxes in consideration for the use of the land. At some stage the Ottoman authorities reached the conclusion that those tenants were misusing their position and exploiting the farmers who were cultivating the lands for which they were responsible. Therefore, the tenant regime was cancelled and in its stead another regime was instated, pursuant to which the right to use Miri land was granted directly by the State and the taxes in consideration for the use of the land were paid directly to its purse, without the tenants’ brokerage. This change, which is reflected in the provisions of Section 3 of the Ottoman Land Code, was essentially administrative, and did not change the classification of the land that existed prior to the legislation of the law (see Goadby and Doukhan, Land Laws of Palestine, on pages 2-6; Ben Shemesh, Land Legislation in Israel, on pages 12-13, Doukhan, Land Laws in Israel, on pages 34-37; Albeck and Fleischer, Land Laws in Israel, on pages 7 and 237-239; Tute, The Ottoman Lands Laws, on page 8).

46.  We learn from Section 3 of the Ottoman Land Code that in order to prove that at hand is Miri-classified land, it is necessary to demonstrate that it was, at some point in time, assigned by the authorities to the use of a private individual (see Goadby and Doukhan, Land Laws of Palestine, on page 17; Tute, The Ottoman Land Laws, on page 8). Additionally, the section conditions the possession and the use of Miri land upon receipt of a title deed (a Kushan) (see Goadby and Doukhan, Land Laws of Palestine, on pages 17-18; Sandberg, Land Title Settlement in the Land of Israel, on pages 136-137). However, due to the many flaws of the Ottoman registration method, there were in fact Miri lands that were also possessed without a Kushan and without having been registered as such in the old land registers (see CA 87/50 Libman v. Lifshitz, IsrSC 6 57 on pages 91-92 (1952) (hereinafter: the “Libman Case”); Sandberg, Land Title Settlement in the Land of Israel, on pages 147-155; Doukhan, Land Laws in Israel, on pages 367; Goadby and Doukhan, Land Laws of Palestine, on page 271), and in this context it was even ruled that a Kushan or registration in the old land registers, do not constitute conclusive evidence of the existence of rights in and to land (see the Libman case, on pages 91-92; and CA 7210/00 Dana v. The Israel Land Administration, IsrSC 57(6) 468, 476 (2003)).

47.  The Appellants did not at any stage present a Kushan for the Lots or any registration thereof as Miri lands in the old land registers. I am willing to assume that that in and of itself is not sufficient to reject the Appellants’ claim that at hand are Miri lands in and to which they acquired rights. However, in order to prove their claim in these circumstances, the burden lies on the Appellants to demonstrate that the Lots were at some time assigned by the authorities for the use of any of their testators or to any other private individual from whom they acquired the rights therein and thereto.

This burden was not met by the Appellants since none of the evidence that they presented substantiates such a finding. Thus, for example, Prof. Yiftachel attached as Annex 13 to his opinion, two pages from a hand-written chart that according to him were photographed from the IDF Archives, and which relate, inter alia, to the Araqib area (in some of the cases “Aragib” or “Ragib” was stated in the column referring to the “location of the land”). These pages include lists of dozens of persons who cultivated the land, and “Al-Uqbi” or “Uqba” are noted alongside most of them in the ownership column, and it is stated that this is Mulk-classified land (Annex 13). According to Prof. Yiftachel, this table is an Israeli document that attests to the Al-Uqbi Tribe’s ownership of the disputed Lots, and to them having been cultivated, and to the agricultural crops therein. In the heading of the first of the two pages of Annex 13 that were attached to Prof. Yiftachel’s opinion, the words “IDF Archives 1953/233-834” are printed, and it thus prima facie emerges that it is a document that was prepared in 1953. This document does not specify to which years the documentation incorporated therein refers, but given the Appellants’ claim that the Al-Uqbi Tribe was transferred by force in 1951 by the Israeli Military Administration to the Siyagh area (the Beer Sheva, Dimona, Arad triangle), it is clear that it is not documentation that relates to the year in which the document was allegedly prepared. Additionally, it is not clear who prepared the document, for what purpose and in what context, and in any event it is a not an official document that documents the property rights in and to the Negev lands. It does not refer to a private owner and the ownership that is stated therein is to the entire tribe, without relating to specific lots in the Araqib area. Additionally, the document relates to Mulk-classified land, while the Appellants themselves do not raise a claim that the Lots are so classified, and rather claim that they are Miri land. In light of the many question marks that emerge with respect to the two-page Annex 13 of Prof. Yiftachel’s opinion, it appears that it is not possible to conclude therefrom about the assignment of the disputed Lots for the use of the Appellants’ family or for the use of any other private individual. An additional document that was attached to Prof. Yiftachel’s opinion, and from which he wishes to infer that the State of Israel recognized the Lots as land that belongs to the Appellants’ family, is the document that was attached as Annex 14 of his opinion. According to him, this is a certificate of the Development Authority from 1956 in which all of the lots that were expropriated are classified as Miri-classified lands. A review of Annex 14 does not indicate any of that which Prof. Yiftachel wishes to deduce therefrom. It is an illegible copy of a hand-written chart, and it is not clear who prepared it, when it was prepared, and for what purpose, and therefore no evidential weight whatsoever should be granted to this document.

48.  Once we have reached the conclusion that not only did the Appellants not acquire rights in and to the Lots as Miri land, but that no evidence was presented at all by virtue of which it is possible to classify the Lots as Miri to begin with, then, in fact, the need to discuss the additional claim that the Appellants raised – that they acquired rights in and to the Lots by virtue of a period of prescription – becomes superfluous. It shall however be noted, above and beyond that which is necessary, that even if we were to assume that the Lots were Miri-classified land, this would not have come to the aid of the Appellants, because, as the District Court rightfully ruled, they did not prove the existence of the terms and conditions that are required in order to create a claim by virtue of a period of prescription, neither under Section 20 nor even under Section 78 of the law (regarding the terms and conditions prescribed in these sections, and the differences between them, see Pliah Albeck “About Land Limitation Laws in Israel” Kiryat Hamishpat, A 335, on pages 344-350 (5761-2001) (hereinafter: “Land Limitation“); and Albeck and Fleischer, Land Laws in Israel, on pages 207-212; Tute, The Ottoman Land Laws, on pages 23-24 and 75-80; Goadby and Doukhan, Land Laws of Palestine, on pages 257-261; Ben Shemesh, Land Legislation in Israel, on pages 53-65 and 131-134; and Doukhan, Land Laws in Israel, on page 316).

49.  In order to acquire rights under Section 20 or under Section 78 of the Ottoman Land Code (together with Section 22 of the Prescription Law), continuous possession of land for a period of at least 15 years, or 20 years if it began after March 1, 1943, is required. In order to acquire rights under Section 78 it is additionally required that the possession of the land shall be accompanied by significant cultivation thereof by the possessor (see Albeck, Land Limitation on pages 344-350; and Albeck and Fleischer, Land Laws in Israel, on pages 207-212). As shall be clarified below, the Appellants, at most, proved continuous possession of part of the Araqib 2 Lot, from 1936. This possession lasted at most until 1948, when the Al-Uqbi Tribe fought alongside the Arab armies and dispersed, after the State of Israel’s victory, to Gaza and to Jordan (see the testimony of Muhammed Al-Grinawi, on pages 53-55 and 60-61 of the minutes of the hearing dated June 7, 2009; the testimony of Ahmad Abu Siam, ibid, on pages 74-75; the testimony of Ismaeel Muhammed Salem Al-Uqbi, ibid, on pages 89-94 and 102-103; the testimony of Younes Salem Muhammed Al-Uqbi, ibid, page 114; the testimony of Muhammed Al-Asibi, on pages 50 and 55 of the minutes of the hearing dated October 26, 2009; also see the opinion of Prof. Kark dated January 31, 2010, Res/C1, pages 20-22 and the references therein). Therefore, it was not proven that the Appellants’ family possessed the Lots or any of them for the period of time that is required in order to acquire rights by virtue of a period of prescription. Additionally, the Appellants did not succeed in proving that they cultivated the Lots continuously throughout the said required period of time, and as shall be clarified below, at most the Appellants proved partial and interrupted cultivation of some of the Lots in certain years.

50.  In light of additional arguments that the Appellants raised in this context, it is important to emphasize that even if we shall assume for the benefit of the Appellants that the Al-Uqbi Tribe indeed lived and roamed in the areas of the Lots for many years, this fact does not entitle it to rights in and to these Lots by virtue of a period of prescription. Support of this can be found in the judgment of the Mandate Supreme Court in the matter of Village Settlement Committee of Arab en Nufei’at v. Samaonov, 8 P.L.R. 165 (1941) (hereinafter: the “Samaonov Case”), where it was explicitly ruled that the Bedouin lifestyle, in the framework of which Bedouin tribes roam from one tract of land to another, in accordance with the seasons of the years, does not entitle rights by virtue of a period of prescription:

It is clear that grazing and wood cutting are rights which are recognized by the law, but I do not think that their exercise gives any right to the land itself. As to camping, whether or not the pitching of tents on the same spot for many years would give rise to prescriptive rights it is not necessary to determine, as in this case the Settlement Officer found that the tents were pitched in the most convenient and accessible places according to the seasons and occupations followed at time. I do not think that by moving tents hither and thither over a tract of land the owners of the tents can establish prescriptive title to the land.

      An appeal on the judgment in the Samaonov case was filed to the Privy Council, which denied the appeal and ruled that it is inappropriate to interfere in the Mandate Supreme Court’s judgment (see P.C.A. 17/44 The Village Settlement Committee of Arab En Nufei’at v. Aharon Samaonov (1944); also see in this matter, Haim Sandberg, The Land of the State of Israel – Zionism and Post-Zionism, on pages 144-146 (2007)).

Interim summary – The Appellants did not prove that the Lots were Miri-classified Lots. And even had they proven that, it would not have come to their aid, since they did not succeed in proving that they acquired rights therein, not even by virtue of a period of prescription.

Were the Lots Mewat-Classified Land?

51.  As was mentioned, the State claimed that the Lots were and always had been classified as Mewat land, and this claim was accepted by the District Court. In the appeal, the Appellants reiterate their claim that the terms and conditions that are required in order to classify the Lots as Mewat land were not proven, and they further argue that the burden of persuasion in this matter lies on the State due to the fact that it acted with lack of good faith and delayed bringing the conflicting claims that were filed with respect to the Lots before the court to be ruled upon, and thus caused them evidential damage.

This argument was rightfully rejected by the court of first instance.

Section 22 of the Settlement Ordinance prescribes that “The State’s rights in and to the land shall be examined and settled regardless of whether or not they were officially claimed, and any right in and to land that was not proven in the claim of another, shall be registered in the name of the State“. Therefore, the State is not required to prove its rights in and to the land in the framework of the settlement proceedings, and if and to the extent the claimant did not prove that he has rights in and to the land that is being claimed, it shall be registered in the name of the State (see CA 182/54 The Custodian for Absentees’ Property v. David, IsrSC 10 776, 782-783 (1956)). The Appellants’ claim, that the State acted in bad faith by delaying the transfer to judicial ruling of the claims that Appellant 1 filed with respect to the Lots and in doing so caused them evidential damage, lacks substance. First, nothing prevented the Appellants from filing the claims on their own to be examined by the court, as they eventually indeed did in 2006. Second, the State explained that, on its part, it refrained for years from transferring claims to be ruled upon judicially due to a policy of preferring to promote compromise agreements in land settlement claims in the Negev rather than judicial rulings (see the testimony of Ms. Chagit Manos, Claims Controller at the Beer-Sheva Land Rights Settlement Office, page 6, lines 11-12 of the minutes of the hearing dated July 7, 2010). This is a worthy policy in land settlement cases, in general, and in land settlement cases in the Negev, in particular, and therefore, this should not be held against the State (see Sandberg, Land Title Settlement in the Land of Israel, on pages 294-295 regarding the advantages of the approach that prefers a compromise in settlement claims rather than a judicial ruling). In the case at hand, the Appellants rejected various compromise offers that the State raised in accordance with the Israel Land Administration’s decisions before and after the claims were filed thereby with the court (regarding this matter see recent decision 1383 of the Israel Land Council “Land Prices, Compensation and Building Lots for Bedouin in the Negev” (September 29, 2014)).

52.  Did the court of first instance err when it ruled that the Lots are Mewat land? Section 6 of the Ottoman Land Code defines Mewat land:

Dead land (mevat) is land which is occupied by no one, and has not been left for the use of the public. It is such as lies at such a distance from a village or town from which a loud human voice cannot make itself heard at the nearest point where there are inhabited places, that is a mile and a half, or about half an hour’s distance from such (Tute, The Ottoman Land Laws, on page 15)

Section 103 of the Ottoman Land Code further rules in this matter that:

The expression dead land (mevat) means vacant (khali) land, such as mountains, rocky places, stony fields, pernallik and grazing ground which is not in possession of anyone by title deed nor assigned ab antiquo to the use of inhabitants or a town or village, and lies at such a distance from towns and villages from which a human voice cannot be heard at the nearest inhabited place. Anyone who is in need of such land can with the leave of the Official plough it up gratuitously and cultivate it on the condition that the legal ownership (raqabe) shall belong to the Treasury The provisions of the law relating to other cultivated land shall be applicable to this kind of land also. Provided that if any one after getting leave to cultivate such land, and having had it granted to him leaves it as it is for three consecutive years without valid excuse, it shall be given to another. But if anyone has broken up and cultivated land of this kind without leave, there shall be exacted from him payment or the tapou value of the piece of land which he has cultivated and it shall be granted to him by the issue of a title deed (ibid, on page 97).

53.  It emerges from the integration of that stated in these sections, that in order for land to be deemed Mewat, three cumulative terms and conditions must apply with respect thereto: First, that it is not possessed by anyone and was not assigned to anyone by means of a title deed (Kushan) (“is occupied by no one” [Section 6]; “is not in possession of anyone by title deed” [Section 103]); Second, that it was not assigned for public use (“not been left for the use of the public” [Section 6]; “nor assigned ab antiquo to the use of inhabitants or a town or village” [Section 103]); Third, that it is barren and is more than a mile and half (2.2185 km) away from a city or a village (“vacant … land” [Section 103]; “at such a distance from a village or town… that is a mile and a half” [Section 6]; for this matter see CA 518/61 The State of Israel v. Badran,IsrSC 16(3) 1717, on pages 1719-1720 (1962) (hereinafter: the “Badran Case”); see also the Huashela Case, on pages 147-149). The first condition is meant to exclude lands that are possessed by virtue of a Kushan, i.e. Miri and Mulk lands, from the definition of Mewat, while the second condition is meant to exclude lands that were assigned for public use, i.e. Matruka land, from the Mewat lands. The third condition, that the Mewat land must be more than a mile and a half away from a town or a village is meant to exclude grazing lands that are adjacent to villages and are used by their residents, even without having been assigned thereto, and which, as I shall specify below, constitute a type of Matruka (see Tute, The Ottoman Lands Laws, on pages 15 and 97; Doukhan, Land Laws in Israel, on page 48; Albeck and Fleischer, Land Laws in Israel, on pages 68-71; and Ben Shemesh, Land Legislation in Israel, pages 37-38).

As was specified in paragraphs 45-50 above, the Appellants did not prove that at hand are Miri-classified Lots, and did not claim that at hand is Mulk-classified land. Therefore, for the purpose of classifying them as Mewat lands, the first condition that is prescribed in Sections 6 and 103 of the Ottoman Land Code, is met. What remains to be discussed in this context is the fulfillment of the second and third conditions, and for the sake of the convenience of the discussion, we shall first address the question of whether the third condition is met.

The Fulfillment of the Third Condition: The Lots’ Distance from a “Town or a Village”

54.  The Appellants claim that the Lots do not meet the third condition that Mewat land must be more than a mile and half away from a town or a village. According to them, there was an ancient Bedouin town of the Al-Uqbi Tribe on the Lots, and the Al-Uqbi tribe resided thereon and possessed them in a permanent manner. This claim was rejected by the court of first instance, which ruled that it was not proven that the Al-Uqbi Tribe ever resided in the area of the Lots (page 23 of the judgment). This ruling is too sweeping, and justifies our intervention on several grounds. First, it appears that the State neither disputes the fact that the Al-Uqbi Tribe roamed in the areas of the Lots nor the fact that it is possible that it used them during certain periods of time for grazing and camping (see paragraphs 27 and 79 of its summary arguments). Second, it appears that there is no dispute that the cultivations visible in the 1945 aerial photographs were the products of Tribal activity. And third, it emerges from the evidence that was presented, including various sources and testimonies of the Tribe’s Elders, that there is substance to the Appellants’ claim that members of their Tribe customarily roamed in the area of the Araqib Lots (see the testimony of Muhammed Abu Jaber, on pages 4-5 of the minutes of the hearing dated June 7, 2009; the testimony of Younes Al-Uqbi, ibid, on pages 107-108; and the testimony of Muhammed Al-Asibi on page 51 of the minutes of the hearing dated October 26, 2009). It further emerges from the sources to which the Appellants refer that in addition to the Araqib Lots, the Tribe also customarily roamed in the area of the Zahliqa Lots (see Aref Al-Aref, The History of Beer Sheva and its Tribes – The Bedouin Tribes in the Beer Sheva District, on pages 100-103 (translated by: M. Kapeliuk, 2000), attached as Supporting Reference 31 of the Appellants’ Supporting References Binder (hereinafter: the “Bedouin Tribes“); and Yosef Braslavi (Braslavsky) Do You Know The Land, Volume B The Negev Land (The Northern Negev), on pages 270-271 (5716); attached as Supporting Reference 32 of the Appellants’ Supporting References Binder).

55.  However, while it emerges from the evidence stated above that, during certain periods, the Tribe customarily roamed in the area of the Lots, this is not sufficient to substantiate the Appellants’ claim that there existed, simultaneous with the periods in which the Tribe roamed to other places, an ancient Bedouin town in which the Tribe resided in a permanent manner. Contrary to that which was alleged by the Appellants, no physical evidence was found in the Lots that attest to the existence of an ancient Bedouin town at the location. As the court of first instance stated, all of the sites (excluding one) that the surveyor Abu Friecha marked on the map, that the Appellants submitted and that according to them attest to Bedouin settlement in the area of the Lots, are in fact outside of the boundaries of the Lots (see the testimony of Abu Friecha on page 63, lines 12-17 of the minutes of the hearing dated February 24, 2010). Additionally, it emerges from the opinion and the testimony of the interpreter Ben Yosef that, according to the aerial photograph of the Lots from 1945, there is one house in the Lots, on Sharia 133 Lot, with respect to which it was not clarified when it was built and to whom it belonged, and an additional house on the Araqib 2 Lot with respect to which the Tribe’s Elders testified that it belongs to Appellant 1, and the Appellants themselves claim that it was built in 1936, meaning, during the Mandate period (see paragraph 14 of their summary arguments in the Appeal). Other than that, the aerial photograph from 1945 does not include any other characteristics that attest to the existence of a permanent Bedouin town in the area of the Lots. It shall be emphasized that according to the testimony of interpreter Ben Yosef, the water pits and the camps that were sighted in the photograph are all outside of the area of the Lots (see pages 12-17 of the opinion of Mr. Ben Yosef, submitted as Exhibit App/3; and his testimony on page 41, line 21 until page 42 line 8 of the minutes of the hearing dated February 24, 2010). It should be further noted that Ben Yosef clarified in his testimony that, from his experience, the settlement that appears in the 1945 aerial photograph outside of the boundaries of the Lots is also not a permanent, but rather a nomadic settlement (ibid, on page 19, lines 5-6, and page 20, lines 6-12).

56.  The historical certificates and documents upon which Prof. Yiftachel wishes to support his opinion with respect to the existence of an ancient Bedouin town in the area of the Lots, also do not substantiate this conclusion: Annexes 12 and 17 of Prof. Yiftachel’s opinion are a copy of a document that is alleged to constitute a directive of the Military Administration to the members of the Appellants’ tribe to concentrate in the “original location“; Annex 18 of the opinion is a copy of a document that is alleged to be a letter from the office of the Military Governor of the Negev to the Sheikh of the Al-Uqbi Tribe in which he is required to submit a report regarding the lands that are cultivated by the members of the Tribe, and the owners of which are not present within the borders of Israel; Annex 19 is a document that is alleged to be Appellant 10’s school report card from 1950 at the “Bnei Uqbi” School; Annex 22 is a copy of a handwritten note which was allegedly written by the representative of the Military Administration in the Negev, in which he specified the areas that would be handed over to the Tribe “until the members of the Bnei Uqba Tribe return to their lands“; Annex 23 is a copy of a letter which was allegedly sent to Appellant 1 from the Custodian of Absentees’ Property, in which he was required to deliver agricultural produce that belongs to someone else; Annexes 24 and 25 are illegible copies of maps, the original of which is unclear as regards the question of where the Lots of the claim appear thereon, if at all. With respect to the map that was attached as Annex 24, it should be noted that Prof. Kark states in her opinion that the name of the Al-Uqbi Tribe appears thereon at a location that is distant from the Lots, while the names of other tribes are written in the Lots (see Res/C1, on page 17); Annex 30 is a copy of a handwritten letter that was allegedly sent by the Sheikh of the Al-Uqbi Tribe in which he complains about having been taxed twice for the same crops. Other than Annex 18 (which was also submitted as Exhibit App/6 in the Appeal), no translation was attached to any of the Annexes that were specified above and no confirmation or verification was presented with respect to any of the Annexes, attesting that they are authentic documents. In any event, even if I shall assume for the benefit of the Appellants that these are authentic documents, and that the contents thereof are as they are alleged to be, none of these documents substantiates the existence of a permanent Bedouin town in the area of the Lots (and in this context, also see Prof. Kark’s reference to the annexes that were mentioned in pages 17-18 of her opinion (Res/C1).

57.  An additional document upon which Prof. Yiftachel relies in support of the claim regarding the existence of a Bedouin town on the Lots, is a list of the names of places in Palestine that the Mandate government published in 1940 (A Gazetteer of Place Names Which Appear in the Small Scale Maps of Palestine and Trans-Jordan (1940); Annex 56 of his opinion; hereinafter: the “Names List“). The name of a place called El-Araqib appears in this list. The Appellants did not bother to attach an expert opinion that clarifies whether the coordinates appearing next to the name El-Araqib on the Names List corresponds with the actual locations of the Lots or of any of them. However, even assuming that the location appearing in the Names List as El-Araqib is located in the area of the Lots, this list does not support the claim that this it is a permanent town. To the contrary. In the prologue to the Names List it is written that this list also specifies unsettled places that appear on the map. It is further stated in the prologue that the notation “Vill.Unit” will appear alongside places that are officially recognized by the government as a town (a ‘Village Unit’) for tax and administration purposes, along with a notation of the area of the town and an estimation of the number of residents residing therein. It is evident that such a notation does not appear in the list alongside the name “El-Araqib” nor is its area nor the number of residents residing therein stated with respect thereto. All that is stated alongside the name “El-Araqib” on the list is that it is a “locality”, a note that does not necessarily indicate that it is a settled area (regarding this matter, see Prof. Kark’s testimony on page 110-114 of the minutes of the hearing dated May 6, 2010). An undated list of tithe tax payers (Annex 35 of the opinion), which is mentioned in Prof. Yiftachel’s opinion as an additional document that supports his position that there was an ancient permanent Bedouin town on the Lots, also does not attest to this. Prof. Yiftachel states that “El-Araqib” is written in that document in the column designated for specifying the town. However, this alone is not enough to draw a conclusion that a permanent Bedouin town existed at that location, especially given the fact that the other evidence that we reviewed thus far, does not support this conclusion. Therefore one can assume that the words “El-Araqib” were meant to describe the area of the crops for which the tithe tax was collected pursuant to such list, and the existence of a permanent town on the Lots cannot be inferred therefrom. An additional piece of evidence upon which Prof. Yiftachel supports his claim regarding the existence of a permanent town in the Lots is a voter’s notice which was sent to Appellant 1 in 1949, upon which “El-Araqib” was written in the slot designated for specifying the “name of the city or the village” (Exhibit App/7 in the Appeal). As was already noted, Appellant 1 built his house on the Araqib 2 Lot in 1936, and therefore it can be assumed that the voter’s notice stated “El-Araqib” for the purpose of identifying the location where he resides. However, one house is not a town, and the existence of a town cannot be inferred from one voter’s notice. Therefore, this document also does not substantiate the claim that the Appellants raised in this matter.

58.  Hence, the documents and the sources upon which Prof. Yiftachel relied are not sufficient to substantiate the Appellants’ claim regarding the existence of a permanent Bedouin town on the Lots. A similar conclusion also emerges from the testimonies of the Tribe’s Elders that the only permanent characteristic that appears at the site is Appellant 1’s house on the Araqib 2 Lot, (see the testimony of Muhammed Abdalla Abu-Jaber on pages 4-17 of the minutes of the hearing dated June 7, 2009; also see the testimony of Elayn Muhammed Al-Grinawi, ibid, on pages 43-47; the testimony of Ahmed Jachada Abu Siam, ibid, on pages 53-65; and the testimony of Muhammed Al-Asibi, on pages 42-52 of the minutes of the hearing dated October 26, 2009, who in their testimonies do not mention any characteristic, other than Appellant 1’s house, of permanent settlement in the Lots). Some of the witnesses testified as to the existence of houses and water pits that were dug in the area of the Araqib Lots (see, for example, the testimony of Younes Salem Muhammed Al-Uqbi, on page 112 of the minutes of the hearing dated June 7, 2009). However, considering the fact that in the aerial photograph from 1945 no houses or water pits are seen within the boundaries of the Lots, and considering the fact that according to the Appellants themselves, the Tribe lived and roamed in a wide tract of land of 19,000 dunam, it can be assumed that the pits to which these witnesses refer are located outside of the area of the Lots. It should be further noted that contrary to Prof. Yiftachel’s claim that there was a school building on the Araqib Lots where the Tribe’s children studied, it emerges from the testimonies of the Tribe’s Elders that there was no school on these Lots: Witnesses Ismaeel Al-Uqbi and Muhammed Al-Asibi testified that the schooling took place at Appellant 1’s house on the Araqib 2 Lot (see page 89 of the minutes of the hearing dated June 7, 2009, and pages 45-46 of the minutes of the hearing dated October 26, 2009), while witnesses Muhammed Al-Grinawi and Younes Salem Muhammed Al-Uqbi testified that the children of the Tribe did not study in the Araqib area at all but rather in neighboring villages (see pages 73 and 112 of the minutes of the hearing dated June 7, 2009).

59.  In contrast, and as the court of first instance stated, in the framework of Prof. Kark’s opinion the State presented abundant evidence attesting to the fact that there never was a permanent Bedouin town on the Lots and to the fact that the Lots were not cultivated between 1858 and 1921. The claims raised by the Appellants against Prof. Kark’s opinion cannot be accepted, and contrary to that which is alleged by them, her opinion does not exclusively rely on the writings of researchers who travelled the Negev in the past but rather on a wide variety of reliable sources, including: land surveys, historical maps and various official certificates that relate to the area of the Lots from which it emerges that the Lots were not settled and cultivated between 1858-1921. Fault should not be found in Prof. Kark’s reliance on the reports of various researchers who travelled in the Negev during the previous centuries (with respect to an expert’s reliance of professional literature, see CrimA 889/79 Hemo v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 36(4), 479 (1982), in paragraph 13 of the judgment of Justice M. Ben Porat), and as the court of first instance rightly stated, Prof. Yiftachel also extensively relied on the reports of various western researchers who passed through the Negev during the last centuries, insofar as they supported his arguments. As is recalled, the court of first instance preferred Prof. Kark’s opinion over that of Prof. Yiftachel’s based on the reasons that were specified above in the chapter that describes its judgment, and we have not found it appropriate to intervene therewith, both because this is a matter in which an appeal instance does not customarily intervene (see, for example, CA 4126/05 Chagazi v. Amutat Va’ad Edat Hasfaradim (June 20, 2006), in paragraph 11; CA 5131/10 Azimov v. Binyamini (March 7, 2013), paragraph 12), and because we have found that in the case at hand the underlying reasons justify this preference.

60.  Due to all of the reasons upon which we have elaborated above, it is to be ruled that although the Al-Uqbi Tribe roamed in the area of the Lots and used them during certain periods of time for camping, grazing and seasonal agriculture, there was no permanent town of the Tribe on the Lots, neither at the time the Ottoman Land Code was legislated (1858) nor thereafter. Therefore the Appellants’ claim that with respect to the Lots, the third condition among the conditions prescribed in Sections 6 and 103 of the Ottoman Land Code for the purpose of classifying lands as Mewat is not met, is to be rejected. However, the Appellants do not suffice with the claim that was rejected regarding the existence of a permanent town. In the alternative, they further claim that said third condition is not met, even if there was no permanent town in the area of the Lots in the relevant years, since it is sufficient that the Tribe maintained nomadic settlement at the location for the condition prescribed in Sections 6 and 103 of the Ottoman Land Code, that Mewat land must be more than a mile and half away from a city or a village, to not be fulfilled. They further claim that even if the Lots were barren and not settled at the time of the legislation of the Ottoman Land Code, this does not mean that they are Mewat lands, since the examination of the Lots’ distance from a town should be done at the time the land settlement proceedings take place. According to them, the interpretation that the land’s classification is determined at the time of the legislation of the Ottoman Land Code and remains set from that time onwards is not logical, and a reasonable interpretation of the Ottoman Land Code should consider the changes that occurred over the years in the area of the Lots. The Appellants are aware of the fact that these claims were rejected in the past by this court, which ruled that the location of a town pursuant to Sections 6 and 103 of the Ottoman Land Code is only a permanent town and also a permanent town that existed at the time of the legislation of the Ottoman Land Code (see the Badran Case, on page 1720; the Huashela Case, in paragraph 4 of the judgment of Justice A. Chalima; and CA 55/63 Suaed v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 20(2) 3 (1966)). However, the Appellants claim that this interpretation is erroneous and discriminatory and they request that it be revisited.

61.  After reviewing the arguments raised by the Appellants in both of these matters, I reached the conclusion that it is inappropriate to change the precedents from the Badran Case and in the Huashela Case regarding the type of settlement to which the third condition, that is prescribed in Sections 6 and 103 of the Ottoman Land Code for the purpose of classifying Mewat land, relates, nor with respect to the effective date for the examination of the distance between the land being classified and the location of a town.

In the translation by Tute and Ben Shemesh of Sections 6 and 103 of the Ottoman Land Code, the term “city or village” was used, and this is also the case in the translation by Doukhan of Section 6 (see Tute, The Ottoman Land Laws, on pages 15 and 97; Ben Shemesh, Land Legislation in Israel, on pages 37 and 147; and Doukhan, The Land Laws in Israel, on page 466; however in his translation of Section 103 of the Ottoman Land Code, Doukhan uses the term “town”: ibid, on page 480). It is difficult to see how a nomadic settlement can be seen as “city or village.” As the State notes, the Bedouin lifestyle was not foreign to the Ottoman legislator, and it appears that if it had been its intention to include nomadic Bedouin settlement among the towns for which the surrounding lands are not deemed Mewat lands, it is presumed that it would have used the appropriate terms to do so and not terms that clearly describe permanent settlement. The purpose that the Appellants attribute to the Ottoman legislator in this context was also not proven at all. According to them, nomadic Bedouin settlement should also be included among the definition of the towns with respect to which the surrounding lands are not Mewat, because the legislator wanted “to encourage people to cultivate lands that are distant from towns” (paragraph 38 of their summary arguments). This claim does not bear any substance, and is actually contrary to the purpose for which Section 103 of the Ottoman Land Code was legislated, to which I shall refer below, which was meant to incentivize cultivating and reviving Mewat land that was distant from places of settlement and which, for example, was used for nomadic settlement, by allowing the person who revived Mewat land to acquire rights therein and thereto.

62.  The Appellants wish to find support for the interpretation they suggest in the fact that the Village Administration Ordinance, 1944, the Mandate Settlement Ordinance, and the Settlement Ordinance that replaced it, define the term “village” also as a “tribal area”. One cannot simply carry the definition of the term “village” in acts of legislation of the Mandate government and of the State of Israel, that were intended for different purposes, to the distinct context of interpreting the Ottoman Land Code. As the State mentions, the definition of the term “village” in the acts of legislation to which the Appellants refer was meant for administrative purposes and did not determine substantive rights in and to land. Therefore, it appears that there is no foundation for the interpretation the Appellants suggest for Sections 6 and 103 of the Ottoman Land Code, relying upon these acts of legislation. Additionally, it emerges from various official publications of the Mandate government that even it interpreted the terms “city or village” in Sections 6 and 103 of the Ottoman Land Code as relating only to permanent towns. Thus, in an official notice that the Mandate government published on November 10, 1921, regarding “Determining the Boundaries of the Government’s Lands” (published in the Official Gazette 56, page 9, 1921) it was stated that a committee shall be established to determine and mark the borders of the Government’s lands in the country. In Section 4 of the notice it was written that “all of the abandoned lands, with respect to which there are no title deeds and which were not delivered to the residents of any place or village, and that are at such a distance from the last house of the place or village from which a human voice cannot be heard, shall be marked by the committee as Mewat lands” (my emphasis; ibid, on page 10). Hence, even the Mandate government did not consider nomadic settlement as a town for which the adjacent lands are not Mewat lands.

63.  As mentioned, an additional claim that the Appellants raised is the claim that the date when the status of the land should be examined for the purpose of its classification under the Ottoman Land Code is that date when the settlement proceedings take place and not the date when the law was legislated. This claim is also to be rejected. Contrary to Miri lands, for which the Ottoman legislator made sure to prescribe provisions that arrange their status upon the change of the nature of the land (see, for example, Sections 5 and 6 of the Law of Possession of Real Estate from 1331 of the Hijra (1913) and Sections 44, 82 and 89 of the Lands Code; for more on this matter see Goadby and Doukhan, Land Laws of Palestine, on pages 29-32; and Tute, The Ottoman Land Laws, on pages 2, 6-7 and 169-170), similar provisions were not prescribed for Mewat lands. Therefore, there is no reference in the Ottoman Land Code to the impact of the expansion of towns or of the establishment of new towns on the classification of the lands adjacent thereto. Tute wrote about this as follows:

The Land Code (vide Art. 31) did not contemplate the extension of the inhabited sites which were in existence when it was passed. It was not therefore foreseen that the extension of those sites would create difficulties. Their rapid growth in recent years brings them continually nearer to the former Mewat area, and, under the definition we are discussing, must result in a progressive curtailment of that area. The process, at the same time, brings into existence an indeterminate class or land, which was formerly Mewat. On this area which is neither Mewat, Mirie, nor assigned pasture, squatters are likely to settle, against whom the present law gives the State no rights, other than those conferred by a strict enforcement of the prohibition of building contained in Art. 31. Such land cannot regarded (under Art. 105) as unassigned pasture, because, ex hypothsi, it lies outside the boundaries of any town or village (Tute, The Ottoman Land Laws, page 16).

Further on, he adds as follows:

The Code does not contemplate any great extension or the village sites which existed when it was framed (Vide art. 31). Of late years the sites of many towns and villages have, however, been greatly extended, and new inhabited-sites have been formed. This means that the limits or the Mewat have retreated with the advance or habitation. The process results in the creation of intermediate land which cannot be brought under any of the classes dealt with by the Code. As the rakaba of such land has never been transferred it apparently remains with the State. It might however be held that, under the conditions referred to, the boundaries of towns or villages adjoining the Mewat must be held to enlarge with the area reachable by the human voice. Whatever view is taken the result is that the Mewat lands of the State are being steadily reduced by the subtraction or areas which, are often of great and increasing value. Legislation is clearly required to deal with the situation. (ibid, on page 98).

64.  Despite Tute’s position that the land created as a result of the expansion of the towns that existed at the time of the legislation of the Land Code towards the area of the Mewat lands is of an undefined class, it appears that it can be classified by means of interpretational principles which the Mandate courts applied when they dealt with such issues. Indeed, a situation in which certain land does not precisely correspond with one of the land definitions existing in the Ottoman Land Code, was quite common in the law that preceded the Land Law (see Ben Shemesh, Land Legislation in Israel, on page 27). In order to deal with this difficulty, the Mandate Supreme Court in Cyprus ruled in the matter of Kyriako v. Principal Forrest Officer, 3 C.L.R. 87 (1894) (hereinafter: the “Kyriako Case”) that in the event in which certain land does not precisely meet any of the land definitions existing in the Ottoman land legislation, the law that is most suitable should be applied thereto, and it should be classified as the class of land to which it is closest (ibid, on pages 94-95). According to Goadby and Doukhan, such land will generally be classified as Mewat (see Goadby and Doukhan, Land Laws of Palestine, on page 45; and see Doukhan, The Land Laws in Israel, on page 48).

It thus emerges that any land, which at the time of legislation of the Ottoman Land Code (1858) was Mewat land and was more than a mile and half away from a permanent town, shall generally continue to be deemed Mewat land and that the expansion and development of the towns in the years following the promulgation of the land legislation cannot change this. This is the case unless the land became a different class of land by way of revival or assignment by the authorities, pursuant to the provisions of the Ottoman Land Code.

In the case at hand it was proven that the Lots were not cultivated and were not near a permanent town when the Ottoman Land Code was legislated. Since the establishment of new, and particularly nomad, towns in their vicinity cannot change the classification relevant at the time of the legislation of the Ottoman Land Code, it is sufficient that the Lots were more than a mile and half from the site of a permanent town on the effective date in order to meet the third condition that is prescribed in Sections 6 and 103 of the Ottoman Land Code, for their classification as Mewat land.

The Fulfillment of the Second Condition: Are the Lots Not Matruka Land ?

65.  Once we have ruled that the third condition that is prescribed in Sections 6 and 103 of the Ottoman Land Code is met with respect to the Lots, it remains to be examined whether the second condition that is required in order to classify the land as Mewat – that it is not land that was assigned or left for public use, i.e. that it is not Matruka land – is met.

Section 5 of the Ottoman Land Code defines Matruka land as follows:

Land left for the use of public (metrouke) is of two kinds: –

(I) That which is left for the general use of the public, like a public highway for example;

(II) That which is assigned for the inhabitants generally of a village or town, or of several villages or towns grouped together, as for example pastures (meras) (Tute, The Ottoman Land Laws, page 14)

      The section distinguishes between two types of Matruka land: that which was “left” to the public and that which is assigned for the use of the inhabitants of a certain city or village. According to Tute, the difference in the terminology between the sections indicates that Matruka land for the use of the general public can become such by being left to the general public to be used even without it being explicitly assigned for its use. By contrast, Matruka land that is intended for the use of a specific population can only become Matruka land by way of explicit assignment by the authorities (ibid, on page 14 and 100; also see Goadby and Doukhan, Land Laws of Palestine, on page 56). This approach was rejected by the Mandate Supreme Court and also by this court which ruled that Matruka land that serves a specific public can also be created by way of an implied assignment if it was left to be used by that public, and there is no obligation that there by an explicit assignment by the authorities for such purpose (see Abu Hana v. The Attorney General, 5 P.L.R. 221, p. 224 (1938); CA 4/50 The Attorney General v. The Tel Aviv Municipality, IsrSC 5(1) 725, 726-727 (1951); CA 673/85 Peki’in Local Council v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 42(3) 627, 631-632 (1988) (hereinafter: the “Peki’in Case”)). As to the duration of the use of the land that is required in order for it to be considered Matruka, it was ruled that it is necessary to demonstrate use over such a long period of time that no one remembers when it began (ibid, and also see CA 24/57 Malakh v. Jandekalo, IsrSC 12 757 (1958), in paragraph 3 of the judgment of Deputy President S.Z. Cheshin). It was additionally clarified that use that began in our generation cannot be considered use ab antiquo, which can entitle collective rights of usage in and to land (see CA 504/61 The State of Israel v. The Tel Aviv-Jaffa Municipality, IsrSC 16 872, 875 (1962) (hereinafter: the “Tel Aviv Municipality Case”)). According to the interpretation of the Mandate Land Court when examining the duration of the use, each case must be examined as per its circumstances, however it is difficult to assume that use that is less than 100 years can entitle collective rights of usage in and to land (see Government of Palestine v. Village Settlement Committee of Sajad and Qazaza, 2 C.O.J. 672, p. 676 (L.C. Jaffa, 1933) (hereinafter: the “Qazaza Case”)). It was further ruled that the entitling use must be continuous and that different uses in different periods cannot be deemed one continuous use which has the power to make land become Matruka (see the Tel Aviv Municipality Case, on page 875; the Peki’in Case, on page 632; and CA 438/70 The Umm Al-Fahm Local Council v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 26(1) 813, 816 (1972)). It was additionally ruled that the use that creates Matruka land that was assigned to a specific public must be exclusive to such public, and if others could have also benefitted from the land in the same manner that the specific public claiming rights could have, it should not be deemed as land that was assigned for the use of that specific public (see the Tel Aviv Municipality case, on page 875, and the Peki’in case, on page 632).

66.  The Ottoman Land Code refers to a variety of public uses of Matruka land, such as: public roads, vehicle parking, gathering cattle, markets, granaries, worship areas, wood-chopping area and grazing areas (see Sections 91-101 of the Ottoman Land Code). The use relevant to the case at hand is grazing rights. The code distinguishes in this matter between grazing lands that were assigned ab antiquo to a specific public (Sections 97 and 101) and grazing lands (Section 105) that are within the boundaries of the village and that serve its residents for grazing even without having been assigned thereto (see Tute, The Ottoman Land Laws, on pages 92-94 and 100 regarding the said distinction between the types of grazing lands. Also see Tute’s approach, ibid on page 14, that lands that comply with the definition of the category of Section 105 of the code, are Mewat lands). Section 97 of the Land Code entitles the residents of the village to an exclusive right to graze their herds in areas that were assigned to them and to prevent strangers from doing so. By contrast, under Section 105 the residents of the village are only entitled to a right to graze in the areas that are adjacent to their village without paying taxes therefor, but it does not allow them to prevent strangers from grazing in these areas. Furthermore, while the grazing rights under Section 97 are protected against both private individuals and against the State, grazing rights under Section 105 do not prevent the State from expropriating the land or granting it to any person as Miri land (see The Attorney General v. Village Settlement Committee of El Maqaibla, 8 C.O.J. 485 (L.C. Nablus, 1935); and Tute, The Ottoman Land Code, on page 96). Section 101 refers to seasonal (summer and winter) grazing rights and it is unique in that in addition to use for grazing purposes, it also allows cultivating the lands with the consent of the residents to whom grazing rights were assigned. Section 101 indeed uses prohibitory language, and provides that one cannot cultivate the lands listed therein without the consent of the residents to which they were assigned. However it can be inferred that upon the consent of the residents, they can be cultivated (see Tute, The Ottoman Land Laws, on pages 95-96). With regard to Matruka lands that are designated for grazing under Section 101, Tute writes that it can be presumed that the Bedouin are the ones that have a special interest in the option of cultivating the land in addition to the grazing rights. In his words:

It may be presumed that the persons chiefly interested in the provisions of this article are members of the Bedouin tribes, who wander in search of pasture and water, and do a little sporadic cultivation when the rainfall permits (ibid, on page 96)

67.  Indeed, the possibility that various parts of the Negev lands were left ab antiquo for the use of various Bedouin tribes for purposes of camping, grazing and seasonal agriculture emerges from the evidence that was presented in this proceeding, and the possibility that the said Lots were also left for such use of the Al-Uqbi Tribe as Matruka lands, cannot be ruled out. However, the Appellants did not claim this in the court of first instance or in the appeal, and the relevant facts were not sufficiently examined or clarified in the framework of the discussions in this proceeding. In any event, even if the Appellants were able to substantiate an argument regarding the Lots being Matruka lands that had been left for the use of the Al-Uqbi Tribe under Section 101 of the Ottoman Land Code, this would not have aided the Appellants in any way, since rights in and to Matruka land are always collective rights and the Ottoman Land Code prohibits private individuals to acquire rights of their own in and to lands of such classification (see Goadby and Doukhan, Land Laws of Palestine, on pages 54-55). Section 101 of the Ottoman Land Code even explicitly provides that:

These summer and winter pastures cannot be bought and sold, nor can exclusive possession of them be given to anyone by title deed … (Tute, The Ottoman Land Laws, page 95).

The Ottoman Land Code further prescribes that it is not possible to use Matruka land for any purpose other than that for which it was assigned. Additionally, it was prohibited to turn the right to public use of Matruka land into private rights, and it is not possible to transfer the rights that were granted therein and thereto to private hands by way of distribution, sale or transfer. Additionally, it is not possible to acquire rights in and to Matruka land by virtue of a period or prescription (see Section 102 of the Ottoman Land Code; and Tute, The Ottoman Land Laws, on pages 15, 89, 93 and 96; Ben Shemesh, Land Legislation in Israel, on pages 164-174; Albeck and Fleischer, Land Laws in Israel, on pages 86-87). For these reasons, the classification of the Lots as Matruka lands, even if they were to be classified as such, does not in any way advance the matter of the Appellants who claim to have private rights in and to such Lots.

68.  In any event, the Appellants did not claim, and obviously did not prove, that the Lots were Matruka land. Therefore, and to the extent that this relates to the proceeding at hand, the second condition prescribed in Sections 6 and 103 of the Ottoman Land Code for the purpose of classifying the Lots as Mewat land, is also met. However, even given this conclusion, it is still necessary to examine the Appellants’ alternative argument that if, and to the extent it shall be ruled that, at hand are Mewat lands, they acquired rights in and to these Lots by virtue of the cultivation and revival thereof, pursuant to Section 103 of the Ottoman Land Code and the Mewat Ordinance.

Cultivation and Revival of Mewat Land

69.  Section 103 of the Ottoman Land Code indeed allows acquiring rights in and to Mewat land by virtue of its cultivation and revival, and prescribes that a person who revived Mewat land with the authorities’ permission shall receive a Kushan therefor, without consideration. Similarly, a person who revived Mewat land without permission by the authorities shall pay the value thereof and thereafter shall be given a Kushan therefor. In the past, prior to the legislation of the Land Code, a person who revived Mewat land with the authorities’ permission received it as fully owned Mulk. The Ottoman Land Code cancelled this option and thereafter Mewat land that was revived is inhabitable only as Miri (see Ben Shemesh, Land Legislation in Israel, page 148; Tute, The Ottoman Land Laws, on page 99). The Mandate courts ruled that in order to acquire rights in and to Mewat land by virtue of revival, continuous and effective cultivation thereof which leads to a clear and permanent change in its quality, is required (CA 226/42 Kirkorian v. The Attorney General, 10 P.L.R. 302, p. 304-305 (1943) (hereinafter: the “Kirkorian Case”); CA 153/46 Habbab v. Government of Palestine, 14 P.L.R. 337, p. 341 (1947) (hereinafter: the “Habbab Case”); also see Goadby and Doukhan, Land Laws of Palestine, pages 48-49; Doukhan, The Land Laws in Israel, on pages 51-52; Sandberg, Land Title Settlement in the Land of Israel, on pages 125-128). It was further ruled that the mere revival of land does not turn it into Miri and that it is necessary to such end to submit an application to register the land in the name of the reviver (see the Kirkorian Case, on page 304 and Doukhan, The Land Laws in Israel, on page 52).

This was the state of affairs until 1921, when the Mandate government legislated the Mewat Ordinance. This ordinance prescribes that anyone who revived Mewat land without the authorities’ permission, not only will not receive rights therein and thereto, but will be considered a trespasser and shall be subject to punishment. In this manner the Mewat Ordinance cancelled the possibility of acquiring rights in and to Mewat land by virtue of reviving it without the State’s permission. As to the revivals that were effected prior to its legislation, the ordinance prescribed a period of two months from the date of its publication during which a person who revived Mewat land without permission may report this to the register officer and request that the land be registered in his name. It should be noted that de facto, the Mandate authorities applied a lenient approach and agreed to recognized revivals that were effected before 1921 even if they were not reported within the period of time that the Mewat Ordinance allocated (see Goadby and Doukhan, Land Laws of Palestine, on page 47; and Doukhan, The Land Laws in Israel, on page 50).

70.  In order to substantiate their argument that they acquired rights in and to the Lots by virtue of cultivation and revival pursuant to Section 103 of the Ottoman Land Code, the Appellants would have had to first prove that their family cultivated the Lots continuously and effectively before 1921. Second, the Appellants would have had to prove to that the family approached the register officer pursuant to the Mewat Ordinance and requested to receive a registration certification of the Lots in their name by virtue of such cultivation and revival, and that they received such a certificate. The court of first instance examined the evidence that was presented thereto and ruled that the Appellants did not prove this. As a rule, the appeal court does not tend to intervene in factual rulings and reliability findings of the court of first instance, except in extraordinary cases of a conspicuous error, relating to evidence presented or to ignoring evidence which could change the conclusion the court of first instance reached (see CrimA 8146/09 Avshalom v. The State of Israel, paragraph 19 (September 8, 2011)). In the matter at hand, the Appellants claim that the court ignored evidence and many testimonies that were presented thereto which could lead to a different conclusion in the matter of the cultivation and the revival. Therefore, we were of the opinion in this case, and even only for the sake of caution, that it is appropriate to examine the entirety of the evidence to which the Appellants referred in this context. However, even after examining all of the evidence we are of the opinion that the conclusion reached by the court of first instance, that the Appellants failed to prove cultivation and revival of the Lots as Mewat lands at the relevant times, nor the existence of a registration certificate that was issued in the name of any member of the family under the Mewat Ordinance by virtue of said cultivation and revival, should remain unchanged.

71.  Prof. Yiftachel, the expert on behalf of the Appellants, states in his opinion that “The lands that are claimed at El-Araqib and Zahliqa […] are only a small part of wide areas that are estimated, according to oral testimonies, to be approximately 19,000 dunam, that were possessed and cultivated by the [Al-Uqbi] Tribe, during the first half of the 20^th century” (page 11 of the opinion). However, the Appellants did not present any objective evidence that attests to the fact that their family cultivated the Lots in dispute before 1945. In his opinion, Prof. Yiftachel states that these Lots were cultivated by the Al-Uqbi Tribe ab antiquo and he substantiates this based on various sources from which it emerges, in a general manner, that the Negev lands were cultivated by Bedouin tribes, and on sources from which it emerges that the Lots at hand are located in areas in which the Al-Uqbi Tribe customarily roamed. The earliest document which was attached to Prof. Yiftachel’s opinion, and which according to him relates to the Lots, is a receipt that relates to the years 1927-1928 for the payment of tithe taxes (Annex 6 of this opinion). Prof. Yiftachel further claims that the tax was paid for agricultural product from harvests on the Araqib Lots (three of the six Lots in dispute), which were cultivated by the Appellants’ family. The Appellants did not bother to attach a true and correct translation of the writing in the said receipt, but the examination thereof shows that the receipt form does not even have a slot in which the area relevant to such agricultural produce is to be stated and specified. Therefore, it cannot be ruled that the said receipt indeed relates to agricultural produce from the Araqib Lots (compare with the Huashela Case, on pages 153-154). This is the case even if we ignore the fact that at hand is only one receipt and the fact that this receipt is from 1927, meaning, six years after the effective date in the Mewat Ordinance (1921), after which it was no longer possible to acquire rights by virtue of Section 103 of the Ottoman Land Code through cultivation and revival. Additional evidence that Prof. Yiftachel presented of the cultivation of the Lots by the Appellants’ family are: a receipt of payment of tithe tax from 1950, which was also alleged to have been issued for taxes that were paid for agricultural produce from the Araqib Lots (Annex 19 of the opinion), and two additional receipts for payment for plowing, also from 1950 (Annex 21 of the opinion). Similar to the receipt from 1927, these receipts also do not state to which areas they refer, and in any event, given the fact that they relate to 1950, they cannot substantiate the Appellants’ claim regarding cultivation and revival of the Lots in the years that preceded 1921.

Prof. Yiftachel further attaches two lists of tithe tax payers to his opinion. One, which allegedly relates to the Araqib Lots, does not bear a date (Annex 35 of the opinion), and the other, which allegedly relates to the Zahliqa Lots (Sharia 133 and Sharia 134 Lots), which are adjacent to the Sharia 132 Lot, bears the date of September 22, 1937 (Annex 36 of the opinion). Due to the quality of the photocopy, and in the absence of a translation or an explanation regarding the contents of such documents, it is very difficult to understand what is said therein. From the little that was legible, it is not possible to reach the conclusion that Prof. Yiftachel reached regarding the Appellants’ family’s alleged continuous cultivation of the Lots which are the subject of the hearing during the relevant years.

72.  Additional documents which were attached by Prof. Yiftachel as Annex 13 of his opinion (two pages from the IDF Archives), also do not substantiate the cultivation and revival claim for the reasons specified in paragraph 47 above, where we addressed these documents in another context, and it is not necessary to reiterate what was stated. Additionally, Prof. Yiftachel sought to rely on aerial photographs of the Lots from 1945 and 1949 in order to substantiate the cultivation and revival claim. With respect to the aerial photograph from 1945, it emerges from Prof. Yiftachel’s opinion, and from the testimony and opinion of interpreter Ben Yosef, that a certain part of the Lots was indeed cultivated in that year. In the absence of a contradicting argument, I am willing to assume that the cultivation was effected by the members of the Al-Uqbi Tribe. An opinion of an interpreter was not attached to the aerial photograph from 1949, and in light of its poor quality it is difficult to infer anything therefrom. Therefore, we have at most a piece of evidence of cultivation of a certain part of the Lots in 1945, and this too is not intensive cultivation that covers the majority of the area of the Lots, as Prof. Yiftachel claims. The court of first instance elaborated on this when it addressed the testimony of interpreter Ben Yosef and said that the picture that emerges from his testimony is entirely different from the one that Prof. Yiftachel tried to portray. In the court’s words:

An entirely different picture emerged, of very partial cultivation [of the Lots], to say the least. Thus the percentage of cultivation in Araqib 6 is 21%, in Araqib 60 at a rate of 5%, where only 3 dunams are arable, the rest being the a channel of a river, ravines where no cultivation is possible at all, not even for grazing. He adds that 10% of the Araqib lands are unusable ravines. With regard to lot 6 he states that most of the area was expropriated by the military and military posts are stationed thereon. In Araqib 2, the entire area is being cultivated (page 26-27, 51). It is not clear from this data as to how Prof. Yiftachel saw intensive cultivation covering most of the Araqib lots – puzzling. The conclusion is that no basis of evidence has been presented of intensive cultivation, also not in 1945 (paragraph 19 of the judgment).

These conclusions of the court of first instance are well substantiated and it is inappropriate to intervene therein.

73.  The Appellants further refer in their arguments to the testimonies of the Tribe’s Elders and object to the fact that the court of first instance ignored these testimonies and did not attribute proper consideration thereto. A review of such testimonies indicates that it is difficult to substantiate the conclusions that the Appellants are trying to reach thereupon, since they are very general and sweeping testimonies with respect to the cultivation of the Lots in dispute which do not contain any precise identification of the Lots or of the years of cultivation or of the nature of the cultivation. As to the continuity of the cultivation, some of those witnesses confirmed that every few years there was a draught year in the Negev during which it was not possible to grow harvests in the ground (see, for example, the testimony of Muhammed Al-Grinawi, pages 52-53 and 62 of the minutes of the hearing dated June 7, 2009; the testimony of Ahmed Abu-Siam, ibid, on page 81; the testimony of Ismaeel Al-Uqbi, ibid on page 86; the testimony of Muhammed Al-Asibi, on pages 43 and 61 of the minutes of the meeting dated October 26, 2009). These testimonies correspond with that which is stated in Mandate government official reports, such as the Village Statistics of Palestine from 1945 (attached as Annex 54 of Prof. Yiftachel’s opinion; hereinafter: the “Village Statistics“), where it was written that:

The Beersheba sub-district has been inhabited from time immemorial by the Bedouin tribes of Palestine who cultivated what areas they were able to depending on the amount of rainfall in a given year. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that Arab practices have been to rotate cultivation, that is, land cultivated one year are left fallow for one or two subsequent years because of lack of fertilizer and sufficient rainfall (ibid, on page 35)

      Similar words were written in a letter dated March 13, 1937, that the Mandate government sent to the Jewish Agency regarding the Jewish settlement in the Negev lands (Annex 52 of the opinion; hereinafter: the “Mandate Government’s Letter to the Agency“), in which it was written that the Bedouin in the Beer Sheva region cultivate their lands only in “favorable seasons” (ibid, on page 3). Therefore, the testimonies of the Tribe’s Elders regarding cultivating lands in the Araqib area, even if we were to attribute them to the Lots, relates at most to certain years that were not explicitly defined. In any event it is not possible, from these testimonies, to draw the conclusion of continuous and effective cultivation in the relevant years, as required in order to prove the condition of cultivation and revival that grant rights in and to Mewat lands by virtue of Section 103 of the Ottoman Land Code. In this context it is not superfluous to note that contrary to the position of Prof. Yiftachel that the Bedouin engaged in agriculture ab antiquo, it emerges from Prof. Kark’s opinion and from the sources that were presented that this was a gradual and relatively late development. For example, Aref Al Aref, the historian and governor of the Beer Sheva District during the Mandate period, writes that “The Bedouin had extended periods of time during which they had no interest whatsoever in land. Moreover, they looked down on anyone connected with working the land, because they perceived that as a disruption and a distraction to the life of wandering and brigandage. It is possible that the foundation of their hatred of farmers and their lifestyle can be found here. However, at present [1933] the situation has changed and the Bedouin have begun leaning towards agriculture” (see Aref Al Aref, The Bedouin Tribes, attached as Supporting Reference 31 of the Appellants’ Supporting References Binder and cited on page 10 of Prof. Kark’s opinion dated January 31, 2010, which was submitted as Exhibit Res/C1).

74.  It emerges from the analysis of the evidence specified above that Prof. Yiftachel does not rely in his opinion on any objective evidence whatsoever that indicates that the Lots were cultivated by the Appellants’ family before 1945. However, even if I shall assume, for the benefit of the Appellants, that the receipts, the tax records, the aerial photographs and the rest of the testimonies and documents that were presented can prove the cultivation of the Lots in certain years, this is not sufficient to meet the condition of continuous and effective cultivation before 1921, as required under Section 103 of the Ottoman Land Code and under the Mewat Ordinance, in order to acquire rights in and to Mewat lands. Furthermore, even had the Appellants proven that they cultivated and revived the Lots before 1921, they would have had to further prove, as stated above, that they approached the register officer under the Mewat Ordinance within the time that was prescribed therein and requested to be registered as the owners of the Lots by virtue of said cultivation and revival, and that their said request was granted. The Appellants did not prove any of the above. This is sufficient to deny the Appellants’ alternative claim that if it shall be found that the Lots are Mewat lands, the Appellants’ family acquired rights therein and thereto by virtue of cultivation and revival. The Appellants are aware of this difficulty and therefore they further argue that the Mewat Ordinance was not applied to the Negev areas, and therefore, according to them, its provisions should not be considered when addressing the matter of the rights they acquired in and to the Lots by virtue of cultivation and revival. This argument is to be rejected since, as was already mentioned, the Mandate government perceived the Negev as area that is subject to its sovereignty, to which the laws it legislated, including the Mewat Ordinance, apply.

The Appellants further argue in this context that the Mewat Ordinance was not de facto implemented, and that the Mandate government allowed the acquisition of rights in and to Mewat lands by virtue of cultivation and revival, without the authorities’ permission, even after the legislation of the Mewat Ordinance in 1921. They refer in this matter to Mandate case-law rulings that support their said approach. However, a review of these judgments reveals that they do not support the Appellants’ claim: the judgments in the Habbab Case and in the Kirkorian Case addressed lands that were revived prior to 1921, and in the Kirkorian Case, the application to register the land in the name of the possessors was even filed within the time prescribed in the Mewat Ordinance. In the Habbab Case, the application was indeed not filed in time but since the register officer was willing to address it, the court ruled that it does not find it appropriate to be punctilious with the Appellants in this matter; the Genama Case also addressed land that was allegedly revived without the authorities’ permission prior to 1921 and the ordinance’s provisions were applied in that case; the judgment in the Debbas v. The Attorney General, 1 A.L.R. 205 (1943) also addressed land that was revived by the appellants therein and the Mandate government agreed to grant them rights therein and thereto in consideration for the payment of its value, even though they did not meet the conditions of the Mewat Ordinance. The settlement officer was of the opinion that since the Mewat Ordinance cancelled the appellants’ right to receive rights in and to the land by virtue of revival, he was not permitted to approve the settlement by and between them and the government. The Mandate Supreme Court ruled that the Mewat Ordinance does not deny the settlement officer’s authority to approve the agreement that the government made with the appellants.

Thus the Mewat Ordinance was binding and was implemented in the Mandate case rulings, inter alia, in respect to the Negev areas.

75.  An additional claim that the Appellants raise in an attempt to overcome their inability to present a registration certificate with respect to the Lots in accordance with the Mewat Ordinance, is the claim that Section 2 of the Mewat Ordinance should be interpreted in a manner that does not deny the rights of a person who revived Mewat land to acquire rights therein and thereto and to register them in his name, even upon the lapse of the two month period that was allocated in that section. According to the Appellants, the said Section 2 indeed prescribes that any person who revived Mewat land without the authorities’ permission must notify the register officer of this within two months from the date of publication of the ordinance and must submit an application to register the land in his name. However, so the Appellants claim, the section does not prescribe that a person who does not do so loses the rights he acquired in and to the land by virtue of revival. The Appellants find support for their claim in the fact that Section 2 of the Mewat Ordinance was omitted from the publication of the ordinance in the “Drayton” Compilation of Mandate Acts of Legislation. The interpretation of the Mewat Ordinance that is suggested by the Appellants was not accepted by this court, which explicitly ruled that any person who revived Mewat land prior to the publication of the Mewat Ordinance, but did not submit an application to register his rights at the date prescribed therein, is not entitled to register the land in his name. For example, it was ruled in CA 298/66 Kassis v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 21(1) 372 (1967), that:

In 1921 the Lands (Mewat) Ordinance was legislated, and granted a last opportunity to receive a Kushan on Mewat land, which had been revived earlier, by giving notice within two months from the date of publication of the ordinance. In the above CA 518/61 [1] it was explained that anyone who missed this time, can no longer benefit from registration of Mewat land in his name in a settlement, even if he revived the land prior to 1921, and even Section 54 of the Lands (Settling Property Rights) Ordinance will not come to his aid, since according to the last part of that section it does not apply to Mewat land. (ibid, on page 375; also see the Badran Case, on page 1721; and the Huashela Case, on page 147; also see Tute, The Ottoman Land Laws, on pages 16 and 98; Doukhan, Land Laws in the State of Israel, on page 49; Ben Shemesh, Land Legislation in Israel, on page 148; Albeck and Fleischer, Land Laws in Israel, on page 74).

As to the matter of the omission of Section 2 of the Ordinance from the Drayton Compilation of Acts of Legislation – no interpretational significance whatsoever should be attributed to this since an ordinance entitled the Revised Edition of the Laws Ordinance (No. 2), 1934 appears in the said compilation of acts of legislation and states various sections which shall be omitted from certain acts of legislation that are published in that compilation, including Section 2 of the Mewat Ordinance. However, this ordinance further rules that the said omission shall not derogate from the validity of the sections that were omitted.

76.  Finally it shall be noted that it is not possible to acquire rights in and to Mewat lands by virtue of a period of prescription (see Goadby and Doukhan, Land Laws of Palestine, on page 263; Tute, The Ottoman Land Laws, on page 16; and Albeck, Land Limitation, on page 344). Therefore and given the conclusion that according to the evidence that was presented in this proceeding, the Lots are Mewat land, the claim of prescription will also not come to the Appellants’ aid.

Did the Appellants Acquire Rights in and to the Lots by Virtue of Other Laws?

77.  All of the reasons specified above lead to the conclusion that the Appellants did not acquire rights in and to the Lots by virtue of the Mandate and Ottoman land laws which entitle them to compensation for their expropriation in 1954. Did the Appellants acquire rights in and to the Lots by virtue of other laws? In this context, the Appellants wish to lean on three systems of laws and claim that they generate rights in and to the Lots; one – the laws of equity; two – international law; and three – the basic laws. I shall begin by stating that I did not find that any of these laws support the Appellants’ claim regarding acquiring rights in and to the Lots.

The Laws of Equity

78.  The laws of equity are a legal doctrine originating from common law. This doctrine is meant to add rules and rights to written law, which are meant to prevent situations in which the application of the letter of the law leads to an unjust result that does not do justice with the spirit of the law and the principles of natural justice (see John Mcghee, SHELL’S EQUITY, p. 4 (13^th Edition, 2000)). The laws of equity were imported into our law by means of Article 46 of the King’s Order-in-Council, which prescribes that the Ottoman legislation and the Mandate government’s ordinances “shall be exercised in conformity with the substance of the common law, and the doctrines of equity in force in England.” In accordance with that stated in Article 46 of the King’s Order-in-Council, the Mandate courts, and the Israeli courts following their lead, applied the laws of equity in various fields, including in the field of land law (see, for example, Farouqi v. Ayoub, 4 P.L.R. 331, P. 339-338 (1937) ), which was delivered following the judgment of the King’s Council, in P.C.A. Faruqi v. Aiyub, 2 P.L.R. 390, p. 394 (1935)); For Israeli case-law that applies the laws of equity, see CA 400/67 Howard v. Melamed, IsrSC 22(1) 100 (1968); and for Israeli case las that applies the laws of equity in the field of land law, see, for example, CA 528/66 Stern v. The Lot 36 in Block 6127 Company Ltd., IsrSC 21(2) 342 (1967) (hereinafter: the “Stern Case”); and FH 30/67 Stern v. Stern, IsrSC 22(2) 36 (1968)).

In 1969 the Israeli Lands Law was legislated, with Section 161 entitled “Denial of Equity Rights” which prescribes that “From the commencement of this law, there is no right in and to land except under law“. In light of this provision, generally speaking, the application of the laws of equity in the field of land law came to an end (for a sweeping denial of equity rights in and to land, see LCA 178/70 Boker v. Anglo-Israel Management and Responsibility Company Ltd., IsrSC 25(2) 121 (1971), and for a certain softening of this case-law rule, see CA 189/95 Bank Otzar Hahayal Ltd. v. Aharonov, IsrSC 53(4) 199 (1999); see also in this matter Miguel Deutch, “The Fall (?) and Rise of the Equitable Right in Israeli Law: The Law in the Wake of Reality” Tel Aviv University Law Review (Iyunei Mishpat) 24(2) 313 (2000)). Having said that, it is important to note that in light of the provision of Section 44(a) of the Settlement Ordinance that provides that in the framework of settlement proceedings “The court will rule in accordance with the land laws that are in effect at the time of the discussion, and shall consider the rights in and to the land both in accordance with the law and in accordance with equity“, the English laws of equity have maintained a certain hold in Israeli law in this context.

79.  In the case at hand, the Lots were expropriated in 1954, meaning, prior to the legislation of the Land Law. According to the Appellants, if and to the extent their arguments regarding acquiring rights in and to the Lots pursuant to the Mandate and Ottoman laws shall be rejected, at the very least they possessed, at such time, rights by virtue of the laws of equity by virtue of the possession of the Lots and their alleged cultivation for years. As was already noted, the Appellants did not claim any compensation or alternative land by virtue of the Acquisition Law, but once we have ruled that the Lots were duly expropriated in 1954, even if the Appellants’ argument for rights by virtue of equity laws shall be accepted, at most it can lead to the conclusion that the Appellants are entitled to compensation or to alternative land by virtue of the Acquisition Law for the expropriation of the Lots. However, the Appellants’ claim that they acquired rights by virtue of equity laws cannot hold. As was specified above, the equity laws were meant to realize the spirit of the law and to lead to a just result in cases in which there is a lacuna or another legislative mishap. However, an equity right is not created ex nihilo and is not established when the alleged right contradicts an explicit provision in law. The Mandate Supreme Court elaborated on this in the Qazaza Case, ibid, on page 675, stating as follows:

It is perfectly true, as the Settlement Officer states, that an equitable right cannot be established in contradiction to the clearly expressed provisions of substantive law, or, in other words, that Equity cannot create a right that the Law prohibits.

Given the provisions of the Mewat Ordinance and the provisions of the Ottoman Land Code, upon which we elaborated above, which provide that the Appellants’ alleged rights of ownership of the Lots is rejected, they do not have any such right by virtue of the laws equity (compare CA 525/74 Issa v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 29(1) 729, 732 (1975)).

The International Law Regarding the Rights of Indigenous People

80.  According to the Appellants their rights in and to the Lots should be recognized by virtue of international law regarding the rights of indigenous people, either by way of interpreting the Mandate and Ottoman land laws and the evidence laws in accordance with the principles of international law which, would entitle them to such rights, or by way of recognizing their rights in and to the Lots by virtue of the principles of international law, even without linkage to such laws.

This argument is also to be rejected.

First, in order for a norm that originates in international law to be of binding validity it must be anchored in customary or treaty-based international law (see CA 24/48 Shimshon Batei Charoshet Eretz Yisraeliim Lemelet Portland Ltd. v. The Attorney General, IsrSC 4 143, 145-146 (1950) (hereinafter: the “Shimshon Case”); HCJ 69/81 Abu Eita v. The Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, IsrSC 37(2) 197 (1983), in paragraph 12 of the judgment of the Deputy President (as was his title at the time) M. Shamgar (hereinafter: the “Abu Eita Case”)). Second, if and to the extent the matter relates to norms that originate in treaty-based international law, it has been ruled that they are not binding unless they were adopted by or incorporated into an internal act of legislation (see CA 439/76 Histadrut Maccabi Israel, Merkaz Kupat Cholim Maccabi v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 31(1) 770, 777 (1977)). Third, with respect to norms that originate from customary international law, it is necessary to demonstrate that they are accepted and recognized by many countries in the world, to such an extent that no civilized country could ignore them (see the Shimshon Case, on page 146; the Abu Eita Case, in paragraph 12 of the judgment of Justice M. Shamgar; CrimA 336/61 Eichmann v. The Attorney General, IsrSC 16 2032, 2040-2041 (1962)), and it is necessary to demonstrate that there is no Israeli act of legislation that contradicts it (see HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel, IsrSC 62(1) 507 (2006), in paragraph 19 of the judgment of the (Ret.) President A. Barak; LCA 7092/94 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada v. Adelson, IsrSC 51(1) 625 (1997), in paragraph 11 of the judgment of President Barak). The burden of proof “regarding the existence of a custom that has the characteristics and the standing, as described […] lies on the party claiming it exists” (the Abu Eita Case in paragraph 14(b) of the judgment of the Justice M. Shamgar), and in the case at hand, on the Appellants.

81.  In all that relates to treaty-based international law regarding the rights of indigenous people, the State of Israel has not joined the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007, to which the Appellants referred, and did not adopt it in internal Israeli legislation. In any event, the declaration cannot come to the aid of the Appellants since declarations of the United Nations General Assembly do not have any binding force (see South West Africa, Second Phase, judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6, para. 98 pp. 50-51) and the Appellants did not refer to any international convention or international treaty that recognize the rights of indigenous people, and in any event it was not alleged that the State of Israel adopted such a convention or treaty. Additionally, no evidence was presented that the Mandate government or the Ottoman Empire recognized rights by virtue of indigenousness or adopted international norms, if and to the extent such existed, in acts of legislation in the relevant years. In other words, the Appellants did not prove the existence of a past or present binding norm in treaty-based international law that impacts their rights in and to the Lots. Additionally no binding norm was proven to exist in the past or at present under customary international law. The Appellants refer in their arguments in this context to an Australian judgment (Mabo v. Quinsland (No. 2) (1992) H.S.A. 23, 175 C.L.R.). This judgment also does not come to the Appellants’ aid. First, the Australian judgment is not sufficient to meet the required burden for substantiating the argument regarding the existence of a binding international norm under customary international law (with respect to the burden of proof regrading customary international law, see the Abu Eita Case, in paragraph 14 of the judgment of Justice M. Shamgar). Second, the Australian judgment recognized collective rights of an indigenous tribe in and to their lands, while in the case at hand the Appellants are claiming the Lots for themselves and claim to private ownership therein. For this reason as well the example is not relevant to the issue at hand. In light of this conclusion there is no need to address the various arguments that the parties raised regarding the question whether or not Bedouin qualify for the term “indigenous“.

Rights Under the Basic Rights

82.  According to the Appellants, the Mandate and Ottoman land laws that preceded the Land Law should be interpreted in the spirit of the basic laws and in accordance with constitutional principles of equality and protection of property. In the spirit of these principles, so the Appellants argue, their rights in and to the Lots should be recognized. Indeed, the approach that the basic laws serve as interpretational tools even with respect to legislation to which the preservation of laws paragraph applies is well grounded in the rulings of this court (and see recently in CA 5931/06 Husein v. Cohen (April 15, 2015)). However, the Appellants’ argument that the Mandate and Ottoman legislation should be interpreted in the spirit of the basic laws is flawed by its generality, and the rights that the Appellants are requesting by virtue of this claim do not coincide with the explicit provisions that are relevant to the case at hand in such legislation, upon which we elaborated above. Interpretation in the spirit of the basic laws is not a magic formula that can create rights ex nihilo, as President A. Barak has already said:

It is necessary to recognize that not in every case can a law be given a dynamic interpretation. It is not always possible, by way of interpretation, to adjust the law to the new social reality. There also are laws that have a “firm” purpose […] In these laws there is no option for dynamic interpretation. A loyal interpreter gives these laws an interpretation that will accord with their purpose at the time they were legislated (see Aharon Barak, Interpretation in Law – Statutory Interpretation, Volume 2, pages 272-274 (5743); and regarding the interpretation of the Acquisition Law, see and compare, the Jabareen Case, in paragraph 35 of the judgment of Justice Y. Danziger)

      It is undisputed that the matter of the Bedouin tribes’ rights in and to the Negev lands is a weighty matter for which a solution must be found, to the satisfaction of all of the parties, and the sooner that happens, the better. However, for the reasons specified above, the basic laws cannot impact explicit Mandate and Ottoman land legislation in a manner that creates property rights ex nihilo. Therefore the solution to this matter – a fortiori when the matter relates to private rights the Appellants are claiming – is not to be found in this channel.

Epilogue

83.  Due to all of the reasons specified above, I shall suggest to my colleagues to reject the Appellants’ arguments insofar as they relate to the validity of the 1954 expropriation of the Lots pursuant to the Acquisition Law. Additionally, I shall suggest to my colleagues to reject the Appellants’ arguments that relate to the rights they acquired in and to the Lots, whether by virtue of traditional Bedouin laws or by Mandate and Ottoman land legislation, or pursuant to the laws of equity, international law and the basic laws. I shall further suggest to my colleagues to rule that in light of these conclusions, the Appellants are not entitled to compensation or to alternative land under the Acquisition Law, due to the expropriation of these Lots.

If and to the extent my suggestion shall be accepted, we shall deny the appeal and consequently cancel the interim relief that was granted on May 6, 2013. However given the circumstances of the matter, I would further suggest to my colleagues that we not issue an order for expenses.

                                                                                                      JUSTICE

Justice S. Joubran:

I agree with the thorough judgment of my colleague Justice E. Hayut, and heartily join in her call to find a solution to the matter of the Bedouin tribes’ rights in and to the Negev lands (paragraph 82 of her judgment). The State should act promptly to find a way in which it will be possible to settle their rights in and to such lands.

                                                                                                      JUSTICE

Deputy President E. Rubinstein:

a.       I concur with the exhaustive and informative opinion of my colleague, Justice Hayut, who examined the issues of the appeal based on material from near and far, and from which much can be learned about the development of the land laws in the country since the Ottoman period and about their implementation in the Negev; both by the abundance of sources therein and in furtherance of the detailed judgment of the court of first instance (Deputy President Dovrat). It is regretful that the attempts to reach a compromise, which we encouraged, were not successful.

b.      The issues that arise in the judgment and in those similar thereto are among the most complex ones in the relations between the State of Israel and the Bedouin in the Negev and they began even before the establishment of the State. The legal situation which my colleague described in detail is suffused with these complexities. I share her conclusions and the need for solutions, and as is known, the State has, presently and in the past, applied various efforts that focused on the establishment of Bedouin towns and on other paths, but they have not been completed; also see just recently LCA 3094/11 Alkiyan v. The State of Israel (May 5, 2015), paragraphs w – x regarding the solutions that were proposed for the matter of the Bedouin settlement in the Negev and the supporting references there, including The Report of the Committee for Proposing Policy to Regulate the Settlement of Bedouin in the Negev (the Justice Goldberg Committee, 5769-2008), and the implementation efforts.

c.       It is not superfluous to note that problems that were encountered in the early years of the State also emerge at present (see, inter alia, C. Porat “The Development Policy and the Matter of Bedouin in the Negev in the State’s Early Years, 1948-1953” Reflections on the Resurrection of Israel (Iyunim Betkumat Yisrael), 7 (5757-1997), pages 389, and particularly 436-438; Havatzelet Yahel “Land Disputes between the Negev Bedouin and Israel”, Israel Studies 11(2) (2006), 1-22, and additional supporting references that were presented by my colleague in the Alkiyan Case; also see Arieh L. Avneri, The Jewish Settlement and the Claim of Dispossession (1878-1948) The Tabenkin Institute for Studies of the Kibbutz and the Labor Movement, 5740 pages 189-192, regarding the acquisition of lands in the Negev in the 1930’s and 1940’s, including the nature of the lands and the identity of the sellers, while stating that the bulk of the land that was acquired in the Negev was barren and inferior, and generally without tenants; also see ibid, pages 215-216, regarding the Negev development plan that was proposed in 1937. Also see G. Biger, A Multi-Bordered Land, The First One Hundred Years of Delineating the Borders of the Land of Israel, 1840-1947 (5761-2001) 212; David Ben-Gurion, The Renewed State of Israel A (1969), on pages 557-558, which describes the hopes for the development of the Negev to which he was especially devoted, and as is known he moved to Sdeh Boker as part of a message to the public. It appears that it emerges from the literature that the essence of the Bedouin experience was nomadic, and not “ordinary”, agriculture, even if there were exceptions, and we carefully listened to the Appellants’ arguments. Also see D. Ben Gurion The War Diary (The War of Independence) edited by G. Rivlin and E. Orren (5743-1982) B 525; and in another context see The War Diary A, 75). Having said that, it is clear that the ambition that the State develop the Negev for the benefit of the entire public, does not contradict the need to attend to the matter of the Bedouin and their rights.

d.      Regarding the adoption of customary and treaty-based international law by Israeli law, also see, in addition to the sources that my colleague presented, T. Broude “The Status of International Law in Domestic Law”, in International Law by R. Sabel with the participation of other authors (2^nd ed. 5770 – 2010), pages 71-75 and the supporting references there; also see R. Sabel “Citizenship and Human Rights” ibid, 205, 211.

e.       The settlement of the matter of the Bedouin in the Negev remains on the agenda and the problems have not ended, but the path to a solution, including with respect to the Appellants, is in the spirit of that which is stated in my colleague’s opinion; and one must hope that material and good-will solutions, will be found in a respectful manner and while applying broad mutual perspectives; see my paper “The Equality of Minorities in a Jewish and Democratic State” Zehuyot 3 (5773 – 2013) 141, 143-146.

Deputy President

It was decided as stated in the judgment of Justice E. Hayut.

Delivered on this 25^th day of Iyar, 5775 (May 14, 2015).

THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT            JUSTICE                    JUSTICE

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https://www.taayush.org/?p=867

Tuesday, July 2 2002תעאיוש בארץ המחסומים – מאמר מכתב העת בעיות ישראליות

פורסם בערבית בכתב-העת בעיות ישראליות (רמאללה), כרך 6, קיץ 2002

גדי אלגזי וחררדו לייבנר

תעאיוש בארץ המחסומים

تعايش  في بلاد المحاسيم

“נתקלתי	واجهث
במחסומים בדרכים	حواجز في الدروب
הראיתי את התעודה	وابنت تذكرتي
וחיפשו בידי ובכלי.	وفُتش في يدي وفي جيوبي
חשתי כזר	احسست احساس الغريب
שנקלע לעיר נוכרית.”	يدبّ في بلد غريب.*
“אני מן הדרום”. טקסט: חסן אלעבד אללה, לחן: מרסל ח’ליפה.	شعر: حسن عبد الله; الحان: مرسيل خليفه

1.

כאשר הרמטכ”ל הימני ביותר שהיה לצה”ל מאז הימים החשוכים של רפאל איתן חוזר ואומר, שישראל לא יכולה להגיע להסדר עם הנהגה פלסטינית בראשות יאסר ערפאת, אין הוא מבטא רק את דעתו האישית או את שאיפותיו להתמקם בימין לקראת פרישתו מן הצבא וכניסתו הרשמית לפוליטיקה. קיצוני ככל שיהיה, דבריו של מופז מייצגים את הלך הרוח הדומיננטי באליטה הבטחונית הישראלית. אותה אליטה בטחונית, אשר קידמה בזמנו את פרויקט אוסלו, נסוגה ממנו כעת. “חומת מגן” והכניסות הבלתי-פוסקות של צה”ל לשטחים מצביעות בבירור על המגמה של חזרה לשלטון כיבוש ישיר על כלל השטחים. בכיוון דומה מצביע גם הנסיון למסד את משטר המחסומים וההגבלות על חופש התנועה בתוך הגדה באמצעות הנפקת אישורי מעבר בין המובלעות הפלסטיניות. זהו ניסיון לקיים שלטון כיבוש דה-לוקס: דיכוי ישיר, עם אופציה מתמדת לנהוג כריבון אלים בכל נקודה בגדה (וזו אחת המשמעויות של הפלישות הישראליות החוזרות לשטח המוקטעה), אך ללא כל נטילת אחריות על החיים האזרחיים, על הכלכלה, הרווחה, הבריאות ומערכת החינוך. הממסד המדיני-בטחוני הישראלי מבקש לשלוט בחיי היומיום של הפלסטינים באמצעות אישורי מעבר ומגבלות, אך לא לשלם אגורה לשם קיום התשתית האזרחית.

עידן אוסלו מת בתום תקופת הסדרי הביניים, כאשר ההנהגה הישראלית, למרות מאמציה, לא הצליחה לכפות על התנועה הלאומית הפלסטינית הסדר קבע שהיה תפור ליעדיה: שמירה על קונצנזוס פנים-ישראלי מינימלי (השארת גושי התנחלויות), המשך השליטה האסטרטגית (מים, גבולות חיצוניים, וטו על שיבת הפליטים, פירוז) ושליטה כלכלית ניאו-קולוניאלית (אזורי תעשייה ממושטרים עתירי עבודה זולה לאורך הגבול ותכתיבי מכס ומסחר). עם זאת, ברור לכולם שאף גורם רציני באליטה הבטחונית הישראלית איננו רואה את המצב הנוכחי או את החזרה לכיבוש ישיר מלא של הגדה והרצועה כאפשרויות ריאליות, בנות קיימא לטווח הבינוני והארוך. ההכבדה הנוכחית בכיבוש נועדה להשיג “הכרעה”, שמשמעותה ייצוב ארוך-טווח של יחסי הכוחות הנוכחיים. בתוך הממסד הפוליטי והבטחוני, נמשכת המחלוקת בשאלה, איזה הסדר כפוי ניתן לייצב? כאן מתחדש הויכוח ההיסטורי העתיק בין הפלגים השונים של המימסד הישראלי: מה עדיף, מקסימום שטח או מינימום ערבים?

אלה שמטרתם העליונה היא “מינימום ערבים”, מעלים כעת הצעות רבות להפרדה חד-צדדית “נדיבה”, הפרדה בטחונית שכרוכה בנסיגה מ”התנחלויות מבודדות”, היערכות צבאית סביב גושי ההתנחלויות וב”מרחב התפר”, כלומר מספר קילומטרים מזרחית לקו הירוק. במקרה זה, כמה אלפי מתנחלים יצטרכו להתפנות, כשצ’קים נדיבים ותשומת-לב תקשורתית רבה מרפדים את דרכם. אך את עיקר המחיר ישלמו עשרות אלפי כפריים פלסטינים, הנמצאים בתחום גושי ההתנחלות או במרחב התפר. קווי ההפרדה יותוו כך שמקומות היישוב עצמם יהיו בשליטה פלסטינית, אך רוב האדמות יהיו חלק מ”מרחב התפר” או יסופחו לגוש ההתנחלויות הקרוב. כך תושג המטרה: מירב האדמה עם מינימום תושבים. זהו ההקשר שבו יש לראות את הכתר הנמשך וההתעללות היומיומית השיטתית בתושבי כפרים ועיירות רבים באזור “קו התפר” (למשל באזור טול-כרם, קלקיליה וסלפית). הם נועדו לערער את אחיזתה של האוכלוסייה הפלסטינית באדמתה ולבודד אותה כדי להחליש אותה. אם מהלך הנסיגה החד-צדדית יתבצע בעיצומה של שפיכות דמים גדולה ופעולות צבאיות נרחבות, הנסיגה המתוקשרת – ביטוי מובהק לנכונות הישראלית הידועה לפשרות – עלולה להתבצע תוך כדי עקירה של כפרים שלמים או הפקעת קרקעותיהם של אחרים.

בעלי הגישה הטריטוריאלית מעדיפים למשוך את המצב הקיים ככל הניתן, תוך הרחבת ההתנחלויות בשקט וחיזוקן. מבחינתם האידיאל הוא ליצור אפרטהייד דה-פקטו בתוך השטחים. מכיוון שברור להם, שלא ניתן יהיה להשיג השלמה פלסטינית עם האפרטהייד, הכרוך בהגבלות תנועה וגזירות יומיומיות מבחינת האוכלוסייה, הם נוטים יותר ויותר לבדוק את האפשרות של טרנספר – ולו מקומי וחלקי – של אוכלוסייה פלסטינית בחסות של שפיכות דמים, שרשרת פיגועים ופעולות תגמול צבאיות. העימות החמוש נתפס על ידי גורמים פוליטיים ובטחוניים שונים, ובראשם שרון, כמסגרת נוחה, היוצרת הזדמנויות לשינוי משמעותי במציאות הטריטוריאלית והדמוגרפית.

שתי הגישות המנוגדות משלימות זו את זו. חלקים שונים במימסד הישראלי יכולים לעבור מתמיכה באחת לשנייה לפי הנסיבות המשתנות. אלה שמבקשים לבלוע שטחים, מגלים לעתים את מגבלות ההתפשטות ומבקשים לטהר אותם; אלה שחרדים כרגיל מעל לכל לטהרתה של המדינה היהודית ומהשתלבותה במזרח הערבי ותומכים לכן בהפרדה, מתפתים שוב ושוב להרפתקות התפשטות. איננו מתיימרים לדעת להיכן נוטה שרון. כיוון שיחסי הכוחות לטובתו, הוא נוטה להתקדם, כשהוא משאיר לעצמו את מירב האופציות פתוחות. בנטיותיו קרוב שרון יותר לאגף הטריטוריאלי, אבל הוא גמיש דיו כדי לאמץ, בנסיבות מסוימות, את רעיון הנסיגה החד-צדדית, המציעה יתרונות דמוגרפיים (כלומר, מעשי נישול וגירוש מוגבלים ב”במרחב התפר”). האסטרטגיה שלו היא של החרפה הדרגתית של העימות, הנחתת מכות קשות לתנועה הלאומית הפלסטינית, תוך יצירת תנאים נוחים בדעת הקהל הישראלית והבינלאומית, בהמתנה להזדמנויות מתאימות.

הצד השני של מדיניות שרון הוא ליכוד דעת הקהל הישראלית מאחוריו וביצור הקולקטיב הלאומי כדי שיעמוד מאוחד נוכח איום השלום הצודק. בעבור הוכח, כי חלקים ניכרים של החברה הישראלית יכולים להיחלץ מן החלומות המשיחיים של ההתנחלות המתמדת – כאשר עתיד אחר, של שלום, נראה ממשי ובר-השגה. לפיכך נוקט שרון מול דעת הקהל הישראלית אסטרטגיה מקורית. הוא אינו מבטיח לאזרחי ישראל את ימות המשיח. הוא אינו מבטיח ניצחון צבאי בנוסח הימין המשיחי ולא “מזרח תיכון חדש” בנוסח פרס. שרון מקפיד לא לפרוש חזון פוליטי – בין היתר, משום שאינו מאמין, שיוכל ללכד את החברה הישראלית סביב הסכמה פעילה לחזונו. במקום זאת, הוא מבקש לגרור את הציבור הישראלי להשלמה עם מדיניותו מחוסר ברירה, מתוך ייאוש ופחד. הוא אינו מבקש מן הישראלים שיסכימו למדיניותו הסכמה פעילה, אלא שיסכינו לה, שישלימו אתה מחוסר ברירה. הוא מוביל את העימות מהסלמה להסלמה, כדי למוטט כל סיכוי להסדר מדיני ולהפוך את הדיון על עתיד העמים לבלתי רלבנטי. ברק הכין לכך את הקרקע, בכך שהודיע שאין סיכוי להסדר פוליטי עם הפלסטינים. שרון ממשיך ומחריף את מדיניותו, בכך שהוא לא רק מודיע לישראלים שאין עתיד – אלא מחסל אותו במו ידיו, בטנקים ובולדוזרים. הוא נבנה מתחושת הייאוש והעדר המוצא, המשתרשת בישראל לאחר כל גל של פיגועי התאבדות. באמצעות החרפת הלחץ על האוכלוסייה הפלסטינית, פעולות חיסול, הרס בתים ופרובוקציות הוא טורח להזין את מעגל האלימות המשרת אותו. הברבריזציה של החברה הישראלית מבוססת בחלקה על ייאוש. כאשר אין תקווה ואין מוצא, נשארים רק ה”בטחון האישי” וההגיון הרצחני של הנקמה. זהו הקשר בין שני המרכיבים של תוכנית שרון: להכות את התנועה הלאומית הפלסטינית – ואת העם הפלסטיני בכללותו – מכה אנושה, כדי לעמוד על החורבות העשנות של מחנה הפליטים בג’נין ולהכריז בפני הישראלים: אין עם מי לדבר. זוהי נבואה המגשימה את עצמה.

יחסי-הכוחות הקיימים נוטים לטובת שרון ובן-אליעזר. יש צורך לפיכך באסטרטגיה של התנגדות לכיבוש, שאינה מצטמצמת בתגובה מיידית לעוולותיו ולפשעיו, אלא מנסה לשבש את ההגיון העומד בבסיסו ואת מימוש מטרותיו ארוכות-הטווח. צד אחד שלה חייב להיות ללא ספק חיזוק הצומוּד הפלסטיני. זהו למשל ההקשר שבו השתלבה תנועת תעאיוש במערכה ציבורית להגנת תושבי דרום הר-חברון מפני הנסיונות החוזרים ונשנים לגרש אותם מאדמותיהם. אך בנוסף למחאה הפעילה, יש צורך בחתירה תחת ההגיון הבסיסי של מדיניות המימסד. אם זו מבוססת על הפרדה וסגר, צריך לחתור תחתיהם. יש להציע לחברה הישראלית מוצא ממעגל הדמים, לא רק מחאה נגד הכיבוש – אלא אלטרנטיבה אפקטיבית, חיים מחוץ לגטו החמוש הנבנה סביבה: תעאיוש בין שווים.

2.

“חומת מגן” – השם שניתן למבצע הצבאי האחרון של שרון ומופז – אינו מקרי. השם מצביע על ניסיון לנצל את תחושות הפחד של הציבור הישראלי כדי להכות בעם הפלסטיני; הרס ומוות נועדו להבטיח ביטחון אשלייתי. אך מעבר לכך, השם שניתן למבצע הצבאי הוא המשך למסורת ארוכה. החל בחומה המגינה על אירופה מפני אסיה, שהמתיישבים היהודים היו אמורים להוות חלק ממנה לפי חזונו של הרצל; דרך ה’חומה ומגדל’ של תנועת העבודה ו’קיר הברזל’ של ז’בוטינסקי, וכלה בדברי בן-גוריון, אשר תיאר את שיכונם של עולים חדשים באזורי הספר כהקמת ‘חומה אדם’, חומה שהלחץ החיצוני מגבש ומלכד אותה.[1] מכאן אפשר היה להמשיך מן ה’משלטים’ ל’מעוזים’, מ’גדר המערכת’ ל’רצועת הביטחון’, מן ה’סגר’ ל’כתר’, ובתוך כל אלה — את עיצובה של החברה הישראלית כ’מדינה במצור’.

עלינו להקפיד על “גידור החברה היהודית”, כתב אהרון אהרונסון לפני יותר משמונים שנה. ואילו אבשלום פיינברג תיאר בעקבות מלחמת העולם הראשונה את ה”חשיבות הכלכלית והציביליזטורית” של “חוטי התיל הדוקרניים” בפלשתינה, אשר יקיפו את המושבות הציוניות, ישסעו את הנוף ויגבילו את חופש התנועה של יושבי המקום. וכך כתב:

“במשך עשרים-וחמש שנה היו הכל עדים למראה, איך לאורך עשרות ומאות קילומטרים מוקמות גדרות של חוטי-ברזל דוקרניים לאורך עצי האקציה שניטעו כאן. האקציה טיפסה, התפתלה בתוך התיל, ירוקה בכל עת, פורחת, מפיצה ריח וכן גם עמוסת קוצים, אלגנטית ומחמירה ומגינה על הנטיעות שהפקידוה על שמירתן. אפילו התן החל להיתקל במכשולים, ובעיני בן-בריתו ההולך-על-שתיים, הערבי, הלכו המכשולים האלה והחמירו יותר ויותר. ואם נתאר את התמונה בסגנון הברית החדשה, יהיה עלינו לומר: מצד אחד, בתוך השטח המוקף גדר, בעל-הבית האמיץ העומד ללא לאות על המשמר, ומצד השני, בחוץ, הגנב האורב לגזל (שני גזעים, שתי תורות-מוסר) — ושני אלה הצליחו לחיות בשלום.”

גדר חיה, חוטי תיל המשתלבים בצמחים ומקיפים את “בעל הבית האמיץ” מול אויבו “הערבי”, כאשר שני אלה מצליחים “לחיות בשלום” משני עברי הגדר – זהו אחד הניסוחים הקולעים ביותר לחלום הציוני, לפנטסיה קולוניאלית הנהפכת לסיוט: גדר תיל מפרידה וכולאת, מלכודת ליושבים בתוכה – ואסון לנמצאים מחוצה לה.

מכאן ועד היום מעצבת ההפרדה את החברה הקולוניאלית שהתהוותה בארץ. היא נועדה להבטיח, שהמתישבים יהפכו מרצונם לחלק מ”חומת-אדם”. הלחץ החיצוני ילכד אותם ויכריח אותם להסתמך על חסות חיצונית אימפריאלית. לעומת זאת, כל סיכוי להשתלבותם במרחב, כל פירצה בגדר המקיפה אותם, מאיימים על עצם המשכו של המפעל הקולוניאלי.[2] כדי לחיות בשלום, על המתיישבים להתחיל לנהוג ולתפוס את עצמם כיושבי המקום, להשתחרר מן השריון המקיף אותם, שנדמה להם שנועד להגן עליהם – אך בפועל ממיט עליהם חורבן. מכאן עולות כמה מסקנות הן ביחס להתנגדות הפלסטינית לכיבוש בשטחים, והן ביחס לפעילותנו בתחומי מדינת ישראל.

מהלכים דיפלומטיים ופיגועים באוכלוסייה אזרחית אינם מהווים אסטרטגיה יעילה נגד הכיבוש. ההנהגה הישראלית מצליחה לרתום אותם לשירות הנצחת המהלך הקולוניאלי. ניתן להציב התנגדות יעילה לכיבוש, אם לוקחים בחשבון את ההגיון העמוק של המהלך הקולוניזטורי. מול שרון יש להציב אלטרנטיבה, שיש בה התנגדות חסרת פשרות להמשך הנישול, התנגדות אזרחית, עממית והמונית, המונעת את הדמוניזציה של העם הפלסטיני – יחד עם נכונות להשלים (לא לצרכי דיפלומטיה ולא כטקטיקה) עם המציאות שכבר נוצרה, עם קיומו של עם ישראלי כחלק בר-קיימא של הארץ ושל האזור. רק העם הפלסטיני והעמים הערביים יכולים להציע ליהודים בישראל מה ששום מעצמה זרה אינה יכולה לתת להם: לגיטימציה של ממש וערבויות לבטחונם הקיומי. יותר מכך: הם יכולים לסייע לישראלים להיחלץ מחומת הברזל המקיפה אותם, בכך שיציעו להם תעאיוש אמיתי, בין שווים, לאחר הפלת גדרות התיל, בהן כיתרו את העם הפלסטיני.

כיצד אפשר להעביר מסר כזה? כיצד לשכנע בו את הישראלים? במלים בלבד אי-אפשר לעשות זאת. חשוב עוד יותר היה, שפעולות ההתנגדות לכיבוש יביעו את המסר הזה לישראלים, יסמנו עבורם אלטרנטיבה של תקווה. קשה מאוד לבקש זאת מעם החי תחת כיבוש, מאנשים הסובלים מלחץ יומיומי וחשופים למעשי הטרור הממלכתי שמבצעת ישראל. אבל, יש לעם הפלסטיני אינטרס עליון להכשיל את ההיגיון הקולוניזטורי הבסיסי – העימות המוביל לנישול, המלווה בהתיישבות וגורר עימות נוסף. לא קל, אבל ניתן למצוא דרכים לחתור תחת החומות המנטליות כדי להרחיב ככל האפשר את הפער בין החברה הישראלית לבין הנהגתה המדינית-בטחונית.

התנגדות אפקטיבית לכיבוש, אם כן, אינה יכולה להסתפק בזירות בהם מתנהל הכיבוש עצמו. בעצם, היא לא יכולה להיות רק “התנגדות”. יש צורך דווקא באסטרטגיה “התקפית”, כזאת שמנסה לקבוע בעצמה את זירת המאבק, חותרת תחת ההיגיון הקולוניאלי ומציבה אלטרנטיבה שיש בה גם תקווה לחיים אחרים. לכן היא חייבת לכלול גם את התהליכים הפנימיים בישראל.

החברה הישראלית מבוססת על הפרדה קפדנית לא פחות בין יהודים לערבים. היא התנאי המוקדם לאפקטיביות של האפליה כלפי המיעוט הלאומי הפלסטיני, והיא מרכיב מרכזי בבניית השריון שנועד להקיף את הקולקטיב היהודי. כל המבנה החברתי בישראל מנציח את ההפרדה והאפליה. ערים מעורבות אינן מעורבות; הן מבוססות על גטאות. שוק העבודה מפוצל; מערכת החינוך מופרדת. האפשרות של חיי תעאיוש בחברה הישראלית היא הסיוט של הממסד הישראלי על כל אגפיו. על כן, כל מערכת האינדוקטרינציה (בתי-הספר, כלי התקשורת, מוסדות התרבות ומומחים למיניהם) נרתמת לחיזוק וביצור של המימד הבדלני בזהות היהודית. משרד הפנים מערים קשיים עצומים על התאזרחותם של לא-יהודים, ערבים או אחרים. משרד הקליטה צמא לבואם של עולים יהודים. למרות האבטלה והשאיפה לקצץ בהוצאות הממשלה הוא שולח שליחים, מעודד יהודים לבוא ומבטיח הרים וגבעות. יחד עם הסוכנות היהודית הם מנסים לכוון את העולים לפי האינטרסים ההתיישבותיים הלאומיים: לייהד את הגליל, לחזק את אריאל, מעלה-אדומים או קריית-ארבע. העולים יקבלו הטבות מפליגות, אם יבחרו ללכת למקומות יישוב, שבהם הפריבילגיות היחסיות שיוענקו להם יציבו אותם מול שכניהם הערבים. הם יהפכו, במלותיו של בן-גוריון, ל”חומת אדם”.

בדרך זו ילמדו אותם ישראלים-יהודים חדשים מיד את נוסחת הפלא של הקיום במסגרת המפעל הציוני: מה שטוב ליהודים רע לערבים ובהכרח גם ההפך. כדי שלא יתפתח תעאיוש, חס וחלילה, כלי התקשורת ההמוניים מזהירים את היהודים חדשות לבקרים, באין-ספור צורות ישירות ועקיפות מכניסה ליישובים ערבים ומקשרים חברתיים. בגיאוגרפיה המדומיינת של רוב האזרחים היהודים בישראל, היישובים הערביים נותרים מטושטשים. טייבה משויכת ל”משולש”, מחוז רחוק ובלתי נתפס אצל התל אביבי או הרמת גני המצוי, שלא יודע שטייבה היא גם ב”שרון”, כמו שכפר-סבא ממוקמת לא רק סמוך (מול!) לקלקיליה, אלא גם במשולש הדרומי. ההפרדה הממשית ולא פחות ממנה ההפרדה המנטלית, הם מנגנונים המשרתים את המשך יחסי השליטה ומאפשרים לחדש את תהליכי הקולוניזציה בתוך הקו הירוק ומעבר לו. הגדרות והחומות המקיפות מתחמות היטב את הקולקטיב הלאומי-אתני, מלכדות את יושבי המצודות, מנכרות אותם מיושבי המקום, הנהפכים ל”סביבה עוינת”, ומשרטטות את קווי העימות בין יהודים לערבים. ללא החומות והגדרות המפרידות, ה”אנחנו” וה”הם” היו עלולים להתבלבל והיה קשה מאוד ללבות אינספור פעמים את העימות ההיסטורי, שהוא תוצר של מהלך הכיבוש-ההתיישבות-והגירוש הקודם – והוא גם התירוץ למהלך הבא.

גם במסגרת של יחסי שליטה ואי-שוויון, הכלכלה הקפיטליסטית המפותחת והחברה המודרנית יוצרות, למרות הכל, הרבה נקודות מגע אנושיות, שיכולות לערער על היגיון ההפרדה. כך למשל באוניברסיטאות, בהן מוצאים עצמם יהודים וערבים זה בצד זה. זה היה הבסיס החברתי לפעולתן של קבוצות שמאל משותפות, כגון קמפו”ס, שמילאו תפקיד חשוב הן במאבק נגד גזענות ואפליה, והן בתנועת המחאה נגד המלחמה בלבנון. אך גם במקומות עבודה או בבתי-חולים יכולים להיווצר סיטואציות חברתיות, המעמידות בסכנה את עקרון ההפרדה. לפעמים, המגע האנושי או ההזדהות על רקע בסיס משותף אחר (מקצוע, אהדה ספורטיבית, אינטרס עסקי, ועוד) מעמידים בסימן שאלה את הדיכוטומיה הלאומית המקובלת. בדרך כלל, אלו רק ספקות קלושים ובלתי-מנוסחים אל מול אידיאולוגיית ההפרדה השלטת ברמה. על רקע זה יש להבין את הופעת מושג ה”דו-קיום” (coexistence), תפיסה של יחסי-גומלין ומגעים לא-קונפליקטואליים בין יהודים לערבים, שמנסה לווסת את המגעים האלה מבלי לערער על ההפרדה היסודית. ממש כשם שמעצמות-העל ביססו ביניהן דו-קיום חמוש בתקופת המלחמה הקרה מבלי לבטל את היריבות ובלי לגעת ביסודות הקונפליקט ביניהן, כך מבקש הדו-קיום לנהל חיי יומיום, שבהם ערבים ויהודים אינם נגררים לעימותים בלתי-פוסקים ואף משתפים פעולה ביניהם. כל זאת – בלי לגעת בגורמי הקונפליקט ובלי לערער על הגדרת המחנות היריבים. אסור לזלזל בתירבות הקונפליקט, במיוחד אם ניקח ברצינות את סכנת הברבריזציה האלימה שלו. אבל דו-קיום אינו יכול להיות תעאיוש. תעאיוש פירושו חיים משותפים, על בסיס של שוויון, המערער על חומות ההפרדה והשבטיות.

זהו, לדעתנו, ההגיון הפוליטי הבסיסי, המנחה את פעולות תעאיוש. לפני שנסקור כיצד הגיון זה מתבטא בפעילות הקבוצה, עלינו להדגיש, שאנו מבטאים את פרשנותנו הפרטית בלבד. מצד שני, מדובר בתוצר של פעילות קולקטיבית. הניתוח מבוסס אומנם על ניסיונות פוליטיים קודמים בהם היינו מעורבים, אך איננו פרי מחשבתנו בלבד. הוא הלך והתגבש מתוך פעולות תעאיוש, בשיחות ארוכות עם פעילותיה ופעיליה. שנית, יש פער ברור בין החזון המקיף של תעאיוש לבין התנועה הקטנה, הנושאת את השם הזה. היא אומנם התחזקה בשנה וחצי האחרונות והשיגה כמה הישגים משמעותיים, אך ודאי אינה מימוש מלא של הדברים שפרשנו כאן. אך הפרקטיקה הפוליטית והחזון החלופי חשובים הרבה יותר מן הארגון הספציפי המבקש לקדם אותם.

3.

במהלך המחצית השניה של אוקטובר 2000 מצאנו את עצמנו יחד עם פעילי שמאל, שדרכינו הצטלבו בהזדמנויות שונות בעבר, נפגשים בהפגנות היהודיות-ערביות המעטות שנערכו בערים הגדולות. 13 פלסטינים אזרחי ישראל נהרגו מדי כוחות הבטחון; האינתיפאדה השנייה פרצה. היינו נבוכים וכועסים. כעסנו על השמאל הציוני ה”מבולבל”, שנטש את מחנה השלום ואת שותפיו הערביים. היינו נבוכים בשל חוסר האונים של הכוחות העקביים בשמאל הישראלי ושל התנועות הפוליטיות בציבור הערבי. חשנו תחושה קשה ביחס לעצמנו, משום שבשעות קשות של מבחן, בשעות של פורענות, לא היינו מסוגלים לייצר שום תגובת-נגד משמעותית חוץ מטלפונים מודאגים לחברים. בשעת מבחן עליונה לא היה מי שיגייס את פעילי השמאל היהודים לעזרת חבריהם הערבים. בשעה זו הוכח כוחו של משטר ההפרדה בחברה הישראלית לשתק את הפעילות הפוליטית. מי שכמונו השתתף בעבר פעילות שמאלית יהודית-ערבית, חש כאב צורב נוכח חוסר המעש. הזיכרון ההיסטורי של הפיצולים הקודמים בין יהודים לערבים במסגרות השמאל בארץ בשעת משבר פוליטי לא בישר טובות. בסוף אוקטובר 2000 העניקה דעת הקהל היהודית בישראל הכשר הולך ומתרחב לפגיעה בזכויות המיעוט הפלסטיני ורעיון הטרנספר צבר מאז חסידים ולגיטימציה. מצד שני, בציבור הערבי התחזקו מגמות בדלניות מובהקות. התפשטה התחושה, שאין מה לצפות משותפים יהודים ויחד עמה גם גברה הטינה חסרת ההבחנה כלפי היהודים. לאחר פרצי המחאה ההמונית הסוערת והדיכוי האלים, החל בסוף אוקטובר שלב של הסתגרות, פחד ופסיביות.

בינתיים החריף העימות בשטחים הכבושים. ברק השלים את הישגו העיקרי – לשכנע את דעת הקהל היהודית, שאין עם מי לעשות שלום בעת הזאת. הכתר והסגר הפכו לאמצעים העיקריים להכנעת העם הפלסטיני, בעוד שפיכות הדמים היומיומית נמשכת, “מחנה השלום” הציוני התנדף. על כן גברה חשיבות תנועות השלום העקביות. אך לא יכולנו להסתפק בפעילויות במסגרת תנועות מחאה של שמאלנים יהודים, רדיקליות וצודקות ככל שיהיו. החברים הערבים הראשונים בקבוצה חשו מצדם בסכנות הכרוכות בבידוד הפוליטי לאחר אירועי אוקטובר 2000, ובה בעת היו מעונינים לחרוג בפעילותם אל מעבר למישור המקומי ומעבר למסגרות המפלגתיות. כמונו, גם הם היו צמאים לשותפות פוליטית ערבית-יהודית. יחד חשבנו על הקמת קבוצת פעולה ערבית-יהודית שתפעל נגד הכיבוש, אבל שתהיה גם מסוגלת להגיב בשעת פורענות כלפי הפלסטינים בתוך ישראל ושתחתור כנגד ההפרדה והבדלנות הלאומית-שבטית. המחויבות העמוקה, הרגשית והמוסרית, למאבק יהודי-ערבי משותף בשתי הזירות, קדמה לכל בירור בשאלה, איזו מין קבוצה אנו רוצים להקים וכיצד ניתן לפעול בתנאים החדשים שנוצרו. מעל הכל רצינו להיות ביחד, יהודים וערבים, בשעת סכנה, בימים הקשים שצפינו שעוד יבואו. זאת המחויבות שלנו מעבר לכל שיקול של תועלת פוליטית. כדי לעמוד במחויבות הזאת, נדרשנו לבנות שותפות עמוקה המבוססת על אמון מלא. לכן, בשיחות ובפעולות ראשונות התחלנו לחתור להיכרות מעמיקה, אישית, כזאת שחורגת מדיונים פוליטיים, אך גם אינה חומקת מהם. רק ברית מלמטה של פעילים, ההולכת ונרקמת תוך פעולות משותפות, תוך התמודדות ביחד עם קשיים וסכנות, עשויה להצמיח אמון עמוק. לא היו בידנו מתכונים תיאורטיים או מעשיים. היה לנו כיוון כללי, כוונות ותחושת מחויבות.

עם זאת, רוב הפעילים בגרעין ההתחלתי של תעאיוש היו בעלי ניסיון פוליטי קודם, גם במסגרות יהודיות-ערביות. הכרנו גם כמה מהרגישויות, שכדאי לקחת בחשבון תוך כדי העבודה המשותפת. חתרנו לעבוד ביחד ללא התנשאות, ללא אידאליזציה, בלי פשרות כלפי המדיניות הרשמית ובלי להינתק מן הסביבות החברתיות המגוונות שמהם אנו באים. כדי שפעילות ערבית-יהודית לא תישאר בגדר הצהרה פורמלית, הכרחי שכל ההחלטות יתקבלו ביחד, שהפעילים הערבים והיהודים ישקלו ביחד את הרגישויות והמשמעויות של כל פעולה במהלך תכנונה. התנסויות פוליטיות קודמות שכנעו אותנו, שיש לתת עדיפות לפעולות על פני ניסוחו של מצע מדוקדק. ידענו הרי מראש, שכולנו מתנגדים לכיבוש ותומכים בשוויון מלא בין ערבים ליהודים בתוך ישראל. בקלות יכולנו לבלות שבועות ארוכים בפולמוסים על פרטי תוכנית השלום הצודק\האפשרי\הרצוי. במקום אמון היינו זורעים אז פלגנות ווכחנות. המציאות הבוערת תבעה מאיתנו להתקדם בתחום הפעילות המעשית. רצינו גם לבנות קבוצה רחבה מבחינת זהויותיהם הפוליטיות של הפעילים, קבוצה שפתוחה לשיתוף פעולה עם מפלגות וארגונים על בסיס של הסכמה על פעילות משותפת, אך שומרת על עצמאותה. מדיניות זו הוכיחה את עצמה, וכיום יש בינינו רבים שאינם חברים או פעילים באף מפלגה או ארגון ובצדם גם פעילים ופעילות, שהם בו בזמן פעילים בחד”ש, בבל”ד, במר”צ, בארגוני שלום, בארגונים פמיניסטיים, בקשת הדמוקרטית המזרחית ובארגונים חברתיים שונים.

מכיוון שלא היינו קואליציה של נציגי ארגונים וגם לא ארגון היררכי עם חלוקת תפקידים מוגדרת מראש, אימצנו מהר מאוד דפוסי התארגנות של דמוקרטיה השתתפותית, שבה ההחלטות מתקבלות בפורום פעילים רחב, על בסיס ליבון עמוק של אופי הפעילות. מטרת הדיונים הממושכים בקבוצה אינה חידוד הבדלי העמדות השונות כדי לגבור בעזרת הרוב על המיעוט, אלא להבין לעומק את ההגיון העומד ביסוד העמדות השונות, ולשכנע זה את זה במידת האפשר כדי להגיע להסכמה, שיכולה לשמש בסיס לפעולה משותפת. ניסינו לקבל החלטות בהסכמה ונוצרה אווירת שיחה שאפשרה לקיים דיונים ממצים, תוך הקדשת תשומת לב רבה לפרטי הפעולות ולמשמעויותיהן בנסיון להיבנות מריבוי הפרספקטיבות בתוך הקבוצה. מתחילתה היתה תעאיוש קבוצה הטרוגנית מבחינת גילאים, נסיון חיים ומוצא מעמדי, אתני ותרבותי.

עיקר המחשבה מוקדש בתעאיוש לפעולות עצמן. הנטיה של רובנו היתה לפעולות סולידריות ישירות, פעולות בעלות משמעות מעשית ולא רק סמלית. ניסינו לחשוב ביחד, כיצד ניתן בתנאים הקשים שנוצרו לא רק להצהיר על מסר פוליטי – אלא להעביר אותו. איך לעצב פעולות, שמערבות את מירב האנשים בפעילות ומעודדות אותם לקחת אחריות? כאשר התחלנו לפעול בנובמבר 2000, מטרתנו לא היתה ליצור קבוצה מצומצמת של פעילים מסורים, אלא לאפשר גם לדור חדש של פעילים להצטרף. חיפשנו דגמי פעולה, המאפשרים לחרוג מן המעגל המצומצם של פעילים פוליטיים. נראה לנו, שאמון ומחויבות עמוקים קשורים לדברים מוחשיים, שמאבק בכיבוש או באפליה קשור לעניינים קונקרטיים, “קטנים” בראייה הכוללת, אך גדולים ומשמעותיים מאוד עבור בני אדם הנתונים בדיכוי. גם השמאל העקבי, בארץ ובהרבה מקומות בעולם, איבד לעתים קרובות את המגע והקשר בין המישורים העקרוניים של מאבקיו לבין המימד המעשי הקונקרטי של הדיכוי והשחרור. ההיגררות של השמאל הרדיקלי והחברתי לפוליטיקת הסמלים והסיסמאות יכולה לגרום לאובדן היסוד המגייס והמעצים שבמאבקים הקונקרטיים. כאשר הזהות הפוליטית מסתכמת בנקיטת עמדות אל מול דבריהם של הפוליטיקאים המיוצגים במרקע הטלוויזיה, הופכים כולנו לאסירי המדיה, המתווכת לנו מציאות ועמדות.

לשיקול העקרוני הזה יש משמעות מיוחדת בהקשר הספציפי בו אנו פועלים. במלים ובסמלים קשה מאוד להתגבר על הפחד והגזענות, שהמציאות הפוליטית הכוללת עצמה תורמת לשעתוקם. ספק גדול אם טקסטים מנוסחים היטב מסוגלים כיום לשכנע פלסטינים, כי יש להם שותפי-אמת בישראל במאבק נגד הכיבוש, או לשכנע ישראלים, כי יש חלופה ממשית להסתגרות מאחורי גדר ההפרדה. “חשיפה תקשורתית” אינה יכולה כשלעצמה לערער על הדרך בה נתפסת מציאות פוליטית, הנקבעת על-ידי בולדוזרים, מחסומים, ומוות יומיומי. לכן, איננו מציבים לעצמנו כמטרה מרכזית להופיע בטלוויזיה ואנו נמנעים מהוצאת הצהרות לעיתונות או מקיום אירועים בעלי ערך סמלי רק כדי “להיכנס לתקשורת”. כניסה של 200 אזרחים ישראלים, יהודים וערבים, לכפר בגדה הסובל מסגר והתנכלויות נראית לנו פעולה מועילה וראויה יותר ממשמרת מחאה עם קוריוז מעניין למען צלמי העיתונות. איננו מזלזלים כמובן בכוחה של התקשורת ובחשיבותן של פעולות סמליות, המכוונות להגיע באמצעותה אל האנשים. אך האפקטיביות של פעולות כאלה – בהם השתתפה קבוצת תעאיוש בצד תנועות השמאל האחרות – מותנית בתנאים חברתיים מוקדמים, בראש ובראשונה ­– בקיומה של אוירה, המאפשרת לחלקים ניכרים בציבורים אליהם הן מופנות להזדהות עם המסר שהן מבקשות להעביר. לא זו האוירה שבה אנו פועלים בדרך כלל. מעגל הדמים שבו אנו נמצאים מעמיק את התהום שבין נקודות-הראות של פלסטינים וישראלים. הוא מציב את תחושותיהם וכאביהם בניגוד חריף זה לזה. לכן המעטנו בפעילויות סמליות. ההחלטה להתמקד בסוגי פעולה אחרים היתה גם קלה יותר, משום שמראש החלטנו לא להתחרות בגופים הפוליטיים הקיימים אלא להוסיף לפעולתם מימדים שנראו לנו חסרים. רבים מפעילי תעאיוש משתתפים לכן בפעילויות נגד הכיבוש ולמען שוויון שיוזמות קבוצות אחרות.

תוך כדי דיונים התעצבו דפוסי הפעולה המאפיינים כיום את תנועת תעאיוש. הם לא היו קיימים מראש כמתכונים מוכנים, אלא נולדו תוך שיחות ופעולות, במבחן של ההתנסות הרפלקטיבית ובעזרתם של פעילים פלסטיניים בשטחים הכבושים. בשטחים מצאנו שותפים להעדפה שלנו לפוליטיקה “מלמטה”, פוליטיקה עממית, בלתי-אלימה, ישירה וקונקרטית. בכפרים שבאזור סלפית יצרנו קשר עם פעילים פוליטיים פלסטיניים, שעזרו לנו לעצב את אופני הפעולה של הקבוצה והיו מוכנים להיכנס לתהליך המורכב של בניית אמון ושותפות. אלה אינם דברים מובנים מאליהם בימים של שפיכות דמים יומיומית ושל דיכוטומיות לאומיות-שבטיות. למרות הלחץ המתמיד של הכיבוש, מגזרים רבים בחברה הפלסטינית לא איבדו את יכולת ההבחנה כלפי החברה הישראלית. ללא קונצנזוס מקומי רחב לא ניתן לערוך ביקורים המוניים של אזרחי ישראל בכפרי הגדה. לולי האמון העמוק שרוחשים לפעילים כאלה בישובי הגדה המערבית, לא היינו יכולים לפעול. יחד איתם התחלנו לארגן את שיירות המזון והסולידריות. השיירות התפתחו מתוך דגם נפוץ ומוכר של הבעת סולידריות – משלוחי המזון מן הפלסטינים בישראל לאחיהם הסובלים מסגר ומצור כלכלי בשטחים הכבושים.

השיירה הראשונה שלנו יצאה בתחילת דצמבר 2000 לעבר הכפר חארס באזור סלפית. זו הייתה שיירה משותפת של קבוצת תעאיוש וסניף חד”ש בכפר קאסם. החידוש היה קודם כל בהרכב היהודי-ערבי, לא רק של מי שנסעו יחד עם משאית המזון לחארס, אלא גם של התורמים לאיסוף המזון. השיירות של תעאיוש כרוכות בגיוס תרומות גם בדרך של פנייה ישירה לאוכלוסייה יהודית-ישראלית. בדוכני איסוף שלנו במקומות ציבוריים בערים הגדולות מבקשים הפעילים תרומות מעוברים ושבים בכרוזים, בכרזות ובשיחות בעל-פה. זהו אתגר בפני כל עובר אורח: האם אתה מוכן להזדהות עם סבלם של הפלסטינים בשטחים הכבושים? גם כאשר האווירה הציבורית לא מאפשרת לנו לקיים בדוכנים ברחוב (ארבעה דוכני איסוף פוזרו באלימות על-ידי בריונים), במיוחד בתקופות של פיגועים קשים נגד אזרחים, הפניה של עשרות פעילים לבני המשפחה, לחברים לעבודה ולמכרים לתרום ולהזדהות היא צעד פוליטי חשוב, המעמת אנשים עם תוצאות מדיניות הממשלה. אנשים רבים שאינם רוצים או מסוגלים מסיבות שונות להשתתף בפעילות פוליטית שוטפת מצאו בתרומה לשיירות המזון דרך להביע את עמדתם, דרך לקשור עצמם למאבק ולהרגיש שהם אינם מבודדים בחברה הישראלית. הפעילים הערבים שיצאו לדוכנים בערים הגדולות בצד חבריהם היהודים הרגישו, שלמרות העוינות והגזענות המאפיינים את הרחוב היהודי הם מסוגלים להעז ולהביע עמדה פוליטית ברורה. במקרים מסוימים לדבריהם של החברים הערבים היה משקל רב יותר בדיונים עם עוברים ושבים לא משוכנעים. מצד שני, האיסופים המשותפים של פעילים יהודים וערבים ביישובים הערביים בתוך ישראל שברו את תמונת העולם הדיכוטומית הנפוצה והגבירו את תחושת המחויבות של חלק מהאוכלוסייה.

היציאה בשיירת מכוניות ארוכה, כאשר הפעילים הערבים והיהודים מתערבבים זה בזה ומתחייבים להגן אלה על אלה, היא עצמה הפגנה פוליטית ממדרגה ראשונה. מדובר בהפגנה לא מתסכלת, המחזקת את המשתתפים בה ומפגישה אותם עם המציאות הקונקרטית של הכיבוש. המשתתפים בשיירות נתקלים במחסומים, בערמות העפר החוסמות את הכניסה ליישוב ורואים את עצי הזית שנכרתו בידי מתנחלים בחסות הרשויות. הם פוגשים את האנשים המובטלים מאונס זה חודשים ארוכים ואת ילדי המקום, שהמונח “יהוד” הוא כרגיל עבורם שם נרדף לחייל או מתנחל. הפרספקטיבה של המשתתפים בשיירה גם היא משתנה בצורה מרתקת. בדרך כלל הצבא והמשטרה עוקבים מקרוב אחרי שיירות תעאיוש, וכאשר אינם מנסים לחסום את דרכנו, הם מנסים ללוות אותנו ליעדנו ונדחים בתקיפות בכניסה ליישוב המיועד. הצבא מציע להגן עלינו, האזרחים הישראלים הנוסעים בתוככי השטחים הכבושים, ואנו מסרבים. עד עתה הצלחנו לאחר מו”מ ולחץ מצידנו להיכנס לרוב הישובים הפלסטינים ללא ליווי צבאי. עבור ישראלים שחווים ביקור כזה לראשונה, רגע ההינתקות מן הג’יפים שעקבו אחרינו, המפגש עם המארחים שלנו והכניסה לכפר מאפשרים להם לחוש לרגע מוקפים על-ידי צבא כיבוש כמו האוכלוסייה הפלסטינית.

העובדה שהפעילים מביאים איתם עזרה קונקרטית לקהילות הפלסטיניות בשטחים – לא כמעשה נדבה או אקט הומניטרי גרידא, אלא כביטוי לסולידריות פוליטית של קבוצה יהודית-ערבית הפועלת בתוך ישראל – משפיעה על אופי הפעולה. השיירה אינה נושאת מסר סמלי בלבד. עובדה  זו מעניקה לפעילים נחישות וכוח, ובה בעת מחזקת את אופייה הבלתי-אלים של הפעולה. מצד שני, היא מקשה על כוחות הצבא והמתנחלים לעצור אותם. כאשר ניסה כוח משמר הגבול למנוע מאיתנו באפריל 2001 לפרוק משאית מזון בכפר יאסוף, רק המחישו בכך לעיני המצלמות את אחד מאמצעי הדיכוי הקשים, היעילים, הבלתי-נראים והבלתי-מצטלמים שהפעילו ברק ושרון – הכתר והלחץ הכלכלי. חיילי מג”ב דחפו והיכו פעילים, שפרקו שקי אורז וסוכר. הפעילים המשיכו בפריקה תוך כדי התנגדות לא-אלימה לקול תשואות תושבי הכפר.

אבל, התנאים הצבאיים והפוליטיים לא תמיד מאפשרים לקיים שיירות סולידריות המוניות כפי שהיינו רוצים. דווקא בעת החרפה של הדיכוי הצבאי וכניסה של צה”ל לשטחי איי, יש צורך מיוחד בעזרה הסולידרית שלנו. כך היו מספר מקרים בהם מצאנו דרכים להעביר מזון או תרופות כסיוע סולידרי מיידי ללא שיירות המוניות. במהלך הפלישה הגדולה הראשונה של צה”ל לרמאללה ארגנה תעאיוש יחד עם קואליציית הנשים לשלום ועם וועדת המעקב העליונה לערבים בישראל הפגנה גדולה מול מחסום א-ראם, בתביעה להעביר משאיות תרופות ומזון לרמאללה הכבושה. למרות נסיונות לפזר את המפגינים בגז מדמיע ואלות, נאלצו הרשויות לאפשר לסיוע לעבור כתנאי להסכמתנו להתפנות. חזרנו על מתכון זה, יחד עם שותפינו, במחסום מול ג’נין שבועיים לאחר מכן.

העמקת המימד החברתי של הפעולה הפוליטית מחייבת מעורבות ארוכה-טווח במאבקים מקומיים. דוגמא טובה למערכה מקומית מסוג זה אפשר למצוא בפעילות תעאיוש בדאר אלחנון, כפר קטן בלתי-מוכר במשולש הצפוני.[3] זה כעשרים שנה שרשויות מדינת ישראל משקיעות מאמץ רב בנסיון לסלק את תושבי הכפר ממקומם. יחד עם תושבי המקום, ארגנה תנועת תעאיוש מחנה עבודה התנדבותי באוגוסט 2001. היה זה פרויקט צנוע, ששאב את השראתו ממסורת מחנות העבודה ההתנדבותיים, שפרחו בשנות השבעים והשמונים.[4]

כ-400 מתנדבים יהודים וערבים מכל רחבי ישראל סללו במהלכו כביש גישה בן כמאה מטר לכיכר הכפר, סילקו את הריסות הבתים שנהרסו בשנים הקודמות והקימו מגרש משחקים לילדים. כל בנייה בכפר בלתי-מוכר אסורה, אך היתה זו יוזמה שקשה היה מאוד לשלטונות להתנגד לה. ואכן, כוח המשטרה שהגיע למקום בשעת העבודות נאלץ לסגת. צו ההריסה שהוציאו הרשויות בוטל בבית-משפט השלום; המדינה ערערה על כך והמערכה המשפטית והציבורית נמשכת. היא אינה מצטמצמת להגנה על הקיים בלבד: הוגשה תוכנית מתאר חלופית לכפר ומאז נמשך המאמץ ליצור ברית רחבה ביישובי הסביבה ולובי פרלמנטרי למען דאר אלחנון.

אין זו פעולה קיצונית; היא קונסטרוקטיבית, בלתי-אלימה – ורדיקלית במובן העמוק של המושג: היא חושפת את שורשי האפליה הסמויים מן העין – ומבקשת להעמיד אותם בסימן שאלה. במקום להסתפק בהתגוננות סבילה כנגד המלחמה השקטה שמנהלות רשויות המדינה נגד המיעוט הלאומי הפלסטיני, מציע מחנה העבודה אתגר קונקרטי למדיניות השלטונות ופותח מערכה פוליטית. אך חשוב לראות, שהפעולה הפוליטית אינה מכוונת רק כלפי השלטונות, אלא כלפי המשתתפים עצמם: ראשית, הקהילה המקומית התלכדה סביב הפרויקט הקונקרטי, שכן במרכז המאבק עומדים האינטרסים החיוניים שלה, ולא סיסמאות מופשטות בלבד. שנית, המשתתפים במחנה, ערבים כיהודים, התוודעו במהלכו לאפליה המבנית של אזרחי ישראל הפלסטינים. מי שעבד בדאר אלחנון ולמד מקרוב את תולדות הנסיונות לסלק את תושביו, לא יתקשה להבין, מה פירוש “כיבוש הקרקע”. משתתפי המחנה גם הפכו מחויבים להגן על מה שבנו יחד עם התושבים. שלישית, האתגר הקונקרטי גייס את הקהילות המקומיות השכנות לסולידריות פעילה עם תושבי דאר אלחנון. ברית הפעולה הרחבה למען דאר אלחנון איחדה את הכוחות הפוליטיים מלמטה, וחשוב עוד יותר – אפשרה לרבים לצאת מן הסבילות ולבחון אפשרויות פעולה חדשות.

חלק ניכר מפעילותה של תעאיוש בשטחים הכבושים התרכז בשני אזורים, שסכנת נישול וסיפוח נשקפת להם הן לפי תוכניות ברק והן לפי מפות שרון: אזור סלפית ואזור דרום הר חברון. בתוך מעגל הדמים שאני מצויים בו, בימים של פגיעות יומיומיות בזכויות האדם בשטחים הכבושים, יש צורך דחוף להסב את תשומת-הלב הציבורית למהלכים הטריטוריאליים והדמוגרפיים, היוצרים מציאות חדשה: התנחלות, נישול, עקירה וסיפוח. מכאן חשיבות המערכה להגנה על תושבי דרום חברון, אותם מנסים שלטונות ישראל זה כמה שנים לגרש מאדמותיהם. פעילי תעאיוש הצטרפו למערכה בדרום הר-חברון בקיץ 2001. גם כאן נוצרה עד מהרה ברית פעולה בין תעאיוש לפעילי גופים אחרים המתנגדים הכיבוש, שצברו נסיון רב במערכות הקודמות להגנת התושבים מאז 1999 – פעילי הוועד נגד הריסות בתים, רבנים לזכויות אדם, האגודה לזכויות האזרח, הפורום למען דו-קיום בנגב והמרכז לאינפורמציה אלטרנטיבית, אליהם הצטרפו קואליציית הנשים למען השלום ו”גוש שלום”.[5] גם במקרה זה היתה חשיבות עצומה לשיתוף הפעולה המקומי עם פעילים פוליטיים פלסטיניים מן השטחים הכבושים – אנשי הוועד להגנה על הקרקעות. במערכה סבלנית וממושכת נגד ההתנחלות והנישול הם השכילו לגשר בין מאבקה של הקהילה המקומית על זכויותיה להקשר הפוליטי הכללי. מאז 1999 מנסים השלטונות לגרש את תושבי אזור סוסיא, שחלקם מתגוררים במערות, מגדלים צאן ומעבדים את אדמותיהם בגבעות הצחיחות שמדרום ליטא. מולם ניצבות כמה מן ההתנחלויות התוקפניות ביותר שבשטחים הכבושים. תרומתה המיוחדת של תעאיוש למערכה היתה ביצירת פעולות מחאה וסולידריות רחבות, רבות משתתפים, שנועדו, ראשית, לחזק את אחיזתם של תושבי המקום באדמותיהם מול הברית הבלתי-קדושה של הצבא, המתנחלים והמנהל האזרחי ושנית, לשבור את תמונת האויב ולהביא אלפי אזרחים ישראלים להזדהות – בעיצומו של עימות מזוין – עם התושבים הפלסטינים של דרום הר חברון וזכויותיהם האנושיות. שיירות האספקה יצרו יחסי אמון וקירבה, שאפשרו לפעילי תעאיוש ששהו במקום להתייצב לצד התושבים בשעת נסיון גירוש מקומי ולסכל אותו. לאחר גירוש נוסף, שבוצע באישון לילה, יצאה למקום משלחת סולידריות, שיצרה חגורה אנושית כדי לאפשר לתושבים לשוב לאדמותיהם. התמיכה בתושבים הפלסטיניים הוציאה גם את המתנחלים מריבצם. הם ניסו למנוע את פעולותינו, לחסום את דרכן של השיירות ולהתעמת עם הפעילים. אך בעוד שבשנה האחרונה צוברים המתנחלים אהדה רבה בציבור הישראלי, במקרה זה נתפסו הם כצד התוקפן. במקום החזית המוכרת, המציבה יהודים מול ערבים ויוצרת הזדהות אוטומטית בציבור היהודי עם המתנחלים, נוצרה כאן חזית משותפת, ישראלית-פלסטינית, נגד הכיבוש. השילוב בין פעולה רחבה, השתתפותית, יד ביד עם אנשי המקום – עם מערכה ציבורית ומשפטית, המגיעה עד בית-המשפט העליון, יכול להיות דגם למאבקים עתידיים. נכון לשעת כתיבת הדברים, תושבי דרום הר-חברון יושבים כיום על אדמתם, אך האיום עדיין מרחף מעל ראשיהם.

4.

שלוש הדוגמאות הללו – שיירות הסולידריות, מחנה העבודה בדאר-אלחנון והמערכה נגד גירוש תושבי הר חברון – מבהירות, אנו מקווים, כמה מעקרונות הפעולה שהתפתחו בתעאיוש מאז הקמתה: הנסיון לחרוג מן ההגדרה הצרה של פעולה פוליטית, המצמצמת אותה לאקטים סמליים – כדי להשיב לפוליטיקה את המימד הקונקרטי, החומרי והמקומי שלה; הבחירה המודעת בפעולה פוליטית בלתי-אלימה; מתוך מודעות ליחסי הכוחות הקיימים, הנסיון לבחור זירות ואופני פעולה, שיציבו את משטר הכיבוש והאפליה במגננה ויאפשרו לאנשים להזדהות עם הפעולה. כוחן של פעולות בלתי-אלימות כאלה הוא בכך שהן רחבות והשתתפותיות במידת האפשר – שהן מאפשרות למירב האנשים להשתתף בהן ולהזדהות איתן.

הבחירה בשם ‘תעאיוש’ הייתה מלווה בלא מעט לבטים. אנו מודעים לכך, שכיוון שבעברית כמו בשפות אחרות אין מונח מקביל ל’תעאיוש’, יש המתרגמים את המושג “תעאיוש” לעברית כ”דו-קיום”. אל זאת כוונתנו. לא ייתכן תעאיוש בתנאים של אי-שוויון, של יחסי כוח ושליטה, בחברות בהן מושרשת אידיאולוגיית ההפרדה. לרעיון התעאיוש יש מימד אוטופי, הרחוק מאוד מהמציאות הממשית בה אנו חיים. מאידך גיסא, יש בכוחו להצביע על חלופה לעימות הלאומי ולכל הסדר פוליטי, שלא ישנה את היסודות הקולוניאליים של העימות ולא יהיה מבוסס על שוויון וצדק. הפעולות המשותפות החותרות תחת הכיבוש וההפרדה בונות כאן ועכשיו, בהווה, את היסודות לשותפות עתידית, להפיכת התעאיוש מחזון למציאות חברתית. הפעולות האלה לא רק יוצרות שותפות ערבית-יהודית, אלא גם מקרבות את הפעילים למימדים של מציאות חברתית שלא תמיד הכירו. נחשפים מקורות נוספים של דיכוי ואי שוויון, מעבר לקולוניזציה והעימות הלאומי. הבכורה של הלכידות הלאומית בסדר היום הפוליטי ובתודעה של רוב האוכלוסייה היהודית והערבית מאפשרת להסוות ולמזער סתירות חברתיות מסוגים שונים, הכרוכות בדיכוי, ניצול וסבל. הריבוד החברתי הקולוניאלי אמנם גורם לכך שלשאלות חברתיות רבות יש מימד לאומי. אך השאלות האלה לא יכולות להצטמצם לשאלה הלאומית. הפוליטיקה של הקונקרטי, הנוגעת בבעיות היומיומיות של בני האדם, מאפשרת להם לא לדחוק את ענייניהם הממשיים כמי שמופלים לרעה או מנוצלים על בסיס מעמדי, מגדרי, תרבותי, עדתי, דתי, שייכות משפחתית או אחר, מפני עניינם הלאומי או עמדתם בנושא הסכסוך הלאומי והשלום. היציאה לפעולה מחוץ לגדרות, כנגד הגדרות והדיכוי, עשויה לא רק לתרום למאבק לסיום הכיבוש ולשלום צודק ושוויון, אלא גם לאפשר לאנשים להשתחרר מהגדרות המנטליות, להיאבק על ענייניהם ולמצוא שותפים חדשים ומגוונים. זהו הסיוט של הממסד הקולוניאלי.

ברורות לנו גם מגבלות הכוח שלנו ושל הכוחות השותפים לנו בהתנגדות הפוליטית מול מדיניות ההרס, הכיבוש והנישול. הסיבוב האחרון של הפעולות הצבאיות המחיש את יחסי הכוחות השוררים ואת מגבלות תנועות המחאה והסולידריות בישראל, ובכלל זה את המגבלות של דפוסי הפעולה שפיתחנו בתעאיוש. מכאן האחריות שמוטלת עלינו: למצוא דפוסי פעולה נוספים שיאפשרו לפתח ולהעמיק את ההתנגדות לכיבוש, לחתור תחת משטר ההפרדה ולבנות חלופה של שותפות שוויונית. זה אתגר העומד בפני כולנו.

מפעולות תעאיוש, נובמבר 2000—מאי 200212 שיירות סולידריות לשטחים הכבושים, בהשתתפות אלפים מאזרחי ישראל, מאז דצמבר 2000דוכני איסוף מזון ותרומות בישובים יהודים וערבים למען תושבי השטחים הכבושים הנתונים בסגרמערכה נגד גירוש תושבי דרום הר-חברון, הנמשכת מאז יולי 2001משמרת מחאה יהודית-ערבית ביום האדמה בואדי ערה, ליד ערערה, מארס 2001מחנה עבודה התנדבותי בכפר הבלתי-מוכר דאר אל-חנון במשולש, אוגוסט 2001מחנה עבודה התנדבותי בכפר הבלתי-מוכר ח’רבת אלוטן בנגב, מאי 2002משמרת מחאה מול משרד הבטחון בתל-אביב במחאה על פציעתו של עיסא סוף, תושב חארס, יוני 2001תרומת דם קולקטיבית בבית-החולים אל-מקאסד למען הפצועים במחנות הפליטים, מרץ 2002ארגון מפגשים של תלמידי תיכון ערבים לפני בגרות עם סטודנטים ומרצים באוניברסיטת תל-אביבמשלחת סולידריות המונית לרמאללה, ינואר 2002תהלוכה של אלפי יהודים וערבים למחסום ג’נין יחד עם ועדת המערב העליונה של ערביי ישראל, אפריל 2002הפגנה מול מחסום טול-כרם, מרס 2002השתתפות במאבקם של תושבי עיסאויה נגד הכתר, להסרת המחסום ונגד העוצר על השכונההשתתפות במאבק תושבי טירה וטייבה נגד כביש חוצה ישראלאיסוף תרומות למען תושבי מחנה הפליטים ברפיח (אוקטובר 2001-יוני 2002)הפגנת אלפים יהודית-ערבית במחסום א-ראם והעברת 4 משאיות סיוע לרמאללה, אפריל 2002הפגנה מול מחנה אנצאר בנגב והעברת סיוע לעצירים, יוני 2002שיירת מכוניות נושאות דגלים שחורים ב-1.10.2001, יום השנה להריגתם של 13 פלסטינים אזרחי ישראל בידי כוחות הבטחון ומשמרת מחאה מאולתרת באום-אל-פאחם בזמן ההתנגשויות של התושבים עם כוחות המשטרההשתתפות במאבקם של תושבי שכונת שיח’ ג’ראח נגד הריסות בתים ונישולהשתתפות בשתי הפגנות המוניות בתל-אביב מטעם הקואליציה היהודית-ערבית לסיום הכיבוש, פברואר 2002 ומאי 2002ימי עבודה התנדבותיים בעין נקובה (הרי ירושלים) ובעין ח’וד (אזור חיפה)משמרות מחאה ברמלה נגד מעצר תושבי לוד שהואשמו בהתקהלות בלתי-חוקית בשל השתתפות במשמרת מחאה נגד הכיבוש (אפריל 2002)אוהל מחאה נגד הכיבוש והאפליה, יפו, מאי 2002השתתפות סולידרית במאבקם של תושבי מג’ד אלכרום נגד הריסת בית, יוני 2002

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* “נתקלתי / במחסומים בדרכים / הראיתי את התעודה / וחיפשו בידי ובכלי. / חשתי כזר / שנקלע לעיר נוכרית.” “אני מן הדרום”. טקסט: חסן אלעבד אללה, לחן: מרסל ח’ליפה.

[1] דוד בן-גוריון, “צבא להגנה ולבניין”, (1948), יחוד ויעוד: דברים על בטחון ישראל (תל-אביב: משרד הבטחון, 1971), עמ’ 44-52, כאן: עמ’ 51.

[2] חשוב להבהיר את ההבדל בין גדר וגבול. הגבול המדיני אמור להבדיל בין קיבוצים אנושיים ריבוניים, ולאפשר להם מגע-ומשא אנושי, מרצונם ולפי בחירתם. הגדר — גם גדר המכלאה — מקיפה את הנשלטים, אבל בשום פנים ואופן אינה מגבילה את השליטים; היא חדירה לחלוטין מצד אחד, כפי שהוכיחה מאז ישראל ב”פעולות תגמול”, “פעולות עונשין”, “סיכול ממוקד” ו”מבצעי מנע”. בדומה לכך חובה להבהיר, כי תעאיוש אינו טמיעה: אין פירושו ויתור על זהות תרבותית, אלא החופש לחיות ביחד ולפתח זהות ללא דיכוי והגמוניה. זהות חברתית, כמו זהות אישית, היא תהליך פתוח של אינטראקציה בין-אנושית.

[3] ראו דו”ח מפורט באתר תעאיוש: taayush.tripod.com.

[4] מחנה העבודה המרכזי, שנערך ביוזמת עיריית נצרת, היה מסגרת ייחודית, שתוך כדי ביצוע פרויקט לרווחת תושבי העיר הפגישה את תושבי המקום ופלסטינים אזרחי ישראל עם פעילי שמאל יהודים ופעילים פלסטיניים מן השטחים הכבושים.

[5] ראו דיווח מפורט באתר תעאיוש וכן באתר המיוחד המוקדש למאבק: www.southebron.com.

This entry was posted on Tuesday, July 2nd, 2002 at 23:00

03.02.22
Editorial Note

Two Israeli political activists based in British universities, Profs. Haim Yacobi and Irit Katz published an article titled “Jerusalem: evictions show how urban planning is being weaponized against Palestinians.” The article disputes Israeli sovereignty in East Jerusalem. 

According to the authors, the Israeli authority admits that houses built before 1967 are legal. Therefore, houses built after 1967 without planning permission are illegal. It is not hard to imagine that many houses were built illegally, for political reasons, as large segments of the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem oppose Israeli sovereignty. They wish the area to be part of the Palestinian capital when the Palestinian state comes into being. The authors do not hide the fact that they support them. 

Yacobi and Katz went on to discuss a case where the Israeli authorities expropriated property to establish a school for children with special needs for the neighborhood’s residents. But, for the authors, “this ‘top-down’ planning did not include any consultation with the family or the community.” The authors forget that practices for local authorities to consult residents when establishing a building for the public benefit are not that common. 

There are many cases of land disputes in Israel, both in the Jewish and Arab sectors, that involve house demolitions. 

Recently, the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood attracted attention. The Israeli media reported in November 2021 that the Palestinian families in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem rejected a compromise proposed by the Israeli Supreme Court last month that would make them “protected tenants” and leave them in their homes for 15 years – or until a settlement is reached. The neighborhood spokesman explained, “This refusal comes from our belief in the justice of our cause and our right to our homes and homeland, despite the lack of guaranty to strengthen our Palestinian presence in occupied Jerusalem by any party or institution.” The media added in their report, “The Palestinian residents claim that in 1956 they purchased houses built in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood by the Jordanian Ministry of Housing. They or their fathers received agreements according to which they waived a “refugee certificate” and received the apartments at their disposal in return. According to them, no arrangement was made for the land. Later on, the land came into the hands of Nahalat Shimon, which claims that it lawfully acquired the rights from committees that owned the land before 1948 and even renewed the registration in 1972. The District Court accepted the “Nahalat Shimon” claim and ruled that the families who appealed this decision should be evacuated.”

Yacobi and Katz also claim that the “Recent events in Sheikh Jarrah clearly mark the current phase in colonizing Jerusalem. This is a micro-scale appropriation of Palestinian territory accompanied by evictions and displacements of Palestinians who remain in the city. Palestinian homes are demolished or colonized by settlers such as in the case of Silwan and Sheikh Jarrah.”

The authors pay no respect to the Israeli courts that examined the documents held by both parties, the Palestinians and the Jews. 

However, according to a Peace Now report, from January 18, 2022, the Sallehiya family was evacuated because, “The Sallehiya family is a Palestinian refugee family originally from the village of Ein Karem, who settled in Sheikh Jarrah, according to the family, before 1967. In 1984, the district planning committee approved a building plan (Plan No. 2591) for the neighborhood, and designated the plot on which the family home and [gardening] nursery were built, for public use. On 3/7/2017, the municipality announced the expropriation of the plot for the purpose of constructing a public building in accordance with the approved plan. The landowners filed an objection to the expropriation but the court dismissed their petition. It should be noted that the Israeli law allows expropriation of private property for public purposes and property owners are entitled to compensation. About a year ago, the Jerusalem Municipality began to work on detailed planning for the construction of a school and kindergartens for the Palestinians on the plot, and initiated eviction proceedings against the Sallehiya family at the Execution Office. The Execution Office set the time of the eviction of the family to be carried out during the month of January 2022.”

It is questionable if people who have no title deed to land should be entitled to live in a property they do not own nor pay rent for. According to Yacobi and Katz, Palestinians have such a right, as it fits with their radical narrative of colonization.  

Over the years, Israel Academia Monitor has discussed the large number of Israeli expats who teach social science in British universities.  Our analysis indicates that many are radical activists who were apparently hired to produce research that besmirches the State of Israel. 

It is probably not a coincidence that Amnesty International UK has recently produced a report that charges Israel as an apartheid state.   Israeli officials have described the report as antisemitic according to the standards of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism.  As a rule, human rights groups use academic research to prove their case and, more to the point, some academic activists help to draft these kinds of reports. Prof. Oren Yiftachel admitted to co-writing the earlier BT’selem report which charged Israel of apartheid.

A more balanced view of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is impossible as long as British universities recruit Israeli expats because of their skills in trashing Israel.  Even better, maybe scarce departmental resources should be used to hire experts on Iran or other countries which violate human rights on a grand scale. As it stands, little has been written on these countries and their long-suffering population. 

References:

https://theconversation.com/jerusalem-evictions-show-how-urban-planning-is-being-weaponised-against-palestinians-175690
 The Conversation
Academic rigour, journalistic flairJerusalem: evictions show how urban planning is being weaponised against Palestinians

January 27, 2022 2.30pm GMT  

1. Haim Yacobi Professor of Development Planning, UCL  
2. Irit Katz Assistant Professor in Architecture and Urban Studies, University of Cambridge

One olive in my garden is better than anything material in the whole world.

These sad words were uttered by Mahmoud Salhiya after his home in Sheikh Jarrah was recently demolished by Israeli forces.

Sheikh Jarrah is a Palestinian neighbourhood of 3,000 inhabitants at the eastern part of Road 1 that runs north to south through Jerusalem and separates Israeli and Palestinian sectors. The neighbourhood has two distinctive sections: the north is the part inhabited by wealthier Palestinians while the poorer, southern part is populated by hundreds of Palestinian refugees from 1948.

The Salhiya family house is in Sheikh Jarrah’s southern area on land designated by an old urban scheme authorised in the 1980s for the construction of a public building. But part of the house already existed, along with some other structures, when the plan was being prepared. In fact, the house and the other buildings on the plot are already visible on maps of Jerusalem from the 1930s.

Importantly, according to the Jerusalem Municipality itself, Palestinian houses built in East Jerusalem before 1967 are considered legal and therefore cannot be demolished. But zoning the Salhiya plot for public use – which ignored the fact of the existing residential property already on the site – is indicative of a common practice that has characterised Israeli planning of East Jerusalem since 1967.

The Israeli authorities argued that the Salhiya property had been expropriated to establish a “special needs” school for the benefit of the neighbourhood’s residents. But this “top-down” planning did not include any consultation with the family or the community.

Demolition as a tool of control

The police are reported to have arrived at the property in the early hours of what was one of the coldest nights so far this winter, and forcibly removed 15 members of the Salhiya family before bulldozing the house. They arrested Mahmoud Salhiya and five members of his family, as well as some of their supporters, both Palestinian and Israeli activists.

This traumatic event is part of an ongoing attempt of displacing Palestinians from their homes – not only in Sheikh Jarrah but also in other neighbourhoods such as Silwan, on the outskirts of the Old City, which is the subject of the continuing conflict between Jewish settlers and the local Palestinian community over archaeology, tourism development and housing.

Housing demolitions have become an all-too-regular occurrence. According to a report by B’tselem (the Israeli information centre for human rights in the occupied territories) between 2006 and November 2021, Israeli authorities demolished at least 1,176 Palestinian housing units in East Jerusalem. At least 3,769 people lost their homes – including 1,996 children. Housing demolition serves Israel’s attempt to control the city’s “demographic balance” – keeping a Jewish majority within Jerusalem’s municipal territory back to the 70:30 ratio that has driven Israeli policy since 1967.

Emerging urban geopolitics

The Salhiya family’s case should be understood within a wider context of the political processes taking place in Jerusalem since June 1967 and the declaration of the city as Israel’s unified capital. The expropriation of Palestinian land by the state through legal measures was central to the colonisation of East Jerusalem at this stage.

Planning further contributed to the colonisation of the city and was characterised by the construction of settlements (“satellite neighbourhoods”). Since 1967, Israel has expropriated over one-third of the Palestinian land that was annexed to Jerusalem’s municipality new boundaries – 24.5 square kilometres – most of it privately owned by Palestinians. Some 11 neighbourhoods have been erected for Jewish inhabitants only.

Under international law, the status of these neighbourhoods is the same as the Israeli illegal settlements throughout the West Bank. As a complementary step, a series of masterplans were drawn that have effectively limited the growth of Palestinian neighbourhoods by limiting construction rights and defining most Palestinian land as not eligible for housing construction.

The beginning of the 21st century marked a shift into a more radical policy in Jerusalem with the construction of the separation barrier. This has allowed Israel to de facto annex another 160 square kilometres of the Occupied Territories.

The route of the barrier creates a sharp division between the walled city of Jerusalem and the Palestinian hinterland. The concrete barrier deliberately disrupts the functional integration of Palestinian neighbourhoods and isolates them from their hinterland in the West Bank.Separation: how the barrier has affected Jerusalem’s Palestinian communities. ir-amin, Author provided

The construction of the separation barrier has placed the vast majority of territory and resources in the Jerusalem metropolitan under Jewish control. Palestinians are confined to disjointed enclaves, without sovereignty, freedom of movement, control over natural resources, or contiguous territory.

Micro colonisation

Recent events in Sheikh Jarrah clearly mark the current phase in colonising Jerusalem. This is a micro-scale appropriation of Palestinian territory accompanied by evictions and displacements of Palestinians who remain in the city. Palestinian homes are demolished or colonised by settlers such as in the case of Silwan and Sheikh Jarrah while agricultural land is confiscated from its Palestinian owners – as in the case of Walajeh where the separation barrier surrounds the village and cuts it off from most of its inhabitants’ land.

This is a new phase in which Palestinian space is appropriated not solely through military acts or large-scale urban planning (such as described above) but rather on small-scale urban spaces and the use of planning policies. These include land-use changes, planning for the apparent “public good” (such as the attempt to build a school on Salhiya’s plot in Sheikh Jarrah), infrastructure development and touristic development. There is also clear discrimination in the distribution of building permits. While 38% of the city’s residents are Palestinians, only 16.5% of the building permits were given for construction in Palestinian neighbourhoods.

In this way, Jerusalem has become a model for using “banal” apparatuses such as urban planning to reinforce Israeli domination of this divided and contested city.

****We are grateful to Dr Mandy Turner for providing the translation of Mahmoud Salhiya’s words at the opening of this article and the linked video.

****
University College London provides funding as a founding partner of The Conversation UK. University of Cambridge provides funding as a member of The Conversation UK.

27.01.22

Editorial Note

The battle of Tantura in the War of Independence is back in the spotlight. Akevot, an anti-Israel Israeli NGO, the house of several anti-Israel Israeli academics, advised the director of a new film on the Tantura battle, as Dr. Adam Raz, the researcher at Akevot, has written in Haaretz.   

The Tantura affair had come up already in the late 1990s when Theodore (Teddy) Katz wrote an MA thesis at the University of Haifa accusing the Alexandroni Brigade of executing a massacre of the Tantura Arab villagers during the war. Katz interviewed 70 witnesses in 140 hours of recordings. However, Katz’s thesis was shelved after the Alexandroni veterans initiated a legal proceeding.   The Alexandroni fighters accused Katz of falsifications since his recordings did not match his writing.

Katz admitted he received $8000 in cash from a Palestinian Authority research center to defend his case in court, a month before the Second Intifada erupted.

Katz signed an apology to the Alexandroni Brigade which stated, “I would like to clarify that after re-examining the matter, it is clear to me beyond any doubt that there is absolutely no foundation for the allegation that a massacre was committed in Tantura by the Alexandroni Brigade soldiers or by any other Jewish fighting group. Let me clarify that what I wrote was also evidently misunderstood, as I did not intend to state that a massacre took place in Tantura and even today I state that there was no massacre at Tantura. I believe the Alexandroni veterans who emphatically denied the massacre, and I retract every part of my thesis that implies that there was a massacre or that defenseless and unprotected people. In light of the above, I believe I owe a sincere apology to the Alexandroni veterans, their families and the families of the Alexandroni men who died in battle for leveling such false accusations against them. This apology will be published in an appropriate section of a major newspaper.”

This was not the end, as Katz withdrew his apology soon after signing it.

Now the film director and Akevot reopened the case but did not provide new evidence. IAM reported on Akevot before, in June 2021, “Hostile NGO Akevot Attracting Israeli Academia.” IAM noted that Akevot only provides information that presents Israel in a negative light. As an institute working for the “collection and accessibility of information concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” It collects money as “protectors of human rights.” The purpose of Akevot, as stated on the NGOs Registrar website, is researching the “belligerent” manner of control of Israel in the territories occupied by it. Akevot was founded in 2013 and was housed with Adv. Michael Sfard, a “lawyer and political activist” who advances the idea that Israel is an apartheid state. 

The Alexandroni Brigade published their account on “Operation Port – Opening of the Road to Haifa,” as follows: “With the liberation of Haifa, the departure of the Arabs of Caesarea and the separation of the Arab villages located along the Zichron Yaacov Road, the enemy was left with only one base in these villages to maintain the external connection by sea, it was the village of Tantura, located on the beach, north-west of Zichron Yaacov. Then, it is no wonder that the village soon became the main supply base for all the surrounding villages. A fleet of dozens of boats and small ships maintained regular contact with Lebanon, sailed in for Tantura supplies, weapons, and equipment, and took fleeing refugees to Lebanon. As a result of this supply, the harassment of Jewish transportation on the Tel Aviv-Haifa road increased by the villagers of the “Little Triangle,” to the point that the road was completely blocked by the rioters. The importance of Tantura was in its ability to preserve the momentum of Arab harassment on Jewish transportation between Tel Aviv and Haifa. The location of this enemy base within our territory was more serious than could be reconciled.  Attempts to negotiate with the villagers for surrender, a negotiation conducted by one of the Hagana personnel in Zichron Yaacov who was in close contact with the village dignitaries before the outbreak of the war. The negotiations failed due to the opposition of the village’s young people and foreigners who were in it, unlike what happened in Fureidis and Jisr-a-Zarqa, where the residents agreed to surrender. In light of the failure of the negotiations, it was decided to occupy the village and purge the beach of enemy forces. According to the intelligence in our hands, there were about 300 fighters in the village, equipped with about 100 rifles, several dozen pistols, and submachine guns, a number of 3” mortars, and a 40-millimeter Bofors cannon (this information was not confirmed). At the head of the fighters were about four Englishmen, British army defectors, Arab police defectors, and a number of Bosnian Muslim fighters. The task was assigned to the 33rd Battalion of the Alexandroni Brigade.  An early tour of the commanders was conducted via a train journey from Hadera to Atlit. The train still operated under the auspices of the British, who held the area of the port of Haifa. At the request of the patrol commander, the train near Tantura slowed down to get a broader idea. As the train stopped at Zichron Yaacov station, it was attacked by an Egyptian plane that missed it. In retrospect, it turned out that the intelligence was quite accurate. In light of the intelligence and reconnaissance, it was decided on the course of action: Attack on two main axes – Company A moves north, crosses the railway, splits into three heads, and simultaneously attacks the ruins of al-Burj on the beach, the “glazier” (the glass factory established by Baron Rothschild) and the village to the north and east. Company C will move from the train station in Zichron, between the track and the beach, and will attack from the south. A force from Company B will attack the school on the hill that dominates the village to the east. The rest of the force from Company B will serve as a reserve force. The auxiliary weapons Company will open fire machine guns and mortars for the stated aid purposes, and a naval unit will block the enemy’s escape from the sea. The operation date was set for May 23, 1948, after midnight. At the point of attack, the movement to the destination began as planned, but Company A was discovered upon crossing the railroad, and then the rest of the forces were ordered to storm in. The operation went as planned, despite skillful and precise sniper fire from the eastern hill ridge that slowed the movement of the force. After a heavy battle from house to house, extensive use of hand grenades, and the elimination of about ten snipers, the battle ended at about 08:00. The forces were prepared for perimeter defense, units engaged in collecting weapons and concentrated the men for interrogation and identification and transferring them along with the rest of the residents to other places, decided and done by other authorities and units. The enemy had about 70 killed. In the battle for the conquest of Tantura, 14 warriors fell. One of the fallen fighters was from the Navy.”

In his book, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, Prof. Benny Morris discussed the “Tantura Massacre” in page 301. He acknowledges that “there is evidence that Alexandroni troops… executed POWs.” and that “A few days after the conquest of Tantura, Ya‘akov Epstein, of Zikhron Ya‘akov, the Ministry for Minority Affairs’ man in the moshava and its longstanding liaison with Tantura, prepared a report. He had arrived in the village minutes or hours after the completion of the conquest, on the morning of 23 May. He reported that he had seen bodies everywhere – ‘in the [village] outskirts, in the streets, in the alleys, in the village houses’ – and had had a hand in organizing their burial. But he had made no mention of a recently completed or ongoing massacre of any sort. On the contrary, he had seen women and children and adult males sitting on the shore and had moved among them in order to identify, at the Haganah’s request, any possible strangers. And he had asked the Alexandroni commander to see to it that villagers were removed from the site and not allowed to remain lest ‘vengeful’ Haganah troops attack them. But he had made no mention of a massacre or of allegations of a massacre.”

Morris mentions another account on Tantura, “a refugee from Tantura, Mahmoud al Yihiya Yihiya, in August 1998 (Dar al Shara, Damascus) published a book on his village, entitled Al Tantura, in which he described the battle and named the village dead, 52 in all, from May 1948 (pp. 117–126 and 143–146). He made no mention of a massacre. It is probable that some of the 52 were unarmed villagers killed in the course of the battle; but this is a far cry from the dozens or hundreds Katz and his Arab ‘witnesses’ claimed were massacred. In the absence of documentary proof to the contrary, the silences of the plaintive women refugees who reached the West Bank in June 1948, of Epstein (in May and June 1948) and of Yihiya concerning a largescale massacre must strike the historian as outstandingly odd if a massacre had indeed taken place.”

The account of Yihiya is brought in full by Prof. Yoav Gelber. Mahmoud al-Yahiya Yahya, Al-Tantura. Damascus: Dar al-Shajra to Lansher and al-Tuzia, 1998 pp. 119-123, wrote the following, “A few days after the conquest of the village Lam, the time of Tantura has come. The Jews attacked it in the evening, but the young people of the village defended it with all their might and forced the attacking invaders to retreat after leaving behind many dead and wounded who fell in the wheat fields east of the village, but the Jews did not like it as it angered them. They returned from all sides and the sea the following day, concentrated on the shore near the village houses in the early morning and began a fierce attack. The situation of the inhabitants of Tantura at this dangerous time was like that of the famous Arab commander Tarek Ben Ziad on the day he raided Spain and burned the ships that led his forces to the Spanish mainland and then told them, ‘The sea is behind you, and the enemy is in front of you, and God has nothing but justice and patience.’ The youngsters of the village defended their houses and land until the last bullet, then ceased, and then the Jews entered the village and in their minds revenge instead of respect for those people who defended their beautiful village and their houses and land, and opened fire on anyone whose gaze fell on him and killed in a humiliating way also women. Then they carried out an order, killing in the village and even those men whom they employed to collect the bodies in the village streets, in front of their wives, children, and mothers who collected them near a pit they dug at the northern end, for them to see with their own eyes. When the Jewish soldiers entered Tantura, 52 victims of Tantura and their names were on the list of Tantura victims, and there were also seven wounded. Here is what happened to the other residents of Tantura: The Jews took them as prisoners, the old, the young who were alive, to a prison camp in Kafar Jalil, and the women, children, and elderly-women to Fureidis nearby and after staying there for a few days, they moved to Tulkarm and then to Nablus and then to Syria. Here, I have no alternative but to go back to the point of the Jewish forces who were called the Hagana, the “defense,” to say these were not defense forces but wild offensive forces that one who is unscrupulous and lack human character and humanity and who does not act according to the laws of war. Is there a law that allows a soldier to kill people in the streets after they have surrendered and after their rifles become sticks after the ammunition has run out? Here are some examples of this barbarism: 1. The same soldiers ordered five young men from the village to collect the bodies from the village streets and led them in trucks to the pit we mentioned. After collecting bodies, they were standing in front of the pit facing the corpses, then one of the officers of the Hagana shot them from the back, and they fell into the pit on the other corpses. 2. A woman was shot from a treacherous bullet with a breastfed baby in her arms. When she fell to the ground, her baby fell beside her while he was crying and approached his mother’s body looking for a breast to suckle and walked away from her because she was lifeless. 3. A mother of three boys, one of whom was killed by a treacherous bullet when Jewish forces entered the village, the second boy was one of five who were tasked with collecting the bodies from the village streets. When he saw that his brother had died, he kneeled over and kissed him. The soldiers shot him above his brother, and he died. While the third brother was near his mother who was sitting among the women near the pit. One of the bloodthirsty Hagana people came and wanted to kill two or three young men sitting by the pit. The officer in charge objected and told him to take only one of them. His choice fell on the third son of that woman, he dragged him a few feet away, shot him in front of his poor mother, and killed him. 4. Directly east of the village, the Jewish soldiers discovered two peaceful people who had no weapons. They demanded of them to stand in front of a high rock with the intention of shooting them in the back as was their custom. Suddenly one of the Jews of Zamarin (Zichron Yaacov) who accompanied this crazy action appeared, who knew one of the two, Yahya bin Muhammad Khachar al-Machi from the village, he had an honest advocate and spoke well of him about his human qualities throughout his life, so they spared him and shot his friend the late Mustafa Abu Jamus. 5. An old woman who came out of her house leaning on a stick was shot to death by the soldiers for no reason. 6. One of the residents of Tantura named Sheikh Suleiman al-Rashid al-Hussein al-Yahya suffered from exhaustion in his mind after studying at Al-Azhar University in Egypt for several years and received a certificate in Islamic studies. This man came from Haifa to Tantura on the second day of conquest. He arrived without knowing that the Jewish soldiers had entered the village. When he entered the threshing floor of the village, without warning, he was shot by a Jewish soldier and fell dead into the rainwater canal near the threshing floor and was left sitting on his knee and remained as they say for two whole days until he was buried in the same water canal. What happened to Tantura prisoners after they were taken to the Jalil detention camp? They suffered greatly for eight months and were exchanged for Jewish prisoners captured by the Arab armies. The Tantura prisoners were transferred to Tulkarem, then went out with their families to Syria or remained in the area… Here, it is only to be noted that the women did not escape the horrors of the Jewish soldiers while searching on them before they were taken out of Tantura and transferred to Fureidis. They behaved disgustingly and criminally and took from them everything they had, like jewelry and money, and when these women came with their children to Syria, they were destitute.”

Clearly, the account by Yihiya paints the Alexandroni Brigade negatively, but does not mention committing a massacre. 

Alon Schwartz, the film director, tells about his motives in an interview titled “We Must Compare the Nakba with the Holocaust – and Say How Different it is.” Schwartz discusses how he met Teddy Katz, “He came to Katz almost by accident, as part of an investigation he conducted three years ago into a series that he tried to develop on the decline of Israeli democracy. One of the chapters was devoted to the activities of the left-wing non-governmental organizations – B’Tselem, Ta’ayush, and Breaking the Silence. When the initiative to document the current political reality in Israel failed, he turned to history, and the search for precedents for the phenomenon led him to Teddy Katz and his research. “I was depressed from Bibi’s time and felt I had to do something to vent my frustration in a creative way, but after the original project got stuck, I discovered a man named Teddy Katz.” 

Akevot and Schwartz should take note, AlJazeera reported a few days ago that “The Palestinian Authority (PA) has called for the formation of an international commission to investigate the massacres committed by Israel in the Palestinian village of Tantura in 1948. The call came after Israeli daily Haaretz reported on Thursday the discovery of a mass grave in Tantura village of Palestinians killed by Zionist gangs in 1948, when the modern state of Israel was formed.”

The difference in versions between Yihiya’s and the Alexandroni’s accounts is evident.   But Alon Schwartz tried to compare the treatment of the Arabs in the 1948 war to the extermination of six million Jews in the Holocaust.  The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism, which an increasing number of countries adopted, defines such comparisons as antisemitism.  Ironically, academics and others have pushed the “Tantura massacre” for decades in order to portray Israel as a Nazi-like state.

References:

https://www.aurdip.org/there-s-a-mass-palestinian-grave.html
There’s a Mass Palestinian Grave at a Popular Israeli Beach, Veterans Confess
The Israeli veterans of the 1948 battle at Tantura village finally come clean about the mass killing of Arabs that took place after the village’s surrender

Adam Raz
Jan. 20, 2022 8:26 PM
“They silenced it,” the former combat soldier Moshe Diamant says, trying to be spare with his words. “It mustn’t be told, it could cause a whole scandal. I don’t want to talk about it, but it happened. What can you do? It happened.”
Twenty-two years have passed since the furor erupted over the account of what occurred during the conquest by Israeli troops of the village of Tantura, north of Caesarea on the Mediterranean coast, in the War of Independence. The controversy sprang up in the wake of a master’s thesis written by an Israeli graduate student named Theodore Katz, that contained testimony about atrocities perpetrated by the Alexandroni Brigade against Arab prisoners of war. The thesis led to the publication of an article in the newspaper Maariv headlined “The Massacre at Tantura.” Ultimately, a libel suit filed against Katz by veterans of the brigade induced him to retract his account of a massacre.
For years, Katz’s findings were archived, and discussion of the episode took the form of a professional debate between historians. Until now. Now, at the age of 90 and up, a number of combat soldiers from the Israel Defense Forces’ brigade have admitted that a massacre did indeed take place in 1948 at Tantura – today’s popular Dor Beach, adjacent to Kibbutz Nahsholim. The former soldiers describe different scenes in different ways, and the number of villagers who were shot to death can’t be established. The numbers arising from the testimonies range from a handful who were killed, to many dozens. According to one testimony, provided by a resident of Zichron Yaakov who helped bury the victims, the number of dead exceeded 200, though this high figure does not have corroboration.
According to Diamant, speaking now, villagers were shot to death by a “savage” using a submachine gun, at the conclusion of the battle. He adds that in connection with the libel suit in 2000, the former soldiers tacitly understood that they would pretend that nothing unusual had occurred after the village’s conquest. “We didn’t know, we didn’t hear. Of course everyone knew. They all knew.”  
Another combat soldier, Haim Levin, now relates that a member of the unit went over to a group of 15 or 20 POWs “and killed them all.” Levin says he was appalled, and he spoke to his buddies to try to find out what was going on. “You have no idea how many [of us] those guys have killed,” he was told.

Another combat soldier in the brigade, Micha Vitkon, talked about an officer “who in later years was a big man in the Defense Ministry. With his pistol he killed one Arab after another. He was a bit disturbed, and that was a symptom of his disturbance.” According to Vitkon, the soldier did what he did because the prisoners refused to divulge where they had hidden the remaining weapons in the village.
Another combat soldier described a different incident that occurred there: “It’s not nice to say this. They put them into a barrel and shot them in the barrel. I remember the blood in the barrel.” One of the soldiers summed up by saying that his comrades-in-arms simply didn’t behave like human beings in the village – and then resumed his silence.

“I was a murderer. I didn’t take prisoners,” says Amitzur Cohen. How many Arabs did he kill outside the framework of the battles? “I didn’t count. I had a machine gun with 250 bullets. I can’t say how many.”

These and other testimonies appear in an impressive documentation project of the director Alon Schwarz. His documentary film “Tantura,” which will be screened twice this weekend online as part of the Sundance Film festival in Utah, would seem to undo the version that took root following the libel suit and Katz’s apology. Even though the testimonies of the soldiers in the film (some of them recorded by Katz, some by Schwarz) were given in broken sentences, in fragments of confessions, the overall picture is clear: Soldiers in the Alexandroni Brigade massacred unarmed men after the battle had concluded.
In fact, the testimony Katz collected was not presented to the court during the libel trial, which was settled midway through the proceedings. Listening to those recordings suggests that if the court had probed them at the time, Katz would not have been impelled to apologize. Often what the soldiers told him was only hinted at and partial, but together it added up to an unequivocal truth.

“What do you want?” asked Shlomo Ambar, who would rise to the rank of brigadier general and head of Civil Defense, the forerunner of today’s Home Front Command. “For me to be a delicate soul and speak in poetry? I moved aside. That’s all. Enough.” Ambar, speaking in the film, made it clear that the events in the village had not been to his liking, “but because I didn’t speak out then, there is no reason for me to talk about it today.”

One of the grimmest testimonies in Schwarz’s film is that of Amitzur Cohen, who talked about his first months as a combat soldier in the war: “I was a murderer. I didn’t take prisoners.” Cohen relates that if a squad of Arab soldiers was standing with their hands raised, he would shoot them all. How many Arabs did he kill outside the framework of the battles? “I didn’t count. I had a machine gun with 250 bullets. I can’t say how many.”
The Alexandroni Brigade soldiers’ testimonies join past written testimony provided by Yosef Ben-Eliezer. “I was one of the soldiers involved in the conquest of Tantura,” Ben-Eliezer wrote, some two decades ago. “I was aware of the murder in the village. Some of the soldiers did the killing at their own independent initiative.”
The testimonies and documents that Schwarz collected for his film indicate that after the massacre the victims were buried in a mass grave, which is now under the Dor Beach parking lot. The grave was dug especially for this purpose, and the burial went on for more than a week. At the end of May 1948, a week after the village was conquered, and two weeks after the declaration of statehood, one of the commanders who was posted at the site was reprimanded for not having dealt properly with the burial of the Arabs’ bodies. On June 9, the commander of the adjacent base reported: “Yesterday I checked the mass grave in Tantura cemetery. Found everything in order.”
In addition to the testimonies and documents, the film presents the conclusion of experts who compared aerial photographs of the village from before and after its conquest. A comparison of the photographs, and the use of three-dimensional imaging done with new tools, makes it possible not only to determine the exact location of the grave but also to estimate its dimensions: 35 meters long, 4 meters wide. “They took care to hide it,” Katz says in the film, “in such a way that the coming generations would walk there without knowing what they were stepping on.”

Disqualified
The confession of the Alexandroni Brigade troops casts a new light on the dismal attempt to silence Teddy Katz. In March 1998, while a graduate student at the University of Haifa, Katz submitted a master’s thesis to the department of Middle Eastern history. Its title: “The Exodus of the Arabs from the Villages at the Foot of Southern Mount Carmel in 1948.” Katz, then in his fifties, received a grade of 97. According to custom, the paper was deposited in the university’s library, and the author intended to proceed to doctoral studies. But his plan went awry.

“They took care to hide it,” Katz says in the film, “in such a way that the coming generations would walk there without knowing what they were stepping on.”

In January 2000, journalist Amir Gilat borrowed the study from the library and published an article about the massacre in Maariv. It touched off a firestorm. Besides the libel suit initiated by the Alexandroni veterans association, the university also went into a tizzy, and decided to set up a committee to reexamine the M.A. thesis. Even though the original reviewers found that Katz had completed the thesis with excellence, and even though the paper was based on dozens of documented testimonies – of Jewish soldiers and Arab refugees from Tantura – the new committee decided to disqualify the thesis.
Katz’s paper is not fault-free, but probably the primary target of criticism is the University of Haifa, which accompanied the research and the writing in a deficient manner, and after approving it then reversed course and disowned its student. That made possible the years-long silencing and repression of the bloody events in Tantura. For Katz, one court hearing was all it took for him to sign a letter of apology in which he declared that there had not been a massacre in the village and that his thesis was flawed. The fact that just hours later he retracted this, and that his lawyer, Avigdor Feldman, was not present at the nighttime meeting in which Katz came under pressure to recant, was forgotten. The apology buried the findings the thesis had uncovered, and the details of the massacre were thereafter not subjected to comprehensive scrutiny.
The historians who addressed the episode – from Yoav Gelber to Benny Morris and Ilan Pappé – reached different and contradictory conclusions. Gelber, who played a key role in the struggle to discredit Katz’s paper, asserted that a few dozen Arabs had been killed in the battle itself, but that a massacre had not occurred. Morris, for his part, thought that it was impossible to determine unequivocally what happened, but wrote that after reading several of the testimonies and interviewing some of the Alexandroni veterans, he “came away with a deep sense of unease.” Pappé, who engaged in a highly publicized debate with Gelber over Katz’s thesis, determined that a massacre had been perpetrated in Tantura in the straightforward sense of the word. Now, with the appearance of the testimony in Schwarz’s film, the debate would seem to be decided.
In one of the more dramatic scenes in the documentary, Drora Pilpel, who was the judge in the libel suit against Katz, listens to a recording of one of Katz’s interviews. It was the first time she had encountered the testimony collected by Katz, whose speedy apology brought the trial to a quick end. “If it’s true, it’s a pity,” the retired judge tells the director after removing her headphones. “If he had things like this, he should have gone all the way to the end.”
The Tantura affair exemplifies the difficulty that soldiers in the 1948 war had in acknowledging the bad behavior that was on display in that war: acts of murder, violence against Arab residents, expulsion and looting. To listen to the soldiers’ testimony today, while considering the uniform stand they demonstrated when they sued Katz, is to grasp the potency of the conspiracy of silence and the consensus that there are things one doesn’t talk about. It’s to be hoped that from the perspective of years, such subjects will be more readily addressed. A possibly encouraging sign in this direction is the fact that the film about Tantura received funding from such mainstream bodies as the Hot cable network and the Israel Film Fund.
The grim events at Tantura will never be completely investigated, the full truth will not be known. However, there is one thing that can be asserted with a great deal of certainty: Under the parking lot of one of the most familiar and beloved Israeli resort sites on the Mediterranean, lie the remains of the victims of one of the glaring massacres of the War of Independence.
Adam Raz is a researcher at the Akevot Institute for Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Research. The Akevot Institute assisted the filmmaker (without remuneration).
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https://forward.com/culture/481231/tantura-documentary-alon-schwarz-israel-palestine-war-of-independence/

Why some Israelis are finally confronting what happened in 1948 in a village called Tantura
Joshua Flanders
January 22, 2022

One week after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, (and three days before the Israeli Defense Forces were created), a large-scale massacre of more than 200 Arabs allegedly occurred in the Palestinian village of Tantura. This event was one incident in wars from 1947-1949, a period that Israeli Jews call the War of Independence. Palestinians use another term: Al Nakba, or the Catastrophe.

The details of what occurred at Tantura have long been disputed, with some Israeli Jews claiming nothing happened and most reluctant to even talk about it. By not acknowledging the massacre at Tantura, the government has committed to not addressing this issue.

A new documentary by an Israeli director that had its world premiere Jan. 20, the opening night of the Sundance Film Festival, explores what happened. The film by Alon Schwarz – called, simply, “Tantura” — also examines why the Nakba is taboo to discuss in Israel and what happened when one person questioned the details of this event.

Schwarz stumbled upon the story of Teddy Katz, who in the late 1990s had conducted extensive research into Tantura, compiling 140 hours of audio interviews with dozens of Jewish and Arab witnesses to the battles. Based on these oral testimonies, he wrote a master’s thesis at the University of Haifa that argued that the IDF’s Alexandroni Brigade carried out this atrocity.

Though initially well-received by the university when it was submitted around 1998, when his paper went public on Jan. 21, 2000, in the Israeli newspaper Maariv, Alexandroni veterans sued Katz for libel. His thesis was later rejected by the university and his reputation was ruined – Katz also suffered a stroke just weeks before his first meeting in court. The legal case questioned the accuracy of the oral testimonies upon which his assertions were founded. Katz, still alive though in poor health, claims he was coerced to write an apology, which he says is his greatest regret. He recanted almost immediately.

But the audio testimonies remain.

“It’s a cinematic rollercoaster,” said his brother, Shaul Schwarz, who produced the film, “hearing these tapes and having these people sit in front of the camera in the last years of their lives and need to puke out this truth or deny their truth.”The film relies heavily on these interviews, conducted in Hebrew, though Schwarz also interviewed several former soldiers, many in their 90s, as well as professors, kibbutzniks, a judge from the case, and Arabs about their recollections. He not only listened to hours of audio interviews from decades ago, he incorporated forensic evidence as well as geographic photos and analysis.

He was referring to the interviews in “Tantura” of elderly former soldiers who unburden themselves by relating acts of war they witnessed or, chillingly, committed themselves. Others said they do not remember the events in Tantura or refuse to speak about them. “We all have these inner secrets,” Shaul Schwarz said, “we all have dark sides we deal with as countries. Do you choose to be truthful or do you choose to bury your secret?”

The events described in “Tantura” came on the heels of the Holocaust, when many Jews were deeply traumatized, fearful, full of anger and panic. It may be difficult for civilians to imagine being a young soldier heading into battle and dealing with such terrifying events. While most ex-soldiers were ready to candidly share their recollections, a few were still firmly committed to taking their secrets to the grave. Some veterans recalled one or two individuals whose actions clearly crossed the line into something more monstrous.

Alon Schwarz says he has compassion for the soldiers of the Alexandroni Brigade. “I think we’re truly not judgmental,” Schwarz says, “the only thing we are judgmental about is telling the wrong story for so long.” But looking back on the events of 1948, Alon admits, “I don’t know that I would have done anything different if I lived in that period.”

Schwarz describes growing up like many Jews did, learning about the founding of the State of Israel as “a land without a people” when the Jewish pioneers arrived, a pure nation with the most moral army in the world. “I love Israel,” he says, “I’m a proud Israeli and Zionist, but like many countries we’re founded on blood. We took another people and threw them out, and in this day and age we need to say it. There needs to be some acknowledgment that the founding myth isn’t what we were told.”

Shaul Schwarz admits that after making “Tantura” something changed for him. Now when he is walking around Israel he asks himself, “I wonder who lived in that house, or I ask friends ‘do you know who lived here?’”Schwarz’s hope is to “create knowledge and understanding within Israel, first and foremost about our own history, a history most of us don’t know about. It’s uncomfortable, so people don’t talk about it, but institutionally Israel has not been very open about releasing archives. We have to say ‘this is where we were wrong, and we acknowledge and we apologize, and we want to go forward to a better place.’”

“I was depressed for a very long time,” says Alon Schwarz about the period after making the film. “It shook my whole world as it shakes Israelis’ world when they watch it. I drive around Israel and I see all these ruined houses on the side roads and suddenly it’s like, ‘OK, this was a village.’”

“American Jews often feel that they have to be 100 percent supportive of the Israeli government in order to be considered a good Zionist,” he says, “For me, loving Israel means aspiring to have a better country, a better democracy and a more open country. It means being independent thinkers. It’s good we acknowledge that we have a diverse population that includes non-Jews that are equal citizens, that they have rights and are part of our country.”

Schwarz believes that peace between Israelis and Palestinians is possible – and that talking about the “Nakba” can help. “Tantura is their tragedy,” he said, referring to the Palestinians. “It’s not comparable to the numbers of the Holocaust, but it is comparable for the personal trauma that these people went through. It’s a multi-generational trauma.

“We showed the film to a couple of Palestinians and they said it’s an eye-opening document because it’s finally some acknowledgement. That’s why we focused the film on Israelis and why we’re proud that Israelis put out this message. It’s important that it comes from us.”

“It’s pretty obvious that things happen that we are not proud of as a nation,” he says, “the best way to go forward is to expose the wrongdoings.”

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https://www.facebook.com/754134248/posts/10158424835019249/

YoaV Gelber

22 January at 23:01הגרסה הערבית לאירועי טנטורה מול אגדות טדי כץ, אילן פפה, אדם רז ואחרים על 200 ויותר הרוגים בני בלי שם שנטבחו בכפר ונקברו מתחת למגרש החניה של דור:יחיא מחמוד אל-יחיא, אל-טנטורה: קריה דמרהא אל-אחתלאל אל-צהיוני, דמשק: דאר אל-שג’רה ללנשר ואל-תוזיע, 1998עמ’ 119-123מספר ימים לאחר שנכבש כפר לאם הגיע תורה של טנטורה. היהודים תקפו אותה לעת ערב אך צעירי הכפר הגנו עליו בכל הכוח ואילצו את הפושטים התוקפים לסגת לאחר שהותירו מאחורם הרוגים ופצועים רבים שנפלו בשדות החיטה ממזרח לכפר, אך הדבר לא מצא חן בעיני היהודים אלא העלה את חמתם והם חזרו לכפר ביום שלמחרת והפעם מכיוונים שונים ואפילו מן הים והתרכזו בחוף בסמוך לבתי הכפר בשעת בוקר מוקדמת והחלו בהתקפה עזה. מצבם של תושבי טנטורה בזמן המסוכן הזה היה כמצבו של המפקד הערבי המפורסם טארק בן זיאד ביום בו פשט על ספרד ושרף את הספינות שהובילו את כוחותיו ליבשת הספרדית ואז אמר להם “הים מאחריכם והאויב לפניכם ובאלוהים אין לכם אלא הצדק והסבלנות”.צעירי הכפר הגנו על כפרם, על בתיהם ועל אדמתם עד הכדור האחרון, אחר כך חדלו ולאחר מכן נכנסו היהודים לכפר ובמוחם הנקמה במקום כבוד לאותם אנשים אשר הגנו על כפרם היפה ועל בתיהם ואדמתם ופתחו באש על כל מי שמבטם נפל עליו והרגו בצורה שפלה גם נשים. אחר כך הרגו כדי למלא פקודה בכפר ואפילו אותם גברים אשר העסיקו אותם באיסוף הגופות ברחובות הכפר וזאת לעיני נשותיהם וילדיהם ואמהותיהם שאספו אותן ליד בור שחפרו אותו בקצה הצפוני כדי שתראינה במו עיניהן. בעת כניסתם של החיילים היהודים לטנטורה נפלו 52 חללים מתושבי טנטורה ושמותיהם ברשימת חללי טנטורה והיו גם שבעה פצועים ולהלן מה שאירע לשאר תושבי טנטורה:היהודים לקחו עמם כאסירים את הזקנים ואת הצעירים שנותרו בחיים למחנה מעצר בכפר ג’ליל ואת הנשים, הילדים והזקנות לקחו לכפר פרידיס הנמצא בקרבת מקום ולאחר ששהו שם כמה ימים, עברו לטול כרם ואחר כך לשכם ואחר כך לסוריה.כאן אין מנוס בידי אלא לחזור לעניין כניסת הכוחות היהודים שנקראו “ההגנה” ולומר כי הם הוכיחו שאינם כוחות הגנה אלא כוחות תקיפה פראיים שאיש לא מתנהג כמוהם אלא רק מי שהוא חסר מצפון ואופי ואנושיות ושאינו נוהג על פי חוקי המלחמה. האם יש חוק שמתיר לחייל להרוג אנשים ברחובות לאחר שנכנעו ולאחר שרובי הצעירים הפכו למקלות לאחר שאזלה התחמושת?והרי לפניכם כמה דוגמאות לברבריות הזו:1. אותם חיילים הורו לחמישה צעירים מהכפר לאסוף את הגופות מרחובות הכפר כפי שהיה קודם במקרה אחר והובילו אותן במשאיות לבור שהזכרנו אותו ולאחר שהסתיים איסוף הגופות הועמדו על שפת הבור ופניהם אל גופות החללים ואחר כך הגיע אחד מקציני ההגנה וירה בגבם מאחור והם נפלו לתוך הבור על גופות חבריהם.2. אישה נורתה מכדור בוגדני ותינוק יונק בידיה וכאשר נפלה על הקרקע נפל תינוקה לידה כשהוא בוכה והתקרב לגופת אמו כשהוא מחפש שד כדי לינוק והתרחק ממנה כי הייתה חסרת חיים.3. אם לשלושה בנים שאחד מהם נהרג מכדור בוגדני כאשר נכנסו הכוחות היהודיים לכפר והאח השני היה אחד מהחמישה אשר הוטל עליהם לאסוף את הגופות מרחובות הכפר וכאשר ראה את אחיו נופל חלל גחן מעליו ואחז בו כשהוא מנשק אותו והחיילים שליוו את מבצע איסוף החללים ירו בו והוא נפל מעל אחיו ומת. ואילו האח השלישי היה בקרבת אמו שישבה בין הנשים ליד בור החללים ובא אחד מאנשי ההגנה צמאי הדם ורצה להרוג שניים או שלושה מהצעירים שישבו ליד הבור והקצין האחראי במקום התנגד ומאחר עמד על דעתו, אמר לו קח לך רק אחד מאלה ובחירתו נפלה במקרה על הבן השלישי של האישה ההיא והוא גרר אותו למרחק כמה מטרים וירה בו לעיני אמו המסכנה והרג אותו.4. החיילים היהודים גילו היישר ממזרח לכפר שני אנשים שלווים מתושבי הכפר ולא היה להם נשק. הם דרשו מהם לעמוד מול סלע גבוה מתוך כוונה לירות בהם מאחור כמנהגם. לפתע הופיע אחד מיהודי זמארין (זיכרון יעקב) שהתלוו לפעולה המטורפת הזו, שהכיר את אחד מהשניים והוא יחיא בן מחמד חצ’ר אל-מאצ’י מתושבי הכפר והיה לו מליץ יושר ודיבר עליו טובות על תכונותיו האנושיות במשך חייו וריחמו עליו אך ירו למוות בחברו והוא המנוח מצטפא אבו ג’אמוס.5. אישה זקנה שיצאה מביתה נשענת על מקל נורתה למוות בידי החיילים ללא כל סיבה.6. אחד מתושבי טנטורה ששמו שיח’ סלימאן אל-רשיד אל-חסין אל-יחיא סבל מתשישות במוחו לאחר שלמד כמה שנים באוניברסיטת אל-אזהר במצרים וקיבל תעודת מוסמך בלימודי האיסלאם ובא האיש הזה מחיפה לטנטורה ביום השני לכיבוש הכפר ולא ידע שהחיילים היהודים נכנסו לכפר וכאשר הגיע לגורן של הכפר ללא התראה ירה עליו חייל להודי ונפל הרוג לתעלת מי הגשם ליד הגורן ונותר יושב על ברכו ונותר כמו שאומרים יומיים תמימים עד שקברו אותו באותה תעלת מים. מה אירע עם אסירי טנטורה לאחר שנלקחו למחנה המעצר ג’ליל? הם סבלו סבל רב במחנה הזה במשך שמונה חודשים ואחר כך הוחלפו בשבויים יהודים שנשבו בידי צבאות ערביים ושבויי טנטורה הועברו לטול כרם ואחר כך יצאו עם משפחותיהם לסוריה או שנותרו באזור. כמה מנכבדי טנטורה וזקניה נפלו בדרך לסוריה או מיד לאחר שהגיעו אליה ומתו כמו:1. אל-חאג’ מחמוד אבו הנאא2. מוסא אבראהים עבד אל-עאל3. אבראהים אל-מצרי4. סעד אל-טנג’י5. פאיז אל-איוב אל-אעמר6. מחמד אל-מצטפא7. אעמר אבו מאצ’י8. אבראהים אל-צבאע’9. מחמד אל-צאדק אל-מאצ’י10. טה אל-שיח’ מחמוד סלאםוזאת בשל המצוקה הנפשית והיגון העמוק והסבל ובעיקר בגלל אובדן המולדת והאדמה והבית ואחר כך אובדן החללים בכפר לעיניהם. כאן אין אלא לציין שהנשים לא ניצלו מזוועות החיילים היהודים בעת שחיפשו עליהן לפני שהוציאו אותן מטנטורה והעבירו אותן לפרידיס. התנהגו כלפיהן בצורה נתעבת ונפשעת ולקחו מהן כל מה שהיה כמו תכשיטים וכסף וכאשר הגיעו הנשים הללו עם ילדיהן לסוריה הן היו חסרות כל. עמ’ 143שמות החללים שנפלו בקרב טנטורה1. קאסם דקנאש2. מחמד מחמוד קאסם אאל חמדאן3. ח’ליל מחמוד קאסם אאל חמדאן4. מחמד אחמד קאסם אאל חמדאן5. עיסא בן חמדאן קאסם6. תופיק בן עיסא חמדאן קאסם7. רפיק בן עיסא חמדאן קאסם8. מוסא חמדאן קאסם קאסם9. מחמד אמין חמדאן קאסם קאסם10. אחמד סלימאן אל-סלבוד11. ח’ליל סלימאן אל-סלבוד12. מצטפא סלימאן אל-סלבוד13. ג’ודת רג’ב אל-סמרה14. תופיק חסן את-הנדי15. מחמד אל-איוב (אבו זיד)16. מחמד אחסאן אל-אעמר17. סלמאן אל-אטרש18. עיסא סלמאן אל-אטרש19. מצטפא אבו ג’אמוס20. פצ’ל מחמוד אבו הנאא21. פוזי אבו זמק22. מחמד טה מחמוד סלאם23. עבד אל-ג’באר טה סלאם24. מוסא בן עיסא סלאם25. עבד אל-ראוף אבראהים סלאם26. סוידאן אל-עשמאוי27. עטיה אל-עשמאוי28. אל-חאג’ עבד אל-רחמן אל-דסוקי29. עיסא אחמד אל-דסוקי30. סלים ח’ליל אל-דסוקי31. נמר ח’ליל אל-דסוקי32. מחמד עוץ’ אבו אדריס33. חסן אניס אבו מאצ’י34. שחאדה סעיד אל-מצלח35. עארף אבראהים אומבישי36. עבד אל-עזיז מחמוד אל-זראע37. ד’יב מחמוד אל-ח’טיב38. חסן מוסא אל-עמורי39. רשיד בן אעמר אבו מאצ’י40. אחמד סלימאן אל-מצרי41. סלימאן אל-מצרי42. מוסא עבד אל-רחים43. סלים מחמד אבו שכר44. אסעד אחמד מדירס45. חסין אל-פראן (מכפר אג’זם, היה בטנטורה דרך מקרה)46. עיסא אל-נורי (מכפר עין ע’זאל, היה בטנטורה דרך מקרה)47. סלמאן אל-פארס (מכפר פרידיס, היה בטנטורה דרך מקרה)48. מחמד חסן אל-ג’מאל49. אל-שיח’ סלימאן אל-רשיד אל-יחי50. רשיד ח’אלד (מסוריה, היה במקום במקרה)51. עזה אל-חאג’ סלימאן אל-הנדי52. שפיק דקנאששמות הפצועים בקרב טנטורה1. עיסא מחמוד סלאם2. פיצל מחמוד אבו הנאא3. אבראהים מוסא אל-שורי4. מחמד אחמד אל-בירומי5. אאמנה מחמד אבו אעמר6. סעאד אל-פלו7. רחמה אסעד אל-מרג’אן8. חפצה שהבאת (זרה, הייתה במקום במקרה)
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YoaV Gelber

22 January at 23:01 The Arabic version of Tantura events in the face of the legends by Teddy Katz, Ilan Pepe, Adam Raz and others about the 200 or more dead unnamed who were slaughtered in the village and buried under the parking lot of Dor: Mahmoud al-Yahiya Yahya, Al-Tantura. Damascus: Dar al-Shajra to Lansher and al-Tuzia, 1998 pp. 119-123 A few days after the conquest of a village Lam, the time of Tantura has come. The Jews attacked it in the evening but the young people of the village defended it with all their might and forced the attacking invaders to retreat after leaving behind many dead and wounded who fell in the wheat fields east of the village, but the Jews did not like it as it angered them. They returned the following day from all sides and the sea and concentrated on the shore near the village houses in the early morning and began a fierce attack. The situation of the inhabitants of Tantura at this dangerous time was like that of the famous Arab commander Tarek Ben Ziad on the day he raided Spain and burned the ships that led his forces to the Spanish mainland and then told them “the sea is behind you and the enemy is before you and God has nothing but justice and patience”. The youngsters of the village defended their houses and land until the last bullet, then ceased and then the Jews entered the village and in their minds revenge instead of respect for those people who defended their beautiful village and their houses and land and opened fire on anyone whose gaze fell on him and killed in humiliating way also women. Then they killed to carry out an order in the village and even those men who they employed to collect the bodies in the village streets in front of their wives and children and mothers who collected them near a pit that dug it at the northern end for her to see with their own eyes. When the Jewish soldiers entered Tantura, 52 victims of Tantura and their names on the list of Tantura victims and there were also seven wounded. Here is what happened to the other residents of Tantura: The Jews took them as prisoners the old, the young who were alive to a prison camp in Kafar Jalil and the wmen children and elderly women to Furadis nearby and after staying there for a few days, they moved to Tulkarm and then to Nablus and then to Syria. Here I have no alternative but to go back to the point of the Jewish forces who were called Hahagana, the “defence” to say these are not defences forces but wild offensive forces that one who is unscrupulous and lack of human character and humanity and who does not act according to the laws of war. Is there a law that allows a soldier to kill people in the streets after they have surrendered and after the young rifles have become sticks after the ammunition has run out? Here are some examples of this barbarism: 1. The same soldiers ordered five young men from the village to collect the bodies from the village streets and led them in trucks to the pit we mentioned and after collecting bodies the were srtanding in front of the pit and their faces facing the corpses and then one of the officers of the Hagana shot them from the back and they fell into the pit on the corpses. 2. A woman was shot from a treacherous bullet and a breastfed baby in her arms and when she fell to the ground her baby fell beside her while he was crying and approached his mother’s body looking for a breast to suckle and walked away from her because she was lifeless. 3. A mother of three boys one of whom was killed by a treacherous bullet when Jewish forces entered the village and the second brother was one of five who was tasked with collecting the bodies from the village streets and when he saw his brother dying as he fell over him and he kissed him and the soldiers shot him above his brother nd he died. While the third brother was near his mother who was sitting among the women near the pit and one of the bloodthirsty Hagana people came and wanted to kill two or three of the young men sitting by the pit and the officer in charge objected and told him take only one of them and his choice fell on the third son of that woman and he dragged him a few feet away and shot him in front of his poor mother and killed him. 4. Directly east of the village, the Jewish soldiers discovered two peaceful people from the village that had no weapons. They demanded them to stand in front of a high rock with the intention of shooting them in the back as was their custom. Suddenly one of the Jews of Zamarin (Zichron Yaacov) who accompanied this crazy action appeared, who knew one of the two and he is Yahya bin Muhammad Khachar al-Machi from the village and he had an honest advocate and spoke well of him about his human qualities throughout his life so they spared him and shot his friend the late Mustafa Abu Jamus. 5. An old woman who came out of her house leaning on a stick was shot to death by the soldiers for no reason. 6. One of the residents of Tantura named Sheikh Suleiman al-Rashid al-Hussein al-Yahya suffered from exhaustion in his mind after studying at Al-Azhar University in Egypt for several years and received a certificate in Islamic studies and this man came from Haifa to Tantura on the second day of conquest and when he arrived without knowing the Jewish soldiers entered the village, when he entered the threshing floor of the village without warning he was shot by a Jewish soldier and fell dead into the rainwater canal near the threshing floor and was left sitting on his knee and remained as they say for two whole days until he was buried in the same water canal. What happened to Tantura prisoners after they were taken to the Jalil detention camp? They suffered greatly in this camp for eight months and then were replaced by Jewish prisoners captured by Arab armies and Tantura prisoners were transferred to Tulkarem and then went out with their families to Syria or remained in the area. Some of the dignitaries of Tantura and its elders fell on the way to Syria or immediately after reaching it and died like: 1. Al-Haj Mahmoud Abu Hana 2. Musa Ibrahim ‘Abd al-‘Al 3. Ibrahim al-Masri 4. Sa’ad al-Tanji 5. Faiz al-Ayyub al-Amer 6. Muhammad al-Mustafa 7. Amar Abu Machi 8. Ibrahim al-Tzaba’ 9. Muhammad al-Zadek al-Machi 10. Te al-Sheikh Mahmoud Salamuzat due to the mental distress and deep grief and suffering and mainly due to the loss of the homeland and the land and the house and then the loss of lives of people in the village before their eyes. Here it is only to be noted that the women did not escape the horrors of the Jewish soldiers while searching on them before they were taken out of Tantura and transferred to Furidis. They behaved in a disgusting and criminal way and took from them everything that they had like jewelry and money and when these women came with their children to Syria they were destitute. Page 143 The names of the martyrs who fell in the battle of Tantura 1. Qassem Dekanash 2. Muhammad Mahmoud Qassem al-Hamdan 3. Khalil Mahmoud Qassem al-Hamdan 4. Muhammad Ahmad Qassem al-Hamdan 5. Issa bin Hamdan Qassem 6. Tawfiq Ben Issa Hamdan Qassem 7. Rafik Ben Issa Hamdan Qassem 8. Musa Hamdan Qassem Qassem 9. Muhammad Amin Hamdan Qassem Qassem 10. Ahmad Suleiman al-Salbud 11. Khalil Suleiman al-Salbud 12. Mustafa Suleiman al-Salbud 13. Judith Rajab al-Samara 14. Tawfiq Hassan the-Handi 15. Muhammad al-Ayyub (Abu Zeid) 16. Muhammad Ahsan al-‘Amar 17. Salman al-Atrash 18. Issa Salman al-Atrash 19. Mustafa Abu Jamus 20. Patchel Mahmoud Abu Hana 21. Fuzi Abu Zamek 22. Muhammad Ta Mahmoud Salam 23. ‘Abd al-Jabbar Te Salam 24. Musa Ben Issa Salam 25. ‘Abd al-Rauf Ibrahim Salam 26. Suidan al-Ashmawi 27. Atiya al-Ashmawi 28. Al-Hajj ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Dasuki 29. Issa Ahmad al-Dasuki 30. Salim Khalil al-Dsuki 31. Khalil al-Dsuki Nimer 32. Muhammad ‘Uch Abu Edris 33. Hassan Anis Abu Machi 34. Shehadeh Said al-Matzlah 35. Araf Ibrahim Umbishi 36. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Mahmoud al-Zara’a 37. Dib Mahmoud al-Khatib 38. Hassan Musa al-Amuri 39. Rashid bin Amar Abu Machi 40. Ahmad Suleiman al-Masri 41. Suleiman al-Masri 42. Musa ‘Abd al-Rahim 43. Salim Muhammad Abu Shachar 44. Assad Ahmad Madirs 45. Hussein al-Fran (from the village of Ajzm, was in Tantura by chance) 46. Issa al-Nuri (from the village of Ein Ghazal, was in Tantura by chance) 47. Salman al-Fares (from the village of Fridis, was in Tantura by chance) 48. Muhammad Hassan al-Jamal 49. Al-Sheikh Suleiman al-Rashid al-Yachi 50. Rashid Khaled (from Syria, was there by chance) 51. Gaza al-Hajj Suleiman al-Handi 52. Shafik Dekanash the wounded in the battle of Tantura 1. Issa Mahmoud Salam 2. Fitzel Mahmoud Abu Hana 3. Ibrahim Musa al-Shuri 4. Muhammad Ahmad al-Birumi 5. Convention Muhammad Abu Amar 6. Sa’ad al-Flu 7. Rahma Assad al-Marjan 8. Object you brought (foreign, was there by chance)

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עמותת אלכסנדרוני

הסיפור על טנטורה – סופה של עלילת הדם

בחודש ינואר 2000 התפרסמה בעיתון “מעריב” כתבת תחקיר שניזומה ע”י אחד, תדי כץ, המתיימר להיות היסטוריון,על טבח שנעשה, כביכול, ע”י לוחמי גדוד 33 באנשים חסרי מגן לאחר הקרב בטנטורה.

לוחמי החטיבה יצאו לקרב משפטי וציבורי לטיהור שמם ולהסרת הכתם הבלתי מוצדק שהדביק להם אותו “היסטוריון”. להלן סיכום הפרשה, שבסופה יצא הצדק לאור.

א. פתח דבר

1.
בחודש מרץ 1998 הוגשה על ידי מר תדי כץ, סטודנט לתואר שני, עבודת גמר כמילוי חלק מהדרישות לקבלת התואר מוסמך מאת החוג להיסטוריה של המזרח התיכון, הפקולטה למדעי הרוח באוניברסיטת חיפה. כותרתה של העבודה “יציאת הערבים מכפרים למרגלות הכרמל הדרומי ב1948-“.

2.
פרק ד’ של עבודת המאסטר, שהוא למעשה הפרק העיקרי בה, עוסק ב- “פרשת הכפר א-טנטורה”. הפרק מתאר את הקרב שהתנהל בכפר טנטורה ועל החולות אשר סביב לו, בלילה שבין ה – 22 ל – 23 בחודש מאי 1948.

3.
בפתיח לפרק ד’ לעבודה כותב מר כץ את הדברים הבאים:
“סה”כ חללי הקרב היהודים – 14 במספר, כולל איש הפלי”ם (פלי”ם – פלוגות ימיות – הזרוע הימית של הפלמ”ח), שנפל מאש כוחותינו. מבין אנשי טנטורה נפלו בקרב עצמו לא יותר מאשר 10 או 20 בלבד, אלא שבסופו של אותו היום היו בכפר לא פחות מ – 200 עד 250 גברים הרוגים, בנסיבות בהן היו אנשי הכפר נטולי נשק ונטולי מגן לחלוטין. אלו הן העובדות היבשות העולות מתוך העדויות, שחלקים מהן יובאו בהמשך הדברים” (עמ’ 88 לעבודה).

4.
וכך למעשה ייחס מר כץ ללוחמים ומפקדים בגדוד 33 של חטיבת אלכסנדרוני אשר נטלו חלק פעיל בקרבות בהם לחמה החטיבה במלחמת השחרור, ובכלל זאת בקרב לכיבוש הכפר “טנטורה”, פשע מלחמה נתעב של טבח המוני של מאות אנשים, בנסיבות בהן היו אלה חסרי נשק וחסרי מגן.

5.
פרסום הדברים הללו עורר בעקבותיו הדים רבים, ואף פרסומים נוספים באמצעי התקשורת השונים. בחלק ניכר מן הדיונים שנערכו בנושא השתתף מר כץ כ”אורח כבוד” והוא הודיע כי הוא ניצב איתן מאחורי הדברים שנכתבו על ידו. התגובה הציבורית להאשמות שהוטחו בלוחמי אלכסנדרוני על ידי מר כץ הייתה קשה ביותר, ובכתבה שפורסמה בעיתון מעריב, בתאריך 21.1.2000 אף מצוטט פרופ’ אסא כשר, מחבר הקוד האתי של צה”ל, כמי שמכנה את “מבצעי הטבח”, שבקיומו הוא אינו מטיל ספק, כ”פושעי מלחמה”.

6.
אכן, קרב קשה התנהל בכפר טנטורה ועל החולות אשר סביב לו, בחודש מאי 1948, כמופיע למעלה. באותו קרב איבדו לוחמי אלכסנדרוני 14 מחבריהם, ואף האויב ידע אבידות רבות. אולם עם עלות השחר נכנע הכפר ואיש לא נורה על ידי לוחמי אלכסנדרוני לאחר תום הקרב, בהיותו “נטול נשק ונטול מגן”, כהאשמתו הזדונית של מר כץ.

7.
לוחמי אלכסנדרוני, אשר נלחמו במלחמת השחרור של מדינת ישראל בהיותם בחורים צעירים, לא ידעו מנוחה לנפשם נוכח האשמות השווא אשר הוטחו בהם, והם החליטו לצאת למסע, אולי האחרון בחייהם, לטיהור שמם. המסע התנהל בשלוש חזיתות במקביל: החזית המשפטית, החזית האקדמית והחזית הציבורית. עו”ד גיורא ארדינסט ליווה ומלווה את לוחמי אלכסנדרוני בנאמנות ובדבקות במלחמתם בשלושת החזיתות.

ב. החזית המשפטית

8.
ביום 16.4.2000 הגישו שמונה מלוחמי אלכסנדרוני תביעת דיבה כנגד כץ בבית המשפט המחוזי בתל אביב (ת.א. 1686/00 בן ציון פרידן ואחרים נגד תדי כץ).

9.
לאחר שנכשלו ניסיונותיו של מר כץ להביא לסילוק התביעה על הסף ולמנוע את ברורה לגופה בטענות מטענות שונות, הוגשה על ידו הודעת צד ג’ כנגד אוניברסיטת חיפה, אשר לפי טענתו הייתה אחראית לפקח עליו ועל האופן בו נכתבה עבודתו.

10.
במסגרת התביעה התקיימו הליכי גילוי מסמכים ובמסגרתם הועברו לידי לוחמי אלכסנדרוני רוב הקלטות של הראיונות שערך מר כץ. לוחמי אלכסנדרוני טרחו ותמללו את הקלטות ואף תירגמו לעברית את אותן שיחות שהתקיימו במקור בערבית, וזאת באמצעות מתורגמנית מקצועית אשר שפת אמה ערבית.

11.
מהשוואת הקלטות עם הציטוטים המופיעים בעבודתו של כץ התגלה ללוחמי אלכסנדרוני, לתדהמתם, כי כץ סירס וסילף באופן שיטתי ומגמתי את הדברים שנאמרו לו על ידי מרואייניו וכי עבודתו “האקדמית” אינה אלא מארג צפוף של דברי סילוף וציטוטי כזב. אין מדובר “בטעויות” שנעשו בתום לב אלא, כפי שניתן להבחין על נקלה, בשיטה ממש של ציטוטי כזב שכיוונם אחד ואשר מטרתם להוכיח מסקנה שסומנה מראש.

12.
לאחר יומיים בהם נחקר מר כץ בבית המשפט על תצהירו בחקירת שתי וערב, על ידי עו”ד גיורא ארדינסט, אשר במסגרתה נחשפו ציטוטי הכזב של מר כץ בעבודתו, ונתגלו הפערים הבלתי ניתנים לגישור בין הדברים שצוטטו על ידי מר כץ לבין הדברים כפי שנאמרו לו בראיונות שערך, חתם מר כץ על מכתב התנצלות אשר זו לשונו:

“בחודש מרס 1998 הגשתי עבודת גמר אשר מהווה חלק ממילוי הדרישות לתואר מוסמך בהיסטוריה של המזרח התיכון באוניברסיטת חיפה (להלן – “עבודת הגמר”).

בפרק העבודה העוסק בכפר טנטורה, נכתב על ידי, כי התמונה הכוללת העולה מתוך העדויות היא שחיילים מחטיבת אלכסנדרוני עסקו עוד במשך שעות אחדות לאחר סיום הקרב במצוד קטלני אחר גברים בוגרים על מנת להרגם, כאשר בסופו של היום היו בכפר לא פחות מ – 250-200 גברים הרוגים בנסיבות בהן היו אנשי הכפר נטולי נשק ונטולי מגן לחלוטין.

ברצוני להבהיר כי לאחר ששבתי ובדקתי את הדברים ברור לי מעל לכל ספק כי אין כל יסוד לטענה כי בוצע בטנטורה הרג של אנשים, לאחר כניעת הכפר, על ידי לוחמי חטיבת אלכסנדרוני, או על ידי כוח אחר של הישוב העברי.

אני מבקש להבהיר כי גם הדברים שנכתבו על ידי הובנו ככל הנראה שלא כראוי, שכן לא התכוונתי לומר שהיה טבח בטנטורה וגם כיום אני אומר שלא היה טבח בטנטורה.

הנני מאמין לאנשי אלכסנדרוני אשר הכחישו את דבר הטבח מכל וכל, ואני חוזר בי מכל מסקנה משתמעת מהעבודה בדבר התרחשותו של הטבח או בדבר הרג של אנשים חסרי נשק וחסרי מגן.

לאור האמור לעיל, הנני מוצא לנכון להביע התנצלותי הכנה בפני לוחמי החטיבה, בפני משפחותיהם ובפני משפחות חללי החטיבה בכך שניתלו בהם האשמות שווא מסוג זה.

הודעתי זו תפורסם בעיתונות בגודל ובמיקום הולם”.

13.
במסגרת הסכם הפשרה אשר נחתם בין הצדדים (ואשר מר כץ ניסה לחזור בו ממנו יום לאחר שנחתם), התחייב מר כץ לפרסם את מכתב ההתנצלות בגודל חצי עמוד בשני עיתונים יומיים. להסכם הפשרה ניתן תוקף של פסק דין לאחר שבית המשפט דחה את כל טענותיו של מר כץ כאילו ההסכם נחתם על ידו ברגע של “חולשת דעת”. למותר לציין כי מכתב ההתנצלות עליו חתם מר כץ נוסח בעצה אחת עם עורך דינו, עו”ד אמציה אטלס, אשר נכח בפגישה בה נחתמו מכתב ההתנצלות והסכם הפשרה.

14.
להשלמת התמונה יצויין כי ביום 17.1.2001 הגיש מר כץ ערעור על פסק דינו של בית המשפט המחוזי ועל החלטתו שלא לבטלו (ע”א 456/01). בתאריך 6.11.2001 התקיים דיון בבית המשפט העליון בערעור בפני הרכב של שלושה שופטים: השופט מצא והשופטות שטרסברג כהן ונאור. בית המשפט העליון דחה את ערעורו של הנתבע, לא אפשר לו לחזור בו מן ההתחייבות לפרסם את התנצלותו וחייב אותו בהוצאות.

ג. החזית האקדמית

15.
עבודת המאסטר של מר כץ נעשתה בהנחייתו של פרופ’ קייס פירו ובסיועו של ד”ר אילן פפה, מי שביודעין נתן יד ל”תיזה” השקרית של כץ, ואף ממשיך להפיץ כזבים ודברי הבל מעל כל במה אפשרית שנקלעת לדרכו.

16.
בעקבות הדברים החמורים שנתבררו במהלך חקירתו הנגדית של מר כץ, נשלח מטעם לוחמי אלכסנדרוני בתאריך 26.12.2000 מכתב תלונה לרקטור אוניברסיטת חיפה, פרופ’ אהרון בן זאב, ולראשי גופים רלוונטיים אחרים באוניברסיטת חיפה, ובו פורטו כזביו וסילופיו של כץ בעבודת התיזה שלו, כפי שנחשפו בבית המשפט.

17.
בעקבות הממצאים החמורים שנחשפו, כפי שפורטו במכתב כאמור, הוקמו על ידי רקטור אוניברסיטת חיפה שתי ועדות: האחת, לבדיקת אי ההתאמות בין הדברים שנאמרו לכץ על ידי מרואייניו, כפי שהם מופיעים בקלטות הראיונות, לבין הציטוטים השזורים בעבודתו, והאחרת, לבדיקת נוהלי הענקת תארים מתקדמים (M.A. ודוקטורט) באוניברסיטת חיפה בכלל, ובמקרהו של מר כץ בפרט.

18.
הוועדה לבדיקת עבודתו של כץ, אשר חבריה היו פרופ’ אמציה ברעם, ראש המרכז היהודי-ערבי, פרופ’ רפי טלמון, ראש החוג לערבית, ד”ר איברהים ג’רייס, מהחוג לערבית ופרופ’ יוסף נבו, מהחוג להיסטוריה של המזרח התיכון, מצאה כי קיים פער בין הקלטות והרשימות לבין טקסט העבודה.

ביום 10.6.2001 הוגש דו”ח הוועדה לרקטור אוניברסיטת חיפה אשר בה פורטו הפערים האמורים על פי שלוש דרגות חומרה.

כך למשל, נמצאו 14 מקרים בהם היו פערים בדרגת חומרה גבוהה, בהם נמסרו בציטוטים אלמנטים שאין להם זכר בהקלטות או ברשימות שכתב כץ. הוועדה ציינה כי “תמונת המצב הכללית המתקבלת מסיכום כלל הפערים היא בהחלט בלתי מחמיאה”, וכן כי “העבודה כשלה בשלב העמדת החומר הגולמי לשיפוט הקורא, הן באירגונו על פי קריטריונים מחמירים של מיון וביקורת, והן במה שנראה כמקרים של אי כיבוד עדויות המרואיינים”.

19.
לאור חומרת הממצאים, הועבר הדו”ח לרשות ללימודים מתקדמים, שהינה הגוף האחראי באוניברסיטת חיפה על עבודות המ.א. והדוקטורט. ביום 20.11.2001 פרסמה המועצה ללימודים מתקדמים החלטה, לפיה עבודת הגמר אינה יכולה להתקבל במתכונתה הנוכחית.

האוניברסיטה החליטה לדחות את אישור עבודת הגמר ואת הציון שקיבל כץ למשך שישה חודשים, בהם יצטרך כץ לתקן את עבודתו, והודיעה כי אם לא יעשה כן, תתבטל ההכרה בעבודה באופן סופי. בנוסף לכך הורה רקטור האוניברסיטה להסיר את העבודה ממדפי האוניברסיטה, וביקש גם מספריות אוניברסיטאות אחרות, לנהוג באופן דומה.

20.
תוצאות מאבקם של לוחמי אלכסנדרוני בחזית האקדמית מלמדות, כי מר כץ איננו “היסטוריון חדש” ואיננו “היסטוריון ישן”, אלא כזבן שיטתי אשר הוליך שולל את המוסד האקדמי, אשר העניק לו את חסותו והעניק לעבודתו את הלגיטימציה לה היתה זקוקה, כפי שהוא הוליך שולל רבים אחרים.

ד. החזית הציבורית

21.
סקירה התקשורתית הנרחבת לה זכתה פרשת טנטורה במהלך השנתיים האחרונות העלתה אותה לסדר היום הציבורי. משכך, תכליתה של החזית הציבורית הינה להסיר את הכתם שהדביקו מר כץ ותומכיו בלוחמי אלכסנדרוני. לפיכך, מלבד ההליכים המשפטיים והאקדמיים המנוהלים כנגד כץ, לוחמי אלכסנדרוני פעלו וממשיכים לפעול כנגד תומכיה הנלהבים בתיזה “החדשנית” והמופרכת של כץ.

22.
ד”ר אילן פפה, היסטוריון אנטי ציוני, מי שסייע בהכנת עבודת המאסטר, עמד ועומד עדיין מאחורי כץ והוא מושך בחוטיה של המריונטה כפי רצונו. כל הפניות שהופנו לד”ר פפה נתקלו במתקפה של דברי שקר ואיומים, אשר אין בהם ולא כלום. סגנונו הבוטה וגס הרוח של ד”ר פפה, הכולל דברי בלע, השמצות, גידופים ותוקפנות ואלימות מילולית, מעורר אף את זעמם של חבריו לסגל האקדמי. לאחרונה אף נשמעה תביעה להעמידו לדין משמעתי על התנהגותו חסרת הכבוד המהווה הפרה בוטה של כללי האתיקה במוסד אקדמי.

23.
על מנת להבין מיהו אילן פפה, נזכיר כי ד”ר פפה הפיץ לאחרונה באינטרנט מאמר (שנכתב על ידי “מאורות” אחרים), ולפיו המוסד וה – CIA עומדים מאחורי הפיגוע בבניין התאומים בניו יורק ביום 11.9.2001.

24.
לוחמי אלכסנדרוני פנו גם לפרופ’ אסא כשר, מחבר הקוד האתי של צה”ל אשר האשים אותם בביצוע פשע מלחמה, בדרישה כי יתנצל בפניהם על הדברים הנלוזים שצוטטו מפיו בקשר עם ממצאי מחקרו “האקדמי” של תדי כץ ולחזור בו מאמירותיו.

נכון להיום, פרופ’ אסא כשר אף לא טרח להגיב לפנייתם, ובכך הוכיח כי האתיקה היא ממנו והלאה, וכי הוא ממהר ליישר קו עם “שורת המקהלה” גם כאשר היא שרה שירי כזב.

25.
בתאריך 20 בינואר 2003, הפרופ’ אסא כשר, שבתחילת הפרשה קבע כי “בטנטורה בוצע פשע מלחמה”, חזר בו מהאשמותיו, ובמכתב ששלח ללוחמי החטיבה אמר כי הוטעה לחשוב כך מקריאת העבודה הראשונה. לאחר קריאת החומר הרב שהצטבר הנושא, במהלך המאבק אותו ניהלו לוחמי החטיבה, הגיע למסקנה כי העובדות שתוארו בעבודה אינן נכונות, והביע את התנצלותו בפני לוחמי החטיבה על עוגמת הנפש שגרמו דבריו לותיקי החטיבה.

26.
ההיסטוריון מאיר פעיל, אשר מלכתחילה היה מבין תומכיה הנלהבים של “התיזה” החדשנית של תדי כץ, חזר בו ביום 7.3.02 מהאשמותיו כלפי לוחמי אלכסנדרוני, לאחר ששב וקרא את החומר המלא שנמסר לידיו על ידם. וכך נכתבו הדברים על ידו:

“כדי להסיר ספק בדבר דעתי המסכמת על מחקרו של תדי כץ בפרשת כיבוש טנטורה במלחמת העצמאות, אני רואה חובה מוסרית, מדעית וחברית להודיעכם כי, לאחר עיון נוסף ובחינה מחודשת […] ולאחר שקראתי בקפידה את החלטת המועצה ללימודים מתקדמים של אוניברסיטת חיפה, הגעתי למסקנה, כי אין, ולא היה כל צידוק בהטלת שום דופי מוסרי על לוחמי גדוד 33 של חטיבת “אלכסנדרוני”, אשר כבשו את טנטורה ב – 24 בחודש מאי 1948″.

כבר הצהרתי בפומבי כי אין להסתמך על ממצאי עבודת המחקר הנ”ל של תדי כץ; ואני מקווה כי תדי כץ יישר את ההדורים במחקרו המחודש”.

ה. סוף דבר

27.
לוחמי אלכסנדרוני נחלו הצלחה בחזית המשפטית, בחזית האקדמית ובחזית הציבורית. הציבור הרחב יודע עתה כי טבח בטנטורה לא היה ולא נברא וכי נשקם של לוחמי אלכסנדרוני היה טהור. לא רק לוחמי אלכסנדרוני נצחו בקרב על מורשת טנטורה – האמת ניצחה.

28.
בתאריך 10 באפריל 2003 התכנסה המועצה ללימודים מתקדמים של אוניברסיטת חיפה, ופסלה את עבודת “המחקר” המתוקנת של תדי כץ. כן קבעה המועצה כי תדי כץ לא יוכל לקבל תואר מוסמך במסלול מחקרי.

העבודה, שהוכנה לאחר שהאוניברסיטה החליטה להסיר ממדפיה את העבודה הקודמת, ואיפשרה למר תדי כץ להגיש עבודה מתוקנת, הוגשה לחמישה שופטים שונים. שניים מהשופטים פסלו לחלוטין את העבודה, והשלושה הנוספים קיבלוה, אך צירפו הערות ביקורתיות ומחמירות ביותר. כל חמשת השופטים הצביעו על “פגמים מחקריים מהותיים” הקשורים למתודולוגיה המחקרית ולרמת הניתוח.

“הביקורת הקשה לא איפשרה למועצה ללימודים מתקדמים לאשר את עבודת המחקר המתוקנת ולזכות את כץ בתואר מוסמך”, אמר רקטור האוניברסיטה פרופ’ אהרון בן-זאב.

29.
הסערה שעוררה עלילת הדם של תדי כ”ץ בעולם האקדמי, הביאה את פרופ’ דני צנזור מאוניברסיטת בן-גוריון בנגב להקים אתר, בו רוכזו כל המסמכים ממשפט הדיבה שניהל תדי כ”ץ מול לוחמי החטיבה. אל האתר ניתן להגיע מהדף באנציקלופדיה הפתוחה (ויקיפדיה), כאן.

מבצע נמל – פתיחת הכביש לחיפה

עם שחרור חיפה, יציאת ערביי קיסריה וניתוק הכפרים הערביים השוכנים לאורך כביש זיכרון יעקב, לא נותר לאויב אלא בסיס אחד בכפרים אלה. בסיס אחד, כדי לקיים את הקשר החיצוני, היה בדרך הים והוא הכפר טנטורה ששכן לחוף הים, צפונית – מערבית לזיכרון יעקב.

לא ייפלא, אפוא, שעד מהרה הפך הכפר לבסיס הספקה ראשי לכל כפרי הסביבה. צי של עשרות סירות וספינות קטנות קיים קשר קבוע עם לבנון והשיט לטנטורה אספקה, נשק וציוד והוציא עימו ללבנון פליטים בורחים.

כתוצאה מהספקה זו, גברה הטרדת התחבורה היהודית בכביש תל אביב – חיפה על ידי כפרי “המשולש הקטן”, עד כדי חסימת הכביש לחלוטין בידי הפורעים . חשיבות טנטורה היתה ביכולתה לשמר את תנופת ההטרדות הערביות על התחבורה היהודית בין תל אביב לחיפה. מיקום בסיס אויב זה בתוך שטחנו, היה חמור משניתן היה להשלים עמו.

ניסיונות המשא ומתן עם הכפריים על כניעה, מו”ם שנוהל על ידי אחד מאנשי ההגנה בזיכרון יעקב, שהיה בקשרים קרובים עם נכבדי הכפר בטרם פרוץ המלחמה.

המשא ומתן נכשל בגלל התנגדות צעירי הכפר והזרים שהיו בו, שלא כפי שקרה בפוריידיס וג’יסר–א-זרקא, שבהם הסכימו התושבים להיכנע.

לאור כשלון המו”ם, הוחלט לכבוש הכפר ולטהר את חוף הים מכוחות האויב.

לפי המודיעין שהיה בידי כוחותינו, היו בכפר כ- 300 לוחמים, מצוידים ב- 100 רובים לערך, כמה עשרות אקדחים ותתי-מקלע, מספר מרגמות “3 ותותח בופורס 40 מילימטר (לידיעה זו לא היה אישור ברור). בראש הלוחמים היו כנראה ארבעה אנגלים, עריקי הצבא הבריטי, ערבים עריקי המשטרה ומספר לוחמים מוסלמים בוסניים.

המשימה הוטלה על גדוד 33 בחטיבת אלכסנדרוני. נערך סיור מוקדם של המפקדים, באמצעות מסע ברכבת מחדרה לעתלית. הרכבת עדיין פעלה בחסות הבריטים שהחזיקו בשטח נמל חיפה. לבקשת מפקד הסיור, האטה הרכבת ליד טנטורה כדי לקבל מושג רחב יותר, בעצירת הרכבת בתחנת זיכרון יעקב, תקף אותה מטוס מצרי שהחטיאה. בדיעבד הסתבר שהמודיעין היה מדויק למדי.

לאור המודיעין והסיור, הוחלט על דרך הפעולה:
התקפה בשני צירים עיקריים – פלוגה א’ תנוע צפונה, תחצה את המסילה, תתפצל לשלושה ראשים ותתקוף בו זמנית את חורבות אל – בורג’ על חוף הים, את “המזגגה” (בית החרושת לזכוכית שהקים הברון רוטשילד) ואת הכפר מצפון ומזרח. פלוגה ג’ תנוע מתחנת הרכבת בזיכרון, בין המסילה וחוף הים ותתקוף מדרום. כוח מפלוגה ב’ יתקוף את בית הספר שעל הגבעה השולטת על הכפר ממזרח. יתר הכוח מפלוגה ב’ ישמש ככוח עתודה. פלוגת הנשק המסייע תפתח באש מרגמות ומק”בים למטרות סיוע שנקבעו, ויחידה של חיל הים תחסום מצד הים את בריחת האויב. מועד הפעולה נקבע ליום ה- 23.5.48, אחרי חצות. התנועה ליעד תחל בחצות ושעת ה- ש’ תקבע עם התייצבות הכוחות בנקודת ההסתערות.

התנועה ליעד החלה כמתוכנן, אולם פלוגה א’ נתגלתה עם חציית מסילת הברזל ואז ניתנה הפקודה לשאר הכוחות להסתער. הפעולה התנהלה כמתוכנן, למרות אש צלפים מיומנת ומדויקת מרכס הגבעות המזרחי שהאטו את תנועת הכוח. לאחר קרב כבד מבית לבית ובשימוש נרחב ברימוני יד וחיסול כ- 10 צלפים, תם הקרב בשעה 08:00 לערך. הכוחות נערכו להגנה היקפית, יחידות עסקו באיסוף נשק ובריכוז הגברים לצורך תחקיר וזיהוי והעברתם יחד עם שאר התושבים, למקומות אחרים שעליהם הוחלט ונעשה על ידי רשויות ויחידות אחרות.

לאויב היו כ- 70 הרוגים.

בקרב על כיבוש טנטורה נפלו 14 לוחמים. אחד הלוחמים היה מחיל הים.

מרשם הקרב
© כל הזכויות שמורות לעמותת אלכסנדרוני

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The Alexandroni Association 

The story of Tantura – the end of the blood libel 

In January 2000, an investigative article was published in Maariv newspaper, initiated by one, Teddy Katz, who claims to be a historian, about a massacre allegedly committed by the 33rd Battalion fighters of defenseless people after the battle of Tantura. The brigade’s fighters went into a legal and public battle to clear their name and remove the unjustified stain that the “historian” had inflicted on them. The following is a summary of the affair, at the end of which justice was served. A. introduction 1. In March 1998, Mr. Teddy Katz, a graduate student, submitted an MA thesis in fulfillment of some of the requirements for obtaining a master’s degree from the Department of Middle Eastern History, Faculty of Humanities, University of Haifa. The title of the work is “The departure of the Arabs from villages at the foot of the southern Carmel in 1948”. 2. Chapter 4 of the master’s work, which is in fact the main chapter in it, deals with the “affair of the village of a-Tantura.” The chapter describes the battle that took place in the village of Tantura and the sands that surround it, on the night between the 22nd and 23rd of May 1948. 3. In the introduction to Chapter 4 of the work, Mr. Katz writes the following: The total number of Jewish deaths – 14 in number, including the man from the Palyam (naval commands – the naval arm of the Palmach), who fell from the fire of our forces. Of the Tantura men, no more than 10 or 20 fell in the battle itself, But at the end of the day, no less than 200 to 250 men were killed in the village, in circumstances where the villagers were completely unarmed and defenseless. These are the facts as coming from the evidenses that some will be brought in the following parts (page 88 to the work) 4. And so Mr. Katz actually attributed to the fighters and commanders in the 33rd Battalion of the Alexandroni Brigade who took an active part in the battles in which the brigade fought in the War of Independence, including the battle for the conquest of the village of Tantura, a heinous war crime of mass slaughter of hundreds of people., in circumstances they were defenceless and unarmed. 5. The publication of these things caused a great deal of controversy, and even more publications in the various media. In a considerable part of the discussions held on the subject, Mr. Katz participated as a “guest of honor” and he announced that he stood firmly behind the things written by him. The public response to the accusations leveled at the Alexandroni fighters by Mr. Katz was extremely harsh, and in an article published in the Maariv newspaper on January 21, 2000, Prof. Asa Kasher, author of the IDF Code of Ethics, was also quoted as calling the “massacre” executers, which he does not doubt, as “war criminals.” 6. Indeed, a fierce battle was fought in the village of Tantura and on the sands around it, in May 1948, as shown above. In that battle Alexandroni’s warriors lost 14 of their comrades, and even the enemy knew many losses. At dawn, however, the village surrendered and no one was shot by Alexandroni fighters after the end of the battle, being “unarmed and defenseless,” as Mr. Katz’s malicious accusation. 7. The Alexandroni warriors, who fought in the War of Independence of the State of Israel as young men, could not rest on their laurels in the face of the false accusations leveled at them, and they decided to embark on a journey, perhaps the last of their lives, to clear their name. The journey was conducted on three fronts simultaneously: the legal front, the academic front and the public front. Advocate Giora Ardinst accompanied and accompanies the Alexandroni warriors faithfully and faithfully in their war on the three fronts. B. The legal front 8. On April 16, 2000, eight of Alexandroni’s fighters filed a defamation suit against Katz in the Tel Aviv District Court (TA 1686/00 Ben Zion Frieden and others vs. Tedi Katz). 9. After Mr. Katz’s attempts to get the lawsuit dismissed outright and to prevent the questioning by making various allegations which failed, he filed a third-party notice against the University of Haifa, which he claimed was responsible for supervising him and the way his work was written.  10. As part of the prosecution, document disclosure proceedings took place and as part of them, most of the recordings of the interviews conducted by Mr. Katz were handed over to Alexandroni’s fighters. Alexandroni warriors bothered to transcribe the recordings and even translated into Hebrew the same conversations that originally took place in Arabic, using a professional translator whose mother tongue is Arabic. 11. From comparing the recordings with the quotes that appear in Katz’s work, it was revealed to Alexandroni’s warriors, to their amazement, that Katz systematically and biasedly distorted the things told to him by his interviewees and that his “academic” work is nothing but a dense fabrication, distortions and false quotes. These are not “mistakes” made in good faith but, as can be easily discerned, the actual method of false citations that are one-sided and whose purpose is to prove a pre-decided conclusion. 12. After two days in which Mr. Katz was questioned in court about his affidavit in Advocate Giora Ardinst, in which Mr. Katz’s false citations were revealed in his work, and the unbridgeable gaps between Mr. Katz and the things he was told in interviews were revealed as he edited, Mr. Katz signed a letter of apology which is his language:  “In March 1998, I submitted a thesis which forms part of the fulfillment of the requirements for a master’s degree in the history of the Middle East at the University of Haifa (hereinafter -“thesis”). In the chapter on the village of Tantura, it was written by me, that the overall picture that emerges from the evidence is that soldiers from the Alexandroni Brigade engaged for several hours after the end of the battle in a deadly hunt for adult men to kill, when at the end of the day were no less than 250-200 Men were killed in circumstances in which the villagers were unarmed and completely defenseless. I would like to make it clear that after re-examining things written by me, it is clear to me beyond any doubt that there is no basis for claiming that there were in tantura people killed after the surrender of the village, by fighters of the Alexandroni Brigade, or by another force of the Yishuv. I would like to make it clear that even the things written by me were probably misunderstood, as I did not mean to say that there was a massacre in Tantura and even today I say that there was no massacre in Tantura. I believe in the people of Alexandroni who have denied the massacre at all level, and I regret all the implicit conclusion from the work regarding the massacre or the killing of unarmed and defenseless people. In light of the above, I find it appropriate to express my sincere apologies to the brigade’s fighters, to their families and to the families of the brigade’s victims in which false accusations of this kind were made. This announcement will be published in the press in an appropriate size and location.” 13. As part of the settlement agreement signed between the parties (and which Mr. Katz tried to withdraw from the day after it was signed), Mr. Katz undertook to publish the half-page apology letter in two daily newspapers. The settlement agreement was given a judgment approval after the court rejected all of Mr. Katz’s claims as if the agreement had been signed by him in a moment of “weakness of the mind.” Needless to say, the letter of apology signed by Mr. Katz was drafted with his lawyer, Adv. Amatzia Atlas, who was present at the meeting at which the letter of apology and the settlement agreement were signed. 14. To complete the picture, it should be noted that on January 17, 2001, Mr. Katz filed an appeal against the judgment of the District Court and his decision not to set it aside (CA 456/01). In 6/11/2001 Supreme Cort discussed the appeal in front of three Judges Matza, Strasberg-Cohen and Naor. The Supreme Court dismissed the defendant’s appeal, did not allow him to withdraw from the undertaking to publish his apology.  and ordered him to pay the costs. C. The Academic Front 15. Mr. Katz’s Master’s thesis was done under the supervision of Prof. Keys Phiro and with the assistance of Dr. Ilan Pappe, who knowingly gave a hand to Katz’s false “thesis,” and even continues to spread lies and nonsense over every possible stage he gets. 16. Following the serious allegations made during Mr. Katz’s cross-examination, a letter of complaint was sent on behalf of the Alexandroni Warriors on December 26, 2000 to the Rector of the University of Haifa, Prof. Aharon Ben Zeev, and to other relevant bodies at the University of Haifa. In court. 17. Following the serious findings that were revealed, as detailed in the aforementioned letter, two committees were set up by the Rector of the University of Haifa: one to examine the inconsistencies between what Katz said by his interviewees, as they appear in the interview tapes, and another to examine the procedures of awarding advanced degrees (MA and PhD) at the University of Haifa in general, and in the case of Mr. Katz in particular.  18. The Committee for the Examination of Katz’s Work, whose members were Prof. Amatzia Baram, Head of the Jewish-Arab Center, Prof. Rafi Talmon, Head of the Department of Arabic, Dr. Ibrahim Jarris, of the Department of Arabic and Prof. Yosef Nevo, of the Department of Middle Eastern History, found that there is a gap between the recordings and writings and the thesis text. On June 10, 2001, the report of the committee was submitted to the Rector of the University of Haifa, which detailed the aforementioned gaps according to three degrees of severity. For example, 14 cases were found in which there were gaps of a high degree of severity, in which elements that have no mention in the recordings or lists written by Katz were given as quotations. The committee noted that “the overall picture obtained from the summary of all the gaps is certainly unflattering,” and that “the work failed at the stage of putting the raw material to the reader’s judgment, both in his organization according to strict selection and criticism, and in what appears to be non-respect to the evidence provided by the interviewees.” 19. In light of the severity of the findings, the report was submitted to the Graduate Studies Authority, which is the body responsible for the MA and doctoral dissertations at the University of Haifa. On 20.11.2001 The Committee for Advanced Studies published that the thesis can not be accepted as is. The university decided to postpone the approval of the dissertation and the grade Katz received for six months, during which Katz would have to correct his work, and announced that if he did not do so, the recognition of the work would be permanently revoked. In addition, the rector of the university ordered the removal of the work from the university shelves, and also asked other university libraries to act in a similar manner. 20. The results of the struggle of the Alexandroni warriors on the academic front show that Mr. Katz is not a “New Historian” and not an “old historian”, but a systematic salesman who deceived the academic institution, who gave him the patronage and gave his work the legitimacy, as he deceived many others. D. The public front  21. The extensive media coverage of the Tantura affair over the past two years has put it on the public agenda. Therefore, the purpose of the public front is to remove the stain left by Mr. Katz and his supporters on the Alexandroni warriors. Thus, apart from the legal and academic proceedings conducted against Katz, the Alexandroni fighters have acted and continue to act against its ardent supporters in Katz’s “innovative” and unfounded thesis. 22. Dr. Ilan Pappe, an anti-Zionist historian who assisted in the preparation of the master’s work, was still standing behind Katz and pulling the puppets’ strings as he wished. All attempt to contact Dr. Pappe were responded in blatant lies rude style, which includes slander, insults and aggression and verbal violence, has also angered his academic staff members. Of late, a demand to internally sanction him in the university due to his disrespectful manners which are a breach of ethical standards in an academic institution. 23. In order to understand who Ilan Pappe is, we will mention that Dr. Pappe recently espoused an article on the Internet (written by other “luminaries”), according to which the Mossad and the CIA are behind the attack on the Twin Towers in New York on September 11, 2001. 24. Alexandroni fighters also turned to Prof. Asa Kasher, author of the IDF Code of Ethics, who accused them of committing a war crime, demanding that he apologize to them for the corrupt quoted from him in connection with the findings of Teddy Katz’s “academic” research and retract his statements. To date, Prof. Asa Kasher has not even bothered to respond to their request, thereby proving that ethics is far from him, and that he is in a hurry to align with the “choir” even when it sings false songs. 25. On January 20, 2003, Prof. Asa Kasher, who at the beginning of the affair stated that “a war crime was committed in Tantura,” withdrew his accusations, and in a letter he sent to the brigade’s fighters he said he was misled to think so from reading the first thesis.  After reading the extensive material accumulated on the subject, during the struggle waged by the brigade fighters, he came to the conclusion that the facts described in the thesis were incorrect, and expressed his apology to the brigade fighters for the anguish caused by words to the brigade veterans. 26. Historian Meir Pa’il, was from the beginning one of the ardent supporters of Teddy Katz’s innovative “thesis”, regreted on March 7, 2002 his accusations against the Alexandroni warriors, after re-reading the full material handed to him by them. And this is what he wrote: “In order to remove doubt about my concluding opinion on Teddy Katz’s research into the Tantura Conquest affair in the War of Independence, I consider it a moral, scientific and societal duty to inform you that, after further consideration and re-examination […] and after carefully reading the University of Haifa Advanced Studies committee I conclude, there is no, and there was no justification for imposing any moral blemish on the fighters of the 33rd Battalion of the “Alexandroni” Brigade, who occupied Tantura on May 24, 1948.  I have already stated publicly that the findings of the above research work of Teddy Katz should not be relied upon; and I hope that Teddy Katz will straighten things out in his renewed research. ” E. Epilogue 27. Alexandroni warriors have had success on the legal front, on the academic front and on the public front. The general public now knows that there was no massacre in Tantura and the uses of weapons of the Alexandroni warriors were pure. Not only did the Alexandroni warriors win the battle for the legacy of Tantura – the truth won. 28. On April 10, 2003, the Council for Advanced Studies of the University of Haifa convened, and rejected Teddy Katz’s revised “research” work. The council also ruled that Teddy Katz would not be able to obtain a master’s degree in a research track.   The work, which was prepared after the university decided to remove the previous work from its shelves, and allowed Mr. Teddy Katz to submit revised work, was submitted to five different judges. Two of the judges completely rejected the work, and the other three accepted it, but attached highly critical remarks. All five judges pointed to “research flaws” related to the research methodology and level of analysis. “The harsh criticism did not allow the Council for Advanced Study to approve the revised research work and award Katz a master’s degree,” said the university’s rector, Prof. Aharon Ben-Ze’ev. 29. The storm caused by the blood libel of Teddy Katz in the academic world, led Prof. Danny Censor of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev to set up a website, where all the documents from the libel trial that Teddy Katz conducted against the division’s fighters were gathered. The site can be accessed from the page in the Open Encyclopedia (Wikipedia), here.  Operation Port – opening of the road to Haifa With the liberation of Haifa, the departure of the Arabs of Caesarea and the separation of the Arab villages located along the Zichron Yaacov Road, the enemy was left with only one base in these villages. One base, to maintain the external connection, was by sea and is the village of Tantura which is located on the beach, north-west of Zichron Yaacov. It is no wonder, then, that the village soon became the main supply base for all the surrounding villages. A fleet of dozens of boats and small ships maintained regular contact with Lebanon and sailed for Tantura supplies, weapons and equipment and took fleeing refugees to Lebanon. As a result of this supply, the harassment of Jewish transportation on the Tel Aviv-Haifa road increased by the villages of the “Little Triangle”, to the point that the road was completely blocked by the rioters. The importance of Tantura was in its ability to preserve the momentum of Arab harassment on Jewish transportation between Tel Aviv and Haifa. The location of this enemy base within our territory was more serious than could be reconciled with.  Attempts to negotiate with the villagers for surrender, a negotiation conducted by one of the Hagana personnel in Zichron Yaacov, who was in close contact with the village dignitaries before the outbreak of the war. The negotiations failed due to the opposition of the young people of the village and the foreigners who were in it, unlike what happened in Fureidis and Jisr-a-Zarqa, where the residents agreed to surrender. In light of the failure of the negotiations, it was decided to occupy the village and purge the beach of enemy forces. According to the intelligence in our hands, there were about 300 fighters in the village, equipped with about 100 rifles, several dozen pistols and submachine guns, a number of 3” mortars and a 40 millimeter Bufors cannon (this information was not clearly confirmed). At the head of the fighters were probably four Englishmen, British army defectors, Arab police defectors and a number of Bosnian Muslim fighters. The task was assigned to the 33rd Battalion of the Alexandroni Brigade.  An early tour of the commanders was conducted, via a train journey from Hadera to Atlit. The train still operated under the auspices of the British who held the area of the port of Haifa. At the request of the patrol commander, the train near Tantura slowed down to get a broader idea, as the train stopped at Zichron Yaacov station, it was attacked by an Egyptian plane that missed it. In retrospect, it turned out that the intelligence was quite accurate. In light of the intelligence and reconnaissance, it was decided on the course of action: Attack on two main axes – Company A moves north, crosses the railway, splits into three heads and simultaneously attacks the ruins of al-Burj on the beach, the “glazier” (the glass factory established by Baron Rothschild) and the village to the north and east. Company C will move from the train station in Zichron, between the track and the beach, and will attack from the south. A force from Company B will attack the school on the hill that dominates the village to the east. The rest of the force from Company B will serve as a reserve force. The auxiliary weapons company will open fire machine guns and mortars for the stated aid purposes, and a naval unit will block the enemy’s escape from the sea. The date of operation is set for May 23, 1948, after midnight. At the point of assault. Movement to the destination began as planned, but Company A was discovered upon crossing the railroad and then the rest of the forces were ordered to storm in. The operation went as planned, despite skillful and precise sniper fire from the eastern hill ridge that slowed the movement of force. After a heavy battle from house to house and extensive use of hand grenades and the elimination of about 10 snipers, the battle ended at about 08:00. The forces were prepared for perimeter defense, units engaged in collecting weapons and concentrating the men for the purpose of interrogation and identification and transferring them along with the rest of the residents, to other places decided and done by other authorities and units. The enemy had about 70 killed. In the battle for the conquest of Tantura 14 warriors fell. One of the fallen fighters was from the Navy.

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https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/22/palestinians-call-for-probe-into-israeli-massacres-in-tantura

Palestinians call for probe into Israeli massacres in Tantura

At least 200 Palestinians were killed by Zionist gangs in the village of Tantura, which was razed in 1948.

Published On 22 Jan 202222 Jan 2022

The Palestinian Authority (PA) has called for the formation of an international commission to investigate the massacres committed by Israel in the Palestinian village of Tantura in 1948.

The call came after Israeli daily Haaretz reported on Thursday the discovery of a mass grave in Tantura village of Palestinians killed by Zionist gangs in 1948, when the modern state of Israel was formed.

Palestinians say multiple massacres of Palestinians by Zionist gangs took place in Palestinian villages during the 1948 war in a bid to forcefully expel at least 750,000 Palestinians from their homes and land, a tragedy Palestinians refer to as the Nakba, or catastrophe.

“The crimes of the occupation did not stop at the year 1948, but are still continuing in a racist and hateful manner, which calls for the opening of investigations into these crimes,” the PA Foreign Ministry said in a statement on Saturday.

The statement continued, “What is required is a broad international campaign to bring justice to the Palestinian victims and to punish Israeli officials and the official Israeli institution that continues to conceal and cover up the ugliness of these crimes and massacres.”

In its report, Haaretz said Israeli officers “of the 1948 battle at Tantura village [have] finally come clean about the mass killing of Arabs that took place after the village’s surrender”.

It added that a documentary titled Tantura is due to be aired online next week, noting that testimonies of Israeli soldiers who participated in the massacre will also be featured.

Haaretz said the graves of at least 200 Palestinians buried after their execution were located under the Dor Beach parking lot.

Translation: The current exhibition at the Palestine Museum in Birzeit includes photographs and documents about the Tantura massacre.

Power of narration

The massacre of Tantura took place on the night of May 22-23, 1948, according to Palestinian historians.

The PA statement said the facts of the Nakba are constantly being “obscured by successive Israeli governments to bury the truth of the crimes and massacres of these Zionist gangs, knowing that the leaders responsible for committing them are given high positions in the occupation army and in official Israeli institutions”.

The Haaretz revelations have prompted the ire of Palestinians, who have long documented their ethnic cleansing through oral and written accounts – such as Walid al-Khalidi’s historical book All That Remains – and say their accounts are always dismissed as unreliable unless recalled by Israelis involved in such atrocities.

Hashem Abu Shama, a Palestinian researcher, said on Twitter that the Haaretz story is more a reflection of Israeli historiography than it is about the massacred Palestinians.

“If anything, it demonstrates that colonial perpetrators, colonial academics, and colonial archives are automatically endowed with the authority to ‘narrate’,” he said.

And while Israeli historians such as Benny Morris have had access to archive files on the forced displacement of Palestinians but stopped short of using the term “ethnic cleansing”, others such as Israeli academic Ilan Pappe faced a harsh response from Israeli society for referring to the events of 1948 as such.

Pappe, who now teaches at Exeter University, was ridiculed and fired from his tenured position at Haifa University back in 2008 after insisting the Tantura massacre, which his student Teddy Katz exposed, took place.

Katz retracted his findings after a public campaign of intense pressure and intimidation.

SOURCE: AL JAZEERA AND NEWS AGENCIES

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https://www.ynet.co.il/entertainment/article/by511a6stk

“אנחנו חייבים להשוות את הנכבה עם השואה – ולהגיד במה זה שונה”

במאי הדוקו אלון שוורץ גדל עם אהבה עזה למולדת, אך כשנתקל במקרה הטבח המוכחש בטנטורה מ-1948, הוא הרגיש איך האדמה תחתיו רועדת. “זה היה טיהור אתני, וזה לא משהו שנעים להגיד. השפיעה עליי הידיעה שכולנו קורבנות של נרטיב מומצא”, הוא אומר לאחר הקרנת סרטו “טנטורה” בסאנדנס, ולא חושש מביקורת: “צריך להכיר בעוולות שלנו, גם אם הערבים טבחו בנו לא פחות”

אמיר בוגן|אתמול | 12:38
העשורים הראשונים בחייו של אלון שוורץ נראו פחות או יותר כמו הביוגרפיה התקנית של כל צבר טיפוסי. כבן למשפחה עתירת זכויות בהגשמת הארץ, נצר למקימי היישוב נהלל ומייסדי תנועת המושבים, אישיותו, דעותיו ואמונותיו התעצבו ברוח ארץ ישראל הישנה והטובה. הוא נולד ברחובות, ונדד עם אבא ואמא והאח שאול לשליחות בארצות הברית. אחרי שההורים שבו ארצה בלחץ הבנים בשנות ה-80, אלון השתלב מחדש במסלול החיים המקומי כבוגר – הוא התגייס למודיעין ואחרי השחרור פנה להייטק כיזם. ילד ישראלי טוב, ומאוד ציוני. כשמאס בלנהל אנשים, עשה הסבה מקצועית לקולנוע ובעקבותיה נתקל במקרה הטבח המוכחש בטנטורה מ-1948, שזעזע אותו. פתאום חלחלה בקרבו התובנה שארץ ישראל הישנה הייתה אולי טובה אבל לא תמיד צודקת, ושהוא התחנך בהשראתה תחת שקר והסתרה. הגילוי הזה גרם לו לחקור את הפרשה כבמאי תיעודי ולצאת למסע אל העבר האפל של המדינה – מסע שמתועד בסרטו “טנטורה” שחושף את לוחמי חטיבת אלכסנדרוני שמדברים לראשונה מול המצלמה ומעידים על שעוללו לפני 74 שנה בכפר הפלסטיני שלמרגלות הכרמל.

“מה שממש השפיע עליי היה הידיעה שכולנו קורבנות של נרטיב מומצא”, אומר שוורץ בריאיון לרגל הקרנת הבכורה של הסרט במסגרת התחרות הדוקומנטרית הבינלאומית בפסטיבל הקולנוע בסאנדנס. “כולנו חונכנו שאנחנו הצודקים ואנחנו הכי צדיקים ומוסריים. זה נראה לנו טבעי כמו שהשמש זורחת בבוקר, וכשהתחלתי את העבודה על הסרט עוד האמנתי שזה נכון. תיארתי לעצמי שאני נכנס למקרה של טנטורה, ואולי משהו קרה שם ואולי לא. אני קראתי כל מה שאפשר על הנושא ולאט לאט חלחלה ההכרה שזה לא רק טנטורה. זה אולי היה טבח המוני, אבל היו 50 מקרים אחרים, אולי יותר, ויש כאלה שאנחנו בכלל לא יודעים עליהם כי אף אחד לא דאג לתעד. בדרכנו, לקחנו בני אדם שלא היו יהודים וגירשנו אותם. זה היה טיהור אתני, וזה לא משהו שנעים להגיד. לא מדובר ברצח עם, אבל הטרנספר היה מתוכנן, וכל מי שמתכחש לכך ממציא נרטיב”.

זו לא הפעם הראשונה שפרשת טנטורה עולה לסדר היום, ולמעשה מי שהציף אותה בציבור בסוף שנות ה-90 היה אדם בשם תדי כץ, שעבודת מחקר שלו באוניברסיטת חיפה הציגה את המציאות ההיסטורית כפי שהתקבלה מראיונות של 70 עדים – מחציתם פלסטינים, ומחציתם ישראלים. המסמך פורץ הדרך של כץ נגנז בהליך משפטי אגרסיבי, שיזמו ותיקי חטיבת אלכסנדרוני. אולם ברשות החוקר נותרו המסמכים, הצילומים וגם הקלטות (כ-140 שעות של עדויות), ואלו מהווים נקודת התחלה למסע של שוורץ, שמרחיב ומעמיק אל תוך הסיפורים ומספק הוכחות משלימות משלו להטמנת גופות תושבי טנטורה בקבר אחים, שלפי טענה שעולה בסרט, נחפר ופונה לאחר מכן. הבמאי מספר כי הגיע לכץ כמעט במקרה, כחלק מתחקיר שערך לפני שלוש שנים לסדרה שניסה לפתח על דעיכת הדמוקרטיה הישראלית. אחד מהפרקים הוקדש לפעילותם של ארגוני השמאל החוץ-ממשלתיים – “בצלם”, “תעאיוש” ו”שוברים שתיקה”. כשהיוזמה לתיעוד המציאות הפוליטית הנוכחית בארץ כשלה, הוא פנה להיסטוריה, והחיפוש אחר תקדימים לתופעה הובילו אותו לתדי כץ ולמחקר שלו.

“הייתי מדוכא מהתקופה של ביבי והרגשתי שאני חייב לעשות משהו כדי לפרוק את התסכול שלי בדרך יצירתית, אבל אחרי שהפרויקט המקורי נתקע, גיליתי אדם בשם תדי כץ ופרסומים על כך שהוא שקרן גדול שעיוות את המציאות. מה שעורר את העניין שלי זה שברשותו 100 שעות של הקלטות. התקשרתי אליו וקבענו להיפגש”, משחזר שוורץ, שסרטו הקודם “הסודות של איידה” מ-2017 תיעד סיפור אישי של אחים זקנים שהופרדו אחרי השואה. “הגעתי לביתו ופגשתי גבר שבור גופנית אבל עם לב גדול. בסוף הריאיון הוא הסכים לתת לי את הקלטות ואני לא האמנתי שזה קורה. זה לא שהוא מייצג ארגון כלשהו והוא לא הציב תנאים. הוא בסך הכול רצה לספר את הסיפור. ולמרות זאת, עדיין פקפקתי בו. הוא נראה לי אדם ישר, אבל הייתי מודע לכך שייתכן שהוא משקר. וכשהתחלתי להאזין לקלטות מה שנחשף בפני היה בלתי נתפס. פשוט לא ייאמן. ואז הבנתי שנפל בידי אוצר, ממש זכיתי בפיס. הדבר הראשון שעשיתי היה להמיר את הקלטות לפורמט דיגיטלי”.

“עם שאינו יודע את עברו – ההווה שלו על הפנים והעתיד שלו בזבל”

הפגישה עם כץ, תושב קיבוץ מגל בשנות ה-70 המאוחרות לחייו, צולמה ואיתה אנחנו עושים היכרות לא רק עם חומרי המקור עליו מסתמך התחקיר של “טנטורה” – אלא גם עם האדם שחשף אותם. כץ המתנייד באמצעות כיסא גלגלים, אב שכול שבתו נהרגה בתאונת דרכים במהלך שירותה הצבאי, אינו נראה במיטבו אך נחוש מאוד בהגנה על הממצאים שסיפק בעבודת המחקר שלו, ומביע חרטה על כך שהסכים להצעת הפשרה של בית המשפט בתביעה שהוגשה נגדו. אל מול מלחמת החורמה שניהלו לוחמי אלכסנדרוני והפניית הגב של אוניברסיטת חיפה לסטודנט שלה, מקצה הסרט מקום להתעמרות המערכתית בכץ. ההיסטוריון פרופ’ יואב גלבר, שפסל את העבודה בדיעבד בטענה של אי עמידה בסטנדרטים אקדמיים, תרם לצנזור המחקר וכיום הוא ממשיך להתייחס בזלזול לעדויות. מבחינה זו, “טנטורה” שמביא את העדים למסך עושה גם איתן צדק, למרות התיאורים המזעזעים שיוצאים להם מהפה על הוצאות להורג, התעללות ואפילו אונס.
“לא כל הלוחמים הסכימו לדבר”, מבהיר שוורץ, “מתי רוצח מתוודה? אני לא חושב שהם רוצחים אבל הם היו חלק מקבוצה שאחראית לסיפור הזה ואחרי 60, 70, 80 שנה שאתה חי עם הסוד הזה – אתה רוצה לפרוק אותו. והיו גם כאלה שפשוט רואים בך חבר והם פשוט חולקים את המידע איתך ככזה. וחלקם לא אכפת להם, הם פשוט מספרים את האמת. אני חושב שחלקם גם רוצים לחשוף את העוולות, אבל הם חשים לויאליות ליחידה ולחברים וזה קשה להם. ויש אנשים שטוענים שהם זקנים ובוודאי כבר סנילים. אבל הם ממש לא סנילים, והם כולם ידעו על מה הם מדברים. הם זכרו”.

האנשים האלה למודי ניסיון מהתקדים של כץ, ובוודאי היו חשדנים. איך גרמת להם לדבר בכזו פתיחות? “כשאתה פונה למישהו שיש לו טראומה ופוסט-טראומה והוא מסתיר משהו ואולי הוא עומד לסיים את חייו בקרוב – יש לזה כוח. בשבילם טנטורה היה זיכרון שהם רצו לחלוק, והייתי צריך להניע אותם לדבר. זה משחק של חתול ועכבר, אבל אני לא חוקר משטרה והם לא חשודים. אתה משוחח איתם וזוכה באמונם. פניתי להרבה אנשים מאלכסנדרוני, מכל מיני קבוצות שונות מהחטיבה. כולם ידעו על הסיפור של תדי כץ, אבל לא כולם התרגשו ממנה, ואחרים כבר פחות חששו להיחשף או אמרו לעצמם שבשלב הזה של חייהם כבר לא אכפת להם. והיו גם כאלה שלא דיברו עם תדי, אבל דיברו לסרט. כל אחד עם הבחירות שלו. השוק עבורי היה שהם חיים עם הסיפור הזה כל חייהם, אבל אנחנו כחברה לא יודעים על זה כלום. ואם מישהו הזכיר משהו אז רובנו רואים בזה ‘דמיון מזרחי’. נכבה חרטה. אז הערבים אולי משקרים, אבל אלו הסבים שלנו שמדברים פה”.
באופן אישי, אתה שומע את הסבים שלנו מדברים על פשעים נוראיים שהם היו שותפים להם. איך זה גרם לך להרגיש בזמן אמת במהלך הראיונות? “רוב האנשים שראיינתי הם יותר מבוגרים מ-80, ורוב רובם לא רצחו. הם עברו טראומה והם ראו מה שהם ראו וניסו להסתיר את זה. והיו גם כאלה שהעדיפו להאמין לסיפור שהם סיפרו לעצמם, שכל הדברים האלה לא התרחשו. אני גם מזכיר לעצמי שהם עברו המון. הם ראו חברים שלהם שנהרגו, ואני מבין אותם שאלו דברים שעדיף לשכוח, ואני לא שופט אותם. באופן אישי באתי מוכן. אני האדם הראשון שהיו ברשותו העדויות המוקלטות, ובאיכות סאונד מיטיבית. ממש כמו בלש אני יודע מה כל אחד מהמרואיינים שלי אמר לפני, ואני יודע מי חבר של מי. שיתפתי איתם את החומרים – ההקלטות וגם המסמכים והתמונות – ועוררתי את הזיכרון שלהם. ידעתי מה אני עושה, ומריאיון לריאיון למדתי יותר ויותר איך לגשת אליהם. אני לא חוקר משטרה, והכול נעשה באופן ידידותי ועדין. הייתי ‘השוטר הטוב’ והם התייחסו אליי בהתאם”.
מתוך הסרט “טנטורה”
התרומה הגדולה של שוורץ לשיח על תולדות המדינה היא הדרך שבה הוא מפרק את הנרטיב הציוני, ובונה אותו מחדש תוך הטמעת הנרטיב הפלסטיני של הנכבה, ומתוך נקודת מבטם של הלוחמים. בכך הוא מנסה לעצב מחדש עבורו ועבורנו אפשרות להצדקת קיומה של המדינה היהודית, אבל מתוך מבט כן לעבר, בלי שקרים: “גם אם נזכור את ההקשר של השואה ואיך הערבים פתחו במלחמה, נדרשת הבנה של מה שעשינו עם מיליון אנשים. זה הודר מהסיפור הלאומי שלנו והמיתוסים שלנו. ההבנה הזאת היא מה שמטלטל את הצופים וזה מה שטלטל אותי כבמאי, ההבדל בין הסיפורים שאנחנו מספרים לעצמנו אל מול המציאות. דחקנו עם אחר והקמנו מדינה משלנו כמעשה פלא, ואני בעדו. זה פרדוקס. קשה להשלים עם מה שאירע בדרך להשגת המטרה – להקים מדינה יהודית שאני תומך בה. לא שאני יודע איך אפשר היה לעשות אחרת, אבל ההבנה שמה שסיפרו לי זה לא האמת היה קשה לי אפילו יותר מלשמוע על המקרים של ההרג עצמו. זה קרה בכל מקום”.
עכשיו אחרי ההתפכחות שלך, איך אתה מסביר את המעמד של הנכבה כטאבו שאסור לדבר עליו, אפילו היום יותר מ-70 שנה אחרי? “הנכבה מערערת את הצדקנות המוחלטת שאנחנו מייחסים לעצמנו. העם היהודי כמעט והוכחד, ואני לא מתווכח על כך שאם היינו מפסידים במלחמת העצמאות היינו חדלים מלהתקיים. אבל לחשוב שהמטרה של כל הערבים הייתה להשמיד אותנו ולחשוב שהמענה היה לזרוק את כולם מפה, או להיכנס לכפרים ולהרוג את כל הגברים כדי ללמד לקח – בשבילי זה נורא. שלוש שנים אחרי השואה יהודים מורים לאנשים לחפור בורות ויורים בהם? זה לא משנה אם 70 נהרגו או 250. הדבר העצוב הוא שכחברה אנחנו מתכחשים לעבר. בהשראת יגאל אלון, שהמשפט שלו פותח את הסרט, אני יכול להגיד שעם שאינו יודע את עברו – ההווה שלו על הפנים והעתיד שלו בזבל. זה מה שעצוב ואנחנו צריך לצמוח מזה כחברה, ולהאמין שאנחנו יכולים להיות טובים יותר, ולא בהכרח לחיות על חרבנו. ישראלים הפסיקו לחלום על עולם טוב יותר”.

במה הסרט שלך יכול לשנות במקום שבו מחקרים אקדמיים של כץ ואחרים כשלו? “אני חושב שזה ש’ההיסטוריונים החדשים’ בשנות ה-80 כתבו כמה מחקרים על פרטים קטנים שמבוססים על מסמכים כאלה או אחרים גרם למזעור של הנכבה. אני מאמין שבעולם של פוסט-אמת, אנחנו צריכים להגיד את האמת. אני מאמין שהאמת משחררת, וככל שמדובר בנכבה, המדינה צריכה להפסיק להסתתר. אנחנו חברה שצריכה לדעת מה היא עוללה, איך פעלנו אז ואיך אנחנו פועלים היום. יש להבין שזה לא סכסוך בין יהודים לטרוריסטים, אלא בין שני עמים. אם אנחנו מעוניינים בדיאלוג, אנחנו צריכים להבין את הצד של הפלסטינים, ומה בעצם הם רוצים מאיתנו. יש להכיר בעוול שנגרם להם. הסרט לא מתיימר להגיד איך לפתור את הסכסוך, אבל הוא כן מראה את החשיבות העליונה של הכרה בנכבה כצעד ראשון לדיאלוג. וזה הכרחי בשבילנו הישראלים לפני הכול, כי זה העבר שלנו. ואז נבין שאנחנו לא תמיד צודקים ולא קדושים. אנחנו אומה מיוחדת, אבל מלאה בפגמים. אם לא נסתכל במראה, אז תמיד נחשוב שאנחנו הכי יפים, כמו באגדות”.

“אנחנו אולי מהטובים בעולם, אבל אי אפשר להיות חברה למופת ולהחביא שלדים בארון או במגרש חניה”

אחת התובנות המכלילות שעולות מצפייה ב”טנטורה” היא כמה משאבים רוחניים, תרבותיים וכלכליים הושקעו על ידי הממסד כדי לטשטש ראיות ולמחוק את הרוחות מן העבר, לכאורה כדי לגונן על האזרחים ולשמר את המוסר הצה”לי הידוע. בעוד שהפרקטיקה המפא”יניקית הזאת נתקלת בהתנגדות ערה סביב פרשות כמו היחס ליהודי המזרח וחטיפת ילדי תימן, ככל שמדובר בזוועות הנכבה – הדיון נותר מחוץ לשיח. “המציאות שלנו נוצרת דרך צנזורה עצמית, כאילו בניסיון לגונן עליך. במקום להתבונן למציאות בעיניים, כמדינה אנחנו חיים במציאות חלופית”, אומר שוורץ, “ברור שהסיפור על הנכבה הוא הרבה יותר מפרשת חטיפת ילדי תימן. לא חקרתי, אבל אני בטוח שהיו מקרים כאלה. בישראל יש תחרות בין המגזרים לגבי מיהו הקורבן. כולם רוצים להיות הקורבן, אבל רק לא הערבים. הם אף פעם לא הקורבן. אני חושב שאנחנו צריכים להתבגר ולהיות פחות נאיבים, וזה לא סוף העולם להכיר בעוולות שלנו, גם אם הערבים טבחו בנו לא פחות”.
מה שמוזר זה שדווקא הימין הקיצוני תמיד התבטא בחופשיות על מורשת הטרנספר, בעוד השמאל התכחש אליה. “זה נכון, כי הימין בעד זה. מה שהפתיע אותי שהשמאל מסרב לקבל את הסיפור הזה. אבל מבחינתי אני מאמין במדינה יהודית, אפילו אם ההיסטוריה שלה מוכתמת בדם. ואני חושב שאם המטרה של הימין זו מדינה דו-לאומית, אז השמאל הוא הרבה יותר ציוני”.
מאמצי ההשתקה של חטאי העבר מזכירים את פועלם של מכחישי השואה – באקדמיה, אבל גם מטעם השלטון במדינות כמו פולין, הונגריה ומדינות אחרות שמתביישות בעברן. “תמיד אומרים שאסור להשוות עם השואה. הדעה שלי היא שאנחנו חייבים להשוות ולהגיד במה זה שונה. ישראל לא ביצעה רצח עם מתוכנן, ולא הייתה כוונה להשמיד את הערבים. זו לא הייתה התוכנית של בן גוריון, ובכך הוא שונה מהנאצים וממשטרים אחרים ברחבי העולם. אבל כן הייתה תוכנית להיפטר מהם, והתוכנית הזאת הוסתרה היטב. ובגלל שבן גוריון היה פיקח מאוד, מכיוון שלא הייתה תוכנית לרצח עם תאי גזים ורכבות, במקומות כמו טנטורה אנשים פעלו באופן עצמאי להשגת המטרה והמפקדים לא אמרו שום דבר ולא עצרו אותם. אבל מההיבט העקרוני, צריך להבין שאנחנו לא העם היחיד שחי תחת טראומה רב-דורית. הנכבה, גם אם היא קטנה בהיקפה ביחס למקרים אחרים בעולם, היא מספיקה כדי לגרום לטראומה, וצריך להכיר בה. אנחנו לא מהגרועים בעולם, אולי מהטובים דווקא. אבל אי אפשר להיות חברה למופת ולהחביא שלדים בארון או במגרש חניה”.

נתקלת בהתנגדות על רקע עשיית הסרט? “עדיין לא. ההתנגדות דווקא באה מהצד של המשפחה. אמא שלי חששה שאני נכנס לדיכאון, ודודתי שהיא מורה להיסטוריה לקח קשה את זה שאני מספר את הסיפור. יש אנשים שמקורבים למשפחה ולא מעוניינים לשמוע מזה, זה מזעזע אותם”.
החשיפה ל”טנטורה” בציבור צפויה לגדול כשהוא ישודר בעתיד ב-HOT8 (שתמכה בהפקה יחד עם הקרן החדשה לקולנוע וטלוויזיה), אבל הקרנת הבכורה בסאנדנס כבר מספיקה לאתגר את השיח הפוליטי בארץ, וכן לעורר קולנוענים פלסטינים ופעילים פרו-פלסטינים למיניהם שמתלוננים ברשתות החברתיות על כך שהסרט מובא מעיניים ישראליות, בעוד שעדויות ניצולי הטבח (חלקן מקבלות במה בסרט) הודרו מאז ומתמיד. “אני יודע על כמה קולנוענים ערבים שניסו לעשות סרט על הפרשה מנקודת המבט של הקורבנות, אבל מבחינתי ברגע שהלוחמים הסכימו לדבר איתנו ולחלוק את סיפורם, הכיוון של הסרט השתנה”, הוא אומר, ונראה שהוא מודע לכך שיהיה מי שיראה בעדויות שבסרט כהודאה באשמה, והרשות הפלסטינית כבר הספיקה לדרוש חקירה בינלאומית של הפרשה: “תמיד יהיה מי שישתמש בזה, אבל כל המחקרים האקדמיים פורסמו בעבר וזמינים באנגלית לכולם. הסרט רק מנגיש את העובדות לקהל, וזה לא נעשה מספיק”.
יהיו ישראלים שיאשימו אותך שאתה גורם נזק ומוציא כביסה מלוכלכת לעולם בעבור תהילה וכסף. “אם מישהו חושב שאני עושה את זה מתאוות בצע, הוא צריך לבדוק את עצמו. אני בא מהייטק, ובחרתי ביוזמתי לעזוב את המקצוע כדי לעשות סרטים תיעודיים. לא עושים מזה כסף. מה שגורם לי לקום בבקרים זה החלומות. אני רווק, וזה לא משהו סקסי לחלוק עם בחורה, שאתה עושה סרט תיעודי על טבח. זה משפט פתיחה נורא. אבל אני עושה את זה כדי להגשים את עצמי. זאת לא עבודה קלה לעשות סרטים דוקומנטריים. אתה משקיע את כל כולך בנושאים קשים. אני עצוב ואני מדוכא כי אני נחשף לחומרים האלה. הם כל כך קשים. ואז השלמת סרט של 90 דקות ואתה חושב עליו כמה ימים ואז ממשיך הלאה. תודה לאל שהעולם רוצה את הסרטים שלי. קיבלתי מימון ישראלי, אבל אני לא זקוק לו. אני אחד מהקולנוענים הבודדים שיכולים לעבוד בחו”ל. אני אעשה יותר כסף באמריקה, אבל אני בא מאידיאליזם. וכן חשוב שבעולם כולו יראו את הסרטים, וזה גם כך קורה. כולם הרי מחוברים לנטפליקס”.
יש רגע חזק בסרט, כשתדי כץ מוסר לך את הקלטות והוא מזהיר אותך: “ירדפו אותך כמו שרדפו אותי”. אתה חושש מזה? “אני לא חושב שמישהו ירדוף אותי. ישראל היא דמוקרטיה, גם אם בחיתוליה. אבל במיוחד אחרי הימים של ביבי ומירי רגב, יש לדעתי ממשלה מאוד מעניינת בישראל ואני שמח שפוליטיקאי ערבי ואיש ימין יכולים לשבת יחד באותה ממשלה. זו התרומה הכי גדולה של ביבי, הכישלון שלו הכשיר את זה. אני לא מאמין שיתנכלו לי מצד הממסד. ובכל מקרה, מי שרוצה להתווכח על העובדות מוזמן להתעמת איתי. השתקה היא מקצוע ויש ארגונים שזה התפקיד שלהם. לא רק בישראל, גם בארצות הברית. הם מונעים ממך להשמיע את קולך באמצעות הפעלת לחץ ציבורי וכלכלי. אולי הם ינסו לפעול גם נגדי. אבל אני יודע שאני עומד לחלוטין מאחורי העובדות. בדקתי את עצמי. תמיד יכולות ליפול טעויות, אבל עשייה דוקומנטרית היא לא בית משפט”.
מתוך הסרט “טנטורה”
באופן אישי, אתה מרגיש שבאמצעות הסרט עשית צדק עבור תדי כץ? “אין ספק בכך. היה לי חשוב להשלים את המעגל של תדי כץ מכיוון שהוא קורבן של השתקה. וגם אם עבודת המחקר שלו הייתה מגושמת מבחינת האקדמיה, האדם הזה עשה צעד נועז שאף אחד לא עשה בעבר. לבדוק בדקדקנות את ההיסטוריה של כפר אחד. זה מאוד חשוב. איסוף המידע שלו היה יוצא מן הכלל. אני חושב שהסרט הזה עושה עימו צדק. זה חלק מהמטרות שלו”.
מבחינה אישית, ייתכן שהשליחות שלך הסתיימה פה. מה הלאה? “אנשים חושבים שמה שעשיתי זה מטורף. התפתח טרנד לדבר על הנכבה באופן כללי, אבל כמו שעורך הדין שלי אומר לי – לקחתי את זה צעד אחד קדימה. זה סיפור אמיתי והוא יוצא מהלב שלי. תמיד מדובר בפרשנויות שונות ואפשר לספר סיפורים שונים, אבל זה הסיפור שאני מזהה ואני שלם איתו. אני יצאתי פגוע מהניסיון הזה, ואני צריך פסיכולוג עכשיו. ואם מישהו חושב שאני עושה את זה מסיבה אחרת מאשר שליחות אידיאולוגית, אז שיהיה. אבל עכשיו אחרי הסרטים שעשיתי על השואה ועל הנכבה, אני חושב שאני צריך לעשות משהו קליל יותר. משהו על יוגה, או אהבה או זוגיות”.
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https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-2093775,00.html
אש”ף מימן את הגנת החוקר שטען: צה”ל רצח

לאחר שפרסם מחקר על טבח במלחמת השחרור, נדרש החוקר תדי כץ לממן את תביעת הדיבה שהגישו נגדו הלוחמים. מי ששמח לסייע היה איש אש”ף פייסל חוסייני: הוא העניק אלפי דולרים להגנה המשפטית על המחקר, שהיווה הישג תעמולתי לפלסטינים. אבל כץ לא מתחרט על בקשת הכסף מהפלסטינים: “אף מוסד אחר לא עזר לי, וזה חשוב לאמת ההיסטורית”

עזרא דלומי עדכון אחרון:  01.09.02 , 09:08

כספים של אש”ף סייעו לממן חוקר שטען כי צה”ל ביצע טבח בתושבי הכפר הערבי טנטורה במלחמת השחרור, כך מדווח לראשונה היום (א’) “ידיעות אחרונות”.
הפלסטינים, שראו הישג תעמולתי כביר בטענה כי לוחמי חטיבת “אלכסנדרוני” ביצעו טבח בכ-200 מערביי טנטורה, שמחו להשתתף בהוצאות המשפטיות למימון התביעות שהוגשו נגד המחקר.
פייסל חוסייני, שהיה מחזיק תיק ירושלים באש”ף, שילם לחוקר תדי כץ אלפי דולרים למימון תביעת הדיבה שהגישו נגדו אנשי חטיבת “אלכסנדרוני”.
בשבוע שעבר אישר כץ כי בקיץ 2000, במהלך המשפט, ביקש – וקיבל – מחוסייני 8,000 דולר במזומן. חודש אחר כך ביקש כץ עוד 10,000 דולר, באמצעות עו”ד ג’וואד בולוס, עורך דינו של האוריינט האוס. אבל לטענתו, סכום זה מעולם לא הגיע לידיו.
כץ (59) חבר קיבוץ מגל, הכיר את חוסייני במסגרת פעילותו באירועי השלום. לכן, סיפר כץ, זה נראה טבעי לפנות אליו כידיד כדי לגייס כספים למשפטו. כץ סיפר כי הרעיון לבקש את עזרת הרשות הפלסטינית עלה בשיחה עם חברו, פעיל שלום שנרצח לפני כחצי שנה בפיגוע במסעדת “מצא” בחיפה.
הרעיון עלה לאחר שמיצה את כל האפשרויות האחרות לגיוס הכספים למשפטו: הוא גייס תרומות מחברים אישיים, מחברים למפלגה ומגוש שלום וקיבל את הכנסות הערב שאורגן לכבודו בתיאטרון “צוותא”. את קיבוצו מגל החליט כץ שלא לערב – והסתפק בקבלת הוצאות תחבורה וחופש מעבודה ככל שיידרש לצורך משפטו. במזכירות הקיבוץ הוחלט שאם כץ יפנה בבקשת עזרה כספית, יהיה הקיבוץ נכון לסייע. כץ לא פנה.
כץ סיפר כי “הגעתי אל פייסל חוסייני עם אותו חבר שנהרג, הצגנו לו את הנושא וביקשנו עזרה. חשבנו שיהיה לו בזה עניין. הסברתי לפייסל שיש תביעה, שהאוניברסיטה נבהלה מהמחקר ויוצאת חוצץ נגדו. הוא אישר את הבקשה. לא היה לי אף מוסד אחר לבקש ממנו עזרה. את הכסף קיבלתי ביד, במזומן. אני חושב שזה היה 8,000 דולר במזומן”.
מאז מת חוסייני. הכסף סייע למימון שכר טרחת עורך הדין שייצג את כץ בכל משפטיו, עו”ד אביגדור פלדמן. זאת למרות שפלדמן עצמו אמר השבוע כי “ברור שבעניין כזה לא הייתי הולך לבקש כסף מהאוריינט האוס”.
כץ עצמו אינו רואה כל פסול בתמיכתם של הפלסטינים: “בקשת הסיוע היא לגיטימית ונועדה לאפשר להוציא לאור את האמת ההיסטורית על מלחמת השחרור”. בחודשים האחרונים הוא עושה ימים כלילות בכתיבת העבודה מחדש. עם זאת, הוא חושש שחשיפת העובדה שקיבל כספים מהרשות הפלסטינית, תהווה עילה למוסדות האוניברסיטה לדחות את גרסתו המתוקנת לה הקדיש ימים ולילות רבים.
פטרונו של כץ, ד”ר אילן פפה מאוניברסיטת חיפה, מצדיק את הפנייה לקבלת כספים מחוסייני. “ברשות הפלסטינית יש עניין בעבודה של כץ. הם רצו לתרגם אותה לכמה שפות. ההתקשרות עמם הייתה לאחר הגשת המחקר שלא נעשה מטעמם. אבל אין מחקר בעולם שאיננו משרת מישהו”.
על דעתו חולק פרופ’ יואב גלבר, ראש בית הספר להיסטוריה באוניברסיטת חיפה, שהיה בין המתנגדים החריפים לעבודתו של כץ. לדבריו, “אני אמנם בספק אם יש משמעות אקדמית לעובדה שהוא קיבל כסף פלסטיני, זו בעיה ציבורית של מדינת ישראל. אבל הסיפור של הכסף מכניס ממד חדש לפרשה. זה לא עסק תמים. הם לא נותנים לו כסף סתם. זה חלק מהמערכה המתנהלת נגד מדינת ישראל במסגרת האינתיפאדה”.

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https://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.821632
תדי כץ: איני רואה כל פסול בקבלת כסף מפייסל חוסייני

02.09.2002 00:00 עודכן ב: 17.08.2011 17:26
מאת דוד רטנר
שמורתגובותשתף בפייסבוק

ההיסטוריון תדי כץ, תושב קיבוץ מגל שעבודת המאסטר שלו באוניברסיטת חיפה טענה לטבח שבוצע בערביי הכפר טנטורה בשנת 1948 במלחמת העצמאות, וניהל על כך מאבק משפטי עם יוצאי חטיבת “אלכסנדרוני”, קיבל מהשר לשעבר לענייני ירושלים ברשות הפלשתינית, פייסל חוסייני, 8,000 דולר למימון המאבק המשפטי. העברת הכסף פורסמה אתמול בעיתון “ידיעות אחרונות”.

כץ אמר אתמול שאינו מעוניין להגיב על הידיעה, אלא רק לאחר שיגיש את הגירסה המתוקנת של עבודתו לאוניברסיטה. עם זאת, הוא חזר על דבריו לפיהם אינו רואה כל פסול בקבלת הכסף ממשרדו של חוסייני – שמת לפני כחצי שנה – והוסיף כי הוא אינו רואה את הסכום שקיבל כ”כסף של הרשות הפלשתינאית, אלא של מוסד המחקר שבראשו עמד חוסייני”.

מקורב של כץ אמר שלא הייתה לו ברירה: “כץ, קיבוצניק שאינו בעל אמצעים, נדרש כבר בשלב התביעה שהגישו נגדו יוצאי חטיבת אלכסנדרוני, לשלם 17 אלף שקלים. כאשר ביקש לצרף לתביעה נגדו את אוניברסיטת חיפה כצד שלישי, הוא נדרש לשלם עוד 30 אלף שקלים. וכל זאת, עוד לפני שדיברנו על שכר טרחת עורך הדין שייצג אותו במשפט” (אביגדור פלדמן. ד”ר).

תחילת הפרשה בשנת 1998. כץ הגיש עבודת מאסטר לאוניברסיטת חיפה על נטישת הערבים מהכפרים בכרמל הדרומי ובחוף הכרמל ב-48′. על סמך עדויות שהגיעו אליו – גם של ערבים וגם של יהודים – הוא טען שבכפר טנטורה (שעל שרידיו ממוקמים היום היישובים דור ונחשולים), נעשה טבח בכמה עשרות מתושבי הכפר. כץ טען כי חיילים מחטיבת אלכסנדרוני ביצעו את הטבח, והם אלה שקברו את הנטבחים בקבר אחים. העבודה זכתה בציון 97 מבודקיה באוניברסיטה.

כאשר התפרסמה העבודה בעיתונים הגישו אנשי עמותת אלכסנדרוני, שהכחישו ומכחישים את דבר קיום הטבח מכל וכל, תביעה נגד כץ על הוצאת לשון הרע. המשפט התנהל בבית המשפט המחוזי בתל אביב, ובמהלכו חשפו עורכי הדין של עמותת אלכסנדרוני מקרים של אי התאמה בין הקלטות המרואיינים של כץ, לבין התיעוד שנרשם בעבודה שהגיש לאוניברסיטה.

כבר ביוני 2000, כאשר הבין כץ שהוא עומד בפני מאבק משפטי ארוך ויקר, הוא פנה בבקשת עזרה כספית לפייסל חוסייני. מקורב לכץ אומר שאת הכסף המזומן הוא קיבל ממשרדו של חוסייני במהלך אוגוסט 2000, כלומר כחודש לפני פרוץ אינתיפאדת אל-אקצה.

בדצמבר 2000 חלה התפתחות במשפט: כץ הסכים לחתום על הסכם פשרה עם עמותת אלכסנדרוני, לפיו ייפרסם בעיתונים מודעת התנצלות גדולה, שבה יחזור בו מטענותיו על טבח שאירע בטנטורה. מקורביו של כץ אומרים שהוא הסכים לחתום על ההסכם זמן קצר אחרי שעבר אירוע מוחי. לדבריהם, הוא עשה זאת ברגע של חולשת דעת, מבלי שהתייעץ עם עו”ד פלדמן, ולאחר שהסתמך על עצות שקיבל מקרוב משפחה משפטן. כבר למחרת היום חזר בו כץ מהסכם הפשרה, אך בית המשפט העליון דחה את בקשתו לבטל את ההסכם.

אחרי שבבית המשפט המחוזי נחשפו כמה אי התאמות בין העדויות המוקלטות לתיעוד שלהן, החליטה אוניברסיטת חיפה לדרוש מכץ לבצע תיקונים בעבודה. בשנתיים האחרונות חוזר כץ על חלקים ממחקרו. לדברי מקורבים לו, הוא מצא עדויות וכתבות חדשות, שבהן מוזכר שנעשה טבח. לדברי המקורבים, כץ משוכנע היום, יותר מתמיד, כי בטנטורה נטבחו תושבים מקומיים. באוקטובר אמור כץ להגיש את העבודה המתוקנת לאוניברסיטה, לצורך בדיקה מחודשת.

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https://www.nli.org.il/he/newspapers/dav/1948/05/24/01/article/28/?e=——-he-20–1–img-txIN%7ctxTI————–1

דבר⁩⁩, 24 מאי 1948
כיצד נכבש כפר טנטורה סופרנו מחדרה מודיע: לאחר פעולת-קרב מוצלחת של חיילינו נכנע — לאחר שעות אחדות, מאור הבוקר אתמול עד הצהרים — כפר הדייגים הנאה טנטורה, בן 2000 נפש. טנטורה עומדת במקום דוא העתיקה. כפר זה, היה, היחידי של התנגדות ערבית באזור השפלה ושימש גם מקום אספקה בים מהארצות השכנות. חיילינו, שהתקרבו לכפר בחצות, נתקלו בהתנגדות גדולה. עמדות הערבים היו מבוצרות. אחדות מהן מוקפות סלעים. בין עמדה לעמדה היה גם קשר טלפוני. ניכר היה שתכנית הביצורים עובדה על ידי מומחים אירופיים. אנשינו התגברו על ההתנגדות ונכנסו לכפר תוך כדי גרימת אבידות כבדות לאויב. בשעות הצהרים נכנע הכפר לפני לוחמינו. נלקח שלל רב של תחמושת ונישבו כי‭20-‬ גברים. הנשים והילדים הועברו לכפר הערבי פאראדיס. בטנטורה  הקים בשעתו מ. דיזנגוף בית- חרושת לזכוכית. בית זה בן שתי הקומות נראה מרחוק בכביש זכרון-יעקב—חיפה.

20.01.22

Editorial Note

A few days ago, Prof. Oren Yiftachel, a Geographer at Ben-Gurion University, and Dr. Rawia Aburabia, a Law faculty at Sapir College, published an opinion piece in Haaretz. They discussed the Bedouin in the Negev and the new electricity law, which would connect their dwellings to the national grid.  However, the article is underlined by a heavy political agenda as symbolized by their use of the word “apartheid.”

The authors claim that “The Bedouin have been living in the Negev for hundreds of years. And as all studies of this issue have proven, they owned much of it until they were dispossessed by the State of Israel… it’s vital to remember that the Bedouin didn’t take over this land; they were in the Negev long before Jewish settlement began.”

They argued a “troubling underlying reality of apartheid that goes far beyond the electricity law.” According to the authors, the Bedouins are “one of the weakest segments of Israeli society – a group far from receiving justice.”  A negative attitude toward the Bedouins “raises serious questions about the blindness and denial that afflict much of Israeli society.” For Yiftachel and Aburabia, this “incites against an entire community whose only crime is existing in a country that refuses to recognize it… After all, the Bedouin are citizens, aren’t they?”  Yiftachel and Aburabia call the critics “deceptive propaganda of right-wing extremist groups” that follows “the time-honored colonialist tradition of victim blaming.” It shows a “historical blindness to the Bedouin issue in particular and Israeli apartheid in general has penetrated deep into the public’s consciousness.”  

They claim that such “racist generalizations reveal the deeper problem – the apartheid in all the areas under Israel’s control, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea… Only under an apartheid regime could a settler… who lives on stolen Palestinian land in the West Bank settlement of Ofra, accuse an indigenous community that has been living on its lands for hundreds of years of “occupation.” Only in an apartheid regime could… settlements, ignore the real occupation, under whose auspices those illegal settlements for Jews only were built in the West Bank.”

Moreover, this is an “ugly flood of inflammatory, racist discourse against the Bedouin coming from large swathes of Jewish society. This is an outstanding example of blaming the victim, behavior so beloved of colonialist regimes.”  According to the authors, a settler from Judea and Samaria “is an illegal occupier, part of the machinery of occupation that commits war crimes on a daily basis.”  The settler’s “vitriolic statements reveal the apartheid regime between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. The obvious and necessary step now is for all true supporters of democracy, in the Negev and throughout Israel, to join the battle against this racist regime.”

The authors neglect to inform the readers about the widespread violation of law in the Negev and only briefly stated that “Actual crimes committed in the south must be condemned, but it’s important not to forget the facts.” 

However, the article is egregious on many counts and needs to be corrected.

While some Bedouins could prove ownership of land, it does not prove that all Bedouins are landowners, as the authors falsely claim. The fact that Bedouins have roamed the Negev with their flocks does not give them ownership of this land. In the same vein, the fact that people live and walk in an area does not mean they own these places. Only properties registered under their names belong to them.  

Israel recognizes the Bedouins as citizens but does not recognize some of their claims to lands they do not have the title deed as proof of ownership. 

Israel is not an apartheid state and not even close to one.

Bedouins who could prove ownership of land have registered in the land registry. Contrary to Yiftachel and Aburabia claims, those who have not proved ownership have no rights to the land and should not build illegally. They must obey Israeli law. The case of al-Araqib is a prime example of such illegal behavior. The al-Uqbi tribe, the claimants, demanded the ownership of 1000 dunams in the Israeli courts. Prof. Yiftachel was their key expert witness. They could not prove they cultivated a thousand dunams, therefore, their cases were dismissed. Still, they erected illegal dwellings ignoring the court order. The Israeli police demolished Al Araqib for the 196th time, as of December 2021. Neither Yiftachel nor Aburabia condemned such illegal behavior.

As for the Jewish claims to the land, Yiftachel and Aburabia are wrong. The Jews were promised by 50 states in 1922 a national home in Palestine due to the historical connection.

The League of Nations appointed Britain to a mandate over Palestine to establish the Jewish people’s national home at the Ottoman Empire’s demise.  On 12 August 1922, the League of Nations approved the Mandate for Palestine, stating that, “Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country… The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.”

The League of Nations document also stated that “An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country… The Zionist Organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty’s Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home. The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes… The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.”  

Interestingly, Yiftachel recently disclosed that he had been influenced as a doctoral student by his mentor, Dr. Hubert Law-Yone from the Technion.  Now retired, Law-Yone (who is a Burmese) is critical of Israeli policies. For example, A 2002 B’Tselem report titled “Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank,” thanks Law-Yone for his assistance in preparing the report. The report claims “that the settlement enterprise in the Occupied Territories has created a system of legally sanctioned separation based on discrimination that has, perhaps, no parallel anywhere in the world since the apartheid regime in South Africa.” 

Yiftachel, Law-Yone, and all their critical neo-Marxist cohorts opposed the government initiative to settle land disputes with the Bedouins in the Negev that aimed to move them into proper houses from the shacks they currently live in. The Bedouins rejected these offers and instead began to riot to show solidarity with the Palestinians.   As a result, the Bedouins of the Negev reject any land settlement and systematically demand more than is offered to them.

As stated above, since Palestine is the Jewish national home, self-governing institutions are established for all Jews and non-Jews alike. The Bedouins are expected to adhere to these institutions and obey the law.  As parts of the Bedouin community are lawless and crime is skyrocketing. Yiftachel and Aburabia contribute to the chaos by providing falsified information.

More to the point, Yiftachel was behind the recent report of BT’selem claiming Israel is an apartheid state.  For Yiftachel, every dysfunctionality in the Arab community is further proof of the apartheid nature of the state.

Both Yiftachel and Aburabia abuse the Israeli academic system by providing falsehoods instead of scholarships. The Israeli taxpayers who pay for the academic institutions deserve better value for their money.

References

https://urbanologia.tau.ac.il/the-dilemma-of-the-dark-side-of-planning/

פרופ’ אורן יפתחאל מגיב לפרופ’ יוברט לו יון ומספר כיצד השפיע עליו המפגש עימו עוד כשהיה סטונדט לדוקטרט ונחשף לעמדתו הביקורתית. כיום הוא מבין את מקצועות המרחב כזירה של מאבק בין ‘צדדים אפלים’ ל’צדדים מוארים‘, סוקר את השלבים בהתפתחות המחשבה על צדק מרחבי ומציע את הקריאה שלו לתכנון טוב יותר
המרחב השקוף
אוקטובר 1988: שיחה בזמן סיור בכפר הלא מוכר (דה-אז) דמיידה במרכז הגליל כחלק מעבודת שדה עם יוברט לו-יון ‘ואגודת הארבעים’  על הכנת תכנית אב לכפרים הלא מוכרים בגליל.
אורן: “כל היישוב כאן זה פחונים וצריפונים? אין כביש? אין בית ספר? אין שלטים?”
יוברט: “כן, זה עד היום ‘התכנון’ למקומות האלה”
אורן: “כישלון מחפיר, המתכננים כנראה לא למדו בטכניון”.
יוברט: “לא לא אורן, זאת דווקא הצלחה של התכנון, אתה צריך לחשוב מחדש על מהות התכנון…”
אורן: “כלומר, התכנון מועל בתפקידו?”
יוברט: “לא אורן, מה שאתה רואה כאן הוא בעצם תפקידו של התכנון, להפוך את המרחב, כשהוא מעוניין בכך, לשקוף, ואת תושביו לתלויים ומוחלשים,. כמו שמלמד אותנו מישל פוקו (‘מי זה? אני שואל את עצמי…’), צריך תמיד לבדוק את תרגום הכוח למרחב ולא את המילים היפות של קובעי המדיניות .. צריך להבין שמהתכנון לא יצמח שינוי, אלא מפעולות חברתיות ופוליטיות גם של אנשי מקצוע “.1
בתור דוקטורנט לתכנון בטכניון, ואחרי מספר שנים של עבודה במשרדי ורשויות תכנון שהציגו עצמן תמיד ככאלה השואפות לטוב הציבורי ‘לכולם’, השיחה הזאת טלטלה אותי. האם אני במקצוע הלא נכון?
רצתי מייד לקרוא את פוקו ועוד ערימה של מאמרים שפרופ’ יוברט לו-יון רשם לנו בקורס הבלתי נשכח “תכנון ואידיאולוגיה”.  אינני בטוח שהבנתי אותם אז במלואם, אבל הם פתחו לי חלונות לעולם חשוב מאין כמוהו –ניתוח הממשק בין כוח ותכנון — העולם שמעבר לכוונות, מטרות והצהרות אידיאולוגיות מכובסות על העתיד הרצוי.
כעבור כשנה נסענו, מספר סטודנטים, עם לו-יון לישיבת הוועדה המחוזית אליה הוזמן, לאישור תכנית המתאר של מחוז הצפון. באקט מחאתי  לו-יון תקע על המפה הגדולה שעל הקיר עשרות סיכות צבעוניות.
יו”ר הוועדה: “פרופ’ לו-יון, מהן הסיכות האלה?”
יוברט: אלה היישובים הקיימים שהתוכנית מוחקת”
יו”ר: “אני מבקש שתוריד אותן מיד. צריך לקיים כאן דיון מקצועי.”
יוברט: “לא אני צריך להוריד, אלא אתם צריכים לכלול את היישובים בתוכנית…”
הישוב הבדואי דמיידה בגליל שהוכר במסגרת הפעולות שיזמה ‘אגודת הארבעים’ בסיוע לו-יון
++
הפעולות שיזמה ‘אגודת הארבעים’ בסיוע לו-יון, אכן הובילו, יחד עם חילופי שלטון במדינה, להכרה בכפרים. זהו אחד ההישגים המשמעותיים עד היום של חברה אזרחית במערכת התכנון הישראלית.
‘המשקפיים’ שהעניקו לי ניתוחיו של לו-יון, אפשרו לי גם להבין אחרת מאבקים ופרויקטים בהם הייתי מעורב באופן אחר, כמו גם את תפקידו של התכנון כפי שהוא מתקיים ‘בשטח’ ולא בתיאוריות המופשטות.  לימים גם ניסחתי את התובנות החדשות בעבודותיי על ‘הצד האפל’ של התכנון, שסללו דרך – יחד עם מספר עמיתים ביקורתיים – לדיון חדש לגמרי בספרות התכנונית.
המרחב האפל (והמואר?)
מאי 2021: בהרצאה המוקלטת כאן מציע יוברט לו-יון מבט-על על השיח התכנוני של תחילת המאה ה-21. הניתוח מישיר עיניים ‘לדילמות התכנוניות העמוקות’, הכרוכות בהתפוררות לדבריו של המחשבה והמעשה התכנוניים במספר ממדים. ראשית, ‘הסיפור’ האופטימי שמספרים לעצמם המתכננים על תפקידם בחברה הולך ומאבד מאמינותו, הן בעולם הגדול, והן במרחב הישראלי-פלסטיני.
שנית, טוען לו-יון, נסדקת בתקופה האחרונה גם האפיסטמולוגיה הבסיסית, כלומר הדרך לאגור וליישם ידע, של ‘מקצועני המרחב’ (אדריכלים, גיאוגרפים, מעצבים וכו’). אובדנים אלו נובעים מהסנגוריה הברורה של התכנון ‘בשטח’ על מוקדי כוח דכאניים בחברה, כגון הון בינלאומי ומקומי, עליונות אתנו-לאומית, ולאחרונה גם ‘לוחמת משפט’ (lawfare) דרכה פוגעים מוקדי הכוח בזכויות של קבוצות מוחלשות, מיעוטים ופריפריות.2
את הרעיונות האלו של יוברט לו יון אנסה לחבר ‘על קצה המזלג’ להתפתחות המחשבה התכנונית ולאתגרי העתיד של חוקרי ופעילי התכנון, כלומר – האתגרים שלנו. הרעיונות שאציג להלן נכתבו מתוך הערכה עמוקה לתרומתו הראשונית והגדולה של יוברט לו-יון בפיתוח הפרדיגמה הביקורתית בחקר התכנון בארץ בכלל, ולעבודתי בפרט.
המרחב הצודק?
מה המקום החברתי של התכנון העירוני? מעבר להשראה ששאבתי מהתורה שהרביץ בי לו-יון, התפתחה ביננו גם מחלוקת שאלה זו. בעוד לו-יון המשיך להעמיק את הביקורת על תפקידו המבני, הכמעט דטרמיניסטי של התכנון כחלק ממנגנוני הדיכוי בחברה, התובנות שאני פיתחתי במהלך שנת עבודתי סייעו לי להבינו כזירה של מאבק. בזירה זאת, להבנתי, מקצועני המרחב ממלאים תפקיד מרכזי בעיצוב מטרות “אפלות” ו”מוארות”, פרקטיקות וחוקים מרחביים, הנעים גם הם במנעד רחב של תוצאות ממשיות, בין ‘צדדים אפלים’ ל’צדדים מוארים’. המאבק הזה, על תוצאותיו המורכבות, מציפים את השאלה התכנונית החשובה – ‘מהו המרחב הצודק?’ האם זו מטרה? תהליך? מקום? האם וכיצד נוכל להפוך עוולות וסכסוכים מרחביים לתהליך של תיקון חומרי, פוליטי ותהליכי? רבים מהכותבים המרכזיים בספרות התכנונית והאורבנית נדרשו גם הם לדילמה עליה מצביע לו-יון, וכך פיתחו במקביל תובנות משמעותיות לגבי כינונה של ‘העיר הצודקת’.
במשיכות מכחול גסות, ניתן לחלק את התפתחות שיח הצדק המרחבי לארבעה שלבים עיקריים – מבני-מרקסיאני, ליברלי, פוסט קולוניאלי, וניאו-קולוניאלי. סוגי השיח היו דומיננטיים בתקופות מסוימות אם כי גם כיום רוב סוגי השיח מתקיימים במקביל.
שלב ראשון –מרקסיאני. אחרי עשורים ארוכים בהן השיח והמחקר התכנוני לקחו כמובן מאליו את השפעותיו החיוביות של התכנון העירוני על החברה, החל בשנות השבעים והשמונים של המאה הקודמת צמח שיח ביקורתי, שאתגר הנחות אלה. בשלב הראשון התיאוריות המרכזיות בשיח התמקדו בכלכלה הפוליטית, ובעיקר בפרשנות המרקסיאנית, כלומר בכוח העצום ובעוולות הנלוות של הקפיטליזם והנאו-ליברליזם, המייצרים מנגנוני צבירת ההון וההפרטה ואיתם ניצול וריבוד המעמדי, ופערים חברתיים מהגדולים בהיסטוריה.  את השיח הובילו הוגים כמנואל קאסטלס, פיטר מרקוזה, דיוויד הארווי, ויותר מאוחר סוזן פיינסטיין, ג’יימי פק וניל ברנר. תפיסתם לגבי המרחב הצודק הייתי מבנית – ‘הרע הגדול’ הוא הקפיטליזם, והתכנון הנכון מנטרל ככל האפשר את היגיון ההון, הרווח, הפיתוח והגלובליזציה, למען מטרות של חלוקה לפי צרכים, תחת עיקרון העל – שוויון. חברתי
שלב שני–פוסט קולוניאלי. בשנות השמונים והתשעים החל לעלות גל נוסף של כתיבה אשר טען שהעוולות בעיצוב המרכז לא מצטמצמות למנגנוני הקפיטליסטיים, אלא נובעים ‘ממשטר הזהויות’, בו אוכלוסיות מסוימות (בדרך כלל לבנות ופטריארכליות) משתלטות על משאבים וכוח, ורותמות את פיתוח המרחב לטובת האינטרסים שלהן.
היגיון של משטר הזהות המפלים נמשך גם בתקופה הפוסט-קולוניאלית, בקולוניות לשעבר כמו גם במאות מיליוני המהגרים מהדרום והמזרח הגלובאליים לצפון העשיר. חוקרים כגון ליאוני סנדרקוק, אש אמין ואייריס מאריון יאנג הובילו כתיבה חדשה ומאתגרת המתבססת על תורותיהם של הוגים כגון אנטוניו גראמשי, מישל פוקו ואדוארד סעיד.  חוקרים אלה הניפו את דגל ההכרה בזהויות אתניות, תרבותיות, מגדריות ומינית כאופק רצוי לעיצוב המרחב והחברה.  
שלב שלישי – ליברלי. בשלהי המאה ה-20 החל לעלות גל אחר, ליברלי יותר, שחיפש את הנתיב לעיר הצודקת דרך שכלולם של תהליכים דמוקרטיים בעיצוב העיר. הוגים מרכזיים כמו פאטסי הילי, ג’ון פורסטר, ג’ין הילייר או ג’ודי אינס הסיטו את העדשה מהתבוננות בעוולות חומריות או זהותיות. במקום זאת, ובהתבסס על הוגים ליברליים כמו יורגן האברמאס ובנג’מין בארבר, התמקדו בניסיון להשיג ‘צדק תהליכי’, תוך התמקדות באופני קבלת ההחלטות, שיתוף הציבור, עולמם הערכי של המתכננים וחיבורם למסגרות של דמוקרטיה מתדיינת. ‘תהליך נכון יוביל לתוצאות נכונות’, הייתה הנחת העבודה של הוגים אלה, כאשר הדגל המרכזי הוא ‘עיר דמוקרטית’.  עם זאת, נראה שאשליית הדמוקרטיה התכנונית התנפצה שוב ושוב על סלעי המציאות, בה תהליכי הפיתוח הדורסניים ומשטרי הזהויות ידעו לתמרן סביב תהליכים ‘דמוקרטיים’ כדי להשיג את מטרותיהן.
שלב רביעי – נאו-קולוניאלי: מציאות עיקשת זו של פערים, עוולות, אלימות ועקירות, חלקן הגדול בחסות מערכת התכנון המרחבי, הובילה לגל רביעי של כתיבה ביקורתית  בעשור האחרון המגיעה בעיקר מהשוליים המתרחבים של הדיון התכנוני. תוך התנגדות לדומיננטיות ארוכת השנים של תיאוריות אוניברסליות כביכול המגיעות מהאקדמיה הדומיננטית של הצפון-מערב הגלובאלי. קולות אלה, הכוללים הוגים כמו וונסה וואטסון, אנאניה רוי, ליבי פורטר, אדגר פיטרסה או טרזה קלדירה, הממקמים את נקודת המבט שלהם בפריפריה הגלובלית, ומדגישים את שיבתם של מצבים קולוניאליים של הדרה, מהותנות, הפרדה וניצול, כגורמים מרכזיים בעיצוב העיר במאה ה-21.
בתהליך זה, דפוסים של  ‘נפרד ולא שווה’ שאפיינו חברות קולוניאליות וגזעניות בעבר עוברים עיור ולאחרונה גם דיגיטציה, ומעצבים מחדש את האזרחות, המרחב והחברה האנושית. תהליכים אלה הרחיבו את ‘המרחב האפור’  — מצב של קיום לימינאלי בין החוקי לנפשע, בין המוכר לשקוף — בו מתגוררים כיום למעלה ממיליארד איש בערי העולם בפאבלות או גטאות למיניהן, כאשר הם אינם מוכללים בעיר ובשירותיה באופן מלא, אך גם לא מגורשים ממנה.  
ירושלים, דובאי או ערי הענק של דרום אמריקה, אפריקה, סין והודו מציגות אופנים שונים לחזרתם של דפוסים קולוניאליים לעיר העכשווית, המשיתה דפוסים של ‘אפרטהייד תכנוני’ על תושביה ומעמידה אותם בסכנה נמשכת של דחיקה ועקירה. הדגל המרכזי המונף על-ידי הוגים אלה כדי להפוך את העוול לצדק, הוא לדמיין וליישם ממדים שונים של ‘דה-קולוניזציה’ בעיר העכשווית. כלומר, לדמיין שינוי עומק רב-ממדי  (חומרי, פוליטי, זהותי, מגדרי) בו מתבטלים דפוסי העליונות המובנית של אוכלוסיות פריווילגיות ומשאבי החברה מתחלקים מחדש באופן הוגן.  
הסלאמס של דובאי רחוקים מדימוי וחיי היוקרה של העיר (Sam Litvin, Flickr)בדובאי מתהווה ‘אפרטהייד תכנוני’ (Christopher, Flickr)
המרחב העתידי – להאיר את השקוף?
כיצד מחברים את הדילמה עליה מצביע לו-יון עם הידע הרב שהצטבר על העיר הצודקת? כיצד קושרים את הניתוח המבני עם המאבק להפוך דיכוי וניצול לשחרור ושוויון? האם המלחמה המשפטית והתכנונית בעקרונות הצדק עליה מצביע לו-יון מחויבת המציאות? האם בישראל/פלסטין הצד האפל של התכנון בהכרח גובר על צדדיו האחרים?
לטעמי, הידע הרב שהצטבר על רצף העוול-צדק המרחביים מציע מוצא מהדילמה –  סנכרון הידע התכנוני  – התאורטי והמקצועי —  עם המאבק לכינונו של מרחב צודק. אם כך, המוצא מהדילמה מחייב את המתכננים ‘לבחור צד’ ולקדם את המטרה העליונה לשמה נוצר התכנון כהתערבות ציבורית במרחב  – שיפור, קידום, שגשוג וייצוב המרחב האנושי. כלומר, הפיכת המרחב השקוף של דמיידה אותו פגשנו בתחילת החיבור, למרחב מואר ונוכח.
אכן, המרחב הישראלי/פלסטיני, כפי שמציין לו-יון בהרצאתו, מלא בעוולות מרחביות, על בסיס כלכלי, אידיאולוגי וזהותי, שנוצרו בידי מדיניות תכנון, קרקע והתיישבות מייהדת של חלקים גדולים מהמרחב הפלסטיני. דפוסים אלה בולטים גם בערים הדו-לאומיות בישראל – במיוחד יפו, לוד ועכו, שהפכו ל’אזור ספר’ חדש בשנים האחרונות במעשה הייהוד, והתפרצו באלימות בשבועות האחרונים.
אך באותו מרחב ישראלי/פלסטיני מתקיימים מהלכים כמו תכנית ‘אגודת ה-40′, תכנית אותה הוביל לו-יון ושסייעה בהכרה בכל הכפרים שהוגדרו כ’לא חוקיים’ בגליל. כך גם ‘תוכנית האב לכפרים הלא מוכרים בנגב‘, בהכנתה הייתי שותף לפני מספר שנים, והיא עדיין מהווה דגל במאבקם של עשרות אלפי אזרחים להכרה תכנונית. מהלכים אלה מעידים על פוטנציאל מתמשך לגלות, לחזק ולהרחיב את ‘הצד המואר’ והצודק של התכנון. תפיסה זו מנוסחת בהרחבה בעבודות בהן השתתפתי לאחרונה עם החוקרים.ות ארז צפדיה, אחמד אמארה, סנדי קדר,  נופר אבני, רני מנדלבאום והודא אבו-זייד.3
אין בקריאה זו המלצה לקידום מודל אוניברסלי של מרחב צודק, אלא שאיפה להטיית חרטום הספינה משיוט כביכול ניטרלי, רציונלי ואובייקטיבי בין מוקדי הכוח (כפי שרוב המתכננים מייצגים את כוונותיהם כיום), אל עבר המים הלא שקטים והעמוקים של קידום העיר הצודקת. שיוט זה איננו קל, והדיון בשאלה ‘מהו צדק מרחבי’ יוביל בוודאי לסערות לא מעטות, אך הוא גם ינווט את ההגות והעשייה התכנונית בכיוון הנכון – מוסרית ופרגמטית. זאת כיוון שמרחבים המקובלים על יושביהם כצודקים יותר, נוטים להיות יציבים ומשגשגים. כך יהיה ברור יותר גם לעוסקים ולעוסקות בעיצוב המרחב מהי כוונתו החברתית של התכנון. הפער הבלתי נסבל אותו חשף בפניי יוברט לו-יון בעבודותיו לאורך השנים, צריך להזכיר לנו כי לתכנון תפקיד ברור מוסרי, ולכן פוליטי – לנווט את המרחב האנושי מהצד האפל לעבר הצד המואר, בתוך עולם מורכב, כפי שמנסחות בדייקנות מילותיו של המשורר —  
לילה
אלי אליהו
אנחנו כעת על חציו האפל
של הכוכב, בִיתי. ואולי בכול זאת
אפשר לומר דבר על העולם –
חציו אפל וחציו מואר.
גם האדם, בִיתי,
כך גם האדם.
 —————————–1. שחזור מזיכרון אישי 2. לרשימה של פרופ’ ארז צפדיה שמרחיבה את הרעיון של לו יון על התכנון כלוחמת משפט ↩ עבודות אלה מוצגות בין היתר בספרי – יפתחאל, א. 2021. עוצמה ואדמה: מאתנוקרטיה לאפרטהייד זוחל בישראל/פלסטין’, תל-אביב: רסלינג.
3. עבודות אלה מוצגות בין היתר בספרי – יפתחאל, א. 2021. עוצמה ואדמה: מאתנוקרטיה לאפרטהייד זוחל בישראל/פלסטין’, תל-אביב: רסלינג.

אורן יפתחאלמלמד גיאוגרפיה פוליטית, תכנון עירוני ומדיניות ציבורית באוניברסיטת בן-גוריון בנגב, באר שבע. עומד בראש הקתדרה ללימודים עירוניים, ובראש המחלקה ללימודים רב-תחומיים. מחקריו עוסקים בקשר בין זהות, כוח ומרחב, ובהשלכותיהם החברתיות של תיכנון, התיישבות ופיתוח וכמו כן בהשוואה בינלאומית של ערים ומשטרים, תוך התמקדות בישראל/פלסטין

בסיוע מועצת הפיס לתרבות ולאמנות המעבדה לעיצוב עירוני, החוג לגאוגרפיה וסביבת האדם. אוניברסיטת תל אביב Urbanologia by LCUD is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License

13.01.22

Editorial Note 

Dr. Ahmed El Hady, an Egyptian postdoctoral fellow of Neuroscience at Princeton University, has lectured last week on Zoom to the Edmond and Lily Safra Center for Brain Sciences (ELSC) at the Hebrew University. The lecture was titled “Functional ultrasound imaging during behavior,” explaining that “Functional ultrasound imaging (fUSi) is an emerging technique that allows us to measure neural activity from medial frontal regions down to subcortical structures up to a depth of 20 mm.”  

However, the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) used the opportunity to harass Dr. El-Hady and urged him not to participate in the lecture.  PACBI was notified of the lecture by Palestinian students at the Hebrew University. PACBI wrote, “We echo the call from Palestinian students at Hebrew University urgently requesting that you cancel your participation in the ‘ELSC Seminar Series’ this Thursday. As the student activists noted, Israeli universities, including Hebrew University, have long played a willing and active role in planning, implementing and justifying Israel’s decades-old regime of occupation, settler-colonialism and apartheid.”  

Worth noting that in this case, the BDS efforts failed. Elhady has also collaborated with the Hebrew University scientists before. In 2014, El Hady, then at the Max Planck Campus, Göttingen, Germany, co-organized a workshop named “NeuroBridges,” aimed to “serve as a bridge between experimental and theoretical neuroscientists addressing system-level questions.” By holding such workshops, they were seeking to establish many new collaborations. He and his co-organizers wrote of NeuroBridges, that “we believe that scientists have a responsibility, which goes beyond their own research. Scientists should promote common understanding between people from different nations. Therefore, the workshop will bring together Israeli, German and Arab scientists.”  Furthermore, they wrote, “We believe that such scientific collaborations can lead to personal relations, and in the long run may alleviate the political distress between Arabs and Israelis. We foresee this event as the first workshop in an annual tradition aimed at fostering scientific collaborations between Israeli and Arab neuroscientists.” His Israeli co-organizer was Yonatan Loewenstein from the Hebrew University. 

In September 2015, the following year, the academic journal Science reported an event that twenty neuroscientists from Israel and the Arab world gathered for dinner at a Left Bank bistro in Paris. The scientists assembled at the Paris Descartes University for a 3-day meeting that sought to foster relationships across the political and religious divide in the Middle East as part of NeuroBridges. It grew from the friendship between El Hady and his Israeli colleague Loewenstein of the ELSC at the Hebrew University.

After they met in Germany, Loewenstein invited El Hady to an ELSC retreat in Ein Gedi, an oasis near the Dead Sea in Israel. During a hike in the area, they agreed that “science could bring more researchers together, both professionally and personally.” 

However, most of the Arab participants, like El Hady, live in Western countries, to which El Hady said, “The mood in most Arab countries is fervently anti-Israel, and scientists there could face a political price for attending NeuroBridges.” Adding that since “Academics are the most reasonable people… If we cut off contact with them, we lose the last resort.”

Worth noting that Palestinian scientists refused to participate in NeuroBridges. 

Although Palestinian students in Israel, like all other Israeli students, have the right to academic freedom, advocating for BDS is illegal under the 2011 Israeli Boycott Law, which the Knesset enacted:

“Bill for prevention of damage to the State of Israel through boycott – 2011,” defines that “1. In this law, “boycott of the State of Israel” – deliberate avoidance of economic, cultural or academic ties with a person or other party, solely for reason of his/her/its relation to the state of Israel, to any of its institutions or to any area under its control, which could cause them economic, cultural or academic harm. Boycott – a civil wrong 2. (a) Anyone who publishes a public call for a boycott of the state of Israel, and its content and circumstances may reasonably be expected to lead to a boycott, and the publisher is aware of this possibility – is committing a civil wrong and the Law of Tort [new version] shall apply to him/her.”

The Hebrew University should be aware of the BDS action of its students. 

Clearly, the academy is the most active arena for delegitimizing Israel, and the Israeli academic authorities should help fight the delegitimization. 

As for the Palestinians, by boycotting all things Israeli, they cut themselves off the thriving global academic community in which Israel has a prominent role.

References:

https://elsc.huji.ac.il/events-and-outreach/elsc-seminars/elsc-seminar-series/functional-ultrasound-imaging-during-behavior/

ELSC Seminar Series

Home » ELSC Seminar Series » Functional ultrasound imaging during behavior

Dr. Ahmed El-Hady

Princeton University
Princeton Neuroscience Institute

Functional ultrasound imaging during behavior

The dream of a systems neuroscientist is to be able to unravel neural mechanisms that give rise to behavior. It is increasingly appreciated that behavior involves the concerted distributed activity of multiple brain regions so the focus on single or few brain areas might hinder our understanding. There have been quite a few technological advancements in this domain. Functional ultrasound imaging (fUSi) is an emerging technique that allows us to measure neural activity from medial frontal regions down to subcortical structures up to a depth of 20 mm. It is a method for imaging transient changes in cerebral blood volume (CBV), which are proportional to neural activity changes. It has excellent spatial resolution (~100 μm X 100 μm X 400 μm); its temporal resolution can go down to 100 milliseconds. In this talk, I will present its use in two model systems:  marmoset monkeys and rats. In marmoset monkeys, we used it to delineate a social – vocal network involved in vocal communication while in rats, we used it to gain insights into brain wide networks involved in evidence accumulation based decision making. fUSi has the potential to provide an unprecedented access to brain wide dynamics in freely moving animals performing complex behavioral tasks.

Seminar Date & Time:

January 6th, 202214:30 (IST)Notifications and Zoom links are sent to ELSC seminar mailing list, subscribe here.
Providing full name is mandatory for joining Zoom. 

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https://bdsmovement.net/news/palestinians-urge-dr-ahmed-el-hady-withdraw-from-hebrew-university-seminar
Palestinians Urge Dr. Ahmed El-Hady to Withdraw from Hebrew University Seminar January 5, 2022 / By Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) /

Following the letter from Palestinian Students at Hebrew University, the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) urges Dr. El-Hady not to participate in event at complicit Israeli university partially built on stolen Palestinian land in occupied East Jerusalem.

Dear Dr. Ahmed El-Hady,

We are writing from the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI), a founding member of the Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) National Committee, the largest coalition in Palestinian civil society. 

We echo the call from Palestinian students at Hebrew University urgently requesting that you cancel your participation in the “ELSC Seminar Series” this Thursday.

As the student activists noted, Israeli universities, including Hebrew University, have long played a willing and active role in planning, implementing and justifying Israel’s decades-old regime of occupation, settler-colonialism and apartheid. 

Hebrew University is partially built on stolen Palestinian  land in occupied East Jerusalem, in violation of international law. The university has joined legal actions to forcibly displace Palestinians to allow for campus expansion.

Hebrew University also hosts the Israeli military’s Havatzalot program, effectively a military base on campus that includes combat training. 

Hebrew University has also hosted recruitment events for Shin Bet, Israel’s notorious domestic intelligence agency. Shin Bet has been condemned by the UN Committee Against Torture over its use of violent interrogation tactics on Palestinians. 

The Israeli organization Academia for Equality has documented Hebrew University’s active cooperation with Israeli occupation forces subjecting residents of the adjoining Palestinian neighborhood of Issawiya in occupied East Jerusalem to “unrelenting and unfathomable police brutality,” including lending its rooftops to Israeli police for mass surveillance of Palestinians.  

As you may know, in 2021, Human Rights Watch and Israel’s leading human rights organization B’Tselem issued separate reports condemning Israel as an apartheid state against the entire Palestinian people. Israeli universities, including Hebrew University, are a crucial part of Israel’s apartheid apparatus.

Regardless of your intentions, participating in the ELSC Seminar Series at Hebrew University would help whitewash Israel’s apartheid regime and its grave violations of international law, including war crimes, gradual ethnic cleansing, home demolitions, expanding settlement enterprise, and administrative detention of political prisoners. 

At a time when academics and academic associations worldwide are increasingly refraining from any engagement with Israel’s universities, including Hebrew University, for their deep, decades-long complicity in apartheid and settler-colonialism, we ask you not to be a part of the ongoing normalization of these complicit institutions. We call on you to urgently withdraw from this seminar series.

Sincerely,

Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI)

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https://www.facebook.com/A4PConcordia/posts/1528313957548961

Academics for Palestine – Concordia

5 January at 17:42  · 

Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) Movement

5 January at 17:18 

We echo the call from Palestinian students urging Dr. Ahmed El Hady to withdraw from Hebrew University seminar series.Hebrew University is partially built on stolen Palestinian land in occupied East Jerusalem, hosts an Israeli military base on campus and actively cooperates with Israeli forces oppressing Palestinians. Regardless of intentions, participating in the seminar series at Hebrew University would help whitewash Israel’s apartheid regime and its grave violations of international law, including war crimes, gradual ethnic cleansing, home demolitions, expanding settlement enterprise, and administrative detention of political prisoners. https://loom.ly/d0Dddsk
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https://pni.princeton.edu/news/pni-postdoc-ahmed-el-hadys-neurobridges-program-brings-arab-and-israeli-neuroscientists-together

PostedJun 032016

PNI Postdoc Ahmed El Hady’s “NeuroBridges” program brings Arab and Israeli neuroscientists together

NeuroBridges is a series of meetings that brings together brain scientists from Israel and the Arab world in hopes of fostering relationships across the political and religious fault lines that divide the Middle East. It grew from the friendship between Ahmed El Hady, an Egyptian neuroscientist at Princeton University, and his Israeli colleague Yonatan Loewenstein of the Edmond & Lily Safra Center for Brain Sciences at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Science sat in on the second NeuroBridges meeting, held in September 2015 in Paris, where discussions about the Middle East were animated but the mood was friendly. 

=================================================================

https://www.science.org/doi/full/10.1126/science.352.6290.1161

Gatherings aim to bridge a wide divide

MARTIN ENSERINKSCIENCE • 3 Jun 2016 • Vol 352, Issue 6290 • p. 1161

When 20 neuroscientists from Israel and the Arab world gathered for dinner at a Left
Bank bistro here in September 2015, it didn’t take long for the conversation to turn
from duck breast to the Middle East—and for the temperature to rise. The researchers,
including two Palestinians, bickered over the Iran nuclear deal, the war in Syria,
and, of course, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “The two-state solution is dead!” one
Arab scientist argued. “We need to think about a one-state model.” “That will never
work!” an Israeli colleague shot back. As the evening wore on, the debates got more
animated and louder.
The scientists didn’t solve any problems that night, but at least they were talking—
and that was the point.
They had assembled at Paris Descartes University for a 3-day meeting that sought
to foster relationships across the political and religious fault lines dividing the
Middle East. NeuroBridges, as it’s called, is one of several science diplomacy efforts
focused on the region; the most ambitious is SESAME, a synchrotron light source
in Jordan expected to come online in 2017 that involves nine unlikely bedfellows,
including Turkey, Israel, the Palestinian National Authority, Iran, and Pakistan.
NeuroBridges grew from the friendship between Ahmed El Hady, an Egyptian
neuroscientist at Princeton University, and his Israeli colleague Yonatan
Loewenstein of the Edmond & Lily Safra Center for
Brain Sciences (ELSC) at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem. After they met in Germany, Loewenstein
invited El Hady to an ELSC retreat in Ein Gedi, an
oasis near the Dead Sea in Israel. During a hike, the
duo agreed that science could bring more researchers
together, both professionally and personally. The
first NeuroBridges, later that year at the University
of Göttingen in Germany, came at an awkward time:
3 weeks into the 2014 Gaza war.
Science sat in on the 2015 successor, in a monumental Parisian university hall
adorned with tapestries woven for King Louis XIV. After an unusual preamble describing
their own geographical, religious, or political background, attendees presented
their work, which spanned a range of neuroscience areas. The mood was friendly.
“We really need opportunities for dialogue like this,” says Mehdi Khamassi, a
French-Tunisian researcher at the Pierre and Marie Curie University in Paris, who
noted that relations between Arabs and Jews in France have deteriorated rapidly:
“We seem to have imported the conflict from the Middle East.” (The meeting took
place 2 months before the 13 November 2015 terrorist attacks here.)
Like El Hady, almost all of the Arab participants live and work in Western countries.
The mood in most Arab countries is fervently anti-Israel, and scientists there
could face a political price for attending NeuroBridges, El Hady says. Mohammad
Herzallah, who heads the Palestinian Neuroscience Initiative, has declined an
invitation twice (see main story, p. 1158).
Critics of Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian Territories say that meetings
like NeuroBridges fail to address the root issue. A mostly scientific meeting that
doesn’t focus on problems faced by Palestinian academics contributes to the
“normalization” of the occupation, says Jonathan Rosenhead, chair of the British
Committee for the Universities of Palestine in London and an advocate of an
academic boycott of Israel. El Hady disagrees. “Academics are the most reasonable
people,” he says. “If we cut off contact with them, we lose the last resort.”
This year’s NeuroBridges will be at a chateau in Burgundy, France, in September.
To reach a wider and younger audience, it will be a 10-day summer school in
computational neuroscience. Can such meetings bring peace in the Middle East
any closer? “To be honest, this is not a question that concerns me very much,”
Loewenstein says after a very long pause. “The question I ask myself is what I can
personally do to improve the situation.” 

===========================================
https://elsc.huji.ac.il/events-and-outreach/conferences/neurobridges-2014/

NeuroBridges 2014

Where

The Max Planck Campus, Göttingen, Germany, July 29-31 2014

Organizers:
Ahmed El Hady (Max Planck Institute)
Tim Gollisch (Göttingen University)
Yonatan Loewenstein (Hebrew University)

The goal of this workshop is to serve as a bridge between experimental and theoretical neuroscientists addressing system-level questions with the hope of establishing as many as possible new collaborations.

In addition to the scientific exchange goal, we believe that scientists have a responsibility, which goes beyond their own research. Scientists should promote common understanding between people from different nations. Therefore, the workshop will bring together Israeli, German and Arab scientists. We believe that such scientific collaborations can lead to personal relations, and in the long run may alleviate the political distress between Arabs and Israelis.

We foresee this event as the first workshop in an annual tradition aimed at fostering scientific collaborations between Israeli and Arab neuroscientists.
Lectures are open for the public and there is no registration fee but space is limited. Therefore, those planning to attend are kindly requested to send an email to inform the local organizer Ahmed El Hady (aelhady1 at gwdg.de).

Program (PDF)
For more information: aelhady1 at gwdg.de, yonatan at huji.ac.il

https://bio.huji.ac.il/yonatanLab/newsite/site.html

05.01.22

Editorial Note

The Israel Prize Committee has petitioned the High Court the second time requesting to award the Israel Prize to Professor Oded Goldreich.  The Supreme Court held the hearing on January 4, 2022, under the new Judge, Daphne Barak-Erez, who decided to schedule a hearing on this issue on February 15, 2022.

The Israel Prize is highly prestigious.  As its homepage states: “The winners of the Israel Prize have placed a faithful stake in their work and achievements and set very high norms, a model for identification and a source of pride for all of us…”

In 2010, the Israeli State Comptroller examined the procedure of granting the award in the Annual Report.  He noted that the Israel Prize had been awarded since 1953 every year on Independence Day by the Minister of Education to “individuals who have shown special excellence and achieved remarkable results. Over the years, the award has received a national status that expresses the state’s appreciation and respect for Israeli citizens and institutions, who, in their activities in various fields, have made important contributions to society and the state.” The State Comptroller explained that the Ministry of Education is responsible for the procedures for the prize to be awarded. “The purpose of the award upon its establishment was to encourage and strengthen the hands of scholars, writers, and artists, who reside and work in Israel. The award is given in humanities and social sciences, Jewish studies, life sciences, exact sciences, arts, and culture.” The State Comptroller office examined the procedures, focusing on the administrative side of the award and not on the selection of winners or their eligibility for the award.  

Interestingly, the Comptroller found cases of conflict of interests. For example, “For about two and a half years prior to his election to the position of counsel, Adv. [Nahum] Langenthal provided salaried consulting services to ‘The Israel Democracy Institute.’ It was revealed that before awarding the prize in 2007, Adv. Langenthal and others recommended the Institute with its president as candidates for the Israel Prize for Lifetime Achievement, but the Institute did not win the prize. Ahead of the award ceremony in 2009, the Institute was again nominated for the Lifetime Achievement Award. Advocate Langenthal selected the judging panel and later participated as an observer. The committee decided to award the Institute the Lifetime Achievement Award.”

The number of scandals relating to the Israel Prize has been high throughout the years, as detailed by the Hebrew press. 

To recall, the Award Committee insisted on Goldreich even after the then Minister of Education, Yoav Gallant, raised concerns over Goldreich signing the petition that called for the European Union to refuse funding to Ariel University.

The Award Committee then petitioned the Supreme Court the first time.  Gallant’s response during the Supreme Court hearing was that “The situation in which Prof. Goldreich will receive, on the one hand, from the state the most prestigious award for contribution to the Israeli society, while on the other hand, he is promoting the affairs of a [BDS] movement that undermines the very existence of that state, is absurd and unacceptable.”

The Supreme Court stated that the petition Goldreich signed, regarding Ariel University, raises a certain difficulty, in light of the definition in section 1 of the Boycott Law, which states: “’Boycott of the State of Israel’ – intentional avoidance of economic, cultural or academic contact with a person or other entity, only because of its affiliation with the State of Israel, its institutions or an area under its control, which could harm it economically, culturally or academically.” 

The Supreme Court Judge stated that “the Boycott Law imposes tort liability and denies certain administrative benefits as specified in the law. I am correct in assuming that a call for a boycott of the State of Israel or a boycott of academia in the State of Israel, especially from the mouths of those whose prestige and achievements grew in the academy in Israel, may fall within the extreme and exceptional cases of “external” consideration. This is because it is hard to grasp that an Israeli academic, who works within the framework of the Israeli academy and enjoys its protection, will participate in the call for a boycott of the academy in Israel. Such a situation is absurd and difficult to imagine.” 

However, the Supreme Court Judge noted that Prof. Goldreich has “repeatedly stated that he does not support the BDS movement.” 

The Supreme Court Judge stated that Prof. Goldreich submitted a response stating that he: “Respects the Israel Prize and feels great pride that the Professional Committee of Judges for the Israel Prize chose him to win the prize for his contribution to the study of computer science for the year 2021[…] In the framework to defend from the defamations by the Minister, respondent five also explained he does not support the BDS movement, however, it will be immediately clarified that the respondent does not believe that his politics and political opinions, including the question of his attitude to this movement, have any relevance to the question of whether he is eligible for the Israel Prize or not. The clarification was made in light of the many articles published and because the Minister attributed to him without clarifying with him that these are not his positions, and these attributions were also published in public.”

In the end, the three Supreme Court Judges ruled in August: “Therefore, it was unanimously decided to cancel the decision of the Minister of Education to reject the recommendation of the Israel Prize Committee to award Prof. Goldreich the prize for the year 2021 in the field of mathematics and computer science research. It was also decided on the opinion of Justices N. Solberg and Y. Wilner, against the dissenting opinion of Justice Y. Amit, to return the examination of the Committee’s recommendation to the Minister of Education in order to reconsider whether to approve this recommendation.” 

In other words, the Supreme Court canceled Gallant’s decision to withdraw the candidacy of Goldreich and ordered the new Minister of Education, Yifat Shasha-Biton, to decide on this issue.  

Shasha-Biton affirmed Gallant’s decision and canceled Goldreich’s candidacy. 

As a result, the Award Committee petitioned the Supreme Court the second time. Stay tuned.

References:

https://news.walla.co.il/item/3473113
  שופטי פרס ישראל עתרו לבג”ץ נגד שרת החינוך: “מניעת הפרס מגולדרייך לא סבירה”

חברי ועדת השופטים להענקת פרס ישראל במתמטיקה ומדעי המחשב, שהמליצה להעניק את הפרס לגולדרייך, טוענים כי החלטתה של שאשא-ביטון שלא להעניק לו את הפרס בגלל תימכתו בחרם על אוניברסיטת אריאל “נגועה בשיקולים זרים”. שרת החינוך: “הוא לא יכול לקבל את הפרס”

סוניה גורודיסקי
24/11/2021

ועדת השופטים להענקת פרס ישראל במתמטיקה ומדעי המחשב עתרה היום (רביעי) לבג”ץ נגד החלטת שרת החינוך יפעת שאשא ביטון שלא להעניק את הפרס לפרופ’ עודד גולדרייך, שקרא בעבר לחרם על אוניברסיטת אריאל. נציגי שופטי ועדת הפרס האשימו בעתירה כי החלטת השרה נגועה “בשיקולים זרים וחוסר סבירות קיצוני”, וכי על כן “עומדת לפנינו עילה ברורה להתערבות החלטת השרה”.

שאשא ביטון הכריזה על החלטתה החוזרת בשבוע שעבר, ובכך הותירה על כנה את החלטתו של שר החינוך הקודם, יואב גלנט. היום היא הבהירה כי היא עומדת מאחורי ההחלטה. “אני בטוחה שבג”ץ ידחה על הסף כל עתירה נגד הכרעתי. בג”ץ העביר לידיי את ההחלטה, ואני מצפה שיכבד אותה. מי שקורא להחרים מוסד חינוכי ישראלי פוגע בחופש הביטוי והיצירה, ולא יכול לקבל את פרס ישראל”, נמסר מטעם שרת החינוך.

שאשא ביטון החליטה לא להעניק את פרס ישראל לפרופסור גולדרייך

ראשית הפרשה במרץ האחרון, אז החליטה ועדת פרס ישראל להעניק לגולדרייך את הפרס, על פועלו בנושא סיבוכיות חישובית. לאחר שגלנט גילה שגולדרייך חתום על פנייה לפרלמנט הגרמני לבטל את ההכרה בתנועת ה-BDS כתנועה אנטישמית, לצד חתימה על עצומה הקוראת להחרים את אוניברסיטת אריאל, הוא פנה לוועדת הפרס בבקשה לבחון מחדש את הענקתו.

בעקבות זאת, הוועדה עתרה לבג”ץ, ובהחלטת ביניים אישר בית המשפט לשר לבדוק תוך 30 ימים האם עמדותיו של פרופ’ גולדרייך מנוגדות לחוק למניעת פגיעה במדינה באמצעות חרם ולכן מצדיקות שלא לאשר את המלצת הוועדה. בחודש יולי הודיעה השרה שאשא-ביטון כי לא תהפוך את החלטת קודמה בתפקיד. לאחר הודעה זו כתב היועץ המשפטי לממשלה בחוות דעתו לבג”ץ כי ההחלטה לשלול את הפרס לא עומדת במבחן משפטי.

באוגוסט ביטלו שופטי בג”ץ את החלטת גלנט למנוע מגולדרייך את הפרס בעקבות חתימתו על עצומה הקוראת להחרים את אוניברסיטת אריאל, והשופטים הורו להחזיר את ההחלטה לשרה הנוכחית שאשא ביטון – שבשבוע שעבר הודיעה פעם נוספת כי לא תהפוך את ההחלטה.

“חתימתו של פרופ’ גולדרייך על העצומה הקוראת להחרים מוסד אקדמי ישראלי מהווה מקרה חריג המצדיק את הבחירה שלא להעניק למועמד את הפרס, על אף הישגיו המקצועיים הבולטים והמרשימים בתחום מחקרו”, כתבה השרה שאשא ביטון בשבוע שעבר. “כשרת החינוך ויו”ר המל”ג, אינני יכולה להעניק את פרס ישראל על הישגים אקדמיים, מרשימים ככל שיהיו, למי שקורא לחרם על מוסד אקדמי ישראלי”.

“הלכה למעשה, פרופ’ גולדרייך כאקדמאי מן השורה הראשונה, שצמח באקדמיה בישראל ונהנה מחסותה וממשאביה, ניסה למנוע קשרים אקדמיים וכלכליים, ממוסד ציבורי – אוניברסיטת אריאל – רק מחמת מיקומו הגיאוגרפי. קריאה זו לחרם על מוסד אקדמי ישראלי עולה לשיטתי כדי נסיבה ‘חיצונית’ חריגה המצדיקה לשלול ממנו את קבלת הפרס היוקרתי”, כתבה השרה בהחלטתה.

לדבריה, “בהקשר זה חשוב להדגיש, כי מטרתו של פרס ישראל לעודד יצירה ישראלית, מצוינות ומחקר. קריאה לחרם על מוסדות אקדמיים בישראל, חותרת תחת מטרה זו, שכן היא מבקשת לגדוע את היצירה, המגוון וחופש הדעות. חרם אקדמי מבקש לקבע עמדות מסוימות, ולשלול אחרות. שלילת הפרס ממי שמבקש לפגוע בחופש הדעות, מגנה למעשה על תכליותיו ומטרותיו של פרס ישראל, מגנה על האפשרות ליצור ולחדש. הענקת פרס ישראל למי שמבקש לחבל ולפגוע בעידוד היצירה והמחקר הישראלי, תחתור תחת התכליות שבהענקת הפרס. אבסורד כזה לא ניתן לקבל”.

===================================================  

https://www.makorrishon.co.il/news/439177/
היועמ”ש: לפסול את החלטת שרת החינוך לא להעניק את הפרס לפרופ’ גולדרייך

היועץ המשפטי לממשלה אביחי מנדלבליט הודיע לבג”ץ כי לעמדתו, החלטת שרת החינוך שאשא ביטון שלא להעניק לפרופסור שתמך בחרם על אונ’ אריאל אינה עומדת מבחינה משפטית

מאת   אילת כהנא  כ״ג בטבת ה׳תשפ״ב (27/12/2021 18:29) בתוך חדשות

היועץ המשפטי לממשלה ד”ר אביחי מנדלבליט השיב היום (ב’) לבג”צ בעתירה נגד החלטת שרת החינוך יפעת שאשא ביטון, שלא להעניק את פרס ישראל לפרופ’ גולדרייך, שקרא לחרם על אוניברסיטת אריאל.

בתשובתו, כתב היועץ כי “החלטת שרת החינוך לדחות את המלצתה של ועדת השופטים להעניק את פרס ישראל בתחום חקר המתמטיקה, חקר מדעי המחשב לפרופ’ גולדרייך, אינה נתמכת בתשתית הראייתית הדרושה לשם כך, בהתאם לאמות המידה המחמירות שקבע בית משפט נכבד זה, לעניין התחשבות בשיקולים “חיצוניים”.

לפיכך, המשיך היועמ”ש בתשובתו, “החלטה זו אינה יכולה אפוא לעמוד מבחינה משפטית, ויש מקום ליתן סעד שיורה על אישור המלצתה של ועדת השופטים, כך שפרס ישראל יוענק לרפו’ גולדרייך, כפי שקבעה ועדת השופטים המקצועית”. היועמ”ש הזכיר את הצהרהת המדינה במסגרת עתירה קודמת בנושא, כי ככל שיוחלט לבסוף להעניק לפרופסור את הפרס גם אם בעקבות הכרעה שיפוטית- הפרס יוענק לו בטקס פרסי ישראל הקרוב, או במועד לפני כן, לפי בחירתו של הפרופסור.

השרה שאשא ביטון מסרה בתגובה לתשובת היועץ, “משום שבית המשפט בחר להעביר אליי את ההכרעה, אני מקווה שיכבד את הכרעתי. נימקתי את עמדתי בצורה ברורה: מי שקורא להחרים מוסד אקדמי בישראל אינו ראוי לפרס ישראל על הישגים אקדמיים”.

סערת הפרס לפרופסור גולדרייך נמצאת כבר תקופה ארוכה במחלוקת. לאחר ששר החינוך לשעבר, ח”כ יואב גלנט, החליט שפרופסור גולדרייך לא יקבל את הפרס, שופטי בית המשפט העליון, יצחק עמית, נועם סולברג ויעל וילנר החליטו פה אחד לבטל את ההחלטה של גלנט. השופטים קבעו כי יש להחזיר את ההחלטה לשולחנה של שרת החינוך יפעת שאשא ביטון, וזאת בניגוד לעמדת ראש ההרכב, השופט עמית, אשר סבר כי יש להורות למדינה להעניק את הפרס לפרופ’ גולדרייך.

שרת החינוך הודיעה כי לא תעניק לו את הפרס למרות המלצת הוועדה ועתירה נוספת הוגשה נגד החלטה זו.

פרופ’ גולדרייך חתם בעברו על מספר עצומות “בעייתיות” שעוררו את השר גלנט לשקול למנוע ממנו את הפרס. על האחרונה שבהן חתם גולדרייך בחודש ינואר האחרון, והיא כוללת קריאה לאיחוד האירופי להפסיק שיתופי פעולה עם אוניברסיטת אריאל. פרופ’ גולדרייך הצהיר באמצעות בא כוחו כי הוא עומד מאחורי חתימתו, אך מנגד הבהיר כי אינו תומך בתנועת ה-BDS. זאת, אגב, למרות שחתם רק בשנת 2019 על עצומה הקוראת לפרלמנט הגרמני לבטל את ההכרה בתנועת ה-BDS כתנועה אנטישמית.

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https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts21760080a13&fileName=21080760.A13&type=2

בבית המשפט העליון

בג”ץ 8076/21

לפני:

כבוד השופטת ד’ ברק-ארז

העותרת:

ועדת השופטים להענקת פרס ישראל לשנת תשפ”א בתחום חקר מדעי המחשב

נ  ג  ד

המשיבים:	1. שרת החינוך
	2. הממונה על פרס ישראל, משרד החינוך
	3. יועץ השרה לעניין פרס ישראל
	4. היועץ המשפטי לממשלה
	5. פרופ’ עודד גולדרייך

עתירה למתן צו על-תנאי

בשם העותרת:                        עו”ד גלעד ברנע

בשם המשיבים 4-1:                עו”ד ענר הלמן, עו”ד יונתן נד”ב, עו”ד אבי טוויג

בשם המשיב 5:                      עו”ד מיכאל ספרד, עו”ד אלי שבילי

החלטה

           העתירה תיקבע לדיון בפני הרכב לא יאוחר מיום 15.2.2022.

           ניתנה היום, ‏ב’ בשבט התשפ”ב (‏4.1.2022).

ש ו פ ט ת

_________________________

   21080760_A13.docx   עכ

מרכז מידע, טל’ 077-2703333, 3852* ; אתר אינטרנט,  https://supreme.court.gov.il

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https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts21990021e17&fileName=21021990.E17&type=2

	בבית המשפט העליון בשבתו כבית משפט גבוה לצדק
בג”ץ  2199/21

לפני:	כבוד השופט י’ עמית
	כבוד השופט נ’ סולברג
	כבוד השופטת י’ וילנר

העותרת:

ועדת השופטים להענקת פרס ישראל לשנת תשפ”א בתחום חקר המתמטיקה, חקר מדעי המחשב

נ  ג  ד

המשיבים:	1. שר החינוך
	2. הממונה על פרס ישראל, משרד החינוך
	3. יועץ השר לעניין פרס ישראל
	4. היועץ המשפטי לממשלה
	5. פרופ’ עודד גולדרייך

עתירה למתן צו על תנאי

בשם העותרת:	עו”ד גלעד ברנע
בשם המשיבים 4-1:	עו”ד יונתן נד”ב, עו”ד אבי טוויג
בשם המשיב 5:	עו”ד מיכאל ספרד, עו”ד חגי בנזימן

פסק-דין

השופט י’ עמית:

           ושוב נדרש בית משפט זה לעסוק בפרס ישראל.

           בעתירה דנן התבקשנו להורות למשיבים 3-1 ליתן טעם מדוע לא יעניקו למשיב 5 את פרס ישראל לשנת תשפ”א בתחום חקר המתמטיקה ומדעי המחשב, כפי שקבעה העותרת, שהיא ועדת השופטים להענקת פרס ישראל לשנת תשפ”א בתחום זה (להלן: ועדת השופטים).

רקע והעובדות הצריכות לעניין

1.        המשיב 1 (להלן: שר החינוך) מינה את חברות וחברי ועדת השופטים להענקת פרס ישראל לשנת תשפ”א בתחום חקר המתמטיקה וחקר מדעי המחשב. נציין כבר עתה כי על פי הוראות סעיף 21 לתקנון פרס ישראל (להלן: תקנון הפרס), שמות ארבעת השופטים חברי הוועדה חסויים עד לפרסום הרשמי, ועל פי סעיף 34 לתקנון הפרס “עד לפרסום הרשמי, חייבים הכול, לרבות מקבלי הפרס וחברי ועדת השופטים, לשמור על סודיות ההחלטה”.

           ועדת השופטים בחנה מספר מועמדות ומועמדים לפרס, ובהחלטתה מיום 8.2.2021 החליטה פה אחד להעניק את פרס ישראל בתחום זה לפרופ’ עודד גולדרייך, הוא המשיב 5 (להלן: פרופ’ גולדרייך). בנימוקי ההחלטה נכתב כי הפרס מוענק לפרופ’ גולדרייך:

“על תרומות מעמיקות ופורצות דרך בסיבוכיות ובקריפטוגרפיה, ובפרט יצירת מושגי יסוד חשובים, לרבות פונקציות פסאודו-אקראיות, חישוב רב-משתתפים בטוח, ערפול תוכנה ובדיקת תכונות. מחקריו ביססו את התחום של מערכות הוכחה, הוכחות אפס-מידע וקידוד שניתן לבדיקה מקומית, תוך הבנת תפקידה של אקראיות בחישוב.

פרופ’ גולדרייך ידוע גם בספריו ומאמריו אשר תרמו ותורמים רבות לחינוך של דור חוקרים הממשיך את דרכו, תוך ביסוס מעמדה של מדינת ישראל ככוח עולמי מוביל בתיאוריה של מדעי המחשב”.

2.        עוד באותו יום, פנה שר החינוך אל ועדת השופטים טלפונית וביקש ממנה לחזור ולבחון שוב את החלטתה, לאור מידע שהגיע אליו בנוגע להתבטאויותיו ולהשקפותיו של פרופ’ גולדרייך. בעתירה נאמר כי מקור המידע הוא באתר ששמו “הכר את המרצה”, שם יש הפניות למספר עצומות שעליהן חתם פרופ’ גולדרייך.

           לאחר שהוועדה בחנה את המידע והמסמכים שאליהם הופנתה, חזרה ועדת השופטים ואישרה בהחלטתה מיום 18.2.2021 את החלטתה להעניק את הפרס לפרופ’ גולדרייך. הוועדה ציינה כי “כל חברי הוועדה סבורים שאין להביא בחשבון את התבטאויותיו והשקפותיו של מועמד בהחלטה על התאמתו לפרס ישראל, אלא אם כן מדובר בדברים פליליים. עקרון זה הוא חשוב על מנת לשמור על יוקרתו של הפרס”.

3.        לא נחה דעתו של שר החינוך והוא וחזר ופנה שוב אל הוועדה. במכתבו מיום 9.3.2021 ביקש שר החינוך כי הוועדה תשקול שוב את החלטתה. השר ציין כי הוא מודע לפסיקת בית המשפט בעניין פרס ישראל ולגבולות ההתערבות של שר החינוך בכל הנוגע להחלטות ועדת הפרס, אך לדעתו, המקרה דנן הוא שונה מהטעמים שפורטו במכתב, ואצטט חלק מהדברים:

“2.   בהמשך להמלצתכם הראשונית, הובא לידיעתי מידע לפיו פרופ’ גולדרייך חתום על פניה לפרלמנט הגרמני להכיר בתנועת ה-BDS כתנועה לגיטימית בגרמניה. אבקשכם לבחון את המידע האמור כיון שאם אכן מדובר במידע מדויק יש בו, להבנתי וכפי שיפורט להלן, כדי לפסול את מועמדותו של פרופ’ גולדרייך לקבלת פרס האמור להעלות על נס את תרומתו של הזוכה לחברה הישראלית.

3.    אקדים ואומר כי לפרופ’ גולדרייך יש היסטוריה עשירה וידועה של התבטאויות וחתימה על עצומות פרובוקטיביות בגנות חיילי צה”ל ובגנות מערכת המשפט הצבאית. כך, למשל ומבלי למצות (ועל סמך המידע שהובא לידיעתי ושאתם מתבקשים לבחון), פרופ’ גולדרייך תמך בטענות (הכוזבות והבלתי הוגנות) כאילו ישראל מפעילה בשטחי יהודה ושומרון מדיניות של ‘אפרטהייד’, כאילו ישראל שופטת את תושבי השטחים ‘במערכת משפט צבאית שאין בה ולו קורטוב של צדק’ וכאילו חיילי צה”ל הפועלים בשטחים הינם ‘פושעי מלחמה ישראלים’.

4.    […] האמירות האמורות הן אמירות נלוזות, שאינן מעודדות שיח ראוי וביקורת אפשרית על פעולותיהם של צה”ל ומערכת המשפט הצבאית אלא מיועדות להחליש את המוסדות האמורים המגנים (בהתאמה) על עצם קיומה של המדינה ועל אופיו המוסרי של צה”ל ולפגוע בחוסנה הלאומי של החברה הישראלית.

[…]

7.    שונה היא הקריאה האקטיבית לפרלמנט הגרמני (שהובאה לידיעתי ושגם אותה אתם מתבקשים לבחון), לה פרופ’ גולדרייך היה שותף, להכיר בלגיטימיות של תנועת ה-BDS הקוראת להחרמתה של מדינת ישראל ולמעשה, לשלילת הלגיטימיות של קיומה. כאן כבר מדובר, להבנתי, בחריגה מהמתחם המוגן של חופש הביטוי ונקיטה בפעולה החותרת תחת עצם קיומה של מדינת ישראל ומקדמת את ענייניה של תנועה שמדינות שונות ומוערכות ברחבי העולם מצאו לנכון, מסיבות טובות ומוצדקות, לאסור על פעילותה בשטחן.

8.    החלטת פרופ’ גולדרייך לפעול באופן אקטיבי לקיום ענייניה של תנועה החותרת תחת קיומה של מדינת ישראל ומבקשת, הלכה למעשה, לשלול את ההכרה במדינת ישראל היא שטר ששוברו בצידו בכל הנוגע להתאמתו למועמדות לפרס ישראל.

9.    מצב הדברים בו פרופ’ גולדרייך יקבל בידו האחת מידי המדינה את הפרס היוקרתי ביותר על תרומה לחברה הישראלית בשעה שידו האחרת מקדמת את ענייניה של תנועה החותרת תחת קיומה של אותה מדינה ממש הוא מצב דברים אבסורדי ובלתי מתקבל על הדעת. את אותה הפרדה (מלאכותית, ולטעמי קשה) בין גולדרייך ‘האזרח’ (המשתלח בחיילי צה”ל ובשופטיו) לבין גולדרייך ‘הפרופסור’ שניתן היה (אולי) עוד לעשות ביחס לאמירותיו הבזויות על חיילי צה”ל ומערכת המשפט הצבאית, לא ניתן עוד לעשות כאשר מדובר בתמיכה בפעילותה של תנועה הקוראת לשלילת ההכרה ממדינת ישראל”.

4.        לאור פנייתו זו של שר החינוך, התכנסה הוועדה שוב ודנה במכתב השר, אך בהחלטתה מיום 11.3.2021 חזרה ודחתה את פנייתו. הוועדה ציינה כי בקשת השר להתכנסות שלישית של הוועדה נוגדת את תקנון הפרס, אך למרות זאת נעתרו חברי הוועדה לבקשה לקיים דיון נוסף. אצטט חלק מהדברים שנכתבו על ידי חברי הוועדה:

“3.   בסעיף האחרון של מכתב השר, סעיף 12, אנו מתבקשים לבדוק לא רק סוגיות פוליטיות שכבר בדקנו וסוגיות פוליטיות חדשות שהעלה השר אלא גם לבחון ‘כל מידע רלוונטי נוסף’. אנחנו חוקרים, לא חוקרים פרטיים.

4.    לחותמי העצומה בעניין ה-BDS דעות שונות ומגוונות, כפי שמובהר היטב בנוסח האנגלי שלה:

The opinions about BDS among the signatories of this call differ significantly: some may support BDS, while others reject it for different reasons. Yet, we all reject the deceitful allegation that BDS as such is anti-Semitic.

5.    רבים מחותמי העצומה הנדונה נמנים עם עמודי התווך של החברה הישראלית, לרבות שישה זוכי פרס ישראל, ויו”ר כנסת לשעבר.

6.    יוקרת פרס ישראל ומניעת הידרדרותו לפרס פוליטי הן לנגד עינינו, ואנו מודאגים מהפרת תקנון הפרס המתבצעת כעת”.

           ושוב חזר שר החינוך ופנה לוועדה במכתבו מיום 14.3.2021 ואביא חלק מהדברים כלשונם:

“5.   אשר לנימוק (בסעיף 3 למכתבכם) לפיו אתם ‘חוקרים, לא חוקרים פרטיים’, אציין כי משעה שקיבלתם על עצמכם את הכבוד והמחויבות הנלווים לכהונה בוועדת הפרס, אינכם יכולים לפטור עצמכם מחובת עריכת הבירורים העובדתיים הדרושים על מנת שהחלטתכם תהיה מבוססת כנדרש בנימוק המתחכם לפיו אינכם ‘חוקרים פרטיים’. ככל שדרושים לכם אמצעים נוספים לצורך קיבוץ המידע הרלבנטי לשם השלמת התמונה העובדתית העומדת לנגד עיניכם, עליכם לפנות אל מזכיר הועדה ולהנחותו בעניין ולא לפטור עצמכם מחובת הבירור האמורה.

6.    אשר לספקולציה (בסעיף 4 למכתבכם) לפיה אפשר שפרופ’ גולדרייך אינו תומך בתנועת ה-BDS, הרי שמדובר בספקולציה שאינה עולה כדי מילוי חובת הבירור המוטלת עליכם כחברי ועדת הפרס. לא רק שמדובר בספקולציה שאינה מוציאה אתכם ידי חובת הבירור, נראה גם כי מדובר בספקולציה נטולת בסיס. כך, על פי מידע שהובא לידיעתי בראיון עם פרופ גולדרייך שהתפרסם באתר ‘מאקו’ ביום 11.3.2021, מיוחסות לפרופ’ גולדרייך אמירות שלא ניתן להבינן אלא כתמיכה בתנועת ה-BDS.

7.    כאמור, מצב הדברים בו פרס ישראל יוענק לאדם, יהיו הישגיו האקדמיים אשר יהיו, התומך בתנועה החותרת תחת לגיטימיות מדינת ישראל ואשר מדינות זרות רבות פועלות לגינויה ולדחיקת רגליה, הוא מצב דברים בלתי מתקבל על הדעת. יודגש, שאין מדובר בסוגיה פוליטית – מדובר בסוגיה של שכל ישר.

8.    בהקשר זה אעיר כי הערתכם (בסעיף 5 למכתבכם) לפיה על חותמי העצומה בעניין ה-BDS מצויים גם שישה זוכי פרס ישראל בעבר אינה רלבנטית לחלוטין בהעדר כל טענה לפיה למי מהם הוענק הפרס לאחר החתימה על העצומה האמורה ומתוך מודעות לתמיכתו בתנועת ה-BDS. ממילא מעשיו של זוכה בפרס ישראל לאחר קבלת הפרס, כאשר מדובר במעשים שיש בהם כדי לשלול את המועמדות, אינם מהווים ‘הכשר’ למעשים דומים של מועמד לפרס” (ההדגשה במקור – י”ע).

5.        בהמשך לכך, שוחח יו”ר ועדת השופטים עם פרופ’ גולדרייך וקיבל ממנו מכתב בחתימתו, המופנה אל יו”ר ועדת השופטים, שבו נכתב “בתשובה לשאלתך, הריני מצהיר בזאת כי אינני תומך ב-BDS ומעולם לא תמכתי בארגון זה”.

6.        ביני לביני התגלגלו הדברים לתקשורת ונחשף שמו של פרופ’ גולדרייך כזוכה המיועד של פרס ישראל (בניגוד להוראות הסודיות בתקנון). מכל מקום, משלא הכריז שר החינוך על פרופ’ גולדרייך כזוכה בפרס ישראל, הוגשה העתירה דנן ביום 30.3.2021, כשבועיים ימים לפני יום העצמאות.

           הדיון בעתירה נקבע ליום שני ה-5.4.2021 אך נדחה לבקשת משיבי המדינה ליום 8.4.2021, על מנת לבחון את האפשרות לייתר את העתירה. המדינה הייתה אמורה להגיש תגובתה עד ליום 7.4.2021 שעה 12:00, אך לאחר מספר דחיות שנתבקשו, הוגשה תגובת משיבי המדינה סמוך לשעה 19:30.

7.        בתגובה, שהוגשה כאמור ערב הדיון, נאמר כי לעת הזו שר החינוך אינו יכול לקבל החלטה בעניין אישורה של המלצת ועדת השופטים, וזאת על רקע מספר פרסומים שנכתבו או נחתמו על ידי פרופ’ גולדרייך, לרבות מהעת האחרונה. הכוונה לעצומה שעליה חתם פרופ’ גולדרייך ובה “תזכורת” וקריאה לאיחוד האירופי להפסיק שיתופי פעולה של מוסדות או תכניות הקשורים לאיחוד האירופי עם אוניברסיטת אריאל (להלן: העצומה בנוגע לאוניברסיטת אריאל). שר החינוך טען כי קיימת אפשרות שיגיע לידיו מידע רלוונטי נוסף שאותו יידרש לבחון וכי יאפשר לפרופ’ גולדרייך להתייחס אליו. בתגובה נאמר כי בכוונתו של שר החינוך לקבל החלטה בעניין הפרס בתוך כחודש ימים, וככל שיוחלט להעניק לפרופ’ גולדרייך את הפרס, ניתן יהיה לעשות כן בטקס פרסי ישראל שייערך בשנה הבאה או במועד מוקדם יותר לפי בחירתו של פרופ’ גולדרייך.

           המשיב 4, היועץ המשפטי לממשלה, הביע בתגובתו את עמדתו לגבי הפרסומים המיוחסים לפרופ’ גולדרייך. לדידו, בשלושה מהם אין די כדי להצדיק החלטה של שר החינוך שלא לאשר את המלצת ועדת השופטים. ברם, באשר לעצומה בנוגע לאוניברסיטת אריאל, סבר היועץ המשפטי לממשלה, כי החלטתו של שר החינוך בדבר הצורך בהמשך בירור העניין אינה חורגת ממתחם הסבירות. לעמדת היועץ המשפטי לממשלה, בשים לב לעיתוי הפרסום ולתוכנו; בשים לב לפסיקת בית משפט זה המכירה באופן עקרוני, לעניין הענקת הפרס, באפשרות קיומם של מקרים חריגים שבהם ניתן יהיה להביא בחשבון שיקולים “חיצוניים” לשיקולים המקצועיים הצרים; בשים לב להוראות החוק למניעת פגיעה במדינת ישראל באמצעות חרם, התשע”א-2011 (להלן: חוק החרם) ולאפשרות כי קריאה לחרם עשויה להיכנס בגדרם של מקרים חריגים אלו; בשים לב להערכת שר החינוך בדבר קיומם של מסמכים רלוונטיים נוספים ולצורך בפרק זמן נוסף לבחינת העניין, לרבות מתן אפשרות להידרש להתייחסותו של פרופ’ גולדרייך לדברים בטרם קבלת החלטה סופית; ובשים לב לכך שמדובר בשאלה “לא טריוויאלית” שעשויה לדרוש ליבון משפטי שקיים קושי לבצעו עד טקס הענקת הפרס – הרי שהחלטת שר החינוך לקבל החלטה בתוך כחודש ימים אינה חורגת ממתחם הסבירות, ולכשתתקבל ניתן יהיה להעמידה לבחינה משפטית.

8.        הדיון התקיים כאמור ביום חמישי ה-8.4.2021, שבוע לפני יום העצמאות שבו מחולק ברגיל פרס ישראל, אך בשל ימי הקורונה צולם הפעם הטקס כבר ביום ראשון, ה-11.4.2021 בהרכב מצומצם של משתתפים, כדי לשדרו במוצאי יום העצמאות. מכאן סד הזמנים הדוחק שבגינו הסכימו משיבי המדינה כי הדיון בעתירה יתקיים כאילו הוצא צו על תנאי.

           כאמור, בעת שהתקיים הדיון בפנינו, שר החינוך טרם גיבש את דעתו באופן סופי. במצב דברים זה, סברנו כי יש למצות את כל האפשרויות לייתר את העתירה, מבלי שבית המשפט יידרש לסוגיה שעלולה להיתפס על ידי הציבור או חלקו, כמחלוקת פוליטית-ערכית. לכן, ומבלי שנעלם מעינינו כי עצם הדחייה יש בה כדי למנוע מפרופ’ גולדרייך לקבל את הפרס בטקס שנערך כעבור שלושה ימים, ניתנה על ידינו מיד עם תום הדיון החלטת ביניים כהאי לישנא (להלן: החלטת הביניים):

“בנסיבות המיוחדות שנוצרו, בשים לב לעמדת שר החינוך בדבר הצורך בפרק זמן נוסף לבחינת העניין, לרבות מתן אפשרות להידרש להתייחסותו של פרופ’ גולדרייך לדברים בטרם קבלת החלטה סופית; ובשים לב לעמדת היועץ המשפטי לממשלה לכך שמדובר בשאלה ‘לא טריוויאלית’ שעשויה לדרוש ליבון משפטי שיש קושי לבצעו לנוכח סד הזמנים (הדיון נערך היום, יום חמישי ה-8.4.2021 והטקס אמור להיות מצולם ביום ראשון הקרוב ה-11.4.2021) – בהינתן כל אלה, אנו סבורים כי יש לאפשר לשר החינוך לחזור ולעיין בדברים ולקבל החלטה בתוך חודש ימים מהיום. זכויות הצדדים שמורות ביחס לכל החלטה שתתקבל.

רשמנו לפנינו כי ככל שיוחלט להעניק לפרופ’ גולדרייך את הפרס, ניתן יהיה לעשות כן בטקס פרסי ישראל שייערך בשנה הבאה או במועד מוקדם יותר לפי בחירתו של פרופ’ גולדרייך”.

           30 יום חלפו, והמשיבים ביקשו פעם אחר פעם ארכה על מנת לגבש את עמדתם. ביום 10.6.2021, ערב השבעת הממשלה החדשה וסיום כהונתו של שר החינוך, מסר האחרון ליועץ המשפטי לממשלה את החלטתו הסופית לדחות את החלטת ועדת השופטים להעניק לגולדרייך את הפרס. בהחלטת השר נאמר, בין היתר, כי אין לראות את שר החינוך כחותמת גומי של ועדת הפרס; כי לצד שיקולים של מצוינות אקדמית, עומדים שיקולים שעניינם תרומת המועמד למדינת ישראל; וכי מקום שבו ועדת השופטים אינה כשירה או אינה יכולה לבחון את שאלת תרומתו של המועמד למדינת ישראל, אזי על השר לעשות כן. שר החינוך הדגיש במכתבו כי עמדתו הפוליטית של פרופ’ גולדרייך אינה רלוונטית לצורך בחינת מועמדותו לקבלת הפרס, ואילו השתכנע כי פרופ’ גולדרייך תרם לחוסנה של מדינת ישראל באמצעות תרומתו לאקדמיה, היה גאה להעניק לו את הפרס. אלא שלדברי השר, תרומתו של גולדרייך למדינה באמצעות מחקריו “מתקזזת” אל מול פעילותו להחרמת מוסדות מחקר ישראליים, המחלישה את האקדמיה הישראלית ופוגעת בחוסנה של מדינת ישראל. שר החינוך הוסיף כי אף אם פרופ’ גולדרייך אינו תומך בתנועת ה-BDS, הרי שמעשיו תומכים בתנועה ומבטאים ניסיון לפעול למתן לגיטימציה עבורה. שר החינוך החליט אפוא כי לעת הזו פרופ’ גולדרייך אינו כשיר לקבל את הפרס, וככל שבעתיד פני הדברים יהיו שונים ופרופ’ גולדרייך יפעל לחזק את האקדמיה הישראלית ויתרום תרומה חיובית לחוסנה של מדינת ישראל, אזי תיפתח בפניו הדרך לקבלת פרס ישראל.

לאחר מספר ארכות, הוגשה ביום 22.7.2021 “הודעה מעדכנת מטעם המדינה”. בהודעה נאמר כי לאחר כינון הממשלה החדשה, הובאה החלטת שר החינוך לידיעת שרת החינוך הנוכחית, אך השרה לא מצאה לנכון להידרש לעניין, וזאת בהינתן שכבר נתקבלה החלטה סופית על ידי קודמה לתפקיד, ותוך שהיא מבהירה כי תכבד כל החלטה של בית המשפט. לגופה של סוגיה, בשורה התחתונה, הביע היועץ המשפטי לממשלה את עמדתו ולפיה יש מקום להיעתר לעתירה ולהורות על אישור המלצת ועדת השופטים להעניק את פרס ישראל לפרופ’ גולדרייך.

           עמדתו זו של היועץ המשפטי לממשלה ראויה ומקובלת עלי ובהתאם לכך אציע לחברי לקבל את העתירה ולעשות את הצו למוחלט. כפי שנראה להלן, המקרה שלפנינו הוא ייחודי, אך כוחה של הפסיקה הנוגעת לפרס ישראל יפה גם לגביו.

דיון והכרעה

9.        כפי שציינו בהחלטת הביניים, “יש להצר על כך שפרס כה יוקרתי ובעל מוניטין ואירוע מאחד ומרומם לב כמו טקס פרס ישראל, הופך כמעט באופן קבוע למקור מחלוקת ופילוג“.

           מורגלים אנו בעתירות של עותרים וגופים שונים כנגד מקבלי הפרס. אלא שזו הפעם, ענייננו במקרה ייחודי וראשון מסוגו בכך שוועדת השופטים עצמה עתרה לבית המשפט לאחר ששר החינוך דחה את המלצותיה. שרי חינוך קודמים, הגם שלא תמיד רוו נחת, בלשון המעטה, מהבחירה בזוכה פרס ישראל, אימצו את החלטת ועדת הפרס. במקרה דנן, זו הפעם הראשונה ששר חינוך בישראל לא מאמץ את החלטת ועדת הפרס, ומצב ייחודי זה הביא למצב ייחודי שבו זו הפעם הראשונה שוועדת הפרס היא שעותרת כנגד החלטת שר החינוך.

           יכול הטוען לטעון כי היה על פרופ’ גולדרייך עצמו להגיש עתירה, בהיותו הנפגע הקונקרטי, וכי הוועדה מתעברת לכאורה על ריב לא לה. הטענה הועלתה על ידי משיבי המדינה בתגובתה הראשונה, אך לאור מכלול הנסיבות, מצא היועץ המשפטי לממשלה שלא לבקש את דחיית העתירה על הסף מטעם זה. עמדה זו ראויה, ואוסיף ואומר כי משהחליטה הוועדה כי פרופ’ גולדרייך ראוי לפרס ישראל, ומשנדחתה בחירת הוועדה, יש להכיר באינטרס הישיר שלה (והשוו, שמא על דרך של קל וחומר, בג”ץ 4500/07 יחימוביץ’ נ’ מועצת הרשות השניה לרדיו ולטלוויזיה, פסקה 15 סיפא (21.11.2007)).

10.      פתחנו ואמרנו כי עתירה כנגד מתן פרס ישראל לפלוני בתחום כזה או אחר, הפכה כמעט לריטואל קבוע, על אף שפעם אחר פעם דחה בית המשפט עתירות אלה. על אף ייחודה של העתירה שלפנינו, הרי שלנוכח הפסיקה שנצטברה בנושא פרס ישראל, נמצאים אנו בשדה משפט שבו נחרשו כבר תלמים. ואכן, כבר בהחלטת הביניים עמדנו על העקרונות הבאים:

“קורפוס הפסיקה שנצטבר בנושא פרס ישראל עומד לפנינו: על עצמאות שיקול הדעת המקצועי של חברי ועדת השופטים – אין חולק. על אופיו המקצועי הטהור של הפרס שעליו יוקרתו והמוניטין שלו – אין חולק. על כך שככלל, לצורך הענקת הפרס אין רלוונטיות להתבטאויות ‘פרטיות’ חוץ-מקצועיות של הזוכה בפרס – אין חולק”.

11.      מבלי להתיימר להקיף את הפסיקה בנושא, אפנה לפסקי הדין הבאים, שכל אחד מהם משקף מחלוקת ציבורית שהתעוררה בעקבות ההכרזה על זוכה הפרס, ובכל אחד מהם נדחתה העתירה:

           (-) עניין עמוס עוז (בג”ץ 1933/98 הנדל נ’ שר החינוך, התרבות והספורט (25.3.1998)) – שם נטען כי הסופר עמוס עוז אינו ראוי לקבלת פרס ישראל לספרות ולשירה בשל מאמר שפרסם, שלטענת העותר היה בו “משום פגיעה קשה בציבור רחב”;

           (-) עניין שולמית אלוני (בג”ץ 2348/00 סיעת המפד”ל, המפלגה הדתית לאומית בארץ ישראל נ’ שר החינוך (23.4.2000)) – שם נטען כי גב’ שולמית אלוני אינה ראויה לקבלת פרס ישראל על מפעל חיים;

           (-) עניין יגאל תומרקין (בג”ץ 2769/04 יהלום נ’ שרת החינוך, התרבות והספורט, פ”ד נח(4) 823 (2004) (להלן: עניין תומרקין)) – שם נטען כי האמן יגאל תומרקין אינו ראוי לקבלת פרס ישראל בתחום הפיסול, בין היתר, בשל שורת התבטאויות שבהן הביע טינה ובוז כלפי הציבור הדתי והחרדי;

           (-) עניין פרופ’ שטרנהל (בג”ץ 2454/08 פורום משפטי למען ארץ ישראל נ’ שרת החינוך (17.4.2008) (להלן: עניין שטרנהל)) – שם נטען כי פרופ’ זאב שטרנהל אינו ראוי לקבלת פרס ישראל בתחום חקר מדע המדינה, בשל שורת התבטאויות נגד התיישבות יהודית ביהודה ושומרון.

           (-) עניין הרב אריאל (בג”ץ 1977/20 האגודה למען הלהט”ב בישראל (“האגודה לשמירת זכויות הפרט”) נ’ שר החינוך (26.4.2020) (להלן: עניין אריאל)) – שם נטען כנגד זכייתו של הרב יעקב אריאל בפרס ישראל בתחום הספרות התורנית בשל שורת התבטאויות כנגד קהילת הלהט”ב;

           (-) עניין פרופ’ ניצה בן-דב (בג”ץ 2056/21 פדבה נ’ שר החינוך (25.3.2021)) – שם נטען כנגד זכייתה של פרופ’ בן דב בפרס ישראל בתחום חקר הספרות העברית והכללית, בין היתר בשל טענות העותר להתעמרות והוצאת לשון הרע על ידה.

           חריג לפסיקה דלעיל אנו מוצאים בעניין שניצר (בג”ץ 2205/97 מאסלה נ’ שר החינוך והתרבות, פ”ד נא(1) 233 (1997)), שם הורה בית המשפט על החזרת העניין לוועדת השופטים. נציין כי הפסיקה המאוחרת לעניין שניצר – שהיה פסק הדין הראשון בשרשרת פסקי הדין בעניין פרס ישראל – חזרה והבחינה בין פסק הדין לבין המקרים שנדונו לאחריו. אין חולק כי מדובר בפסק דין חריג ויוצא דופן שעליו נמתחה בשעתו ביקורת (דניאל פרידמן “שפיטות החלטות בעניין פרס ישראל” המשפט ה 181 (התשס”ה); מאיר הופמן “שפיטות החלטות בעניין פרס ישראל – עד מתי?” המשפט ח 557 (התשס”ג)).

היקף שיקול הדעת של שר החינוך ו”למה לי פוליטיקה עכשיו”?

12.      אחזור ואפנה את הקורא אל פסקה 1 לעיל, לציטוט נימוקי ועדת הפרס. הנימוקים אינם נהירים ואינם מובנים לקורא מן השורה, אלא ליודעי ח”ן בתחום המתמטיקה ומדעי המחשב. זו בדיוק הסיבה בגינה ממנה שר החינוך לוועדת הפרס שופטים שהם מומחים בתחום נשוא הפרס. רק המומחים לדבר, הם שיכולים להבין, לבחון ולהעריך מי ראוי לפרס שניתן על הישגים מקצועיים טהורים בתחום הרלוונטי.

13.      לכך השלכה על היקף שיקול דעתו של שר החינוך, ועל מידת התערבותו של בית המשפט בשיקול דעתו. במצב הדברים הרגיל בית המשפט יימנע מלהתערב בשיקול הדעת של הרשות המבצעת אלא אם נפל בה אחד או יותר מהמריעין בישין של המשפט המינהלי, כגון אי סבירות, העדר מידתיות, הפרה של כללי הצדק הטבעי, הפליה, שרירות, חריגה מסמכות וכיו”ב. לא כך כאשר בפרס ישראל עסקינן. שיקול דעתו של שר החינוך בבואו לאשר את החלטת ועדת הפרס, מצומצם מלכתחילה:

“הכרעתה של ועדה כאמור אמנם כפופה לאישורו של שר החינוך, אך בכפוף לאישור זה, שעל טיבו ומטרתו אשוב לעמוד, ועדת שופטים שמונתה כדין ופעלה בתום-לב ותוך קיום הכללים שהותוו בתקנון לפעולתה, סוברנית להחליט על-פי הבנתה המלאה. ניתן לומר כי החלטתה כמעט חסינה מפני התערבות, בין מצדו של שר החינוך ובין מצדו של בית-המשפט.

[…] אף שבעיקרון, החלטותיהן של ועדות השופטים הן שפיטות, הרי שלנוכח אופי התפקיד המוטל עליהן ורוחב שיקול-הדעת הנתון להן, הרי שרק במקרים חריגים ובנסיבות יוצאות דופן עשויה להימצא עילה להעמיד את הכרעותיהן לביקורת שיפוטית.

[…] כשלעצמי הריני סבור כי סמכות האישור הנתונה בידי שר החינוך נועדה לאפשר לו לפקח על תקינות פעילותן של ועדות השופטים לפרס ישראל, ואין סמכות זו מתירה לשר להתערב בהכרעותיהן ובהערכותיהן של הוועדות לגופן מטוב עד רע. הווי אומר: בכל הנוגע למהות השיקולים שעל יסודם מחליטה ועדת שופטים להעניק את פרס ישראל בתחום פלוני לפלוני, נתונה לוועדה אוטונומיה מוחלטת, ואין שר החינוך רשאי להתערב בהכרעתה ובשיקולים שעליהם ביססה הוועדה את החלטתה. הפיקוח שבידי שר החינוך לקיים מוגבל לבחינת הפן הארגוני-ממוני של פעולת הוועדה וכן לבחינה אם הדיונים שהתקיימו לפניה ותהליך קבלת ההחלטה על-ידיה עולים בקנה אחד עם הוראות התקנון, ואף עומדים במבחני התקינות המינהלית של המשפט הציבורי (עניין תומרקין, פסקה 12) (הדגשות הוספו – י”ע).

“לוועדת השופטים נתון שיקול דעת רחב ביותר, בהיותה גוף המונחה בשיקולים מקצועיים ובידיו הידע והנתונים לקבל החלטה […] מקום שהחלטתה של ועדת השופטים להעניק את פרס ישראל למאן-דהוא התקבלה בתום-לב ועל בסיס שיקולים מקצועיים ענייניים, אין ככלל עילה להתערבות בית משפט זה בתוכן ההחלטה” (עניין שטרנהל, פסקה 6 וההפניות שם).

14.      הנה כי כן, בניגוד להחלטות מינהליות רגילות של הרשות המבצעת, אישורו של שר החינוך את המלצת ועדת השופטים לא נועד לקיים ביקורת לגופה של החלטה, אלא בחינה אם החלטת ועדת השופטים התקבלה בהתאם למבחני המשפט המינהלי, כגון, אם מי מחברי הוועדה לא נגוע בניגוד עניינים וכיו”ב.

           זאת ועוד. על אף שלסעיף 33 לחוק החוזים (חלק כללי), התשל”ג-1973 אין תחולה ישירה על החלטות ועדות השופטים לעניין פרס ישראל, הרי שסעיף זה מקרין על מדיניות בית המשפט שלא להתערב בהחלטות ועדות השופטים, ובדומה, ראוי להחיל מדיניות מרוסנת זו גם על שר החינוך. הפרס ניתן בשל הישגים מקצועיים ולחברי הוועדה יש את המומחיות הנדרשת להחליט מי ראוי לקבל את הפרס. השיקולים שעל ועדות הפרס לשקול הם אפוא שיקולים מקצועיים טהורים. כך עולה מסעיף א’ לתקנון פרס ישראל הקובע כי הפרס יוענק ל”אזרחי ישראל יחידים, שהצטיינו מאוד וקידמו את התחום באחד המקצועות והתחומים המפורטים להלן, ושנבחרו על-ידי ועדת שופטים ציבורית”.

           מקצועיות ומצוינות – זו נקודת המוצא וזו גם נקודת הסיום.

15.      לצד ההפרדה העניינית בין שיקולים מקצועיים לבין התבטאויות שאינן נוגעות לתחום המקצועי, ניתן בפסיקה משקל לחופש הביטוי.

           במדינות דמוקרטיות, חופש הביטוי והחופש האקדמי הולכים שלובי זרוע. הכל כבר נאמר בעניין שטרנהל ואחזור ואביא דברים בשם אומרם:

“בעוד פרס ישראל ניתן בגין הישגים מקצועיים ראויים להערכה, ההתבטאויות בהן מדובר על פי רוב נעשות מחוץ למסגרת המקצועית בגינה ניתן הפרס. במצב דברים זה קשה שלא לראות את מניעת הפרס ממי שנמצא ראוי לו בשל הישגיו המקצועיים, אך על בסיס עמדות שהביע, כפגיעה בחופש הביטוי, ולו באופן עקיף. תוצאה שכזו יש לה אפקט של ‘סתימת פיות’ שאין לה מקום במשטר דמוקרטי, שהלוא מהו המסר המתקבל אם לא מסר של השתקה? עצם הידיעה כי הבעת דעה שאינה פופולרית עשויה לשאת כעבור זמן תוצאות במישור שיש לו היבט מקצועי, גם אם על דרך של הענקת פרס, אינה מתיישבת עם תרבות של חופש ביטוי במשטר דמוקרטי” (שם, פסקה 10).

           ומכאן שגם התבטאויות שהן “צורמות, בוטות ועולבות בציבור שלם” (עניין אריאל, פסקה 10), נדחות מפני יוקרתו המקצועית של פרס ישראל והפגיעה בחופש הביטוי.

16.      בית המשפט חזר והדגיש בעניין שטרנהל כי להתבטאויות של מועמדים לפרס ישראל בנושאים שאינם נוגעים לתחום המקצועי שבגינו הם זוכים בפרס, אין מקום במערך השיקולים שעל ועדות הפרס לשקול, וכפי שאמר המשורר, “אז למה לי פוליטיקה עכשיו”? למדינת ישראל, כמדינה שמעודדת מצוינות בתחומי המדע והטכנולוגיה, יש אינטרס מובהק להפריד בין דעות פוליטיות וחברתיות כאלה ואחרות של המועמד, לבין הערכה אקדמית של יכולותיו המקצועיות ותרומתו המקצועית בתחומו. זו הסיבה בגינה ועדות מומחים מהשורה הראשונה בתחום הרלוונטי הן שממליצות על המועמד לפרס וכאמור, זו הפעם הראשונה בהיסטוריה של פרסי ישראל, ששר חינוך לא אישר המלצה של ועדת שופטים מקצועית.

עניינו של פרופ’ גולדרייך על רקע הפסיקה דלעיל

17.      הפסיקה הכירה בכך שאין “לשלול באופן מוחלט את האפשרות כי תהיינה התבטאויות שנשמעו מפי מועמד לפרס ואשר חומרתן כה חריפה וכה קיצונית, עד כי יהא זה בלתי ראוי ובלתי סביר להתעלם מהן ולשקול אך את זכויותיו המקצועיות של אותו מועמד” (עניין שטרנהל, בפסקה 10).

           מהם אותם מקרים חריגים וקיצוניים? ככל שאנו נדרשים ליתן בהם סימנים, נביא לדוגמה מועמד שמעל ראשו תלוי כתב אישום על מעשים פליליים חמורים, או מעשים והתבטאויות מאלו המפורטים בסעיף 7א לחוק יסוד: הכנסת, על פי הפסיקה שפירשה ויישמה חוק זה: שלילת קיומה של מדינת ישראל כמדינה יהודית ודמוקרטית; הסתה לגזענות; תמיכה במאבק מזוין של מדינת אויב או של ארגון טרור נגד מדינת ישראל (וראו עניין שטרנהל, בפסקה 10).

18.      לנוכח הוראות חוק החרם, היועץ המשפטי לממשלה סבר כי עקרונית, קריאה לחרם יכולה להיכנס בגדר המקרים הקיצוניים והחריגים שבהם ניתן להתחשב בשיקול “חיצוני” לשיקולים המקצועיים. אך זאת, בהתחשב במכלול נסיבות המקרה – חומרת הדברים, עדכניותם, תכיפותם וכיו”ב.

           שר החינוך השתית את החלטתו על הפרסומים הבאים (חלקם הובאו לידיעתו רק לאחר החלטתו לדחות את החלטת ועדת השופטים):

           (-) מכתב משנת 2005 – מכתב לעיתון ה”גרדיאן” הבריטי, שעליו חתומים מספר אנשי אקדמיה, שם נטען כי אוניברסיטת אריאל מנוגדת לחוק הבינלאומי. במכתב זה יש תמיכה בקריאה לחרם של ארגון אקדמאי בריטי על אוניברסיטת בר אילן בשל שיתוף הפעולה שלה עם אוניברסיטת אריאל.

           (-) עצומה משנת 2008 – עצומה עליה חתומים עשרות אנשים, הממוענת למזכיר הכללי של הכנסיה המתודיסטית המאוחדת, וקוראת לכנסיה לתמוך בכנס הכללי שלה בהצעה שלא להשקיע בחברות ש”מאפשרות לכיבוש להמשיך”, וכי ככל שכך יוחלט “אנו החתומים מטה נריע ליוזמתכם האמיצה, ונקווה שהדבר יהווה דוגמה להרבה אחרים ללכת בעקבותיה”.

           (-) עצומה משנת 2011 – מחאה פומבית נגד חוק החרם, עליה חתומים מאות אנשים, כולל פרופ’ גולדרייך וכולל אנשי אקדמיה, שרים וחברי כנסת לשעבר, בכירים לשעבר בצבא ובגופי ביטחון אחרים, כולל כלות וחתני פרס ישראל ופרס ביטחון ישראל.

           (-) מאמר משנת 2014 – במאמר זה דן פרופ’ גולדרייך בהצדקות להטלת חרם ומנתח את הסוגיה מזוויות שונות.

           (-) עצומה משנת 2019 – עצומה המופנית אל מפלגות בגרמניה, ועליה חתומים חוקרים יהודים וישראלים המבקשים להבחין בין אנטישמיות לבין תמיכה בזכויות האדם של פלסטינים, וזאת לאור הצעות שעלו בפרלמנט הגרמני להשוות את תנועת ה-BDS לאנטישמיות.

           (-) העצומה בנוגע לאוניברסיטת אריאל משנת 2021 – שבה נכתב כי על האיחוד האירופי לעמוד בכללים שקבע הוא עצמו בעניין אוניברסיטת אריאל. התאריך על גבי העצומה הוא 23.3.2021 אך פרופ’ גולדרייך הבהיר בדיון שנערך בפנינו, כי העצומה נחתמה על ידו בחודש ינואר 2021. בעצומה, עליה חתומים 522 חותמים, נטען כי האיחוד האירופי מעניק לגיטימציה למוסדות אקדמיים ישראליים הפועלים בהתנחלויות לא-חוקיות בשטחים ואינו עומד בכללים שהוא עצמו קבע. הלכה למעשה, יש בעצומה זו קריאה לאיחוד האירופי להפסיק שיתופי פעולה של מוסדות/תוכניות הקשורים לאוניברסיטת אריאל.

           העצומה בנוגע לאוניברסיטת אריאל, היא שעמדה בבסיס בקשתו של שר החינוך ליתן לו שהות לבחון את הדברים, בקשה לה נעתרנו בהחלטת הביניים.

19.      לגישת היועץ המשפטי, המקובלת עלי, אין במכתבים או בעצומות שנסקרו לעיל, חלקם לפני שנים ארוכות, כדי לגבש עילה שלא לאשר את המלצת ועדת השופטים להעניק לפרופ’ גולדרייך את פרס ישראל. חלק מהמכתבים והעצומות נחתמו מספר שנים לפני חקיקתו של חוק החרם ולפני פסק הדין שניתן בבג”ץ 5239/11 אבנרי נ’ הכנסת (15.4.2015)), שדחה עתירות שתקפו את חוקתיותו של החוק. חלוף הזמן מאז פורסמו מרבית המכתבים או העצומות, בצירוף הצהרתו הנוכחית של פרופ’ גולדרייך כי אינו תומך ב-BDS כפי שיפורט להלן, מביאים למסקנה כי לא מתקיימות נסיבות קיצוניות שבהן תיתכן התחשבות חריגה בשיקול חיצוני לצורך הענקת פרס ישראל.

           העצומה משנת 2019 – שנחתמה על ידי פרופ’ גולדרייך ועל ידי כמאתיים אנשי אקדמיה מכל רחבי הארץ – קוראת לפרלמנט הגרמני לבטל את ההכרה בתנועת ה- BDS כתנועה אנטישמית. השאלה אם יש לזהות קריאה לחרם על ישראל עם אנטישמיות שנויה במחלוקת בשיח הציבורי בארץ ובחו”ל. יש הסבורים כי מטרתה של תנועת ה-BDS היא לפעול כנגד החזקתה של ישראל בשטחים, ולדידם, אין לזהות ביקורת חריפה על מדיניות ממשלת ישראל בשטחים כאנטישמיות. דומה שרוב הציבור אינו רואה כך את תנועת ה-BDS, ורבים וטובים סבורים כי לפנינו תנועה אנטישמית בתחפושת, וליתר דיוק, אנטישמיות בצורתה החדשה, אנטישמיות מדינית השוללת את זכותו של העם היהודי להגדרה עצמית ושוללת את עצם קיומה של מדינת ישראל. כך סבר גם הפרלמנט הגרמני, שאליו מצאו לפנות חותמי העצומה. יש שיתמהו מה מצאו אנשי אקדמיה בישראל לפנות לגרמניה (דווקא לגרמניה) כדי להעמידה על “טעותה” ולהסביר לפרלמנט הגרמני מהי אנטישמיות. מכל מקום, אין בחתימה על אותה עצומה, כשלעצמה, כדי להכניס את פרופ’ גולדרייך אל אותן נסיבות חריגות שבהן “ניתן יהא לשקול שיקולים שאינם מקצועיים גרידא” (עניין שטרנהל, בפסקה 10).

20.      העצומה בנוגע לאוניברסיטת אריאל מעוררת לכאורה קושי מסוים לנוכח ההגדרה בסעיף 1 לחוק החרם הקובע כלהלן:

‘חרם על מדינת ישראל’ – הימנעות במתכוון מקשר כלכלי, תרבותי או אקדמי עם אדם או עם גורם אחר, רק מחמת זיקתו למדינת ישראל, מוסד ממוסדותיה או אזור הנמצא בשליטתה, שיש בה כדי לפגוע בו פגיעה כלכלית, תרבותית או אקדמית.

           חוק החרם מטיל אחריות נזיקית ושולל הטבות מינהליות מסוימות כמפורט בחוק. אני נכון להניח כי קריאה לחרם על מדינת ישראל או לחרם על האקדמיה במדינת ישראל, במיוחד מפיו של מי שיוקרתו והישגיו צמחו לו בערוגות האקדמיה בישראל, עשויה להיכנס לגדר המקרים הקיצוניים והחריגים של התחשבות בשיקול “חיצוני”. זאת, מאחר שקשה להלום כי איש אקדמיה ישראלי, שפועל במסגרת האקדמיה הישראלית ונהנה מחסותה, ישתתף בקריאה לחרם על האקדמיה בישראל. מצב מעין זה הוא בבחינת אבסורד שקשה להעלותו על הדעת. את דעתי על החרם האקדמי הבעתי בעניין אבנרי:

“החרם הוא כלי יוצא דופן בארגז הכלים של חופש הביטוי […] יש משהו אורווליאני בטענת העותרים כי החוק מגביל את חופש הביטוי. חרם אקדמי-תרבותי מהווה סתימת פיות במובן הפשוט של המילה, מונופול של דוכן אחד ויחיד בשוק הדעות, אנטי-תזה מובהקת לחופש הביטוי ולרעיון של שוק דעות חפשי. החרם התרבותי-אקדמי על ישראל, נועד לשתק ולהשתיק את הביטוי הפוליטי, לכפות דעה אחת ו’אמת’ אחת”.

           ברם, פרופ’ גולדרייך הצהיר וחזר והבהיר כי אינו תומך בתנועת ה-BDS. עוד קודם לדיון שנערך בפנינו, פרופ’ גולדרייך הגיש תגובה מטעמו שבה נאמר כי הוא:

 “מכבד את פרס ישראל וחש גאווה גדולה על שוועדת השופטים/ות המקצועית לפרס ישראל בחרה בו לזוכה בפרס על תרומתו לחקר מדעי המחשב לשנת תשפ”א […] ובמסגרת הניסיון להדוף את ההכפשות של השר, המשיב 5 אף הבהיר כי הוא איננו תומך בתנועת ה-BDS, אולם יובהר מיד כי המשיב אינו סבור כי לעמדותיו המדיניות והפוליטיות, לרבות בשאלת יחסו לתנועה זו, יש רלבנטיות כלשהי לשאלה אם הוא זכאי לפרס ישראל אם לאו. ההבהרה נעשתה לאור הכתבות הרבות שפורסמו ומשום שהשר ייחס לו מבלי לברר עימו עמדות שאינן עמדותיו, וייחוסים אלה גם פורסמו ברבים”.

           גם במכתבו של בא כוחו של פרופ’ גולדרייך מיום 5.5.2021 במענה למכתבו של שר החינוך, נאמר כי “הוא איננו תומך בתנועת החרם על ישראל ואילו היה תומך ברי כי לא היה מסכים כלל לקבל את הפרס”. גם במהלך הדיון, שב פרופ’ גולדרייך והבהיר והצהיר באמצעות בא כוחו כי הוא עומד מאחורי חתימתו על העצומה אך אינו תומך בתנועת ה-BDS. במסגרת בחינת התבטאויותיו של פרופ’ גולדרייך יש לזכור כי חופש הביטוי הוא אחד השיקולים שנלקחו בחשבון בפסיקה בנושא פרס ישראל, והדברים נכונים במיוחד כאשר בביטוי פוליטי עסקינן.

21.      פרס ישראל נושא אופי ממלכתי, מקצועי וא-פוליטי. מהפסיקה שהובאה דלעיל נמצאנו למדים כי החלטת ועדת השופטים להעניק את פרס ישראל לפלוני “כמעט חסינה מפני התערבות מהותית בשיקוליה מצדו של שר החינוך, ואף מפני ביקורת שיפוטית” (דברי השופט מצא בעניין תומרקין). שיקול הדעת המוקנה לשר החינוך ביחס להמלצת ועדת השופטים תחום ומוגדר היטב, ומוגבל למקרים שבהם נמצא פגם בהליכי עבודת הוועדה או בנסיבות קיצוניות שלטעמי אינן מתקיימות במקרה דנן.

           מהפסיקה דלעיל ניתן לחלץ אמירה ברורה וחד-משמעית ולפיה יש להבחין בין דעותיו האישיות של מקבל הפרס, גם אם מקוממות וקיצוניות ושנויות במחלוקת, לבין הנושא המקצועי המסור לוועדת הפרס. מתן פרס ישראל לפלוני או לאלמוני אין בו משום “הסכמה” לדעותיו ולהליכותיו של אותו מועמד. אך כפי שנאמר על ידי השופטת (כתוארה אז) נאור בעניין תומרקין: “לכל אחד משופטי בית-משפט זה, כאזרח במדינה, עמדה ערכית משלו בשאלה אם ראוי פלוני לפרס המכובד הניתן בשם כולנו, אם אינו ראוי לאצטלא זו. עמדות אישיות אלה ישמור כל אחד מאתנו לעצמו, ואל לנו להפוך את בית המשפט לוועדת-על לאי-הענקת פרסים”.

           אכן, הפרס הוא ממלכתי אך אינו אמור לשקף קונצנזוס של הציבור. אין בתקנון הפרס תנאי סף לפיו על ועדת השופטים לבחור רק במי שאוחז בדעות שהן בקונצנזוס הציבורי:

“[…] נראה כי ייסודו של הפרס על הסדר וולונטרי מבטיח ביתר-שאת את עצמאותן של ועדות השופטים ומגן על הפרס – חרף היותו פרס ממלכתי – מפני השפעותיהם של גורמים פוליטיים. מאותם טעמים כנראה נמנעו נסחיו של תקנון פרסי ישראל מלכלול בתקנון תנאי סף להכרה בזכאות המועמד שעליו המליצה ועדת שופטים, לקבל את הפרס” (עניין תומרקין, פסקה 14) (הדגשות הוספו – י”ע).

22.      לא למותר להזכיר את התהליך שבסופו החליט שר החינוך, ממש ב”דקה ה-90″, כי הוא מבקש לבחון שוב את עניינו של פרופ’ גולדרייך. נכון ליום 6.4.2021 עמדתו של היועץ המשפטי לממשלה כפי שהועברה לשר החינוך הייתה, כי יש לאשר את המלצת ועדת השופטים ואין בשלוש ההתבטאויות של פרופ’ גולדרייך שעמדו באותה עת בפניו, חלקן מלפני שנים, כדי לפסול את זכייתו בפרס ישראל. מכאן, שבנקודת זמן זו, ניתן היה לצפות כי שר החינוך יפעל כפי שפעלו כל קודמיו לפניו, ויאשר את הזכייה בפרס. ברם, בשלב זה נעשה ניסיון לאיתור התבטאויות נוספות של פרופ’ גולדרייך, וביום 7.4.2021, יום אחד לפני המועד שנקבע לדיון, העביר שר החינוך ליועץ המשפטי את העצומה שעליה חתם גולדרייך, הנושאת את התאריך 22.3.2021 וכך התגלגלו הדברים כמתואר לעיל.

סוף דבר

23.      ועדת השופטים החליטה להעניק את הפרס לפרופ’ גולדרייך על הישגיו המקצועיים, על עשייתו האקדמית העשירה והמוערכת ועל הישגיו המוערכים בארץ ובעולם. החלטתו של שר החינוך חורגת מאמות המידה שהותוו בפסיקה העניפה שנזכרה לעיל וממכלול ההסדרים הנוגעים לפרס ישראל. לא על שר החינוך המלאכה לבחון את ה”תרומה למדינה” של המועמד באשר שיקולים אלה חורגים מתקנון פרס ישראל, מההלכה הפסוקה, ומהפרקטיקה הנוהגת מזה שנים רבות. התרומה של המועמד לתחום עיסוקו מסורה לוועדת השופטים. כפי שפורט לעיל, התחשבות בשיקולים חיצוניים בבחירה בזוכה בפרס ישראל שמורה לנסיבות קיצוניות וחריגות במיוחד, ולא זה המקרה שלפנינו.

24.      אשר על כן, אציע לחברי להפוך את הצו על תנאי למוחלט, ולהורות למשיבים 3-1 להעניק לפרופ’ גולדרייך את פרס ישראל בתחום חקר המתמטיקה ומדעי המחשב כפי שקבעה ועדת השופטים להענקת פרס ישראל לשנת תשפ”א.

           לנוכח הצהרת היועץ המשפטי בתגובתו הראשונה, הרי ש”הכדור” עובר למגרשו ולבחירתו של פרופ’ גולדרייך – אם לבקש כי הפרס יוענק לו בטקס פרסי ישראל בשנה הבאה התשפ”ב או במועד לפני כן, שלא במסגרת הטקס השנתי של פרסי ישראל.

           המשיבים ישאו בהוצאות העותרת בסך 15,000 ₪ ובהוצאות המשיב 5 בסך 15,000 ₪ (סה”כ 30,000 ₪).

25.      אחר הדברים האלה, משהונחה לפני חוות דעתם של חברי, השופט  נ’ סולברג והשופטת י’ וילנר אוסיף מילים מספר בנוגע למסקנה האופרטיבית שאליה הגיעו.

במקרה שלפנינו התוצאה היא בהכרח בינארית – קבלת הפרס או שלילתו. אין מדובר במקרה שבו עומדות לפני הרשות המינהלית מספר אפשרויות בתוך מתחם הסבירות, שאז יש לעיתים טעם להחזיר לרשות המינהלית את ההחלטה על מנת שתבחר באחת האפשרויות בתוך מתחם הסבירות. ובכלל, לא כל אימת שבית משפט זה מוצא כי נפל פגם בהחלטת הרשות המינהלית, הוא מחזיר את ההחלטה אל הרשות המינהלית לצורך עיון מחדש בהחלטה, והדברים הם מן המפורסמות (ראו, מני רבים, בג”ץ 153/83 לוי נ’ מפקד המחוז הדרומי של משטרת ישראל, פ”ד לח(2) 393 (1984); בג”ץ 1284/99 פלונית נ’ ראש המטה הכללי, פ”ד נג(2) 62 (1999); בג”ץ 6840/01 פלצמן נ’ ראש המטה הכללי – צבא ההגנה לישראל, פ”ד ס(3) 121 (2005)).

כפי שנאמר בעניין תומרקין, וצוטט גם על ידי חברי, החלטת ועדת הפרס “כמעט חסינה מפני התערבות מהותית בשיקוליה מצדו של שר החינוך”. אזכיר שוב כי על פי תקנון פרס ישראל, המלצת ועדת השופטים מקבלת תוקף לאחר אישור השר, ומשהגענו למסקנה כי דין החלטת השר במקרה דנן להתבטל, הרי שביטול החלטת השר מביא מאליו לפתרונה של הסוגיה. כל הנתונים והשיקולים הצריכים לעניין כבר הונחו לפתחנו והתוצאה אפוא ידועה וברורה – שר החינוך צריך היה לאשר את החלטת ועדת השופטים להעניק לפרופ’ גולדרייך את הפרס, כעמדתו של היועץ המשפטי לממשלה שסבר כי הנסיבות דנן רחוקות מהנסיבות הקיצוניות והקשות שבהן תיתכן התחשבות, חריגה כשלעצמה, בשיקולים חיצוניים. דווקא לאור דברים הנחרצים והנכוחים של חבריי, שאליהם אני כמובן מצטרף, כי שר החינוך שקל שיקולים שאינם ממין העניין כמו תרומתו של המועמד למדינת ישראל, התוצאה האופרטיבית מתבקשת מאליה. משכך, איני רואה טעם ותוחלת בהחזרת הנושא לשולחנה של שרת החינוך, מה שיביא מן הסתם להחזרת הנושא אל שולחננו.

ש ו פ ט

השופט נ’ סולברג:

1.         דברי חברי, השופט י’ עמית, בחלקם, מקובלים ורצויים; אך למסקנתו, לא אוכל להצטרף. אפרט ואבאר.

2.         פרס ישראל מוענק בראש ובראשונה כאות ומופת להצטיינותו ולתרומתו המקצועית של מי שנבחר לזכות בו; לא בכדי ועדה מקצועית יושבת על המדוכה, וממליצה על הזוכים. חייו האישיים והתבטאויותיו הפרטיות של הזוכה, הרי הם שיקולים ‘חיצוניים’, ועל פני הדברים, הם זרים להחלטה זו. הצטיינות ומקצועיות, עשויות להימצא אצל מי שדעותיו האישיות נטועות בלב הקונצנזוס הישראלי, ובאותה מידה גם אצל מי שדעותיו קיצוניות. אלה כמו אלה, עשויים להימצא ראויים לעטרה נכבדה זו – פרס ישראל – אם הצטיינותם ותרומתם המקצועית רמה ומוּכחת. הדברים עולים מן האמור בחלק א’ לתקנון פרסי ישראל, שבו נקבע כך: “פרסי ישראל יוענקו על-ידי שר החינוך, ביום העצמאות במעמד ראשי המדינה, לאזרחי ישראל יחידים, שהצטיינו מאוד וקידמו את התחום באחד המקצועות והתחומים המפורטים להלן, ושנבחרו על-ידי ועדת שופטים ציבורית”. כדברים האלה אמר השופט (כתוארו אז) א’ מצא בבג”ץ 2769/04 יהלום נ’ שרת החינוך, התרבות והספורט, פ”ד נח(4) 823, 839 (2004) (להלן: עניין תומרקין): “הדעת נותנת שלא בכדי נמנעו שר החינוך בן-ציון דינור, שבימי כהונתו (בשנת 1953) נוסד פרס ישראל, וכל שרי החינוך שבאו אחריו מלעגן את פרס ישראל בחקיקה. נראה כי ייסודו של הפרס על הסדר וולונטרי מבטיח ביתר-שאת את עצמאותן של ועדות השופטים ומגן על הפרס – חרף היותו פרס ממלכתי – מפני השפעותיהם של גורמים פוליטיים. מאותם טעמים כנראה נמנעו נסחיו של תקנון פרסי ישראל מלכלול בתקנון תנאי סף להכרה בזכאות המועמד שעליו המליצה ועדת שופטים, לקבל את הפרס”.

3.         ניכר אפוא, כי השיקול המרכזי והעיקרי בבחירת זוכה, נוגע למידת הצטיינותו ותרומתו המקצועית בקשר עם התחומים והעניינים שפורטו בתקנון; בעוד שאישיותו המלבבת או נועם הליכותיו – אינם עומדים למבחן. כאמור, טעמים כבדי-משקל עומדים ביסוד קביעה זו, בהם רצון למנוע פוליטיזציה של הפרס, מתוך הבנה כי גלישה מן התחום המקצועי אל זה האישי, אשר מעצם טיבו וטבעו עמום יותר, יכול שיהיה כחומר ביד היוצר.

4.         יחד עם זאת, אין משמעות הדברים כי לעולם חוסן, וכי לא ניתן להתחשב בהתנהגות או התבטאות, שאינה קשורה במישרין למצוינות האישית שהביאה להענקת הפרס. כפי שציין חברי השופט עמית, ובהתאם להלכה הפסוקה, ועדת הפרס, כמוה גם שר החינוך, רשאים לשקול, במקרים החריגים המתאימים, גם שיקולים ‘חיצוניים’ שאינם נוגעים למידת המצוינות של מקבל הפרס. כך למשל, אם נמצא כי המועמד עשה שימוש בביטויים גזעניים קשים כלפי אדם או ציבור מסוים, אם נקט ביזוי קשה כלפי אלה, או אם שלל את קיומה של מדינת ישראל כמדינה יהודית ודמוקרטית, הסית לגזענות ולאלימות, או תמך במאבק מזוין נגד המדינה. אין זו רשימה ‘סגורה’. כפי שנקבע בבג”ץ 2454/08 פורום משפטי למען ארץ ישראל נ’ שרת החינוך (17.4.2008), מפי השופטת ע’ ארבל: “ניתן להעלות על הדעת נסיבות בהן יהא זה ראוי, ואף מתבקש, כי אל מול הישגיו המקצועיים של מועמד לפרס ישראל ישקלו שיקולים נוספים, כלליים. בהחלט יתכנו מקרים בהם לא ניתן יהא לשקול שיקולים שאינם מקצועיים גרידא אלא נוגעים בדמותו של המועמד ובמשמעויות הערכיות והחברתיות של הבחירה בו. כך למשל, מועמד המזוהה עם ערכים המנוגדים באופן ממשי לערכיה של מדינת ישראל, דוגמת מי שידוע כאוחז בעמדות גזעניות, או מקרים קיצוניים מעין זה. בנוסף, איני יכולה לשלול באופן מוחלט את האפשרות כי תהיינה התבטאויות שנשמעו מפי מועמד לפרס ואשר חומרתן כה חריפה וכה קיצונית, עד כי יהא זה בלתי ראוי ובלתי סביר להתעלם מהן ולשקול אך את זכויותיו המקצועיות של אותו מועמד. כידוע, גם רף הסיבולת הגבוה ביותר שנטל על עצמו הציבור במדינה דמוקרטית באשר לחופש הביטוי אין משמעו כי הנייר והאוזן סובלים הכל ותיתכנה התבטאויות שיש בהן השפלה או ביזוי כה קשים בכבודו של אדם או של ציבור. במצב מעין זה דומני כי לא יהא זה סביר להעניק לאותו אדם את אות ההערכה הגבוה ביותר שמעניקה מדינת ישראל לבניה ובנותיה”. בכלל זה, מקובלת עלי עמדת היועץ המשפטי לממשלה, כי גם קריאה לחרם על ישראל, באחת מן הדרכים הנזכרות בחוק למניעת פגיעה במדינת ישראל באמצעות חרם, התשע”א-2011 (להלן: חוק החרם), עשויה להיות נסיבה רלבנטית, הראויה לבחינה במסגרת אותם שיקולים ‘חיצוניים’.

5.         בהקשר זה אבקש להסתייג מעמדת חברי השופט עמית, הסבור שדווקא “קריאה לחרם על מדינת ישראל או לחרם על האקדמיה במדינת ישראל, במיוחד מפיו של מי שיוקרתו והישגיו צמחו לו בערוגות האקדמיה בישראל, עשויה להיכנס לגדר המקרים הקיצוניים והחריגים של התחשבות בשיקול ‘חיצוני’. זאת, מאחר שקשה להלום כי איש אקדמיה ישראלי, שפועל במסגרת האקדמיה הישראלית ונהנה מחסותה, ישתתף בקריאה לחרם על האקדמיה בישראל. מצב מעין זה הוא בבחינת אבסורד שקשה להעלותו על הדעת” (פסקה 20 לחוות דעתו; ההדגשות הוספו – נ’ ס’). לעמדתי-שלי, גם חרם כלפי אדם מסוים, או כלפי מוסד מסוים, עשוי לעלות כדי מקרה חריג, שיש בכוחו לאפשר התחשבות בשיקולים ‘חיצוניים’. זאת אני לָמֵד מהגדרת המונח “חרם על מדינת ישראל” בסעיף 1 לחוק החרם: “הימנעות במתכוון מקשר כלכלי, תרבותי או אקדמי עם אדם או עם גורם אחר, רק מחמת זיקתו למדינת ישראל, מוסד ממוסדותיה או אזור הנמצא בשליטתה, שיש בה כדי לפגוע בו פגיעה כלכלית, תרבותית או אקדמית” (ההדגשות הוספו – נ’ ס’). מלשון הסעיף עולה בבירור, כי חרם-הוא-חרם; בין אם הוא מופנה כלפי קהל עם ועדה, בין אם הוא מופנה כלפי יחידים; בין אם הוא מופנה כלפי האקדמיה בישראל, בין אם הוא מופנה ‘רק’ כלפי אוניברסיטת אריאל. סבורני אפוא, כי במקרים המתאימים ובנסיבות ההולמות, גם קריאה לחרם נגד אדם או גורם ספציפי, עשויה לבוא בקהל המקרים החריגים המצדיקים התחשבות באותו שיקול ‘חיצוני’.

6.         דעת לנבון נקל, כי מעשיו ופעולותיו של פרופ’ גולדרייך, בכל הנוגע לענייני החרם (6 מהם הובאו לפנינו), אינם בקונצנזוס; אדרבה – הם מעלים את חמתם של רבים, אשר מוצאים בהם טעם רב לפגם; בפרט כך, מקום שבו מדובר במי שנהנה מחסות אקדמית ישראלית מחד גיסא, ומנסה למנוע קשרים אקדמיים, שמא גם כלכליים, ממוסד הנמנה על מוסדותיה האקדמיים של המדינה, רק מחמת מיקומו הגיאוגרפי, באזור המצוי בשליטתה, מאידך גיסא; לא בכדי ראה היועץ המשפטי לממשלה, בצדק, להתייחס אל מעשיו ופעולותיו אלוּ של פרופ’ גולדרייך – “בחומרה רבה”. זהו אכן היחס ההולם. יחד עם זאת, אם נבקש לצמצם את יריעת המחלוקת, נמצא, כפי שטען לפנינו היועץ המשפטי לממשלה, כך:

           (א) כי 3 מן הפעולות שננקטו על-ידי פרופ’ גולדרייך, והובאו לעיוננו, נעשו לפני עשור ויותר, 2 מהן עוד קודם לחקיקת חוק החרם: כך לגבי המכתב משנת 2005, שבו נטען כי הקמת אוניברסיטת אריאל מנוגדת לחוק הבינלאומי, תוך תמיכה בקריאתו של ארגון אקדמאי בריטי להחרים את אוניברסיטת בר-אילן, מחמת שיתוף הפעולה שהיא מקיימת עם אוניברסיטת אריאל; כך לגבי העצומה מחודש ינואר 2008, שבה נקראה הכנסיה המתודיסטית המאוחדת, לתמוך בהצעה שלא להשקיע בחברות המאפשרות את ‘המשך הכיבוש’, בהקשר הישראלי של הדברים; וכך גם לגבי העצומה משנת 2011, שבה הובעה מחאה נגד חקיקת חוק החרם, על-ידי מאות אנשים, בהם פרופ’ גולדרייך, תוך קריאה להחרים מוצרים שמקורם באיו”ש.

           (ב) כי 2 מהפעולות הנוספות שנקט בהן פרופ’ גולדרייך אינן מעידות על קריאה ישירה לחרם: זאת ביחס למאמר שפִּרסם בשנת 2014, שבו נדונה שאלת ההצדקה על הטלת חרם, תוך ניתוח הסוגיה מזוויות שונות; וכן ביחס לעצומה שעליה חתם בשנת 2019, אשר מופנית אל מפלגות בגרמניה, ובה מובעת דאגה מפני העלייה באנטישמיות בעולם כולו ובגרמניה, כאשר לצד זאת מבקשים החותמים להזהיר מפני השוואה בין אנטישמיות לבין תמיכה בזכויות האדם של פלסטינים, נוכח הצעות מצד מפלגות בגרמניה לפרלמנט הגרמני, להשוות את תנועת ה-BDS לאנטישמיות.

           (ג) כי פרופ’ גולדרייך הבהיר במפורש, אם במסגרת התכתבויותיו עם ועדת הפרס ושר החינוך, אם בעת בירור העתירה לפנינו, כי הוא אינו תומך בתנועת החרם על ישראל, וכי הוא “מכבד את פרס ישראל וחש גאווה גדולה על שוועדת השופטים/ות המקצועית לפרס ישראל בחרה בו לזוכה בפרס על תרומתו לחקר מדעי המחשב לשנת תשפ”א”.

7.         נראה אפוא, כי הקושי העיקרי שנותר לפנינו נוגע לפעולתו האחרונה של פרופ’ גולדרייך – חתימתו על עצומה בראשית שנת 2021 (העצומה מתוארכת לחודש מרץ 2021, אך פרופ’ גולדרייך טוען כי חתם עליה בחודש ינואר 2021), שבה נכתב כי האיחוד האירופי נותן לגיטימציה למוסדות אקדמיים ישראלים, הפועלים בתחומי איו”ש, בכך ששיתף את אוניברסיטת אריאל בתוכנית מחקר במימונו, בניגוד לכללים שקבע האיחוד האירופי עצמו בעניין זה.

8.         על פני הדברים, כדברי חברי השופט עמית, “הלכה למעשה, יש בעצומה זו קריאה לאיחוד האירופי להפסיק שיתופי פעולה של מוסדות/תוכניות הקשורים לאוניברסיטת אריאל” (פסקה 18 לחוות דעתו); אם לא במישרין, ודאי בעקיפין. השאלה שלפנינו היא אפוא, האם די בחתימה על עצומה זו כדי להביא את העניין דנן בקהל אותם מקרי-קצה חריגים, אשר לגביהם נפסק כי ניתן לשקול בגדרם גם שיקולים ‘חיצוניים’, שאינם נוגעים במישרין לאיכותו המקצועית של הזוכה? היועץ המשפטי לממשלה סבור, כי יש להשיב על שאלה זו – בשלילה. לדבריו: “יושם אל לב גם שהמכתב מסב עצמו, ככתוב בו, על טענה שעל האיחוד האירופי לעמוד בכללים שקבע הוא עצמו בעניין, כללים שלמיטב ההבנה חלים מבחינת האיחוד האירופי ושמדינת ישראל מודעת להם וחרף קיומם התקשרה בעניין מול האיחוד האירופי; מה שדי בו כדי להדגיש ביתר שאת את ריחוקן של נסיבות כאלה מאותן נסיבות קיצוניות וקשות שבהן תיתכן התחשבות – חריגה – בשיקול חיצוני לצורך הענקת פרס ישראל”. לזאת מוסיף היועץ המשפטי, גם את הצהרתו של פרופ’ גולדרייך, אגב ההליך שלפנינו, כי הוא אינו משתייך לתנועת החרם. לעומתו, שר החינוך התייחס לסוגיה באופן שונה בתכלית; לגבי דידו, פרס ישראל איננו “פרס נובל לעניים”, הוא אינו ניתן על יסוד מצוינות מקצועית בלבד. לשיטת השר, טרם מתן החלטה בדבר הענקת פרס ישראל, יש לבחון את המועמדים בשתי מסננות שונות; האחת – מקצועית, האחרת – ערכית; והן דרות שתיהן בכפיפה אחת. לדבריו, השיקול המקצועי הוא אמנם תנאי-סף, בלעדיו-איִן, עליו אמוּנה הוועדה המייעצת, אך גם בהתקיימוֹ, הוא איננו ‘שובר-שוויון’; אין בכוחו לגרוע מן המשקל המשמעותי שיש ליתן גם לשיקול הערכי. השר מוסיף עוד, כי לטעמו, השיקול הערכי כפוף בעיקר לקביעותיו-שלו, משום שלוועדה המקצועית אין בהקשר זה עדיפות מיוחדת על פניו. בהינתן זאת, ובנסיבות העניין דנן, סבר השר כי “את תרומתו של פרופ’ גולדרייך כחוקר מאיינים מעשיו הנמשכים של פרופ’ גולדרייך המכוונים לפגוע במדינת ישראל ובחלקים מהאקדמיה הישראלית”. בהתאם החליט השר, כי “את פרס ישראל – הפרס של מדינת ישראל, המוענק על תרומה למדינת ישראל – אין פרופ’ גולדרייך ראוי לקבל, לפחות לא לעת הזו. […] כל עוד ידו האחת בונה והשניה הורסת, אין הוא עומד בתנאים לקבלת הפרס”. דומני, בהתייחס לעמדת השר, כי “טענו חטין, והודה לו בשעורים” (משנה, שבועות ו, ג). בעוד שהיועץ המשפטי לממשלה בחן את העניין כנדרש, בהתאם להלכה הפסוקה, שלפיה רק במקרים חריגים וקיצוניים ניתן יהיה לשקול אותם שיקולים ‘חיצוניים’, שאינם נוגעים למידת תרומתו ומקצועיותו של הזוכה; בחר השר לפעול בדרך שאינה עולה בקנה אחד עם ההלכה הפסוקה. במסגרת החלטתו הפך החריג לכלל, הוא החיל הליך דו-שלבי על בחירת הזוכה – שלב מקצועי ושלב ערכי – תוך מתן משקל רב לשיקול הערכי. דומה אפוא, כי תשובתו של שר החינוך לשאלה שהעלינו קודם לכן, אינה ממין העניין. השאלה איננה האם ראוי להעניק את הפרס לפרופ’ גולדרייך, אלא, כפי שפורט לעיל, האם מעשהו זה של פרופ’ גולדרייך – חתימתו על העצומה משנת 2021 – הוא כה מקומם, עד כי הוא בא בקהל אותם מקרי-קצה חריגים, המאפשרים לשקול אותו כשיקול ‘חיצוני’. משלא ניתן מענה לשאלתנו זו בהחלטת השר, שבה נבחנה הסוגיה באופן שונה בתכלית, עמדתי היא כי אין מנוס מלהשיב את העניין אל שרת החינוך, על מנת שתבחן את ההחלטה פעם נוספת – זאת הפעם בהתאם להלכה הפסוקה – ותחליט כחוכמתה.

9.         אמנם, בנקודת הזמן הזו, משהשר לא שקל את השיקולים המתאימים, יש בכוחנו להורות על קבלת העתירה, כדעת חברי, השופט עמית, תוך אימוץ המלצת הוועדה, כעמדת העותרים, שאליה הצטרף גם היועץ המשפטי לממשלה. ברם, אינני סבור כי כך עלינו לנהוג, ולהעניק, אנחנו, שופטי בג”ץ, במו-ידינו, את פרס ישראל, לראשונה מאז היווסדו. תמים-דעים אני עם השופטת (כתוארה אז) מ’ נאור, לגבי דבריה בעניין תומרקין: “לכל אחד משופטי בית-משפט זה, כאזרח במדינה, עמדה ערכית משלו בשאלה אם ראוי פלוני לפרס המכובד הניתן בשם כולנו, אם אינו ראוי לאצטלא זו. עמדות אישיות אלה ישמור כל אחד מאתנו לעצמו, ואל לנו להפוך את בית המשפט לוועדת-על לאי-הענקת פרסים” (ההדגשה הוספה – נ’ ס’). מצדי אוסיף: כשם שאל לנו להפוך את בית המשפט לוועדת-על לאי-הענקת פרסים, כך גם אל לנו להפוך את בית המשפט לוועדת-על להענקת פרסים. מוטב לנו, כשופטים, להימנע מלהכניס ראשנו למחלוקות ציבוריות-ערכיות מעין אלה.

10.      טרם סיום אציין עוד זאת: תחושה לא נוחה אופפת אותנו, כל אימת שאנו נדרשים, בעל כורחנו, להתפלפל בשאלות של הענקת פרס, לפלוני או אלמוני. ספק רב אם העניין שפיט, אם בית המשפט הוא הכתובת המתאימה לדון בדבר ולהכריע בו (ראו האמור בסעיף 61(ב) לחוק החוזים (חלק כללי), התשל”ג-1973, בצירוף סעיף 33 לחוק זה, הקובע כי “חוזה שלפיו יינתן ציון, תואר, פרס וכיוצא באלה על פי הכרעה או הערכה של אחד הצדדים או של אדם שלישי, אין ההכרעה או ההערכה לפי החוזה נושא לדיון בבית משפט”). לגבי דידי, נראה כי מדובר בשאלה מקצועית (כאשר הטרוניה היא כי המועמד אינו ראוי בפן המקצועי) וערכית (כאשר המועמד נתקף משום מעשיו הפרטיים והאישיים); כך או כך, השאלה היא לבר-משפטית. כך נאמר בעניין תומרקין: “החלטה להעניק את פרס ישראל לפלוני – הגם שהיא כמעט חסינה מפני התערבות מהותית בשיקוליה מצדו של שר החינוך, ואף מפני ביקורת שיפוטית – אין היא חסינה מפני ביקורת ציבורית. וזה, לטעמי, גם דינה הראוי של ההחלטה להעניק את פרס ישראל בתחום הפיסול לתומרקין, שאף היא פתוחה לביקורתו של הציבור הרחב” (ראו בהקשר זה: דניאל פרידמן “שפיטות החלטות בעניין פרס ישראל” המשפט ה’ 181 (תשס”א); מאיר הופמן “שפיטות החלטות בעניין פרס  ישראל – עד מתי?” המשפט ח’ 557 (תשס”ג)). דומה בעינַי, כי מוטב לבית המשפט להדיר רגליו מן העיסוק בכגון דא, למשוך ידו מהענקת פרס, או ממניעת הענקתו. עדיף לו, לפרס, להיות נתון למבחן הציבור.

11.         אשר על כן, משנמצא כי לא נשקלו השיקולים המתאימים על-ידי שר החינוך, אציע לחברַי כי לא נחליט אנחנו במקומו על הזכייה בפרס ישראל, לשבט או לחסד, וכי נשיב את העניין אל שרת החינוך, על מנת שתשקול את הסוגיה כדבעי ותחליט כהלכה.

ש ו פ ט

השופטת י’ וילנר:

1.        עיינתי בחווֹת הדעת של חבריי, השופטים י’ עמית ונ’ סולברג, ואני מצטרפת לעמדתם כי החלטת שר החינוך לדחות את המלצת ועדת השופטים להעניק לפרופ’ גולדרייך את פרס ישראל לשנת תשפ”א בתחום חקר המתמטיקה ומדעי המחשב – אינה יכולה לעמוד ויש להורות על ביטולה. באשר לתוצאה האופרטיבית של ביטול החלטת השר, שלגביה נחלקו חבריי, ראיתי להצטרף לחוות דעתו של חברי, השופט נ’ סולברג. אבאר להלן את נימוקיי לכך.

2.        כפי שציינו חבריי בהרחבה, לא אחת עמד בית משפט זה על שיקול הדעת הרחב הנתון לחברי ועדת פרס ישראל בתחום מקצועי זה או אחר, וכפועל יוצא מכך – אף על הצמצום המתחייב בשיקול דעתו של שר החינוך בהחלטה אם לאשר את המלצות הוועדה, אם לדחותן. בתוך כך, נקבע כי נקודת המוצא היא שחברי ועדת הפרס הם אנשי מקצוע המומחים בתחומם, ולכן אוחזים ביתרון ניכר, כמעט מכריע, בכל הנוגע לבחירת המועמד הראוי ביותר לקבלת פרס ישראל בשל כישוריו, תרומתו והישגיו המקצועיים. על רקע זה, הוטעם כי “בכל הנוגע למהות השיקולים שעל יסודם מחליטה ועדת שופטים להעניק את פרס ישראל בתחום פלוני לפלוני, נתונה לוועדה אוטונומיה מוחלטת, ואין שר החינוך רשאי להתערב בהכרעתה ובשיקולים שעליהם ביססה הוועדה את החלטתה” (ראו: בג”ץ 2769/04‏ יהלום נ’ שרת החינוך והתרבות, פ”ד נח(4) 823, 838 (2004); ההדגשה הוספה, י.ו.; וכן ראו: סעיף א לתקנון פרס ישראל). בהתאם לכך, נקבע עוד כי הסמכות הנתונה לשר החינוך ביחס להחלטות הוועדה תחומה אך לפיקוח על פגמים דיוניים-ארגוניים, כגון פגמים שנפלו בקיום הוראות התקנון, מבחני התקינות המינהלית, כללי ההימנעות מניגוד עניינים וכיוצא באלה (ראו: עניין יהלום, שם).

3.        כמו כן, הודגש כי ככלל, אין מקום לשלול את הזכייה בפרס ישראל מאדם אשר נמצא ראוי לו מחמת עשייתו המקצועית, אך בשל התבטאויות שנויות במחלוקת שאינן נוגעות לעשייתו זו. זאת, הן מאחר שהתבטאויות מעין אלה חורגות מן המסגרת המקצועית העומדת לבחינתה של ועדת הפרס, והן מחמת החשש לפגיעה בחופש הביטוי של מועמדים לפרס ישראל – הכולל גם את זכותם להביע עמדות חריגות ואף מכעיסות בעיני הציבור או חלקים ממנו (ראו: בג”ץ 2454/08 פורום משפטי למען ארץ ישראל נ’ שרת החינוך‏, פסקה 10 (17.4.2008) (להלן: עניין פורום משפטי); וכן ראו: בג”ץ 1977/20 האגודה למען הלהט”ב בישראל (“האגודה לשמירת זכויות הפרט”) נ’ שר החינוך, פסקאות 11-9 (26.4.2020)).

4.        יחד עם זאת, צוין בפסיקה כי לצד אופייה המקצועי המובהק של עבודת ועדת הפרס, הרי שאין לשלול את האפשרות כי בבחינת מועמדותו של אדם לפרס ישראל, יינתן לעתים משקל אף לשיקולים “חיצוניים” – חברתיים-ערכיים, שהם בעלי משקל ניכר ויוצא דופן בחריגותו (ראו: עניין פורום משפטי, שם).

5.        נמצאנו למדים, אפוא, כי בבחינת מועמדותו של אדם לזכייה בפרס ישראל, הכלל הוא כי יישקלו אך תרומתו וסגולותיו המקצועיות של המועמד בתחום שלגביו עתיד להינתן הפרס. בחינתם של שיקולים מקצועיים מעין אלה נתונה כל כולה לשיקול דעתם של חברי ועדת הפרס – המומחים בתחום הנדון, ושר החינוך ימעט עד מאד מהתערבות בהמלצותיהם, למעט במקרים שבהם נפל בהתנהלות הוועדה פגם הליכי המצדיק את דחיית המלצותיה, כפי שבואר לעיל. לצד האמור, מתן משקל לשיקולים “חיצוניים”, כגון סוגיות חברתיות-ערכיות אשר אינן נוגעות לעשייתו המקצועית של המועמד לפרס ישראל, הוא אך בבחינת חריג שבחריג לכלל המתואר, אשר שמור למקרים נדירים וקיצוניים ביותר.

6.        יישום דברים אלה על ענייננו מעלה כי בהחלטתו מיום 10.6.2021, בה דחה שר החינוך את המלצת ועדת פרס ישראל להעניק לפרופ’ גולדרייך את הפרס בתחום חקר המתמטיקה ומדעי המחשב – הפך השר את היוצרות, משל היה החריג לאחד מרכיבי הכלל ממש, כפי שציין חברי השופט סולברג. כך, למשל, כתב שר החינוך בהחלטתו כדלקמן:

“כאשר נשקלת מועמדותו של איש אקדמיה לקבלת הפרס בתחומו המקצועי, עניין התרומה לאקדמיה הישראלית, ובאמצעותה – למדינת ישראל, אינו הטפל ההולך אחרי העיקר אלא, לכל הפחות, שיקול שווה-ערך לשיקול המצוינות האקדמית, אף אם בסדר הדברים הוא נשקל רק לאחר שהמועמד צולח את תנאי המצוינות האקדמית…

אין חולק כי תנאי הכניסה שאין בילתו לשערי המועמדות לקבלת פרס ישראל הוא מצוינות אקדמית או חברתית. מבחינת סדר הדברים זהו גם התנאי הראשון הנבדק. על בחינת עמידת המועמד בתנאי זה מופקדים אנשי האקדמיה המרכיבים את ועדת הפרס… ואולם עמידת המועמד בתנאי זה שעניינו מצוינות מקצועית אינה מבטיחה לו את קבלת פרס ישראל שכן עליו לעמוד בתנאי נוסף והוא – התרומה למדינת ישראל. על בחינת עמידת המועמד בתנאי זה מופקד, להבנתי, שר החינוך באותם מקרים חריגים יחסית בהם תרומתו המחקרית והאקדמית של המועמד אינה מכריעה גם את שאלת תרומתו למדינת ישראל…” (חלק מההדגשות הוספו, י.ו.).

הנה כי כן, הקורא בהחלטת שר החינוך עשוי לטעות ולחשוב כי חרף פסיקותיו המפורשות של בית משפט זה, שיקולים חברתיים-ערכיים אשר עניינם ב”תרומה למדינת ישראל”, כלשון השר, משמשים כחלק בלתי נפרד מן השיקולים אשר יש לבחון בטרם הכרזה על הזוכה בפרס. זאת, אף תוך מתן משקל שווה ערך (אם לא למעלה מכך) לשיקולים “חיצוניים” אלה, לצד השיקולים המקצועיים הנבחנים על-ידי חברי ועדת הפרס. בתוך כך, אף הרחיב שר החינוך את שיקול הדעת הנתון לו בפיקוח על החלטות הוועדה, ואשר צומצם בפסיקה לכדי פגמים דיוניים-ארגוניים בלבד, ולמעשה הפך עצמו לגורם נוסף השוקל באופן מובחן, לעתים דה-נובו ממש, את עמידתו של מועמד לפרס ב”תנאי התרומה למדינת ישראל”. 

7.        נוכח כל האמור, אני מסכימה לעמדת חברי, השופט נ’ סולברג, כי החלטת שר החינוך ניתנה תוך מתן משקל יתר לשיקולים אשר על-פי פסיקתו של בית משפט זה, יש לשמרם אך למקרים חריגים ונדירים במיוחד. לפיכך, ברי כי יש לבטל את החלטת השר לדחות את המלצת ועדת הפרס.

8.        ואולם, בביטול החלטת השר לא די, ועלינו להוסיף ולבחון מה תהא תוצאתו האופרטיבית של ביטול ההחלטה האמורה. בסוגיה זו נחלקו חבריי, כאשר השופט עמית סבור כי עלינו להכריז על פרופ’ גולדרייך כזוכה בפרס לשנת תשפ”א; ואילו השופט סולברג גורס כי עלינו להשיב את ההכרעה בנדון לשרת החינוך על מנת שתשוב ותשקול את המלצת ועדת הפרס, זאת לאור אמות המידה שהותוו בפסיקת בית המשפט. במחלוקת זו, כפי שציינתי לעיל, אני מצטרפת לעמדתו של חברי, השופט נ’ סולברג.

9.        כלל ידוע הוא כי נקודת המוצא בהפעלת ביקורת שיפוטית על החלטותיהן של רשויות המינהל היא כי בית משפט זה אינו מחליף את שיקול דעתו של הגורם המינהלי המוסמך בשיקול דעתו שלו, וכי על ההתערבות השיפוטית בכגון דא להיעשות באיפוק ותוך כיבוד חלוקת התפקידים בין רשויות השלטון. כלל זה משליך אף על ההכרעה במקרים שבהם לא די בקביעה כי החלטת הרשות המינהלית בטלה בשל פגמים שנפלו בה או בהליך קבלתה, אלא יש צורך לקבל החלטה חדשה תחתיה. במקרים אלו, עומדות בפני בית המשפט שתי חלופות אפשריות – האחת, לקבל החלטה חדשה במקום זו שבוטלה, והשנייה, להשיב את העניין לרשות המינהלית על מנת שזו תקבל החלטה חדשה בהתאם להנחיות שבפסק הדין אשר הורה על ביטול ההחלטה המקורית. אני סבורה כי ככלל, ראוי לו לבית המשפט להעדיף את אפשרות הפעולה השנייה, שהגיונה בצדה, ולהשיב את הדיון בסוגיה הנדונה אל הרשות המינהלית המוסמכת לשם מתן החלטה מחודשת, זאת הפעם בשים לב להוראות שניתנו בפסק הדין המבטל את ההחלטה המקורית. יפים לעניין זה דבריה של פרופ’ ברק-ארז:

“תוצאות ההתערבות השיפוטית – במקרה הרגיל, כאשר בית המשפט פוסל את שיקול הדעת שהפעילה הרשות המינהלית, ההחלטה חוזרת אל הרשות על מנת שתחליט בה בעצמה פעם נוספת לאור פסק דינו של בית המשפט. זהו ביטוי נוסף לגישה הבסיסית הגורסת שההחלטה מסורה בידי הרשות, ואל לו לבית המשפט להחליט במקומה. חריגים לכלל זה ניתן למצוא במקרים שבהם קיים חשש ממשי כי בשל תהליך ההחלטה שהתקיים לא תוכל הרשות להחליט בנושא מחדש בלי להיות ‘מקובעת’ בהחלטתה הקודמת, או במקרים שבהם נותרה למעשה חלופת החלטה אחת בלבד (לדוגמה, כאשר הבחירה היא בין שתי חלופות)” (ראו: דפנה ברק-ארז משפט מינהלי כרך ב 624 (2010); ההדגשה הוספה, י.ו.).

           דברים ברוח זו כתב אף פרופ’ זמיר בספרו:

“במקרים רבים הביטול של החלטה מינהלית כשלעצמו מספק פיתרון מלא בעניין הנדון, אך יש מקרים שבהם עם ביטול ההחלטה המינהלית נוצר צורך בקבלת החלטה חדשה שתסדיר את העניין הנדון. כיצד לנהוג במקרה כזה? כפי שבית המשפט אמר, ‘ברירת המחדל במקרים שבהם נמצא פגם בהחלטת הרשות המינהלית היא להשיב את העניין לשולחנה’. כך הדבר משום שהסמכות להחליט באותו עניין ושיקול הדעת הכרוך בהחלטה הוקנו על פי החוק לרשות המינהלית” (ראו: יצחק זמיר הסמכות המינהלית כרך ד – סדרי הביקורת המשפטית 2909 (2017); ההדגשה הוספה, י.ו.).

           (כן ראו והשוו בתחום דיני המכרזים: עע”ם 8409/09 חופרי השרון בע”מ נ’ א.י.ל. סלע (1991) בע”מ, פסקה פ לחוות דעתו של השופט (כתוארו אז) א’ רובינשטיין ופסקה 3 לחוות דעתו של השופט (כתוארו אז) ס’ ג’ובראן (24.5.2010); בענייני הענקת מעמד בישראל: עע”ם 9371/08 סאלח נ’ משרד הפנים, פסקה 13 (15.2.2011); ובאשר לתוצאותיה של הפליה בהענקת זכות הנתונה לשיקול דעת הרשות, ראו: בג”ץ 637/89 חוקה למדינת ישראל נ’ שר האוצר, פ”ד מו(1) 191, 208-206 (1991); ברק-ארז, בעמודים 711-710).

10.     השבת הדיון במועמדותו של פרופ’ גולדרייך לפרס ישראל אל שרת החינוך, מוצדקת ביתר שאת לנוכח הפסיקה העקבית לפיה בית משפט זה מבכר למשוך ידיו מהתערבות בעתירות הנוגעות ל(אי-)זכייה בפרס ישראל. פסיקתו של בית המשפט בנדון נומקה בעיקרה לאור השיקולים המקצועיים העומדים ביסוד הפרס, והרצון להימנע מהחלפת שיקול דעתם של הגורמים האמונים על הענקתו. ודוק, נימוקים אלה יפים אף לעניין בחירת התוצאה האופרטיבית הראויה בעקבות ביטול החלטת שר החינוך (ראו: בג”ץ 2205/97‏ מאסלה נ’ שר החינוך והתרבות, פ”ד נא(1) 233, 238 (1997); עניין יהלום, בעמודים 836-832, ו-840; עניין פורום משפטי, בפסקה 6; בג”ץ 2324/11 גיל נ’ שר החינוך, פסקאות 10-9 (26.4.2011); והשוו: בג”ץ 1933/98 הנדל נ’ שר החינוך התרבות והספורט (25.3.1998); בג”ץ 2348/00 סיעת המפד”ל, המפלגה הדתית לאומית בארץ ישראל נ’ שר החינוך (23.4.2000); כן השוו בהקשר זה להוראת סעיף 33 לחוק החוזים (חלק כללי), התשל”ג-1973).

11.      אשר על כן, אני מצטרפת, כאמור, לעמדת חבריי כי יש לבטל את החלטת שר החינוך לדחות את המלצת ועדת הפרס בדבר זכייתו של פרופ’ גולדרייך בפרס ישראל לשנת תשפ”א בתחום חקר המתמטיקה ומדעי המחשב. בכל הנוגע לתוצאה האופרטיבית של ביטול החלטת השר, אני מסכימה עם חברי, השופט נ’ סולברג, כי יש להחזיר את הדיון בענייננו אל שרת החינוך על מנת שתשוב ותבחן את המלצתה של ועדת הפרס במסגרת אמות המידה שהותוו לשם כך בפסיקתו של בית משפט זה, ובכלל זה בהתאם לפסק הדין דנן.

12.     בשולי הדברים, אך לא בשולי חשיבותם, ראיתי להוסיף ולהעיר כי אף אני מצטרפת לעמדת היועץ המשפטי לממשלה אשר ראה בחומרה רבה את התבטאויותיו של פרופ’ גולדרייך, כמו גם לעמדתו לפיה לא מן הנמנע כי קריאה לחרם על ישראל, באחת מן הדרכים הנזכרות בחוק למניעת פגיעה במדינת ישראל באמצעות חרם, התשע”א-2011 (להלן: חוק החרם), עשויה, במקרים המתאימים, להיות נסיבה “חיצונית” רלוונטית, אשר תישקל בבחינת זכאותו של מועמד לפרס ישראל. בתוך כך, כפי שהדגיש חברי השופט סולברג, אף קריאה לחרם על מוסד אקדמי יחיד (ובכלל זה על אוניברסיטת אריאל) עשויה לשמש כשיקול כאמור, וזאת, בין היתר, אף לאור הגדרתו המפורשת של המונח “חרם על מדינת ישראל” שבסעיף 1 לחוק החרם. ואולם, השאלה העומדת להכרעתה של שרת החינוך היא אם יש בחתימת פרופ’ גולדרייך על העצומה בראשית שנת 2021, משום נסיבה חיצונית חריגה ויוצאת דופן שיש בה כדי להצדיק את שלילת פרס ישראל ממנו, חרף הישגיו המקצועיים וטיבו המקצועי המובהק של הפרס, ולשם כך, כאמור, ראינו להשיב אליה את הנושא למתן החלטה חדשה.

13.     לבסוף, יש לקוות כי הדיון החוזר ונשנה בפרס ישראל יוותר בזירה הראויה לו – היא הזירה הציבורית – לטובת העניין ולכבודו של פרס ישראל.

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           אשר על כן, הוחלט פה אחד לבטל את החלטת שר החינוך לדחות את המלצת ועדת פרס ישראל להעניק לפרופ’ גולדרייך את הפרס לשנת תשפ”א בתחום חקר המתמטיקה ומדעי המחשב.

           כמו כן, הוחלט על דעת השופטים נ’ סולברג וי’ וילנר, כנגד דעתו החולקת של השופט י’ עמית, להשיב את בחינתה של המלצת הוועדה אל שרת החינוך על מנת שתשוב ותשקול אם לאשר המלצה זו.

           ניתן היום, ‏ד’ באלול התשפ”א (‏12.8.2021).

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חוזרים להנחלה

העיתונים מדווחים על המאבק הפוליטי סביב פרס ישראל 

חנוך מרמרי 11.02.2015 

המנחילים

המושג “הנחלה” מופיע פעמים רבות במשנתו של בן-ציון דינור (דינבורג), אדריכל התרבות של הישראליות בחיתוליה. “צריך למצוא דרך להנחיל לעם לא יצירות גרידא ולא ידיעתם של סופרים”, כתב, “אלא תמצית עמדתו הרוחנית של ישראל בעולם”. ומהי עמדה רוחנית זו? “להחדיר בהם במוקדם את גישת החיים שלנו שהיא קשורה עם יסודות התרבות וההשכלה שלנו”.

דינור, שחיפש “דרכים חדשות אל ההמונים”, היה אינטלקטואל ופקיד שלטון גם יחד שכיהן כשר החינוך מטעם מפא”י בארבע ממשלות (1951–1955). דינור, שיזם את חוק החינוך הממלכתי וחוק זכרון השואה והגבורה, הגה וייסד בין השאר את פרס ישראל על כל דקדוקי בחירותיו ופרטי טקס הענקתו. דינור, שהיה בוודאי אדם ראוי, זכה פעמיים בפרס ישראל (ללימודי יהדות ולחינוך), ולא סירב לקבלו, כבן-גוריון למשל. לא רק את הפרס כונן, אם כך, אלא גם את הסבב המעגלי שבו איש המחקר מעניק את הפרס לאיש החזון והרוח, וזה בתורו מעניק את הפרס לאיש המחקר.

מרטין בובר היה נואם הכבוד בטקס הענקת פרס ישראל הראשון, שנערך ב-5 באפריל 1953. בנאומו הציג שתי גישות שונות ליחסים שבין מדינה לאנשי הרוח שבה. המודל הראשון הוא של הכפפה מוחלטת של התרבות למדינה. “המדינה היא שקובעת את קנה-המידה התרבותי, היא שמגדירה את האמת למדע ואת היופי לאמנות, וכל יצירה תרבותית נעשית בהכוונתה וביוזמתה”. המודל האחר הוא “הכרה של המדינה בערך התרבות העצמאית, והפקת תועלת ממנה דווקא מתוקף עצמאותה”. לפי גישה זו, “המדינה והתרבות הן שותפות במפעל משותף, למען מטרה משותפת. החופש שמוענק לתרבות הוא שמאפשר יצירה מקורית, ובזכות היצירה הזו מגיע העם לגישוּם אחדותו העמוקה שגם המדינה שואפת לו”.

בובר בירך על כך שישראל, בזכות “מורשתה ומסורתה הקדומה”, שייכת לסוג השני של המדינות.

חרף שלטונו הריכוזי של בן-גוריון, יחסי האליטה האינטלקטואלית והמדינה התגבשו ברוח תקוותו של בובר יותר מאשר ברוח חזונו של דינור. ואמנם, רק בשנים ההן יכלה להתקיים תופעת אבא חושי, ראש העיר הנצחי של חיפה, שיזם פרויקט להעתקת משכנם של סופרים לעיר בתקווה לכונן בה סצינה ספרותית. עידוד היצירה מבחינתו התגלם בהענקת דירות עם מרפסת המשקיפה לים לאלה שיהגרו מן המרכז ומירושלים להר הכרמל.

אבל זה היה קוריוז מקומי, שהתאים לזמנו, ובסך-הכל צמחה כאן סצינה אינטלקטואלית עצמאית, תוססת, שנבנתה ממחלוקות פנימיות עזות בתוכה וכמה מאנשיה לא חששו להטיח את הפרס בחזרה במעניקיו – לא חשוב מאיזו ממשלה – ולא מתוך סגפנות בן-גוריוניסטית, אלא מתוך חתרנות לשמה. משנים די מוקדמות הפרס לא רק נתפס כאן כאות הערכה, אלא גם כאינטרס שלטוני, והחזרת הפרס לנותניו ביטאה גם מחאה כלפי העובדה שהפרס החליף ידיים בין ההגמונים לבין עצמם.

מי שירצה יוכל לכרוך את כל מהפכות התרבות המתחוללות כאן עם שקיעת ההגמוניה הוותיקה – בפיקוד הבכיר על צבא, בריסוק האוניברסיטאות, במאבק המר נגד התקשורת – ועכשיו היד הנעלמה נשלחת אל המחקר והיצירה. היה אפשר לברך על חילופי הדורות אילו היו מתרחשים מתוך שיח פנימי, כפי שדורות יוצרים מרדו באבותיהם הרוחניים. אבל כאן נראה שמחזירים את השעון לאחור. לימי דינור ובן-גוריון. נראה כי הפקידות התרבותית תופסת מחדש את השלטון שהופקע מידיה. לא מהפך, אלא מהפכת נגד. האם ההגמונים החדשים מתכוונים להקים כאן את המדינה מחדש?

תרעלה רוחנית

“להחזיר את פרס ישראל לישראל”, קורא נדב העצני במאמרו בעמוד הדעות של “מעריב”, שמובאה ממנו מודפסת בעמודו הראשון. “כמה טוב שיש מערכת בחירות מדי פעם. מסתבר שזו אולי הדרך היחידה לגרום לליכוד, ובעיקר לעומד בראשו – בנימין נתניהו, לפעול להגשמת המנדט שקיבל מהבוחרים שלו ולא רק לדאוג לג’ובים ובקבוקים. כל-כך הרבה שנים הליכוד בשלטון והנה, לראשונה, עושה ראש הממשלה צעד ראשון לקראת מה שהיו חייבים לעשות ראשי הממשלה מאז 1977 – לשמוט את השליטה של השמאל הקיצוני בתחום התרבות”.

העצני מציג כמה פריטים ברשימה השחורה שלו: פרופ’ הירשפלד התייצב בגלוי וחתם על עצומה המביעה תמיכה במי שמסרבים לשרת ביו”ש והוא חבר המועצה הציבורית של הארגון האנטי-ישראלי בצלם; פרופ’ נסים קלדרון כתב מאמר תמיכה נלהב בסרבני 8200; דוד טרטקובר, “שמוציא את דיבתנו רעה באופן שיטתי”, ומאז קיבל את הפרס נוסף לכל עצומה ויצירה מסיתה שהוא חתום עליהן התואר המכובד “חתן פרס ישראל”; א”ב יהושע, עמוס עוז, “וכמובן יוסי יונה – הציוני מהמחנה. הדעות הקיצוניות של אלו ידועות מזה שנים. רק לאחרונה חתמו מי מהם על עצומה שקראה לפרלמנטים זרים להכיר במדינה פלסטינית, אבל התייצבותם בפאתי השמאל הקיצוני לא מונעת מהם ומרבים שכמותם – במאים, תסריטאים, אמנים, שחקנים ועוד – לקבל מענקים ופרסים ממלכתיים ולהזריק לעורקי התודעה שלנו את התרעלה הרוחנית שהם משווקים”.

“אינני אוהב התערבות פוליטית בתהליכי תרבות, וחבל שאבנר הולצמן, חוקר ראוי, חטף בעקבו של אריאל הירשפלד”, כותב דרור אידר ב”ישראל היום”, “אבל מה הטענה? הוועדות הללו הן ברובן פוליטיזציה אסתטית במסווה. אפשר להבין את חבורת פורסי הפרסים שהתרגלה להעניק יוקרה ומעמד לאנ”ש ולהם בלבד. פתאום גם הם עומדים למבחן, ולא רק בני-טיפוחיהם. המצב העלוב של מדעי הרוח והחברה באוניברסיטאות נובע, בין השאר, בשל פוליטיזציה יתרה שבמסגרתה הפכו חוקרים ומרצים את הקתדרה שלהם לבמה פוליטית חד-ממדית. לפוליטיקה יש סימני קריאה ולחוקרים מהמחקר המדעי – סימני שאלה.

“הירשפלד הסתובב אמש באולפני הטלוויזיה כקדוש מעונה. הוא תהה כיצד פסלוהו משיקולים פוליטיים ולא תרבותיים, בעוד זה מה שהוא עצמו עשה במשך שנים. כי זאת האמת, מכלול מפעלו הביקורתי של הירשפלד בתחום הספרות נגוע בפוליטיזציה. באוקטובר 2006 התקיים פסטיבל המשוררים הבינלאומי בירושלים שהירשפלד היה מנהלו האמנותי. באותו זמן פירסמה המשוררת חוה פנחס-כהן את ספר שיריה השישי. כמי שחקר את שירתה, מדובר לטעמי במשוררת המוכשרת, הפורייה והמעמיקה ביותר כיום בשירה העברית. פשוט קראו את שירתה וראו את שכבות העומק הלשוניות, תרבותיות, ספרותיות, מיתולוגיות, יהודיות, נשיות המככבות תדיר בכתיבתה. והנה הירשפלד לא הזמין אותה לפסטיבל, כפי שלא הזמינו אותה לפסטיבלים הקודמים.

“[…] כך החבורה הזאת עובדת: יש לה מונופול על המוסר, האינטלקט, האסתטיקה. בקיצור, בדיחה. לא רק חוה פנחס-כהן, אלא מכלול יוצרים גדול, מלא ומקיף זכה להדרה מכתיבתו ומפעליו של הירשפלד ואחרים המשתמשים בקריטריונים אמנותיים כמסווה לקריטריונים פוליטיים, והדוגמאות מרובות […] עכשיו הירשפלד תוהה כיצד מערבים פוליטיקה בתרבות. אז מה עשית כל השנים, ספרות?”.

כותב דן מרגלית ב”ישראל היום”: “בקבלו מהשר שי פירון את האחריות למשרד החינוך מצא בנימין נתניהו שקודמו קבע כי הפרופסורים אריאל הירשפלד ואבנר הולצמן (וכן הסופרת גיל הראבן) ישמשו השנה כחברי הוועדה לבחירת חתן פרס ישראל לספרות. לשכתו הורתה להדיח את הירשפלד והולצמן (מדוע גם אותו? שאלתי במשרד ראש הממשלה ולא קיבלתי תשובה). הירשפלד כתב בקיץ מאמר חריף נגד נתניהו ב”הארץ”, אבל ההסבר להדחתו היה שקרא לסרב לשרת בצה”ל. איני חוקר כליות ולב, אבל גם אם נכון שהמניע הוא תמיכתו בסרבנות, היה זה משגה דרמטי מאת נתניהו לפטרו. מפני שהדחתו בדיעבד עלולה ליצור מראית עין של ז’דנוביזם (רדיפה).

“[…] רק שמנגד קיימת תהייה: כיצד קורה שכל התקציבים לעידוד התרבות זורמים בישראל למי שבכתיבתם נוטים לצד הפלשתיני בעודם עוסקים בסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי? ניתנים גם למי שבכל מחלוקת חילונית-דתית כותבים נגד חובשי הכיפות. לא סביר שכבר עשרות שנים לא נראה על הבמה או על צג הטלוויזיה מחזה כלשהו המתאר דווקא את האור הגדול של הציונות. גם זה דורש תיקון”.

שתי מודעות

“הארץ”, עמוד ראשון, מודעת רבע עמוד של מרצ: כותרת: “פרס חורבן ישראל”. מתוך הטקסט: “ביבי הופך את פרס ישראל לפרס ארץ ישראל השלמה”; “היום זו משטרת דעות, מחר זו תהיה משטרת מחשבות”.

“הארץ”, עמ’ 6, ריבוע בן 3 טורים: “קראנו בתדהמה על החלטת לשכת ראש הממשלה לפסול ללא נימוק את מועמדותם של שני חברים בוועדת השופטים לפרס ישראל בספרות, פרופ אריאל הירשפלד ופרופ’ אבנר הולצמן. אנו קוראים לראש הממשלה לחזור בו”. על הקריאה חתומים 26 שמות. 19 פרופסורים, 3 דוקטורים, 3 סופרים ומשוררת. 8 מהחתומים זכו בפרס ישראל – 6 חתנים ו-2 כלות.

מחכים להוראות מלשכת רה”מ

הכותרת הראשית ב”הארץ”: “בצל גל הפרישות: חשש לביטול פרס ישראל השנה”. על הידיעה חתום אור קשתי, מי שפירסם לראשונה את דבר פסילתם של הירשפלד והולצמן מחברות בוועדת הפרס. קשתי דיווח כי בעקבות החשיפה התפטרו במחאה 4 מ-5 חברי ועדת השופטים בפרס ישראל לחקר הספרות (שהוקמה במקביל לוועדה לפרס הסופר): פרופ’ נסים קלדרון, פרופ’ נורית גרץ, פרופ’ זיוה בן-פורת וד”ר אורי הולנדר. זאת, נוסף לסופרת גיל הר-אבן, שהתפטרה מהוועדה לפרס הספרות, וליוצר הקולנועי רם לוי, שהתפטר מהוועדה לפרס הקולנוע (בעקבות פסילת מפיק הקולנוע והטלוויזיה חיים שריר לחברות בוועדה זו). אמש הודיע פרופ’ יגאל שוורץ כי החליט לוותר על מועמדותו לפרס.

עופר אדרת סוקר ב”הארץ” כמה מן השערוריות שעורר הפרס ב-51 שנותיו. ב-1968, במלאות שני עשורים לקום המדינה, סירב דוד בן-גוריון לקבל את הפרס על מפעל חיים, וכך כתב לשר החינוך זלמן ארן: “פועלי בארצנו לא היה יותר ממילוי חובתי האזרחית. אני רואה כחובה להודיע לכבודו שאינני רואה לי כל זכות לקבל פרס זה […] לפי הכרתי לא מגיע לי כל פרס בעד מילוי חובה, ולכן הפרס נשאר לרשותך ותוכל למסור אותו למי שתראה צורך בכך”. ב-1961 התבשר הרב צבי יהודה הכהן קוק על-ידי שר החינוך אבא אבן כי יקבל את פרס ישראל לספרות תורנית על ההוצאה לאור של כתבי אביו, הרב קוק. הוא סירב לקבל את הפרס בטענה שאינו ראוי לכך ובשל התרחקותו מכל כיבוד.

“ב-1993 הודיע פרופ’ ישעיהו ליבוביץ כי אינו מעוניין לקבל את הפרס בשל המהומה שעוררה ההחלטה להעניק לו אותו והודעתו של ראש הממשלה יצחק רבין כי יחרים את הטקס באופן חסר תקדים. על ליבוביץ נמתחה אז ביקורת ציבורית רחבה בשל ההשוואה שערך בין חמאס למסתערבים”. יצחק שמיר אמר אז כי ההחלטה להעניק לו את הפרס “מעוררת בי גועל נפש” וכי היא “תקלקל את אווירת יום-העצמאות”. שרת החינוך והתרבות דאז, שולמית אלוני, לא התרשמה מהביקורת ואמרה כי לממשלה ולכנסת אין מעמד בהחלטה על מקבלי הפרס. “אי-אפשר לבחור רק אנשים שמקובלים על הכל. מי שמקובל על כולם מותר לחשוד בו שאינו מקורי ויצירתי כל-כך”, אמרה.

ב-1976 זכה אורי זוהר בפרס ישראל לקולנוע ולטלוויזיה על סרטיו, לצד מוטי קירשנבאום, שזכה על “ניקוי ראש”. “ירידה ברמה” ו”מעשה ליצנות” היתה רוח התגובות שהציפו את העיתונים באותה תקופה במחאה על הבחירה בשניים. “אחד שהשתמש בסמים – צריך לתת לו את פרס ישראל?”, תהה אדם אחר, בהתייחסו לזוהר, שלבסוף ויתר על הפרס.

ב-1992 הוענק הפרס למשורר הערבי-ישראלי אמיל חביבי. הביקורת נגד ההחלטה באה משני עברי המתרס – פלסטינים ויהודים כאחד. העיתונאי הערבי הנודע לוטפי משעור ליגלג, ומחמוד דרוויש דרש מחביבי לא לקבל את הפרס. “ואולי נפל חביבי טרף לתכסיס תעמולה של הממסד הישראלי, המבקש להראות כי הדמוקרטיה חוגגת בישראל עד כדי כך שמעלים על נס את הישגיו של סופר ערבי”, תהה פרופ’ שמעון בלס מהחוג לספרות ערבית באוניברסיטת חיפה.

חביבי לא נרתע מהביקורת וקיבל את הפרס. “אני אוחז בתהילה בשני קצותיה. דבק בעמדותי בלי לוותר על מקומי […] איני בוגד […] אני ממשיך להילחם על זכויותי ובמשנה מרץ. עובדה היא שכיום, לאחר דרך ארוכה של מאבק למען זכויות עמי, מכירים בי גם השלטונות הישראליים. עצם הענקת הפרס מביעה את השלמתם עם היות ערביי ישראל עובדה קיימת, וכי לא יוכלו לגרשם מכאן”, אמר.

במחאה על הענקת הפרס לחביבי, החזיר יובל נאמן, ראש תנועת התחייה, את פרס ישראל בפיזיקה שניתן לו ב-1969, ויצא עם תומכיו מהאולם. הקהל, מצדו, הגיב בתשואות לחביבי, שבהמשך העניק את הפרס לסהר-האדום בעזה.

התערבות פוליטית בפרס ישראל נרשמה ב-2003, כששרת החינוך לימור לבנת שללה את הפרס ממשה גרשוני, בעקבות סירובו ללחוץ את ידה ואת ידו של ראש הממשלה אריאל שרון. שנה אחר-כך שוב נגררה לבנת למחלוקת, כשפנתה לוועדה בבקשה לדון מחדש בהמלצה להעניק את הפרס לאמן אחר, יגאל תומרקין. זאת, “בשל התנהגות והתבטאויות פוגעות של הפסל”. הוועדה, שבחנה את הנושא פעם נוספת, עמדה על החלטתה והפרס הוענק לו.

לאורך השנים הוגשו כמה עתירות לבג”ץ נגד מקבלי פרסים. כולן נדחו. ברשימה היו גם השרה שולמית אלוני והפרופ’ זאב שטרנהל. בהתייחסה לאחרון, כתבה השופטת עדנה ארבל: “בעוד פרס ישראל ניתן בגין הישגים מקצועיים ראויים להערכה, ההתבטאויות בהן מדובר על פי רוב נעשות מחוץ למסגרת המקצועית בגינה ניתן הפרס. במצב דברים זה קשה שלא לראות את מניעת הפרס ממי שנמצא ראוי לו בשל הישגיו המקצועיים, אך על בסיס עמדות שהביע, כפגיעה בחופש הביטוי”.

ב-1997, באופן חריג, התערב בג”ץ בהחלטה על מתן הפרס. השופטים ביטלו אז את החלטת שר החינוך זבולון המר לאשר את מתן פרס ישראל לעיתונות לשמואל שניצר מ”מעריב”, והורו לוועדת הפרס לקיים דיון חוזר. הוועדה נקראה להתחשב בכך ששניצר הורשע בעבירת אתיקה עיתונאית על פרסום מאמר שבו תיאר את בני הפלשמורה כ”שחורים” ומפיצי מחלות מסוכנות. בדיון בבג”ץ התברר כי ועדת השופטים שהמליצה לשר לתת את הפרס לשניצר כלל לא ידעה על פרסום המאמר, וגם לא על העובדה שבית-הדין לערעורים בענייני אתיקה של מועצת העיתונות קבע שעבר בו עבירה אתית.

בפסק הדין שביטל את החלטת המר קבע השופט תיאודור אור, בהסכמת השופטים דליה דורנר ודורית ביניש, כי העובדה שהשר והוועדה לא ידעו על המאמר, על ההרשעה ועל סירובו של שניצר לחזור בו פוגמת בהחלטת השר באופן המצדיק את ביטולה. אור הדגיש כי אין בפסק הדין משום קביעת עמדה בשאלה אם ראוי לתת את הפרס לשניצר.

כמה ימים לאחר מכן התכנסה הוועדה שנית והחליטה שלא להעניק את הפרס לשניצר, בשל אי-יכולתם של חבריה להגיע להסכמה פה אחד בנושא. בהודעה שפירסמו אמרו, עם זאת, כי אין במאמר של שניצר בכדי לערער את תרומתו לעיתונות העברית במשך למעלה מחמישה עשורים, אך התנצלותו עליו לא הניחה את דעתם.

ביקורת על התנהלות הוועדה מתח מבקר המדינה מיכה לינדנשטראוס ב-2010. “יוקרתו של פרס ישראל מחייבת שתהליך בחירת הזוכים יהיה הוגן, שוויוני, נטול כל ליקויים בהליך בחירת חתני הפרס, בשל זיקה בין יועצי השר לענייני הפרס לבין ארגונים שקיבלו אותו”.

המבקר התייחס אז לשני יועצים לשר החינוך, שבדיקתו מצאה כי המליצו על הענקת הפרס לגופים שהיו קשורים עימם מקצועית. המבקר קבע עוד כי בחירת החברים לוועדות השופטים אינה שקופה לציבור, וכי תהליך זה מוביל גם לכך ש”אין הלימה בין התפלגות האוכלוסייה לבין מקבלי הפרס במשך השנים”. כך, מבין כ-620 זוכים יחידים בפרס רק כ-90 הן נשים, ורק חמישה אינם יהודים.

30.12.21

Editorial Note

Sweden is set to assume the Presidency of the International Holocaust Remembrance of Antisemitism (IHRA) from March 2022 to the end of February 2023.  Sweden has taken this role seriously. In October 2021, Sweden hosted the Malmö International Forum on Holocaust Remembrance and Combating Antisemitism, where the leaders of the European Union, the United Nations, and heads of state and government from many countries have met.  Forty-seven members of states and several international organizations have participated.  

Sweden presented its pledges to fight antisemitism with EUR 9.3 million a year.  

In 2022, a museum will be established in Sweden to preserve and pass on the memory of the Holocaust.  The Swedish Government will contribute 5.5 million kronor to the Auschwitz-Birkenau Foundation so that this place is preserved, and new generations can build a future from learning, reflecting, and remembering the terrible past. 

Sweden pledges “to promote education to prevent antisemitism and other forms of racism and to strengthen Holocaust research education for active citizenship to prevent antisemitism and other forms of racism will be promoted through a nationwide undertaking conducted by the Swedish National Agency for Education in cooperation with the Living History Forum. It will focus on a wide range of target groups encompassing formal and non-formal education. Activities will be initiated during 2022, with funding allocated by the Swedish Research Council.  

Sweden pledges to combat antisemitism and antigypsyism, and other forms of racism, both online and offline. Action programs with measures against antisemitism will be presented in 2022, such as criminalizing all forms of organized racism.  The Swedish Government will “consult the Parliament and appoint a parliamentary committee of inquiry to unbiasedly consider whether Holocaust denial should be more clearly criminalized.” Sweden also pledges to “promote Jewish life.” For this, a “government inquiry on a strategy to promote Jewish life in Sweden will be appointed… Funding for security-enhancing measures for civil society, including the Jewish community, will increase significantly from 2022.”

Unfortunately, during the Malmö Forum, Swedish police investigated how the words “the Holocaust was a scam” were projected onto the main synagogue in Malmö and on other buildings in cities across southern Sweden. The Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter reported that the police are handling the case as a hate crime. The Nordic Resistance Movement, a neo-Nazi group, claimed responsibility for the incident. 

A group of academics mounted a much more sophisticated attack on the Malmo Forum.  They wrote the Forum urging to reject and counter the “instrumentalization” of antisemitism. For them, several of the IHRA examples are “being weaponized against human rights organizations and solidarity activists who denounce Israel’s occupation and human rights violations.” The seven IHRA examples concerning Israel “legitimize wrongful accusations of antisemitism, which serve as a warning for anyone voicing criticism of Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians. This has a chilling effect on free speech and academic freedom and compromises the fight against antisemitism. Regrettably, this clear abuse of the IHRA definition and of the examples has so far not been acknowledged by governments and parliaments that have adopted it.” Instead, the group offers the alternative definition of antisemitism that was launched the year before, the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA).  

The JDA was an initiative of a number of scholars from the US, Israel, Europe, and the UK, “who have vast experience with the IHRA definition.” For the group, “the JDA is clearer and more coherent than the IHRA definition. Without any underlying political agenda, it offers guidance concerning political speech where the IHRA definition has created muddle and controversy.” 

Not surprisingly, the letter to the Malmo Forum boasts several Israeli academics as signatories, including  Moshe Behar; Jose Brunner; Amos Goldberg; David Shulman; Moshe Zimmermann, and Moshe Zuckermann. IAM reported in the past on their anti-Israel/pro-Palestinian activism, including borderline antisemitism.

For example, Prof. Goldberg has espoused the equivalence between the Holocaust and the Palestinian Nakba. 

Prof. Zimmerman found similarities “Between Hebron youth and Hitler Youth, between the motivation and conditions of service in some of the IDF’s elite units and that of the Waffen SS, between Israeli soccer fans and those of the Third Reich, and between the Old Testament and Mein Kampf.” Zimmerman, a well-known scholar and head of the Minerva Center for German History at the Hebrew University, must be aware that the Waffen-SS, the military branch of the SS has been involved in some of the most heinous crimes against Jews and other civilians during WWII.  During the Nuremberg Trials the Waffen-SS was declared a criminal organization responsible for the murder of millions.  Zimmerman’s comparison between “the motivation and the condition of service in some of the IDF’s elite units” and the Waffen-SS is a malevolent act of antisemitism that the IHRA definition seeks to target.  

Prof. Zuckermann wrote in his book Shoah Baheder Haatum, that “The Zionist collective which cannot escape the truth, that every “deviation” in Gaza, every victim of a “warning shot in the air” in the West Bank, that every act of brutal suppression is distancing it from the ethical and humane conduct befitting victims of the Holocaust, and is moving it into the realm of a mentality represented by the identity of the murderers.” 

Others seem to give to wanton outbursts of rage similar to blood libel.  Dr. Behar, Program Director of Arabic & Middle Eastern Studies, University of Manchester, is a case in point.  In a recent comment on Facebook concerning Israel Academia Monitor (IAM), he commented, “There are not many expectations from a person [IAM] whose entire livelihood is built on allowing blood spill, incitement and lies… You do nothing but allow blood to spill. And what do you think gave birth to Baruch Goldstein and Yigal Amir if not people like you… There is a close connection between you and murderous violence against non-Jews and democratic Jews (bombing of [Zeev] Sternhell).”

Antisemitism has surged around the world to levels not seen since WWII.  The IHRA working definition is among the few tools available to fight it.  Scholars who oppose it legitimize this new wave of antisemitism. They may not necessarily wish to protect free speech but rather to spread antisemitic ideas. The IHRA working definition prevents them from doing so.

References
https://www.government.se/articles/2021/09/swedens-pledges-at-the-malmo-forum/

Sweden’s pledges at the Malmö Forum

Published 13 September 2021

Sweden will assume the Presidency of the IHRA from March 2022 to the end of February 2023. This was Sweden’s first pledge in connection with the Malmö Forum. Pledges presented at the Malmö Forum will be followed up during the Swedish Presidency. The ambition of the Swedish Government is to implement the measures below and allocate a total amount of approximately EUR 9.3 million/year.

We pledge to preserve and pass on the memory of the Holocaust

A museum to preserve and pass on the memory of the Holocaust will be established in Sweden in 2022. The activities of the museum will be built up and formed over the years to come. One starting point is that stories of Holocaust survivors with a connection to Sweden will be at the core of the museum’s activities. A Swedish-language version of the Dimensions in Testimony installation (developed by the Shoah Foundation) that allows visitors to interact with Holocaust survivors via pre-recorded answers to questions – using artificial intelligence technology – will be spread by the museum to schools and other museums all over the country.

The Swedish Government will make a contribution of 5,5 million kronor to the Auschwitz-Birkenau Foundation, so that this place is preserved and new generations can build a future from learning, reflecting and remembering the terrible past.

We pledge to promote education to prevent antisemitism and other forms of racism and to strengthen Holocaust research

Education for active citizenship to prevent antisemitism and other forms of racism will be promoted through a nationwide undertaking conducted by the Swedish National Agency for Education in cooperation with the Living History Forum. It will focus on a wide range of target groups encompassing formal and non-formal education.
Activities, based on the recommendations of the Swedish Research Council’s survey of Swedish research on the Holocaust and antisemitism, including groups such as the Roma and antigypsyism, will be initiated during 2022, with funding allocated by the Swedish Research Council.

We pledge to combat antisemitism, antigypsyism and other forms of racism – online and offline

An action programme with measures against antisemitism will be presented in 2022. Action programmes targeting antigypsyism, islamophobia, Afrophobia and racism against the Sami will also be presented. The IHRA working definitions of antisemitism and antigypsyism/Roma discrimination will be considered in these respective programmes. The programmes will e.g. include measures in the field of education, continued and enhanced efforts by the police to counter racism and hate crime, as well as an assignment to the Swedish Defence Research Agency to continuously monitor antisemitism and other forms of racism, hate speech and violent extremism in digital environments.
Organised racism and support for organised racism will be criminalised. The Government will also consult the Parliament and appoint a parliamentary committee of inquiry to unbiasedly consider whether Holocaust denial should be more clearly criminalised.

We pledge to promote Jewish life, strengthen Roma inclusion and enhance security for civil society

A government inquiry on a strategy to promote Jewish life in Sweden will be appointed. The National strategy for Roma inclusion will continue and permanent resources will be allocated from 2022. Language centres for Yiddish and Romani will be established.
Funding for security-enhancing measures for civil society, including the Jewish community, will increase significantly from 2022.

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Click to access outcome-document—pledges-presented-at-the-malmo-international-forum-on-holocaust-remembrance-and-combating-antisemitism.pdf

Outcome Document
Pledges presented at the
Malmö International Forum on Holocaust Remembrance and Combating Antisemitism
Remember—ReAct 2 (89)
At the invitation of Stefan Löfven, Prime Minister of Sweden, Heads of State and Government, ministers and other representatives of governments, international organisations, civil society organisations, companies, researchers, experts and survivors of the Holocaust gathered in Malmö the 13 October 2021 at the Malmö International Forum on Holocaust Remembrance and Combating Antisemitism – Remember ReAct. In total 74 delegations participated.
Determined to strengthen the work on Holocaust remembrance and to combat antisemitism and other forms of racism, both nationally and internationally participants affirmed their commitment to Holocaust remembrance, Holocaust education, antisemitism on social media, and combating antisemitism, antigypsyism and other forms of racism.
Taking into account the Stockholm Declaration adopted at the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust held in 2000 and the 2020 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) Ministerial Declaration, participants at the Malmö Forum pledged to strengthen their work and international cooperation in this area.
The pledges made by participants, listed below, will be followed up during the Swedish Presidency of the IHRA, March 2022–February 2023.
Pledges are presented in their entirety as formulated by the participants of the Malmö Forum (as per 30 November 2021). The Swedish Government Offices does not take responsibility for the content or formulation of pledges made by others than Sweden.
Remember—ReAct 3 (89)
Pledges presented at the Malmö International Forum on Holocaust Remembrance and Combating Antisemitism
Countries ………………………………………………………………………………. 6
1. Albania ……………………………………………………………………………….. 6
2. Argentina …………………………………………………………………………….. 7
3. Australia ……………………………………………………………………………… 8
4. Austria ………………………………………………………………………………… 8
5. Belgium …………………………………………………………………………….. 15
6. Bosnia and Herzegovina ……………………………………………………… 16
7. Bulgaria …………………………………………………………………………….. 18
8. Canada …………………………………………………………………………….. 19
9. Croatia ……………………………………………………………………………… 21
10. Cyprus…………………………………………………………………………….. 22
11. Denmark …………………………………………………………………………. 22
12. Estonia ……………………………………………………………………………. 24
13. Finland ……………………………………………………………………………. 24
14. France …………………………………………………………………………….. 25
15. Germany …………………………………………………………………………. 26
16. Greece ……………………………………………………………………………. 29
17. Hungary ………………………………………………………………………….. 30
18. Ireland …………………………………………………………………………….. 31
19. Israel ………………………………………………………………………………. 33
20. Italy ………………………………………………………………………………… 34
21. Latvia ……………………………………………………………………………… 34
22. Lithuania …………………………………………………………………………. 35
23. Luxemburg ………………………………………………………………………. 39
Remember—ReAct 4 (89)
24. Moldova ………………………………………………………………………….. 40
25. Monaco …………………………………………………………………………… 41
26. North Macedonia ………………………………………………………………. 43
27. Norway ……………………………………………………………………………. 44
28. Poland …………………………………………………………………………….. 45
29. Portugal …………………………………………………………………………… 47
30. Romania ………………………………………………………………………….. 47
31. Rwanda …………………………………………………………………………… 49
32. Serbia……………………………………………………………………………… 50
33. Slovakia ………………………………………………………………………….. 51
34. Slovenia ………………………………………………………………………….. 52
35. Spain ………………………………………………………………………………. 54
36. Sweden …………………………………………………………………………… 55
37. Switzerland ……………………………………………………………………… 57
38. The Czech Republic ………………………………………………………….. 57
39. The Netherlands ………………………………………………………………. 58
40. Turkey …………………………………………………………………………….. 59
41. Ukraine ……………………………………………………………………………. 61
42. United Kingdom ……………………………………………………………….. 62
43. United States of America …………………………………………………… 63
International organisations …………………………………………………… 64
44. European Commission ………………………………………………………. 64
45. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights ………………….. 66
46. International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) …………. 67
47. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) ……………………………………………………………………………….. 68
Remember—ReAct 5 (89)
48. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) ……………………………………………………………………………. 69
Civil Society organisations …………………………………………………… 70
49. American Jewish Committee ………………………………………………. 70
50. Anti-defamation league ……………………………………………………… 71
51. B’nai B’rith International …………………………………………………….. 71
52. European Jewish Congress ……………………………………………….. 72
53. European Roma Rights Centre …………………………………………… 74
54. The International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA World) ………………………………………………………… 75
55. World Jewish Congress …………………………………………………….. 76
Private sector ………………………………………………………………………. 80
56. Facebook ………………………………………………………………………… 80
57. Google & YouTube …………………………………………………………… 81
58. TikTok …………………………………………………………………………….. 83
Others …………………………………………………………………………………. 84
59. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum …………………………. 84
60. Yad Vashem ……………………………………………………………………. 84
Annex ………………………………………………………………………………….. 86
Participants at Malmö International Forum on Holocaust Remembrance and Combating Antisemitism, 13 October 2021 ……. 86
Remember—ReAct 6 (89)
Countries
1. Albania
Albania pledges to continue to educate and help its society especially younger generations to understand the evils of anti-Semitism and commits to oppose to the Holocaust denial.
In this context, in addition to initiatives already undertaken in Albania against anti-Semitism, including through education curricula, Albania pledges: To translate and publish in Albanian the four-volume publication on Addressing Anti-Semitism in Schools: Training Curricula for trainers of primary school teachers, secondary school teachers, vocational school teachers, and school principals. These curricula will aim to strengthening the capacity of school principals and teachers to prevent and respond to anti-Semitism.
A didactic package to be supplemented with other publications produced by ODIHR such as:
Addressing Anti-Semitism through Education: Guidelines for Policymakers;
Training and Addressing Anti-Semitism in Schools: Educational Videos.
Teaching about Holocaust: continue the inclusion of the topic in the new school textbooks Teachers will continue to refer to materials produced by the Council of Europe, such as the “Guidelines for teachers and educators” for teaching about the Holocaust, publication of UNESCO, ODIHR, recommendations for teaching and learning about the holocaust- 2019, IHRA.
Training of teachers and education professionals:
History teacher, civic education teacher and geography teachers to receive training on how to deal with discrimination.
Enriching the section of the National Historical Museum in Tirana dedicated to the Holocaust since 2004 and consisting of photographs, texts, maps, and wartime documents.
Remember—ReAct 7 (89)
Opening the Cultural Center for Albanian-Jewish relations in Tirana and Jerusalem, an initiative taken by PM Rama. (DCM No 246, 25.10.2019)
Establishing the Albanian Jewish Museum in the city of Vlora, a proposal of the Ministry of Culture approved by the National Council of Museums in July 2020. Currently there is an international competition for the project design supported through collaboration by Jewish Museums curators.
We also pledge to invest and develop further the Solomon Museum in Berat.
Investing in Jewish Museum in Berat will be followed up by the pledge of Mayor of Tirana to turn into museums the Tirana Houses that sheltered Jews. This promise was declared during the Albania-Israel cultural festival taking place in Tirana, by the Mayor of Tirana Erion Veliaj focusing on the relations between the Albanian and Jewish people, expressed pride in the protection of Jews in our country during the Holocaust.
2. Argentina
Proposal I: “Argentina is committed to continuing the fight against anti-Semitism, a commitment that will be reflected in the new National Plan against Discrimination 2021-2024 that is being prepared by INADI” (source: INADI).
Proposal II: “The Argentine State, according to the National Education Law 26.206 art. 3 and 92 and in the Resolutions of the Federal Council of Education N ° 80/09, 188/12 and 269/15 and in the Priority Learning Centers, has the objective to consolidate an educational policy that promotes the teaching of subjects related to the violation of human rights in order to build a democratic citizenship.
In relation to the teaching of the Holocaust and the fight against anti-Semitism, the Ministry of Education, through the Education and Memory program, is committed to carry out:
• Training actions for teachers with a national scope;
• Accompaniment and assistance to technical teams for the insertion of topics in schools in the provinces;
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• Develop educational materials for the implementation of the contents related to the teaching of the Holocaust and the fight against anti-Semitism.
3. Australia
Australia recognises the importance of continuing to act with regards to racism in the community and welcomes the Australian Human Rights Commission’s ongoing consultations on developing a National Anti-Racism Framework.
Australia pledges to support efforts to preserve and pass on the memory of the Holocaust by undertaking and promoting activities of Holocaust Memorial week and International Holocaust Remembrance Day (January 27).
Australia pledges to call out antisemitism online, facilitate public reporting to online service providers, and encourage public engagement in this process.
Australia welcomes the upcoming Gandel Philanthropy and Deakin University Holocaust Knowledge and Awareness in Australia survey, the first and largest of its kind, which will assist research and future policy directions.
To further endeavours on preserving and passing on the memory of the Holocaust, Australia is working toward Holocaust Museums or Education Centres in each jurisdiction. We appreciate the ongoing assistance and leadership of philanthropic organisations to fulfil this ambition.
4. Austria
Pledge: New Austrian exhibition in Auschwitz
A new Austrian exhibition is being created to go on display at the former concentration and extermination camp and present-day State Museum Auschwitz-Birkenau. It is accommodated on the ground floor of Block 17 of Auschwitz I, where the first Austrian exhibition was on display from 1978 to 2013.
The original exhibition was initiated and co-conceived by former inmates. It reflected the then prevalent victim paradigm. In 2009, the Austrian Federal Government decided to renew the exhibition. The National Fund was
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entrusted with the tasks of renewing the content and design of the exhibition and overseeing the challenging restoration of the former inmate block 17, a listed building, to ensure that it is fit to house the new exhibition.
Following a pan-European call to tender the National Fund appointed a team led by curator Hannes Sulzenbacher and architect Martin Kohlbauer to conceive and design the new exhibition.
The new exhibition bears the title “Far Removed. Austria and Auschwitz”. The notion “far removed” refers to the geographical distance between Austria and Auschwitz, which was part of the Nazi strategy to conceal the genocide. At the same time, removal was synonymous with extermination: it meant the physical removal of the deportees – from Austria and from the realm of the living. The main elements of the exhibition consist of three interdependent and yet interrelated levels: “Here” (Auschwitz), “There” (Austria) and “The Void”.
The exhibition will portray the fates of the Austrian victims in Auschwitz, the acts of resistance carried out by Austrian inmates there and the involvement of Austrians as perpetrators of and accessories to the atrocities committed there. As well as providing historical information, it will also provide a space for collective commemoration and private remembrance.
The exhibition will open in autumn 2021.
As a place or remembrance and learning, it is to be hoped that it will help fostering the understanding and dialogue between the generations and people with different religious, national and ethnic backgrounds.
Pledge: Stepping up training for educators and adapting teacher training curricula
Currently an IHRA co-funded international research project is conducted to develop a catalogue of qualifications and measures for appropriate initial training as well as further training for teachers in the areas of the Holocaust and National Socialism as well as the prevention of antisemitism (also in the context of anti-racist educational work). For Austria, the research is carried out by _erinnern.at_, the Holocaust Education Institute of the Federal Ministry of Education, Science and Research.
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The recommendations of the international research group will be implemented both in the training curricula of teachers and in programs for teacher further training. To this end a thorough evaluation of Austrian teacher training curricula will be carried out which will result in respective adaptations of initial and further training for educators.
Furthermore, the Austrian Federal Ministry of Education plans the expansion of educational offers for educators to enable them to appropriately deal with current challenges with regard to antisemitism and racism in classroom.
To support this goal cooperation and exchange measures with international educational institutions, including Israel will be expanded.
Pledge: Systematic hate crime data collection and police training
The Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) has implemented “hate crime” as an international monitoring definition since July 2019. Since then, the BMI has worked on improving the systematic recognition of bias motives in criminal charges as part of a two-year EU-co-funded project. 17 consultations with civil society organisations, especially with the Jewish Community of Vienna, have taken place. For the training of approximately 30,000 police officers nationwide, a comprehensive e-learning seminar was developed. Face-to-face trainings are carried out by 207 specially trained instructors.
On 1 November 2020, the “Motive” tab was activated in the police data processing system in order to recognise “bias motives according to victim group”. As a result, data is transmitted automatically to the judiciary via a specially created interface using “E-Justice”. There are 9 categories of bias motive: age, disability, gender, skin colour, national/ethnic origin, religion, sexual orientation, social status and ideology/political views.
Data (November 2020 to April 2021) was statistically evaluated and a pilot report was published in July 2021. In 1,936 bias-motivated crimes, 2,401 bias motives were registered. Two details concerning antisemitism stand out: Firstly, offences against public order, in particular hate speech and those under the law banning National Socialist activities (the Prohibition Act), were especially prevalent in the categories skin colour and the Jewish faith. Secondly, concerning the sites of the crimes, a large proportion of online
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crimes detected was committed – again – due to “skin colour” or Jewish affiliation.
Systematic recognition of bias motives in criminal charges has been fully implemented within the police force and this system is now being developed further with a victim-centered approach – in close cooperation with the Jewish Community of Vienna in particular.
Pledge: National strategy against antisemitism
On 21 January 2021, the Austrian Federal Government has presented the National Strategy to combat and prevent all forms of antisemitism. The strategy was developed by several ministries and with the involvement of the Jewish community and relevant organisations.
The strategy draws together 38 concrete measures within the fields of security, law enforcement, education and research, integration and at the level of the whole society.
One of the main tasks is to join forces, create better coordination and clear structures, through regular exchange with the Jewish communities and the broadest possible involvement of all public actors and civil society organisations. To this end, a new coordinating task force in the Federal Chancellery, the central body of the Austrian governmental institutions, was established.
Another important measure is a new legislative act ensuring a yearly financial support of 4 million Euro to the Jewish community. It aims to offer sustainable prospects to Jews in Austria. They need an outlook for a life in peace, stability, and security, the provision of services such as schools, cultural and social events.
The national strategy sets out a holistic approach to prevent and combat all forms of antisemitism, and foster Jewish life in Austria. It aims to provide prospects to Jews in Austria and thereby safeguard the continuation of Jewish life in Austria for generations to come.
Pledge: Centre for research on Antisemitism at the Austrian Academy of Sciences
Austria is currently implementing the recently finalised “National Strategy against Antisemitism”, which also mentions research on antisemitism.
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The Federal Ministry of Education, Science and Research expressly welcomes the efforts of the Austrian Academy of Sciences (OeAW) to tackle the lack of structured, multi-perspective antisemitism research in the Austrian academic landscape.
Until 2023, the OeAW will establish a centre for research on antisemitism – supported by the Federal Ministry of Education, Science and Research. The focus will be on interdisciplinary basic research on antisemitism, anti-Judaism, and anti-Zionism regarding causes, manifestations, and effects in the present, with a focus on Austria and Europe.
Pledge: Simon Wiesenthal Prize
In view of the darkest chapter of its history, Austria has a special historical responsibility. Part of this is fighting antisemitism, which has taken on many faces today.
In 2021, for the first time, the National Fund of the Republic of Austria for Victims of National Socialism will confer the annual Simon Wiesenthal Prize1 for outstanding civic engagement to combat antisemitism and/or promote Holocaust education endowed annually with a total of 30,000 euros.
The international award is named after Holocaust survivor and so-called Nazi hunter Simon Wiesenthal (1908–2005) who had an unparalleled impact on dealing with Nazi crimes. An unshakeable admonisher of antisemitism, he made it his life’s work to foster remembrance of the victims of Nazi terror and bring Nazi criminals to justice.
The Simon Wiesenthal Prize aims to recognize individuals or groups from civil society who follow his example by making an outstanding contribution through their special civic engagement to combat antisemitism and/or to promote Holocaust education.
The winner(s) of the Simon Wiesenthal Prize shall be selected by the Board of Trustees of the National Fund on the basis of the shortlist drawn up by a jury.
The Simon Wiesenthal Prize Jury consists of six members:
1 Federal Law Gazette I no. 94/2020
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• The family of Simon Wiesenthal has appointed as their representative Ariel Muzicant, Vice-President of the European Jewish Congress (EJC) and former President of the Jewish Community Vienna.
Other members are:
• Oskar Deutsch, President of the Jewish Religious Community in Austria,
as well as recognized figures from public or cultural life or persons with an academic reputation. As such, we are happy to welcome to the jury:
• Brigitte Bailer(-Galanda), lecturer in Contemporary History at the University of Vienna.
• Katharina von Schnurbein, Antisemitism Officer of the EU Commission.
• Barbara Stelzl-Marx, University Professor of Contemporary European History at Karl Franzens University Graz and Director of the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Research on the Consequences of War, Graz
• Monika Schwarz-Friesel, professor at the Institute for Language and Communication at the TU Berlin
The Simon Wiesenthal Prize aims at fostering and reinforcing awareness and efforts within society to fight antisemitism and educate people about the Holocaust.
Pledge: Training the judiciary:
The Austrian judiciary is particularly concerned with providing well-founded training in the context of antisemitism, racism and National Socialism.
In the area of training for judicial trainees, two periodic training events in particular, which are mandatory, deal in detail with fundamental rights in the context of judicial history and current affairs:
Curriculum on judicial and contemporary history for trainee judges
Duration: 1 week
Curriculum on basic rights for trainee judges
Duration: 3 days
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In the area of further training, the seminar series “Justice and Contemporary History” for judges and public prosecutors deals with the topic.
Duration: 1.5–2 days
The IHRA working definition of antisemitism is used by the trainers and in the training materials of the two above-mentioned seminars, as well as in specific seminars for candidate judges, judges and prosecutors on hate crimes and the law banning National Socialist activities (the Prohibition Act).
In addition, in 2020 comprehensive information on the IHRA working definition was published on the intranet for all judicial staff.
The Austrian judiciary provides assurance that these training activities will be continued and that it will continuously develop and grow its programme.
Pledge: Shoa wall of names memorial
More than 64,000 Jewish Holocaust victims from Austria shall not be forgotten. In order to create a place of remembrance, the Memorial to the Jewish children, women and men of Austria who were murdered in the Shoah is now being erected in Vienna.
A Holocaust survivor from Austria, Kurt Yakov Tutter initiated this memorial. Born in Vienna in 1930, he had to flee Austria. His parents perished in the Holocaust. His longing for a place of personal remembrance, which he shares with many survivors and descendants of the victims, was a motivation for his commitment to the project.
The realisation of the memorial began in the Year of Remembrance 2018.
The project is being implemented and funded by the Federal Government, which provided the main part of the financing, the Federal Provinces, the City of Vienna, the Federation of Austrian Industries and the Austrian National Bank. It is under the patronage of the President of the Austrian National Council. The costs amount to around 5.3 million Euros.
Names and dates for the Memorial are based on the Shoah Victim Database by the Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance (DÖW). From 1992 to 2001, the DÖW recorded the biographical data and circumstances of death of around 62,000 Austrian Holocaust victims. In the summer of 2020, there was a global appeal to review the names. After years of intensive research,
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the database currently contains records on 64,435 persons (as at March 2021).
The ideal location for the Shoah Wall of Names Memorial was found in Ostarrichi Park in Vienna’s 9th district – a green area in front of the Austrian National Bank, named after the oldest form of Austria’s name, “Ostarrîchi”.
Construction work began in June 2020. The Wall of Names will comprise 180 stone slabs on which the victims’ names are engraved. Several of the slabs have already been set in place. It is already an impressive sight.
A separate plaque will commemorate all other groups of victims persecuted under National Socialism.
The inauguration of the Shoah Wall of Names Memorial will take place on 9 November 2021. It will be a central yet peaceful place to commemorate the fate of the victims and to honour their lives. Due to the historical importance of the memorial, the City of Vienna and the National Fund will jointly assume responsibility for its maintenance and ongoing operation.
5. Belgium
Belgium remains deeply concerned about the rise of antisemitism, online as well as offline, and especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. The federal government is, in collaboration with the regions, taking its responsibility to strongly respond to and curb antisemitic incidents and hate crimes.
The federal government pledges to take further measures to strengthen the protection of victims, including its work on improving recording and collecting data on hate incidents and hate crimes by law enforcement and judicial authorities. The aim is to develop an efficient and effective method that makes it possible to register the hate motive in a consistent way in the registration systems of the police and judiciary. In doing so, more detailed and more reliable figures on hate crimes, hate speech and discrimination will become available, as well as specific figures on antisemitic offences. Reliable official data is essential for developing policy measures which will effectively counter antisemitism offline and online.
In its aim to further the efforts to combat antisemitism, Belgium is currently working on the adoption of a comprehensive and horizontal national action plan against racism. This plan is prepared by the governments of the federal State, the Regions and Communities, together with experts, affected
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communities and civil society to further the goal of countering all forms of racism that undermine human rights. The first Belgian national action plan against racism will cover issues ranging from education, employment, housing, health care to the justice systems The plan will mainstreams an anti-racism approach in all policies it also tackles specific forms of racism, including antisemitism.
The Community governments competent inter alia for education, will continue supporting many existing initiatives to tackle antisemitism, especially in the field of education. Including financial support to develop didactic materials and training about the holocaust, antisemitism and remembrance education, amongst others to further roll out of the IHRA Recommendations for Teaching and Learning about the Holocaust.
6. Bosnia and Herzegovina
Chairman of the Presidency Željko Komšić
This year marks the 76th anniversary of the most brutal crime of the last century. It will remain forever engraved in the memory of civilization.
The Holocaust, a unique and systematically planned crime against one nation – the Jews, has left lasting consequences on the society we live in. The genocide committed against Jews, Croats – political opponents of the Ustasha regime, Serbs and Roma in Jasenovac left unforeseeable consequences and has shown how dangerous and evil the human mind can be. The events of the Second World War left a deep mark on all of us. We have the daily obligation to fight against all forms of ideologies born from hatred, segregation and intolerance.
Unfortunately, despite the painstaking struggle against the divisions and inhuman actions, recent history also remembers the suffering of innocent victims of all ethnic groups. That includes crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s. The genocide committed in Srebrenica, in the heart of Europe, took lives of a large number of victims. It once again showed that great criminal ideologies are not a matter of the past. They still exist in the present too.
As witnesses of the dark side of history, we have an obligation to keep talking about it and not allow it to happen again. My obligation, as a politician, is to be persistent and concrete in my fight against any kind of divisions, fascism, antisemitism and all other forms of intolerance and
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discrimination. My moral obligation is to promote civilizational values in the society I live in and to work on improving mutual relations. I want to build a future where fundamental human freedoms, rule of law and moral values will prevail.
My country, Bosnia and Herzegovina, has been a home to Jews and members of other ethnic groups for centuries. That particular diversity, that we need to preserve and respect, is our greatest wealth. Preservation of the Jewish cultural heritage and the heritage of all people living in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be a positive story to guide the future generations. It is our obligation to educate young people about everything that has happened in the past so that they can be able to appreciate the society in which they live now even more.
The International Forum on Holocaust Remembrance and Combating Antisemitism is a great opportunity to exchange experiences and send clear messages as leaders of the countries we represent here. Unfortunately, fascism and antisemitism are gaining strength throughout the world. We need to act in a timely manner to prevent them from spreading any further.
Member of the Presidency Šefik Džaferović
While attending the last year’s 75th Anniversary of the liberation of the concentration camp Auschwitz, in a memorial complex located at the site of that concentration camp, I was deeply shaken by the survivors’ testimonies.
The death industry devised by Nazi criminals was the largest killing machinery in human history. If there is an illustration of absolute evil, then it is this very crime, without precedent.
At the same time, if there is an absolute symbol of human strength, it is the strength of the surviving victims who, despite their immense suffering, were able to testify on their own behalf, but also on the behalf of all of those who did not get to see freedom and peace.
Seventy-six years later, we can only feel hope that humanity will be redeemed through reflection, unreserved respect for human life, and effective efforts to finally stop the evil of hatred, segregation, and crime, once and for all.
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The crimes committed during the last war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the Srebrenica genocide, testified in a frightening way that the world has failed to learn its most important lessons.
In this place, I wish to reaffirm my commitment to preserving memory and truth.
On that note, I will initiate the activities of the Srebrenica Memorial Center, in cooperation with the Jewish community and institutions dedicated to preserving the Holocaust memory, with the aim of implementing a special project within the Srebrenica Memorial Center dedicated to protecting the memories of crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia during Holocaust.
7. Bulgaria
The Bulgarian society has a long-standing historic tradition of tolerance. On this solid basis, the Republic of Bulgaria has pursued a consistent policy aimed at preventing and eliminating any form of discrimination, in particular antisemitism.
The Republic of Bulgaria is a full member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) and has adopted the Alliance’s working definition of antisemitism.
In the light of its participation in the Malmö International Forum on Holocaust Remembrance and Combating Antisemitism, the Republic of Bulgaria has identified four strands of work that would further enhance the effect of the efforts to fight against antisemitism, intolerance and hate speech.
The position of the National Coordinator on Combating Antisemitism will be upgraded into a permanent one, at the level of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affair. The initial appointment of a National Coordinator in 2017 has led to visible improvements in the coordination of the relevant ministries, other authorities and the civil society.
The Government will work with the leading sport clubs to encourage the adoption and application in their activities of the Working Definition of Antisemitism. Bulgaria has started already a nationwide campaign for the definition’s adoption by the leading Bulgarian universities.
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The Bulgarian authorities will work for the establishment of a permanent exhibition at the National History Museum and/or a virtual “Pantheon of Saviours”, dedicated to the saving of the Bulgarian Jewish citizens during WWII. Among others, this will provide an additional tool to spread the knowledge about a major positive example of how the active and massive engagement of citizens can stop occurrences of intolerance and hate speech, in particular antisemitism.
The Republic of Bulgaria will finalize the National Action Plan on Combating Antisemitism by the end of 2022. It will be drafted through a joint project of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Norwegian Centre for Holocaust and Minority Studies. The National Action Plan will further consolidate the comprehensive and systematic approach in the fight against antisemitism.
8. Canada
The Government of Canada unequivocally condemns the disturbing rise of antisemitism at home and abroad. Canada is committed to reinforcing efforts to advance Holocaust awareness, remembrance and research, and to combat antisemitism as key elements of the promotion and protection of human rights globally. We know that antisemitism is not a problem for the Jewish community to solve alone, it is a challenge for all of us, especially governments, to take on. The Government of Canada will always stand with the Jewish community to fight antisemitism and hatred in all its forms. To that end, since November 2020, the Honourable Irwin Cotler, Canada’s first Special Envoy on Preserving Holocaust Remembrance and Combatting Antisemitism, has worked to promote Holocaust education, remembrance, and research, as Canada continues working with partners at home and around the world to fight against hate and intolerance, including convening the National Summit on Antisemitism in July 2021.
Antisemitism has no place in Canada or elsewhere. The Government of Canada commits therefore to the following pledges today:
We pledge to combat antisemitism, Holocaust denial and distortion, hate crimes and all other forms of racism and to protect at-risk communities
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• As part of a renewed Anti-Racism Strategy, we will engage with Jewish communities in the development of our National Action Plan on Combatting Hate.
• Establishing the Special Envoy on Preserving Holocaust Remembrance and Combatting Antisemitism as a permanent position, supported by dedicated resources.
• We will strengthen the Canada Human Rights Act and the Criminal Code to more effectively combat online antisemitism and hate.
• We will introduce legislation to combat serious forms of harmful online content.
We pledge to promote awareness about the Holocaust and antisemitism in Canada
• Building on lessons learned regarding the increase of antisemitism and of Holocaust distortion, we will continue to expand publicly accessible Holocaust-related material and to bring awareness to the dangers of antisemitism. This will include using the historical legacy of Raoul Wallenberg – Hero of the Holocaust and Canada’s first honorary citizen – as an inspirational role model for educational purposes.
We pledge to continue supporting the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) and to promoting the IHRA working definition of antisemitism
• We will continue to enhance the adoption and implementation of the IHRA working definition of antisemitism.
• We will encourage mainstreaming the implementation of the definition to dovetail with the Canadian adoption of the IHRA definition in June 2019, as part of Canada’s federal anti-racism strategy (2019-2022).
• We will work internationally to encourage broader cross-regional representation at the IHRA, toward a more inclusive organization.
We are reminded every day that antisemitism is still very much alive. Its new and resurgent forms require constant vigilance and action. Canada remains
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unwavering in its commitment to challenge antisemitism wherever and whenever it occurs and to build more just and inclusive societies.
9. Croatia
We pledge the IHRA Presidency from March 2023 to the end of February 2024
• As IHRA Presidency, Croatia will continue to promote cooperation among IHRA member states in the field of Holocaust research, education and remembrance as well as countering Holocaust distortion and denial, while at the same time fostering our shared responsibility in fighting antisemitism, intolerance and hate speech. This is Croatia’s umbrella pledge that confirms our strong commitment to IHRA’s activities and goals. For the preparation and implementation of Presidency activities we intend to allocate all necessary funds and resources, including establishing a dedicated inter-agency working body.
We pledge to preserve and pass on the memory of the Holocaust
• Croatia will continue with efforts to strengthen the activities and content of the Jasenovac Memorial Site, with continuous consideration of the modernization and upgrading of museum material. Croatian Government will logistically and financially support the introduction of high technology and contemporary approaches in the presentation and interpretation of historical content.
We pledge to promote education to prevent antisemitism and other forms of racism and to strengthen Holocaust research
• In 2022, in cooperation with the Mémorial de la Shoah Museum, Croatia will continue to participate in organization of international seminars in the form of expert dialogues with neighboring countries, one with Italy and Slovenia and the other with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. In cooperation with Yad Vashem, Croatia will continue to upgrade its education programmes intended to raise the awareness among the young population about the Holocaust.
We pledge to combat antisemitism, anti-Roma discrimination and other forms of racism – online and offline
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• In accordance with the Operative Program for National Minorities for the period 2021-2024, Croatian Government will intensify activities aimed at countering violence and hate speech, especially towards the vulnerable groups and national minorities. It will continue to raise awareness that discrimination, public hate speech and incitement to violence are unacceptable and will be prosecuted, in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Code and Anti-discrimination Act.
We pledge to continue strengthening Roma inclusion, including by strengthening civil society
• In accordance with the new National Plan for Roma inclusion for the period 2021-2027, Croatian Government will continue to increase the funding allocated for the main pillars of Roma inclusion – education, employment, housing and health.
10. Cyprus
The Republic of Cyprus, despite its newly established participation in the Alliance, is swiftly taking substantial steps to underscore the value of our participation.
Cyprus adopted the IHRA definition for Antisemitism in 2019. Procedures are now under way to also adopt the IHRA definition on Holocaust Denial and Distortion, not only as a tribute to victims and survivors, but also as an indispensable tool for education and training.
In addition, a specialized training program on anti-semitism is being planned for police and law enforcement officers. Let me also mention that, as we did last year, we are again proceeding with a voluntary contribution to IHRA.
11. Denmark
We pledge to step up our fight against antisemitism significantly
The Danish Government will present a comprehensive plan to fight antisemitism in Denmark in the near future. The overarching goal of the plan is to strengthen the general resilience against antisemitism and to ensure that antisemitism does not take root in Denmark.
We pledge to protect the Danish Jews
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The Danish Government will keep its promise to protect the Danish Jews. We will continue to uphold a high level of protection around Jewish institutions in Denmark in close cooperation with the Jewish Community in Denmark.
We pledge to strengthen our knowledge about contemporary forms of antisemitism in Denmark
We will strengthen monitoring of antisemitic incidents and through research increase our understanding of contemporary forms of antisemitism.
We pledge to develop tools to detect and counter antisemitism in schools and on the work place
The plan will aim at improving the way the Danish authorities handle antisemitic incidents in order to improve support for victims of antisemitism and strengthen the cooperation and coordination among relevant Danish authorities and the Danish Jewish Society.
We pledge to strengthen education on Holocaust and other genocides
The plan will focus on how schools and institutions educate children and young people about antisemitism and how we define antisemitism. No child in Denmark should leave school without being taught about the six million Jews who died in the horrors of Holocaust – and about those who survived and were saved through courageous civic actions.
We pledge to teach ourselves on and sustain Jewish life in Denmark
We want not only to fight antisemitism, so that Jews can live safely and freely in the Danish society. We want to create the conditions to sustain Jewish life for generations to come. This will be achieved through a comprehensive plan that also addresses education and information about Jews, Jewish life, history and practices.
We pledge to strengthen our focus on antisemitism internationally
Denmark will underline the importance of fighting antisemitism and respecting human rights and non-discrimination globally when participating in international fora.
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12. Estonia
Estonia commits itself
1. to safeguarding the memory of the Holocaust.
We intend to mark with dignity the remaining Holocaust-related sites in Estonia. In November, a memorial stone to the Estonian Jews killed in 1941/42 will be consecrated at the Liiva graveyard in Tallinn.
2. to vigorously combatting antisemitism.
We will implement the recently adopted governmental policy for combatting antisemitism by all means and measures, both in the field of security and safety, as well as Holocaust remembrance and education in the broadest sense. Our policy is guided by the non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism adopted by IHRA member-states.
13. Finland
Finland commits itself to ensure that all national and religious communities and minorities can feel safe in our country. We are committed to safeguarding human rights, freedom, tolerance and equality in our society.
Finland will make sure that freedom of speech is not confused with hate speech. We will make sure that incitement against anyone based on descent, national or ethnic background or religion does not pass in our country as free speech. It is hate speech and will be treated as such.
High-quality research and education is a key means of preventing antisemitism and other forms of discrimination in our society. Finland will continue to invest in research and communication concerning The Holocaust. We will translate all relevant documents into Finnish and Swedish and will make sure that they are used in education and research.
Finland has a strong research tradition concerning The Holocaust. We will make sure that this tradition continues and the actions of Finnish authorities and individuals in The Second World War are brought to light without any interference from the Finnish authorities.
The Constitution of Finland guarantees freedom of religion and freedom of conscience. We will make sure that all places of worship are protected by the national authorities. Finland has strong legislation concerning freedom of
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speech and thought and we will make sure that all people residing in Finland can live freely and practice their faith without fearing for their security. We will also make sure that religious communities can fully exert their influence on the legislation that concerns them.
In its international activities, Finland will make sure that international organizations, such as the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, continue to tackle these issues. We will also consider bringing them up in the framework of Nordic Cooperation.
We will consider organizing a seminar on The Holocaust around The Holocaust Remembrance Day to bring together all researchers in this area together with the relevant civil society organizations. If any gaps in our national remembrance are identified in this seminar, we commit ourselves to address those gaps with public financing.
14. France
The guarantee of the rights and equality of every citizen “without distinction as to origin, race or religion” is at the heart of the French Constitution. France remains uncompromising in the face of antisemitism -of which we have endorsed the operational definition set forth by the IHRA-, as well as being actively engaged in the remembrance of the Shoah.
At the domestic level, the French government has strengthened its institutional arsenal through the work of the “Interministerial Delegation to the fight against racism, antisemitism and anti-LGBT hate” (DILCRAH). Among the main priorities of the soon-to-be-adopted “national plan to combat racism and antisemitism” are:
New educational tools for professionals that will strengthen the education and training aimed at helping teachers address the history of the Holocaust. It will also support the effort of publishers and authors of school textbooks to raise awareness against anti-Semitic stereotypes.
Victims of anti-Semitic acts will be more strongly supported thanks to simplified complaint-filing procedures, the training of victim support associations, and a greater awareness among the users of platforms and social networks on a more protective use of these tools.
We will improve the prevention of anti-Semitic acts thanks to research and dissemination of knowledge on racism and anti-Semitism, the development
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of citizenship-training courses and the mobilization of the private sector as well as the economic circles.
We will enhance the crackdown on hate speech online by strengthening the investigative teams of the Interior Ministry’s reporting platform (Pharos), and by enabling the creation of a prosecutor’s office specializing in digital affairs. This repressive arsenal is supplemented by the faculty to dissolve any association or group that promotes antisemitism or Nazism.
At the international level, France is relentless in advocating for the fight against antisemitism and in promoting Holocaust remembrance within UN bodies or the Council of Europe (particularly within the European commission against racism and intolerance – ECRI or the International Holocaust remembrance alliance – IHRA). As part of the French presidency of the European Union, we will consolidate actions at the European level in order to fight the resurgence of antisemitism and Holocaust denial, as well as to pursue the development of the Digital services Act.
Memorial institutions, like the Holocaust Memorial, are very active in terms of education, training, research, and communication to maintain the work on Holocaust remembrance. The French State allocates 6 million euros to financing the interventions of partner associations and places of memory, both at local and national level. January 27, selected as the day of “International Holocaust Remembrance Day” is the opportunity for numerous commemorations, particularly for young people. As part of the many educational projects, the “Convoy 77” project encourages students from different countries to carry out educational work whose purpose is to retrace the lives of those deported last towards the Auschwitz camp by this large convoy.
15. Germany
I. Remembrance of the Holocaust and the genocide of the Sinti and Roma Germany will contribute to making eye-witness accounts accessible to more people everywhere by means of digitising remembrance of the Holocaust and the genocide of the Sinti and Roma, in particular in memorials and museums in Germany and abroad.
Germany will campaign through the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance for the continued existence of the Global Task Force against Holocaust
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Distortion and the implementation of its findings, and calls on all IHRA member countries to become involved in these efforts.
II. Holocaust education
Germany will develop independent funding for Holocaust education from the perspective of survivors and survivor organisations.
Germany will, working through the Foundation Remembrance, Responsibility and Future, advance a novel education agenda on Nazi injustice, imparting lessons from the National Socialist past in a historically aware and energising way.
Germany will strengthen remembrance of the Holocaust and the genocide of the Sinti and Roma by continuing to systematically incorporate the perspective of survivors and their advocacy groups.
Germany will develop innovative approaches to Holocaust education in a post-migrant society.
III. Antisemitism in social networks and on social media platforms
Germany will develop both a network of experts and a federal working group on online hate.
Germany will finance a study on digital news skills as well as scientific studies on right-wing extremism, in particular the links between right-wing extremism and antisemitism.
IV. Combating antisemitism, antigypsyism and racism
Germany will continue to actively combat antisemitism, antigypsyism and racism in all spheres of life and in peoples’ daily interactions.
Germany will further anchor a holistic approach to preventing and combating all forms of antisemitism, antigypsyism and racism as a cross-cutting task across all levels and policy fields and will draw up a national strategy against antisemitism and for Jewish life. Germany will strengthen research into antisemitism, establishing and promoting research networks to this end.
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Germany will further develop prevention and study projects on the connection between right-wing extremism and antisemitism as well as between racism and antisemitism.
Germany will support the development of a civil-society monitoring process to record antisemitic assaults and continue to anchor it in the Competence Network on Antisemitism (KOMPAS), which gathers information on this issue and provides expert advice on preventive educational work on antisemitism.
Germany will establish a civil-society monitoring process to record antigypsyist assaults and, based on the Competence Network on Antisemitism, will develop a similar body on antigypsyism to gather information and provide expert advice.
Further information
The promotion of Holocaust remembrance and education as well as efforts to combat antisemitism, antigypsyism and racism are a priority of the German Government at national, European and international level.
In view of the rise in right-wing extremism, racism and antisemitism, a Cabinet Committee for the fight against racism and right-wing extremism was set up in 2020. As well as implementing measures already adopted, the committee has drawn up a catalogue of 89 individual measures. These measures are now being implemented by the relevant lead ministries. The German Government intends to make available a total of more than one billion euro between 2021 and 2024 for the fight against right-wing extremism, racism, antisemitism, antigypsyism and other forms of group hatred. This funding is to be used, among other things, to boost research and prevention, cooperation among security authorities, judicial systems as well as state and civil-society stakeholders and to develop new approaches to fighting the phenomena mentioned. The aims are, inter alia, to create greater awareness of all forms of antisemitism, antigypsyism and racism as a phenomenon which affects society as a whole, strengthen prevention and further develop civic education, promote the work to foster democracy, expand support for those affected, promote recognition of a diverse society and strengthen equal opportunities, as well as bolster vigilant democracy and the security authorities.
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Germany wants, also with the help of newly established bodies such as the Joint Federal and State Commission to fight antisemitism and protect Jewish life founded in 2019, to work at national, European and international level to strengthen the fight against antisemitism, antigypsyism and racism, in particular in the spheres of legislation, basic and further education, public relations work, exchange and remembrance. To this end, we will seek to ensure greater networking among all those affected and stakeholders from civil society, academia and government agencies. The fight against antisemitism, antigypsyism and racism is a cross-cutting task which affects society as a whole. Holocaust remembrance and education are part of this. Given the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and growing technological possibilities, new ways can be found to strengthen and further develop remembrance and education.
16. Greece
Greece’s pledge, in line with the legacy of our Presidency, seeks to bring the Holocaust narrative into the digital era, in a meaningful and efficient manner. In order for the message of the Holocaust to remain relevant forever, it needs, most of all, to adapt to modern circumstances.
Living memory is fading, as survivors and witnesses of the horrors of the Holocaust are leaving us forever. Humanistic studies, including historical studies, unfortunately do not attract young minds as much as they used to. Awareness through education remains essential but may not be sufficient anymore.
For better or worse, information and ideas are now presented, discussed and often fought over in the digital battlefield. This is where the current generation primarily seeks information, explores ideologies and instigates debate. This is also where peddlers of extremist ideas, hate and racism, gain access to large gullible audiences, with unprecedented ease and opportunity to spread views that not only offend the victims of past atrocities, but also threaten democracy and basic human values.
As the current COVID pandemic has regrettably shown, distortion of information is a very real concern and even the most outlandish conspiracy theory claims can still fall to eager ears, often with grave results.
This is where the current threat lies and this is where we intend to take the fight.
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The Greek IHRA Presidency, in collaboration with Greek and foreign State agencies as well as academic institutions and industry agents, is preparing a Congress titled “Combating Anti-Semitism, Holocaust Denial and Distortion and Extremist Resurgences in the Digital Battlefield”.
The Congress is to be held late February – early March of 2022 in the Greek city of Ioannina, home to one of the most ancient Jewish communities in Europe. It will host three round tables:
On Anti-Semitism and other extremist phenomena in Social Media and the Internet.
On the means to detect, counter and suppress such phenomena, using leading edge technologies such as Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Prediction.
On the legal aspects, such as the balance that must be achieved between freedom of speech and the need to defend Democracy against racism and discrimination.
Should the Congress prove successful, we shall seek to incorporate its premise as a constant feature in all future IHRA Presidencies, so that the threat can keep being fought and countered as it develops.
Bringing the Holocaust messages to the digital era, bringing the fight against anti-Semitism, racism, fascism and all forms of hate-speech to the digital battlefield, is the most efficient way to ensure the continued memory and relevance of the Holocaust.
This is our pledge and the legacy of Greece’s IHRA Presidency.
17. Hungary
Since the fall of communism – particularly over the last 12 years – Hungary has done its utmost for its Jewish compatriots, and its commitment towards the Jewish community enjoys international recognition. It has carried out a compensation program, has been paying annuities, and has been operating a Public Foundation for Jewish Heritage in Hungary. It makes every effort to combat anti-Semitism and hate speech through comprehensive legislation. A multitude of synagogues and cemeteries have also been renovated with state support and in keeping with Jewish religious customs.
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Today, three established Jewish congregations flourish in Hungary, all of them receiving state support. The Hungarian government remains committed to nurturing Jewish traditions, preserving Jewish culture, and researching and presenting Jewry’s past as well as maintaining and developing its institutions with numerous tools and generous support. And the government will continue to do all of this in the future. To pay tribute to the memory of the Holocaust, a Holocaust Memorial Centre has been operating in Hungary with significant state support. Furthermore, by parliamentary decision, April 16 was declared National Holocaust Memorial Day, when the tragedy of the Jews is commemorated throughout the country, not only by parliament but also by NGOs supported by the government.
In connection with the International Forum on Holocaust Remembrance to be held in Malmö, Hungary will seek to curb the anti-Semitic groups of the BDS movement and prevent them from receiving European Union funds. It will also undertake to fight restrictions and bans on Jewish religious practices and traditions in order to safeguard Jewish freedom. Furthermore, Hungary has adopted and applies the IHRA’s definition of anti-Semitism and undertakes to further accelerate and deepen its implementation. In the framework of cross-border Hungarian-Serbian cooperation, a Holocaust memorial site will be established in the town of Bor in Serbia, while Hungary will continue its program of renovating synagogues and cemeteries.
Thanks to the above measures, the Jewish community may consider Hungary among the safest places in Europe, a place where they can live freely according to their identity and are not threatened by the growing anti-Semitism caused by the waves of migration affecting Europe. We trust that our commitments will further strengthen Jewish communities in Hungary.
18. Ireland
We pledge to publish a National Action Plan Against Racism, by 21 March 2022, the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. It will be guided by best practice, as set out in the Practical Guide to Developing National Action Plans Against Racism published by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights and informed by the EU Action Plan Against Racism (2020-25), which itself reflects the UN Guide. The action plan will:
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have regard to the review of evidence, including state responses to UN and European commitments; international practice; the outcome of stakeholder dialogues; and taking account of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action;
include an action programme, that identifies priority issues, as well as measures that strengthen the Government’s approach to combating racism, building on the actions currently included in the Migrant Integration Strategy, and the National Traveller and Roma Inclusion Strategy, preventing antisemitism and other forms of racism.
We pledge to combat antisemitism, antigypsyism and other forms of racism, online and offline.
We will continue to ensure that discrimination on the grounds of race is prohibited in the provision of goods and services, education and accommodation, and in employment settings. Victims of discrimination will have recourse to redress mechanisms where the discrimination occurs.
We will conclude the review of our Equality Acts to examine the functioning of the Acts and their effectiveness in combatting antisemitism, antigypsyism and other forms of racism, and promoting equality. A public consultation process is currently live and will conclude at the end of November 2021.
We will continue to support the commemoration of Holocaust remembrance in Ireland.
We pledge to take steps to put in place ethnic equality monitoring across our public services, to inform initiatives to address inequalities experienced by minority ethnic groups.
We will deliver an action programme to implement an interdepartmental initiative on Ethnic Equality Monitoring, in line with recommendations contained in the OECD review (2019), and including measures to improve the collection and analysis of data in line with the National Equality Strategies.
We pledge to renew our commitment to respect, celebrate and recognise the normality of diversity in all parts of human life, promote equality and human rights, challenge unfair discrimination and promote the values upon which
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equality is built through supporting intercultural education in primary and post-primary schools.
We will commence the update of the Intercultural Guidelines for primary and post-primary schools, to support the further integration of intercultural education in the curriculum.
We will prepare a report on Traveller Culture and History with examples of teaching and learning to support learning and teaching about Traveller Culture and History in the curriculum in primary and post-primary schools.
We pledge to introduce new hate crime legislation and update the 1989 Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act.
The new Hate Crime Bill will introduce new offences of incitement to hatred, which are clearer and simpler than those in the 1989 Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act. These offences will cover inciting hatred against a person or persons because they are associated with a protected characteristic, and also disseminating or distributing material inciting hatred. A protected characteristic will be defined to include race; colour; nationality; religion, ethnic or national origin; sexual orientation; gender; or disability. “Ethnicity” includes membership of the Traveller community.
We will create a new offence of publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivialising crimes of genocide, including holocaust denial, based on the definition of genocide from the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
The Hate Crime Bill will create specific, aggravated forms of existing criminal offences, where those offences are motivated by prejudice against a protected characteristic.
19. Israel
The State of Israel is fully committed to promoting Holocaust remembrance and combating antisemitism.
Israel is working alongside governments and non-governmental organizations in creating and expanding partnerships aimed at promoting education programs, monitoring and dealing with the various manifestations of antisemitism.
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In light of the discernible and dangerous increase in antisemitism online, mainly on social-media platforms, Israel pledges to work toward the establishment of an international coalition for combating antisemitism and Holocaust denial and distortion online.
This coalition will work to establish a mechanism that will facilitate the international cooperation in this endeavor.
20. Italy
• In September 2021, the National Coordinator for the fight against Anti-Semitism , with the support of the technical working group composed by Ministries and representatives of Jewish Communities, presented the Report with the National Strategy to combat Antisemitism to the Government and the Parliament: now all Italian Institutions are called to implement its recommendations in a close coordination with the recently adopted EU strategy on combating antisemitism and in line with IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism.
• It is also on that basis that the Ministry of Education is currently finalising the Guidelines for combating Antisemitism which will be used in schools and in teachers’ training.
21. Latvia
In these turbulent times the Forum has served as a reminder of the continued need to strengthen Holocaust research, education and commemoration across Europe.
In Latvia much has been done in the past three decades since regaining independence. Already in 1990, Latvian parliamentarians adopted a declaration on condemning genocide and antisemitism, and the Commemoration Day of Genocide against the Jews – 4 July – was officially established. A Commission of Historians was established in 1998 upon the initiative of the then President of Latvia and its academic research on the Holocaust has resulted in a series of significant publications. Latvia has carried out fundamental research on crimes against humanity committed by totalitarian regi.mes on the territory of Latvia. Memorials to the victims of the Holocaust are marked with monuments and commemorative plaques. The Holocaust has become an integral part of history lessons in all Latvian schools, and in study programmes related to history and culture. Cooperation with Yad Vashem in this field is essential and has been very
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successful. Latvia’s highest officials are directly involved in Holocaust remembrance.
Let me assure you that Latvia will continue to further develop these endeavours, also with my personal participation at the commemoration next month of 80 years since the horrific events on the outskirts of Riga at Rumbula and Bikernieki.
Despite the continuous efforts of the international community, and in particular by IHRA countries, we realize that the tragic lessons of 20th century history have not been adequately understood or acted upon – we continue to witness expressions of Holocaust denial, xenophobia, racism, antisemitism and acts of violence world-wide, as well as attempts to distort the history of the World War II.
We must prevent attempts to rewrite the history in a hybrid warfare aimed at manipulating public opinion.
At the global level, combating disinformation effectively requires even doser understanding and cooperation in international organizations. Earlier this year Latvia was one of the initiators of the UN General Assembly resolution on the promotion of media and information literacy at the global level. We will continue to provide support to partners with our expertise in combating disinformation.
Latvia has consistently condemned all totalitarian ideologies, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed during the World War Il, categorically denounces the Holocaust and mourns its victims. As a member state of the IHRA, Latvia reaffirms its full commitment to the goals of the Stockholm Declaration. The major future objectives in this field embrace the efforts to further raise awareness of the general public concerning the history of the Holocaust as well as the continual promotion of an attitude and practice of zero-tolerance for any signs or expressions of antisemitism and racial discrimination. In this context I would like to inform you that in 2022 the newly renovated Museum of the Occupation of Latvia will host an exhibition entitled “Riga as a Place of Crime and Remembrance – The Deportation and the Holocaust in Latvia”.
22. Lithuania
The Lithuanian government is engaged in a number of initiatives on Holocaust remembrance and education, which are to be implemented within
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a 5-year perspective. The most significant of them include opening new museum spaces and updating existing school curricula incorporating modern teaching recommendations on the Holocaust. This is an important contribution to raising awareness and educating society not only about the Holocaust but also the ages rich history of Jews in Lithuania. It was extensively presented during the year 2020, which was officially dedicated to the Vilna Gaon and saw a significant increase of interest in Jewish life, history and heritage in Lithuania.
Development of museums and memorials
1. Currently two museums devoted to Lithuanian Jewry are undergoing renovation to be completed in 2023-2024. Both will become branches of the Vilna Gaon Museum of Jewish History which is a state museum under the Lithuanian Ministry of Culture.
• The Memorial Museum of Holocaust in Lithuania and the Vilna Ghetto will be located in the building which housed Meficei Haskala (Education Disseminators) society library before World War II. The library was nationalized during the first Soviet occupation in 1940. After the establishment of the ghetto in 1941, the library found itself enclosed in the ghetto area and functioned there until the liquidation of the ghetto in 1943. The library witnessed cultural activities as well as the activities of the underground armed resistance organization in the Vilna Ghetto. Survivors of the Holocaust (among them writers Shmerke Kaczerginski and Avrom Sutzkever) founded the Jewish Museum there in 1944. It was closed by the Soviet government in 1949. The new Memorial Museum of Holocaust in Lithuania and the Vilna Ghetto will replace the current Holocaust exposition. The museum is expected to be opened at the end of 2024. It is funded by the state budget.
• The Museum of Culture and Identity of Lithuanian Jews is to be opened in 2023 in the building of the former Tarbut Gymnasium in Vilnius. It will be a modern interactive exposition with authentic exhibits on Lithuanian Jewish history and culture. The project is funded by the European Union.
2. Paneriai (Ponar) killing site
An action plan for the re-arrangement and accessibility of the Paneriai (Ponar) Memorial for 2019–2024 was approved by the Government in 2018.
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The plan stipulated that the project should be fully implemented in mid-2024. However, its implementation will be extended due to several reasons, first and foremost, due to the process of choosing a location for the new visitor center.
3. Other killing sites
The central and local governments in cooperation with the Lithuanian Jewish Community continue to re-arrange, maintain and mark the sites of mass killings of Jews by 1) putting up memorial plaques and erecting monuments; 2) putting up directional signs on roads leading to the sites of killings and burial; 3) installing information stands telling the history of the Holocaust. While most of the Holocaust killing sites in Lithuania are marked, the priority for the near future is the identification of the names of the Holocaust victims and their commemoration in Lithuanian towns and villages, which has already started. Currently, information stands with the names of the victims are installed at the killing sites of Jews in five towns.
Education
1. Secondary education
Currently, the Ministry of Education, Science and Sports is reviewing all actual educational curricula for the grades from 1 to 10 adopted in 2008. The review process aimed at the modernization of the educational system should be completed in 2022. In the new curriculum of history, IHRA Recommendations for Teaching and Learning about the Holocaust will play an important role. The Holocaust will be taught in the context of World War II. The contents will be more detailed and developed by introducing a better explanation of specific terms such as ghettos, pogroms, collaboration, antisemitism and so on. It will include the individualization of the Holocaust narrative through personal stories as well as study visits by students to the Holocaust memorial sites. The genocide of the Roma will also become an integral part of the curriculum for the first time. One of the important objectives is to stimulate critical thinking of students and to ensure a more precise understanding of the consequences of antisemitism.
2. Non-formal education
The Secretariat of the International Commission for the Evaluation of the Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet Occupation Regimes in Lithuania plays an
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important role in non-formal Holocaust education. It was on the initiative of the Secretariat that starting from 2003 Tolerance Education Centers were established in 151 schools, local museums and educational centers. Teachers who work at these centers support the International Commission’s initiatives and are active participants in its educational programme about the Holocaust. The Commission together with Tolerance Education Centers, local Jewish communities and other partners have been inviting people to unite on the Memory Road across Lithuania for over a decade now. The participants (most of them schoolchildren and teachers) retrace the paths that the Holocaust victims were forced to walk from central parts of towns and settlements to the sites of their massacre. There are about 260 such killing sites in Lithuania. The Memory Road visits from 100 to 150 sites every year. 200 to 300 schools have joined the campaign, and the total number of participants exceeds 10 000. The Prime Minister, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Education as well as MPs walked down the Memory Road in 2021, which marks the 80th anniversary of the beginning of the Holocaust in Lithuania and is held in cities and towns across the country from June to December.
Private initiatives A unique private museum of the history of Jewish towns (shtetlakh) has been launched in the town of Šeduva in 2015. The project is funded by private sponsors from Lithuania and the RSA in cooperation with the local municipality. It will tell the story of Jews in Šeduva before the Holocaust, about the traditions, businesses and culture life of all Lithuanian shtetlakh. It will be a state-of-the-art museum designed by US and Finnish architects. The museum is expected to open in 2023. The Lost Shtetl Museum is a segment of a broader project, the Lithuanian Jewish Culture and Heritage Project implemented since 2012. The other segments of the project: restoration of the Old Jewish Cemetery in Šeduva; three monuments on the sites of mass killings; monument in the center of Šeduva; historical monograph about the Šeduva Jews; documentary film “Petrified Time”.
Artistic means of expression to fight against modern forms of antisemitism
To commemorate the Holocaust, one of the most promising composers of the younger generation in Lithuania, Jievaras Jasinskis, and shofarist Tadas Daujotas presented a bespoke music project “Symphony from Jerusalem of the North” this September. This contemporary symphony is unique and one
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of its kind. It showcases classical music intertwined with Lithuanian and Hebrew folklore motifs. The music project honors the memory of Jews living in Lithuania, expresses solidarity to the Jewish community, and uses artistic means of expression to fight against modern forms of antisemitism. The symphony has started its journey across Lithuania, witnessing the most important moments of Israel’s and Lithuania’s history.
23. Luxemburg
With the number of Holocaust survivors diminishing from year to year, thus reducing the precious witness accounts of these horrors, and with antisemitism on the rise again, Governments face the important challenge to perpetuate the remembrance of the Holocaust, to educate younger generations and to vigorously combat antisemitism.
The Luxembourg Government is committed to upholding its responsibilities and continuing to play an active role in addressing these issues in close consultation with the local Jewish Community.
Luxembourg will continue to fully implement the 27th January 2021 Agreement on Outstanding Holocaust Asset Issues in close collaboration with the local Jewish Community and concerned non-state actors. Signed between the Luxembourg Government and the local Jewish Community, this historic agreement, that was commended both nationally and internationally, contains a series of measures which includes but is not limited to a final lump-sum payment to Holocaust survivors, increased financial support for the Foundation for the Memory of the Holocaust, as well as additional funds for Holocaust remembrance and academic research to be realized in the coming years.
In addition to previous and ongoing efforts to remember the Holocaust and its victims, and keeping in mind the vanishing nature of monuments, Luxembourg is further set on establishing a living place of remembrance and education to guarantee that future generations learn about the Holocaust and its causes.
As part of the above-mentioned agreement, Luxembourg acquired and is currently developing the site of the “Abbaye de Cinqfontaines“ which holds a unique place in our national history for being the only place of internment for Jews operated by the Nazis in Luxembourg during World War II and from where 658 Jewish men, women, and children, were deported to concentration and extermination camps.
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The aim is to create a continuity from a place of remembrance to a place of education in tolerance and respect for Human Rights that shall prevent the roots of evil to corrode society again.
The memorial site will thus be enhanced to not only honour the fate of those whose lives took a dramatic turn in this particular place, but also to educate all generations on the history of Holocaust and provide them with tools in identifying and fighting antisemitism and racism.
In line with the EU Strategy on Combating Antisemitism and Fostering Jewish life, presented on the 5th October 2021, Luxembourg will finalize its National Strategy on Combatting Antisemitism in the next months.
24. Moldova
The efforts undertaken by my country in building a cohesive and inclusive society based on the respect for human rights, includes both implementation of concrete actions or projects in combating antisemitism and work on complex and long-term issues such as developing an appropriate legal framework in compliance with the international standards and practices.
In this regard, here are the pledges that Moldova assumed in its efforts on combating anti-Semitism, Holocaust remembrance, education and research:
1. Acknowledging the importance of preserving the memory of Holocaust and at the same time giving due recognition to the contribution of the Jewish people on the development of our societies through history, we continue our work on establishing the fully fledged Jewish History Museum of the Republic of Moldova.
2. Continue developing the framework for education to prevent intolerance and anti-Semitism in general education system and of the teaching resources (digitization) to expand the scope of the optional subject “Holocaust: history and life lessons”. Education proved to be one of the most efficient instruments in promoting the Holocaust remembrance, and we continue our work on developing programs, methodological regulation and adapting teaching aids on anti-Semitism education.
3. Deepening and consolidating the knowledge about the phenomenon of the Holocaust and introducing this knowledge in education and public policies.
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4. Adjusting the national legislation to the international standards on combating anti-Semitism, racism, xenophobia and intolerance.
5. Facilitating expert research for the purpose of identifying and mapping sites and localities from where Roma were deported to concentration camps for mass execution during World War II with purpose of increasing the visibility and investigation of the Roma community as victims of the Holocaust.
Considering the growing demand for engagement in the field of human rights, the Government of Republic of Moldova will continue its efforts for implementing the international commitments on combating antisemitism, racial discrimination and intolerance. We are determined to stand undeniably against all forms of hatred and discrimination on any ground.
25. Monaco Monaco is a cosmopolitan country that guarantees all human rights, among which freedom of worship. The Monegasque population is extremely diverse and the city-state offers a safe environment for people of all religious backgrounds to practice their faith. There are extremely few cases of hate speech or acts of racist or anti-Semitic nature.
Monaco pledges to include the transmission of the memory of the Holocaust in its cultural and educational programs Education is an essential tool to address anti-Semitism. Monaco will emphasize the inclusion of the History of the Shoah in the school curricula and raise awareness among schoolchildren about genocides and mass crimes. Monaco will develop educational programs that address antisemitism in a framework of human rights and global citizenship. The Principality will encourage students to participate in the commemorations of the International Holocaust Remembrance Day (January 27th). In addition, school trips will be organized regularly to former concentration camps.
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Monaco will also make sure that more Holocaust remembrance is included in its cultural and theater programming in order to raise awareness among a wider audience.
Monaco pledges to perpetuate the memory of the deportees Following on the creation, in 2015, of a monument in homage to the Jewish deportees, Monaco wishes to perpetuate the memory of people of Jewish faith arrested in Monaco and deported. Soon, a conference room of the Oceanographic Museum of Monaco will be named after the former Consul of Poland in Monaco, Mr. Mieczyslaw OXNER. He was an eminent expert in marine biology who refused to cooperate with the Germans. Mr. OXNER was arrested on September 1st, 1944 and sent to the Auschwitz-Birkenau camp, where he died soon after.
Monaco pledges to perpetuate the financial support provided for the activities of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Foundation On several occasions, Monaco has allocated a funding to the Auschwitz-Birkenau Foundation. As of 2022, the Principality will dedicate an annual contribution to support the work of this Foundation.
The Government of Monaco commits to transparency by opening its archives for research purposes In March 2020, the Government of Monaco allowed access to the archives covering the period 1942–1944 to several experts of the Simon Wiesenthal Center. The Principality shall continue to foster transparency by allowing access to historical documentation for research purposes.
Monaco pledges to promote the restitution of Jewish property looted during the Second World War and the compensation of victims or their heirs The Government of Monaco is determined to continue the task of resolving claims and compensating victims, or their heirs, who lost possession of
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property in Monaco during the Second World War. The Commission for Assistance to Victims of Despoliation has been active since 2006.
26. North Macedonia
On behalf of the Republic of North Macedonia, I would like to present 3 pledges that are going to be implemented by the country in the upcoming period:
As part of the reform of the curricula for primary education, the Republic of North Macedonia, in the next two years, will include teaching content that will address Antisemitism and Holocaust denial for students in the final grades. The Ministry of Education and Science is already working on the procedure for supplementing the teaching contents. It is our great responsibility and duty to preserve the memories of the Holocaust and to pass them on to the next generation.
Within the calendar for mandatory visits of primary and secondary school students, we will include a mandatory educational visit to the Holocaust Memorial Center for the Jews from Macedonia in Skopje. The Center is dedicated to 7148 Jews from Macedonia during the Holocaust and is located in a former Jewish quarter. The museum building displays the life of the Jews, their identity, spirituality and culture, which the Museum conveys to visitors and thus maintains the spirit of the place, its uniqueness and recognition, and at the same time, is a symbolic place that points to the horror of the Holocaust. Visiting this Memorial Center by students, will contribute to building a healthy society in which cultural, racial and other diversity will be the basis for unity, not division.
The third commitment refers to the adoption of the IHRA working definition on antigypsyism/anti-Roma discrimination, by the Government of the Republic of North Macedonia. Modern societies must not allow denial of the genocide against Roma and Sinti during the Second World War. Their suffering, losses and traumas should be a warning to us to pledge that this terrible period of history will never happen again elsewhere in the world. We as societies, should have institutional policies and practices for Roma inclusion and prevent any further marginalization, exclusion, physical violence, devaluation of Roma cultures and lifestyles, and hate speech directed at Roma, as well as other individuals and groups. It is the responsibility of today’s generations to create open societies in which every
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individual, regardless of gender, age, ethnicity, religion or skin color, has the right to a dignified life.
27. Norway
1) Norway will develop relevant education and aim at reaching out to new groups.
Key in our efforts is the Dembra program for schools: a program for the prevention of racism, group-based hostility and antidemocratic attitudes, lead by the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies.
Dembra offers schools guidance, courses and online resources to prevent various forms of group hostility and undemocratic attitudes. Competence development is about building democratic competence. Inclusion, participation, critical thinking, and diversity competence are central to the offer. Thus, Dembra is also relevant for, and has overlapping themes with, competence development in a safe and good school environment. The basic principles of Dembra are based on the idea that students develop their identity, their attitudes, and their behavior in interaction with others. Democratic preparedness is built through knowledge and reflection, but not least through social experiences, experiences of equal interaction and dissent. Therefore, the development of a democratic and inclusive school culture is essential.
With full implementation from 2021, between 30 and 40 schools will participate annually. This involves courses and follow-up of between 800 and 1500 teachers per year.
2) Countering contemporary antisemitism and other forms of racism online and offline.
In the spring of 2021, The Norwegian Centre against Racism carried out a pilot which monitored antisemitism online – limited to Facebook and Twitter. Later in 2021 and in 2022 the Centre aims at extending the project to additional platforms, which will give a unique picture of the extent of antisemitic statements on social media and how these are followed-up by big tech. Some years ago, the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies presented a media analysis on antisemitism.
Together, these reports will help us understand the extent of antisemitism on- and offline
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and be a basis for developing policies within the framework of freedom of speech.
3) Promoting remembrance and fighting distortion.
In 2022, Norway will, through the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies, launch a new population survey on attitudes towards Jews and other minorities in Norway. The survey has been carried out every few years since 2013 and is initiated by the Norwegian government.
The Day of the Commemoration of the Victims of the Holocaust is marked in several Norwegian cities, including Oslo. Knowledge can help to break down prejudices. There are several Norwegian institutions that provide knowledge about Judaism and Jewish cultural life and history in Norway. The Jewish museums in Oslo and Trondheim, the Falstad Centre and the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies convey such knowledge to a wider audience. The Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies has in 2021 extended its exhibition area substantially, which gives a potential for even more activities in the years to come. The Jewish communities in Trondheim and Oslo play an important role in disseminating knowledge. With the support of the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation the Jewish Pathfinders Program was established some years back and will be continued in the years to come. The Pathfinders Program involves visits by two young Jews to upper secondary schools
The Norwegian Government has decided to continue a grant scheme for school trips to former concentration camps and World War II for the coming years.
Details on the Norwegian commitments to following up the Malmö Forum are to be found in the Norwegian Government’s Action Plan against antisemitism 2021–2023.
28. Poland
Poland consistently continues and intensifies actions aimed at:
• commemorating, strengthening academic research and promoting education about the Holocaust;
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• continuing support of Jewish life in contemporary Poland, supporting the revival of Jewish culture and preserving the Jewish Heritage in Poland;
• combating antisemitism and other forms of discrimination and racism;
• strengthening the academic research on the extermination of Roma and Sinti as a vital part to preserve the memory of the Second World War and the German occupation of Poland.
The Republic of Poland has a vital role on fighting and combating antisemitism due to the fact that within the present borders of our country there is the key material evidence on Genocide against European Jews, on the grounds of former German concentration and death camps and other mass killing sites. The most important actors in that regard are state and local museums: Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial, the State Museum at Majdanek together with Museum and Memorial in Sobibór and Museum and Memorial Site in Bełżec, Museum of the Former German Kulmhof Death Camp in Chełmno on Ner, the Stutthof Museum in Sztutowo and others, all financed mainly from the Polish state budget and local authorities supported in this respect by the government. From year to year we are observing the significant rise in the number of projects, more and more sites of key historical significance to the Holocaust, and repression of Poles, Sinti and Roma, Soviet war prisoners and victims of other nationalities and groups are being protected and preserved. In the upcoming years, we pledge in particular to implement the following projects:
Actions aimed at expanding a new cultural institution “Treblinka Museum. The Nazi German Extermination and Forced Labour Camp 1941-1944” with a total value of EUR 5,500,000. The project completion date: 2025;
Establishment of a cultural institution “Kraków Museum and Memorial Site. The Nazi German Extermination and Forced Labour Camp 1942-1945 “. Total value of the project: EUR 11,000,000. The project completion date: 2025;
Actions aimed at building new facilities: Visitors Service Center and a new permanent exhibition at the Auschwitz Memorial, with a scheduled completion date in 2028;
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The construction of the Warsaw Ghetto Museum in Warsaw, which is scheduled in 2025.
The Republic of Poland, in accordance with the spirit of Stockholm Declaration of 2000 and the joint ministerial statement of IHRA Member States, issued on January 19, 2020 in Brussels, will continue its actions aimed at honoring all those who resisted the Third Reich, especially the Righteous among the Nations, and others who protected or sought to rescue those who were in danger. It is our duty to keep alive the memory of crimes committed during World War II by German Nazis and its collaborators. The legacy of Holocaust and suffering of Victims as well as heroism of those who sought to rescue must not expire over time. It is our duty to pass remembrance about this tragedy to future generations, this is how we can avoid in the future what has already happened in the past.
29. Portugal
1. Developing education for the future to prevent anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance, discrimination and racism – to launch and implement a training program for civil servants and other public officials on Human Rights and the Holocaust, with the goal of preventing and combating anti-Semitism and all other forms of intolerance, discrimination and racism;
2. Developing education for the future to prevent anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance, discrimination and racism – translate into Portuguese and disseminate widely the IHRA “Recommendations for Recognizing and Countering Holocaust Distortion”, which will be used for education and capacity building initiatives in Portugal and to mobilize support by other Portuguese speaking countries and actors;
3. Preserve testimonies, promote remembrance, fight distortion and strengthen research on the Holocaust – create the annual municipal prize “Aristides de Sousa Mendes” to award those local authorities which best promoted universal values, humanism and justice and preserved the remembrance and lessons of the Holocaust.
30. Romania
We reunited, in Malmö, 21 years after the adoption of the Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, which is the founding
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document of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance – IHRA and one year since the adoption of the 2020 IHRA Ministerial Declaration.
This was the perfect occasion to take stock of our successes and failures, to draw lessons learned over the past two decades and to reiterate our commitment to upholding Holocaust education, research and remembrance, as well as to preventing and combating antisemitism, by presenting new national pledges.
Against this background, we pledge to:
Continue to encourage the use of IHRA’s non-legally binding working definition of Antisemitism, both in Romania and on the international arena;
Review, update and strengthen Holocaust education for Romanian pupils;
Review, update and strengthen the training programs for professors, teachers and instructors teaching about the Holocaust;
Increase the number of Romanian pupils participating at the Marches of the Living;
Inaugurate the recently established National Museum of Jewish History and of the Holocaust in Romania;
Work diligently with the Romanian universities in order to expand the number of bachelor, Master and PhD degree programs dedicated to the study and research of the Holocaust, as well as to combatting antisemitism, xenophobia, radicalization and hate speech;
Promote the adoption of Codes of Conduct on Preventing and Combatting Antisemitism by Romanian universities, academic and cultural institutions;
Develop dedicated training programs for managers of cultural institutions, such as museums and theaters, in order to prevent antisemitism and Holocaust denial and distortion and to encourage the fight against racism throughout the cultural expressions;
Support the Federation of the Jewish Communities of Romania, in developing programs for the preservation of Jewish heritage;
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Improve data collection regarding anti-Semitic incidents that do not reach the threshold envisaged in the current administrative regulations and criminal code;
Establish a national annual award for Romanian and international personalities that will contribute to Holocaust education, research and remembrance, as well as to preventing and combatting antisemitism;
Continue to engage with our international likeminded partners in order to promote Holocaust education, research and remembrance at the international level, and to develop international instruments for fighting against antisemitism.
The pandemic that continues to affect our lives has facilitated the proliferation, especially online, of conspiracy theories and anti-Semitic speech. This is unacceptable, and today we reiterate our strong resolve to decisively act against these phenomena, both online and offline.
31. Rwanda
The Constitution of Rwanda of 2003 revised in 2015 indicates the Commitment of the Government of Rwanda to preventing and punishing the crime of genocide, fighting genocide negationism and revisionism, eradicating genocide ideology and all its manifestations, divisionism and discrimination based on ethnicity, region or any other ground. In the same line, the Government of Rwanda will strengthen existing efforts to fight against the impunity of the perpetrators of all Genocide recognized by the international community.
The Government of Rwanda will collaborate with other stakeholders to join the effort to eradicate Holocaust denial and denial of genocide recognized by the international community as indicated in the NST1 on the priority area 4 related to Strengthening justice, law and order under Transformation Governance Pillar2.
To overcome the challenge related to the persistence of genocide ideology despite legal enforcement towards preventing and punishing the crime of genocide ideology.3 The Government of Rwanda will continue to ensure the implementation of law no 59/2018 of 22/08/2019 on the crime of genocide
2 7 years Government Programme: National Strategy for Transformation (NST1) 2017-2024, Page 37
3 Justice, Reconciliation, Law & Order Sector Strategic Plan 2018/19-2023/24, Page 12p
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ideology and related on the ideology of genocide that punishes the denial of any internationally recognized genocide on the Rwandan territory.
Kigali Genocide Memorial is an important place of remembrance and learning about the Genocide against the Tutsi. It proposed educational programme on other genocides and atrocities through exhibitions. Kigali Genocide Memorial will continue to display a Holocaust exhibit for the visitors.
Rwandan schools will continue to teach the Holocaust to help students understanding the historical events of the Holocaust.
The Government of Rwanda will continue its efforts of transmitting memory through the exchange of experience and archives with the Paris Shoah Memorial aiming to promote research on the Holocaust and the Genocide against the Tutsi.
As started with the Government of Sweden4, the Government of Rwanda will continue to advocate for the adoption of a law by all States to punish on their territory the denial of any genocide recognized by the international community.
32. Serbia
We, the Republic of Serbia, pledge to preserve the Memory of the Holocaust
Holocaust Memorial at the city of Bor, one of the largest forced labor camps in Europe during the Second World War, will be established during 2022. The Memorial center is envisaged as an interactive venue where educational and research project would be carried out, engaging wider society, especially children and young adults. The Memorial center would, at the same time, encourage cultural and educational exchange with relevant international partners, institutions and experts in the field of the Holocaust. Within the Center, the Park of friendship between Serbia and Hungary will be established in the memory of many prominent Hungarian Jews who died working in the inhumane conditions of the labor camp. We commit to invest a sum exceeding 500.000 EUR into this project, together with Hungary.
4 Letter to Swedish Parliament requesting to initiate a law on genocide denial and a letter to the Swedish Minister of Justice on genocide denial law.
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We pledge to further honor the victims of the Holocaust
The reconstruction of the Jewish cemetery in the city of Bor will be carried out in 2022 and all the locations of suffering will be mapped and marked. Furthermore, all locations along the “March of death” to which most of the labor camps workers were forced to, on their way to concentration camps in Germany, will be marked as well. Throughout 2022, reconstruction works will be conducted at the central remembrance site in Serbia -Staro Sajmiste, Belgrade. This location will be allotted partially to the Museum of the Genocide victims and for the permanent Memorial center “Staro sajmiste”.
We pledge to further promote education on the Holocaust
Education for children and young adults, as well as teachers and others in the formal and informal educational system, to prevent antisemitism and other forms of racism, will be carried out through an extensive and interactive program in schools and other institutions. Furthermore, literature festival dedicated to the memory of the Holocaust will be inaugurated in 2022, initially on the national level and, in later stages, international level.
We pledge to continue supporting the Jewish community in the Republic of Serbia
Being the first country in Europe to adopt the Holocaust Property Restitution Bill in 2016, we pledge to continue the restitution of all property belonging to the victims of the Holocaust without legal heirs, by compensating Jewish community with 950.000 EUR each year, until 2041.
33. Slovakia
Slovakia pledges to preserve and pass on the remembrance of the Holocaust
Holocaust Museum of the Slovak National Museum – Museum of Jewish Culture was opened in the town of Sereď in 2016. The Museum is located on the grounds of a former labour and concentration camp from the Second World War. The aim is to complete the construction of the entire area of the Holocaust Museum and to create a memorial for Holocaust victims on the grounds of the former appelplatz, which will be a dignified commemorative place appropriate to remember the Holocaust tragedy and to pay tribute to its victims.
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Slovakia pledges to promote education on Holocaust, education to prevent antisemitism and other forms of racism and to strengthen Holocaust research
The use of the IHRA working definition of antisemitism will be supported as a part of further education of judges, prosecutors, attorneys, police officers and other legal professions. The use of IHRA working definition of antigypsyism/anti-Roma racism will be supported.
The use of the existing educational materials on the history of the Roma and about the Roma genocide during World War II will be intensified with the aim to extend the knowledge of pupils and students. Once the IHRA recommendations for teaching and learning about the Roma genocide, currently under preparation, are adopted, they will be actively used in the preparation of educational processes.
The IHRA document Recognizing and Countering Holocaust Distortion Recommendations will be translated into Slovak and awareness of it will be raised among educational institutions, Slovak universities, institutes of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and institutions raising future teachers and policy-makers and among drafters of teaching materials. The document will be disclosed on dissemination portals focused on lifelong learning.
A creation of the Slovak national node of the European Holocaust Research Infrastructure (EHRI) and a prospective membership of the Slovak Republic in the permanent organisation of EHRI will be carefully considered.
Events for teachers and drafters of educational materials related to promotion and use of the IHRA Recommendations for teaching and learning about the Holocaust will be organised. Targeted measures to raise awareness of the young generation about the Holocaust and the risk of its distortion will be implemented.
34. Slovenia
To preserve and pass on the memory of the Holocaust
Slovenia will continue with the annual project every January to commemorate the International Holocaust Day by many events throughout the country that are coordinated by the Sinagogue Maribor under the umbrella name “Shoah – We remember”. Until the COVID-19 pandemic these events in state premises, museums, schools, galleries, cultural
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institutions were physical, but since 2021 (more than 70 events) also in virtual form, which multiplied the public attendance. In the future these events will probably be in a hybrid form, targeting the young generation, survivors and their families and friends as well as public at large.
The yearly traditional Festival of Tolerance, a one week event, which builds awareness with international movies, theatre performances, exhibitions, lectures, new book presentations on the topics of Holocaust and different kinds of intolerance, as well as educational mornings for the young and lively debates of intellectuals, will continue in the years to come.
The ”Stoplersteine” project of remembering the victims of national-socialism and fascism, who have lived in Slovenia, before they were forcefully transported to concentration and extermination camps, will continue.
To promote education on Holocaust
The education of teachers to promote Holocaust education within the school curricula will continue in cooperation with Yad Vashem (currently it is underway virtually) and within other international projects like Memorial de la Shoah (group seminars organised for Slovenian, Italian and Croatian teachers).
A Yad Vashem Exhibition on the Holocaust, which has been recently translated into the Slovenian language, will be made available in the next period to schools and possibly also for public at large. Teachers have just received training about the methodology how to promote this exhibition.
Slovenia has translated among the first all the working definitions of IHRA (Antisemitism, Holocaust Denial and Distortion, Antigypsism) as well as “Educational Guidelines on Teaching ad Learning about the Holocaust” which are available on the internet. Slovenia expects the ”EU Handbook for the practical use of the IHRA definition of antisemitism” to be translated into the Slovene language in due time. Currently the translation of “Recommendations for Policy and Decision Makers on Recognizing and Countering Holocaust Distortion” is underway into the Slovene language.
To continue Holocaust research
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Yearly academic symposiums at the Sinagogue Maribor “Each Year One Name” will be continued as well as occasional publications about the history of “Jews in Slovenia: History and Holocaust” and about “Porajmos-The Roma Genocide”.
35. Spain
Spain is in many respects a leading country regarding Holocaust remembrance and combating anti-Semitism. Our efforts over the last few years have been effective in both areas.
Nevertheless, we support the Swedish presidency of the IHRA in the idea that new grounds can always be found in order to enhance and improve social sensitivity and public commitment to preventing anti-Semitism and to fostering remembrance of the Shoa.
Therefore, the Spanish government wishes to present three pledges which can be developed in the next few years:
1. Disseminate and explain the working definition of anti-Semitism, as defined by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance
After Spain endorsed the definition on July 22nd 2020, we commit to continue our work so that the definition is known and its usefulness is properly understood by all public institutions, as well as by different entities of civil society in the political, social, cultural, educational, and sports fields. We will thus reaffirm Spain’s commitment to fighting anti-Semitism.
2. Work with Spanish municipalities in order to encourage tolerance and the understanding of cultural and religious diversity, by implementing public policies focused on dealing with pluralism
“Municipalities for tolerance” is a project sponsored by the public foundation “Pluralismo y Convicencia” and the Spanish Federation of Municipalities and Provinces. It intends to promote respect and awareness of the diversity present in Spanish society, as well as to prevent any form of hatred. The project includes specific actions aiming to raise awareness of our historical Jewish heritage and its presence in our cities today.
3. Enlarge the network of teachers who receive training in anti-Semitism and Remembrance of the Holocaust
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“Centro Sefarad-Israel”, a public diplomacy institution linked to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation will strengthen and enlarge its training programmes for teachers, in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and with the Autonomous Communities.
These pledges will be implemented by public Spanish institutions, such as the Spanish delegation to IHRA, different Ministries, the Centro Sefarad-Israel and the Foundation “Pluralismo y Convivencia”. Support will be also requested from regional and local authorities, as well as from agents of the civil society, universities in particular, with which cooperation has already begun.
36. Sweden
Sweden will assume the Presidency of the IHRA from March 2022 to the end of February 2023. This was Sweden’s first pledge in connection with the Malmö Forum. Pledges presented at the Malmö Forum will be followed up during the Swedish Presidency. The ambition of the Swedish Government is to implement the measures below and allocate a total amount of approximately EUR 9.3 million/year.
We pledge to preserve and pass on the memory of the Holocaust
• A museum to preserve and pass on the memory of the Holocaust will be established in Sweden in 2022. The activities of the museum will be built up and formed over the years to come. One starting point is that stories of Holocaust survivors with a connection to Sweden will be at the core of the museum’s activities. A Swedish-language version of the Dimensions in Testimony installation (developed by the Shoah Foundation) that allows visitors to interact with Holocaust survivors via pre-recorded answers to questions – using artificial intelligence technology – will be spread by the museum to schools and other museums all over the country.
• The Swedish Government will make a contribution of 5,5 million kronor to the Auschwitz-Birkenau Foundation, so that this place is preserved and new generations can build a future from learning, reflecting and remembering the terrible past.
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We pledge to promote education to prevent antisemitism and other forms of racism and to strengthen Holocaust research
• Education for active citizenship to prevent antisemitism and other forms of racism will be promoted through a nationwide undertaking conducted by the Swedish National Agency for Education in cooperation with the Living History Forum. It will focus on a wide range of target groups encompassing formal and non-formal education.
• Activities, based on the recommendations of the Swedish Research Council’s survey of Swedish research on the Holocaust and antisemitism, including groups such as the Roma and antigypsyism, will be initiated during 2022, with funding allocated by the Swedish Research Council.
We pledge to combat antisemitism, antigypsyism and other forms of racism – online and offline
• An action programme with measures against antisemitism will be presented in 2022. Action programmes targeting antigypsyism, islamophobia, Afrophobia and racism against the Sami will also be presented. The IHRA working definitions of antisemitism and antigypsyism/Roma discrimination will be considered in these respective programmes. The programmes will e.g. include measures in the field of education, continued and enhanced efforts by the police to counter racism and hate crime, as well as an assignment to the Swedish Defence Research Agency to continuously monitor antisemitism and other forms of racism, hate speech and violent extremism in digital environments.
• Organised racism and support for organised racism will be criminalised. The Government will also consult the Parliament and appoint a parliamentary committee of inquiry to unbiasedly consider whether Holocaust denial should be more clearly criminalised.
We pledge to promote Jewish life, strengthen Roma inclusion and enhance security for civil society
• A government inquiry on a strategy to promote Jewish life in Sweden will be appointed. The National strategy for Roma inclusion will continue and permanent resources will be allocated from 2022. Language centres for Yiddish and Romani will be established.
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• Funding for security-enhancing measures for civil society, including the Jewish community, will increase significantly from 2022.
37. Switzerland
Switzerland has always made a strong connection between dealing with the past and prevention of atrocities. While we are very active in dealing with the past and memorialisation, we also have the responsibility to create conditions to prevent violence, end the commission of atrocities and promote conditions for a peaceful world.
In this context, Switzerland is pleased to announce the following pledges – from now on and beyond 2022:
Switzerland will work on the development of a memorial for the victims of National Socialism.
Switzerland will continue the development of educational material about the Holocaust, with a special focus on victims who have not been considered much until now – like the Roma/Sinti.
Switzerland will be actively involved in the organization of the annual Holocaust commemorations on 27 January and 2 August.
Switzerland will continue its active engagement within the IHRA.
Switzerland will continue to take on an active role in making prevention a reality through the global initiative for atrocity prevention GAAMAC, where during its fourth international meeting in November, IHRA will offer a workshop on strengthening national efforts to address hate speech, discrimination and prevent incitement. A highly relevant topic to this day!
38. The Czech Republic
• The Czech Republic is committed to preventing and combating antisemitism both offline and online. The Czech Republic will prepare the Czech National Strategy for Combating Antisemitism. The intention is to create a working platform among the respective state institutions and the Federation of Jewish Communities for long-term cooperation on combating antisemitism. The Strategy aims mainly at shortening the time between the appearance of antisemitic texts online, their removal and the official punishment.
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• The Czech Republic will establish a state subsidized institution called Memorial of Silence. The institution will commemorate the victims of the Holocaust and will serve as a Holocaust education center for people of all ages. As a state institution, it will also have the ambition to join all other Holocaust memory institutions in the Czech Republic. The institution will also focus on the comparison of the past experiences with current signs of xenophobia and antisemitism.
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic will organize an International Ministerial Conference as a part of the Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2022. The conference will be organized as a follow up to the Terezín Declaration endorsed by 47 countries. The main goal of the conference will be to support educational and remembrance programs for young people, to review progress in rectifying injustices from the time of the Holocaust, and encourage the creation of strategies and funds for combating antisemitism, xenophobia and hate.
39. The Netherlands
Thanks to the unwavering efforts of the chairman of the Dutch Auschwitz Committee, Mr. Jacques Grishaver, the Holocaust Memorial of Names was unveiled last month. In the very heart of Amsterdam, a brick labyrinth slowly took form, bearing the names and ages of all 102,163 Dutch Jews, Roma and Sinti murdered by the Nazis during World War II. Each brick is inscribed by a single name.
According to Mr. Grishaver commemoration is more than honouring the dead. It also leads us to account for the actions of the past, and sustains us in the fight against the poison of antisemitism.
The Dutch government has developed four initiatives to support this fight. This year, we appointed a National Coordinator for Countering Antisemitism (NCAB) whose role is to offer advice, both solicited and unsolicited, on tackling intimidation, discrimination and threats against the Jewish community.
Secondly, the Netherlands is pleased to announce that we wish to host the headquarters of the European Holocaust Research Infrastructure (EHRI) in the Netherlands and contribute financially to the establishment of the EHRI.
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The task of the EHRI is to safeguard continuing international research into commemoration of and education about the holocaust.
Thirdly, in line with the European framework decision on racism, the Netherlands aims to cover specific forms of hate speech – such as public denial of genocide – explicitly in an existing criminal provision. Denying the evil that was committed is nothing short of a new assault.
The fourth and final initiative involves additional efforts aimed at raising awareness of the Holocaust and broadening understanding of the Jewish culture, among schoolchildren.
Some of the bricks that make up the new Memorial of Names are now marked by small stones. According to this Jewish custom, the descendants of the deceased show that their thoughts are still with their lost loved ones.
Let all of us try in our lives to symbolically leave behind our own stone of remembrance every day. By honouring the dead, by remembering the horrors, and by pledging our relentless commitment to the fight against today’s antisemitism.
40. Turkey
On Holocaust Remembrance;
We are determined to continue our efforts for commemorating and reminding the public of the victims of the Holocaust, in observance of the “never again” motto.
The visibility is closely related to awareness. Therefore, we are resolved to continue organizing high-profile ceremonies and public events held in memory of the victims on 27 January and 24 February every year -the occasions of the International Holocaust Remembrance Day and the Struma Incident- engaging a wider audience in the Turkish public.
The “Weremember” website, launched by the Directorate of Communications of the Presidency on 27 January 2021, is a testimony to our determination in this regard.
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On Holocaust Education;
We are engaged to better educating the younger generations about the Holocaust, the most vicious crime against humanity which gave its meaning to the term genocide, not only through the present curriculum but also scholarly research and the power of social media platforms.
The “IHRA Recommendations for Teaching and Learning About the Holocaust,” published on the afore-mentioned website “Weremember,” is a noteworthy step towards this direction.
We will also encourage extensive scholarly work on the Holocaust through the Institute on Genocide Studies to be established in Istanbul University.
On Antisemitism on social media platforms;
We will continue raising awareness against Antisemitism in social media.
One of our priorities will be to facilitate public access to the Turkish translation of the “UNESCO/OSCE Guidelines on Addressing Antisemitism Through Education” on suitable channels.
On combating Antisemitism and other forms of racism in all spheres of life;
We are committed to promoting academic work on the intersecting lines between Antisemitism and other forms of racism and discrimination, including the Islamophobia.
We will also continue to support civil society initiatives to combat Antisemitism, Islamophobia, racism and discrimination.
Next year, we will mark the 530th Anniversary of the welcoming by the Ottoman Empire of the Jewish people fleeing from the Inquisition and persecution. We aim to promote and organize activities both at home and abroad to remember this event and draw lessons from the history of Antisemitism.
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41. Ukraine
1. Preserving the memory of the Holocaust victims:
Preservation of historical memory is an important component of Ukraine’s humanitarian policy. The issue of historical justice is very acute. We are responsible to all past and all future generations for historical justice. That is especially crucial to preserve and pass on to future generations the memory of the tragedy in Babyn Yar and to convey to the world community the truthful information about this mourning symbol of Holocaust on the Ukrainian soil, as there are almost no survivors of this human drama nowadays.
a. Therefore, the National Historical Memorial Preserve Babyn Yar or the Ukrainian Holocaust Museum will be created on the base of the complex of historical monuments on the place of mass extermination of civilians and prisoners of war in the Babyn Yar ravine during the Nazi occupation. It is our duty to make Babyn Yar a place of memory, not a place of oblivion. As a state, we strive to make this place worthy of the memory of more than 100,000 Holocaust victims.
b. We also pledge to preserve and pass on the memory of the Holocaust by ensuring that the permanent exhibition of the National History Museum of Ukraine properly represents and reflects the rich history of Ukrainian Jews, their centuries-long input into cultural, economic, social and political development of Ukraine. We will enhance substantially cooperation between Ukraine’s local history museums, museums of Ukrainian Jews and museums of Holocaust through organization of joint exhibition projects, online public lectures and virtual exhibitions to ensure better education of the Ukrainian citizens on the subject of Holocaust and history of the Ukrainian Jews.
2. Support for research on the Holocaust and reflection of this issue in educational and academic programs of Ukraine:
Ukraine pledges to enhance knowledge about the Holocaust by elaborating of the National educational program to spread awareness about the Holocaust, ensuring proper representation of this subject in school textbooks, academic programs and research institutions. To this end, the Government of Ukraine will provide the state funding under existing undergraduate and graduate Jewish Studies programs in Ukraine, namely those at the Ukrainian Catholic University (Lviv) and National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.
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3. Combating antisemitism, racism, xenophobia and discrimination in Ukrainian society:
To develop a strategy for promoting and protecting the Jewish life in Ukraine by conducting a National information campaign on the historical lessons of genocides of the XX century in the context of combatting xenophobia and antisemitism and appointing liaison officers/national focal points for an operative interaction with the local Jewish communities in relevant law enforcement bodies.
42. United Kingdom
Today we must confront the reality that around the world antisemitism is on the rise. We cannot remain silent. Antisemitism has absolutely no place in our society, which is why we are taking a strong lead in tackling it in all its forms whether it be in our universities, schools or in our communities. When we see swastikas daubed on walls of synagogues and hear vile verbal abuse, we must not be silent. That is why we pledge to keep up the fight against Antisemitism.
To mark the 21st anniversary of the Stockholm Declaration the United Kingdom Government pledges to:
UK Holocaust Memorial and Learning Centre
• build and open a new national Holocaust Memorial and Learning Centre to honour the six million Jewish men, women and children who were murdered during the Holocaust and all other victims of Nazi persecution by January 2025.
• ensure that the learning centre focuses on subsequent genocides, and provides a balanced narrative, addressing the complexities of Britain’s responses to the Holocaust, avoiding simplistic judgements and encouraging visitors to critically reflect on this pivotal period of history
Holocaust Remembrance
• continue supporting the annual Holocaust Memorial Day Ceremony on 27 January, alongside local ceremonies across the length and breadth of the United Kingdom
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Holocaust Education
• continue to encourage higher education providers to adopt the IHRA definition of antisemitism
• continue to ensure that teacher training supports teachers to understand equality issues and subject knowledge, including through the Initial Teacher Training Teachers’ Standards and providers’ own legal duties on equality.
Online Harms
• bring forward the government’s proposals for a new regulatory framework that will usher in a new age of accountability for technology companies. The draft Online Safety Bill, published in May 2021, will give rise to the regulatory framework which will place a duty of care on platforms, requiring them to tackle illegal and legal but harmful abuse online, including antisemitic abuse. The regime will be overseen by an independent regulator who will have powers to issue large fines of up to 10% of annual turnover or £18 million, whichever is higher.
UK Holocaust Sites Map
• jointly fund with the Association of Jewish Refugees the development of a new digital resource to map sites and documents relevant to the Holocaust and Nazism in Britain.
Engagement with the next generation
• continue building links with the children, grandchildren and future descendants of Holocaust survivors, to ensure that they are never forgotten.
• empower the next generation so they can challenge Holocaust denial and distortion and champion the cause of Holocaust remembrance.
43. United States of America
Promoting Holocaust remembrance and combatting anti-Semitism remain top policy priorities of the United States, especially as the world witnesses an alarming rise in anti-Semitism. We unequivocally condemn all attacks targeting Jews, Jewish places of worship, community centers, and cemeteries,
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as well as anti-Semitic rhetoric in the United States and abroad. As President Biden said on May 28, 2021, “In recent days, we have seen that no community is immune. We must all stand together to silence these terrible and terrifying echoes of the worst chapters in world history, and pledge to give hate no safe harbor.”
Secretary of State Blinken is announcing the following United States pledges at the Malmö International Forum on Holocaust Remembrance and Combating Antisemitism:
• One-million-dollars for a program to counter anti-Semitic hate speech online in the Middle East and North Africa.
• An expanded series of International Visitor Leadership Projects starting Fall/Winter of 2021–2022 to confront and counter Holocaust distortion and anti-Semitism in North Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and Latin America. • Working with our Congress, the United States plans to provide $1 million in Central Europe to support the IHRA Global Task Force Against Holocaust Denial and Distortion in Central Europe.
International organisations
44. European Commission
At the Malmö International Forum, the Commission pledges its first-ever EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life. With antisemitism worryingly on the rise, in Europe and beyond, the Strategy sets out a series of measures articulated around three pillars:
I. Preventing and combating all forms of antisemitism;
II. Protecting and fostering Jewish life; and
III Education, Research and Holocaust remembrance.
Some of the key measures in the strategy include:
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I. Preventing and combating all forms of antisemitism:
The Commission will support the creation of a Europe-wide network of independent trusted flaggers, fact checkers and Jewish organisations to help remove illegal hate speech online and address antisemitic conspiracy myths and disinformation through developing counter narratives. The Commission will cooperate with industry and IT companies to prevent the illegal display and selling of Nazi-related symbols, memorabilia and literature online. The Commission will mobilise EU funds and support Member States in designing and implementing their national strategies as well as improve and align their methodologies for recording and collecting of data on antisemitic hate crime.
II. Protecting and fostering Jewish life in the EU:
To ensure that Jews feel safe and can participate fully in European life, the Commission will double EU funding to better protect public spaces and places of worship to 24 Mio in 2022. It will cooperate closely with Europol and encourage Member States to make use of Europol’s support to counter terrorism activities, both online and offline. To foster Jewish life, the Commission will support actions together with Jewish communities, to safeguard Jewish heritage and raise awareness around Jewish life, culture and traditions.
III. Education, research and Holocaust remembrance:
The Commission will support the creation of a network of lesser-known local places “where the Holocaust happened”, such as hiding places or shooting grounds. The Commission will also support a new network of Young European Ambassadors to promote remembrance of the Holocaust. With EU funding, the Commission will support the creation of a European research hub on contemporary antisemitism and Jewish life and finance educational professionals’ training on “Adressing antisemitism through education” by UNESCO/OSCE-ODIHR. To highlight Jewish heritage, the Commission will invite cities applying for the title of European Capital of Culture to address the history of their minorities, including Jewish community history.
The EU will use all available tools to call on partner countries to combat antisemitism in the EU neighbourhood and beyond, including through cooperation with international organisations. It will ensure that EU external
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funds may not be misallocated to activities that incite hatred and violence, including against Jewish people. The EU will strengthen EU-Israel cooperation in the fight against antisemitism and promote the revitalisation of Jewish heritage worldwide.
45. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
If the European Union fails its Jewish Community, then it itself has failed. The stakes are that high. The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights is steadfast in its commitment to combat antisemitism in all its forms and manifestations. In doing so, it will continue to work with the EU and its Member States; with international organisations; with the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance; with Jewish community organisations; and, with national bodies with a human rights or equality remit.
Pledge 1: Periodic surveys on the lived experience of antisemitism
The Agency pledges to continue conducting its periodic survey on experiences and perceptions of antisemitism among Jews in the EU. The Agency will roll out its next survey in 2022, and at regular intervals thereafter. This survey provides all stakeholders in the field with the most comprehensive source of reliable evidence on the lived experience of antisemitism among Jews in the EU, including as regards experiences of online antisemitism. This evidence can be the basis for taking targeted action to protect Jewish life in the EU. The Agency also stands ready to provide interested parties with advice on how to conduct such surveys, at the national and international levels.
Pledge 2: Assistance in monitoring the implementation of strategies on combating antisemitism
The Agency pledges to provide the EU and its Member States with evidence, assistance and expertise to support them in monitoring the implementation of their strategies on combating antisemitism and promoting Jewish life. As part of this, the Agency will publish an annual update on antisemitism in the EU, with a focus on three areas: the situation of recording of and data collection on antisemitic incidents; the state of play on the roll out of strategies to combat antisemitism; and, the ways in which EU Member States (intend to) use the IHRA working definition of antisemitism.
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Pledge 3: Assistance in improving recording and encouraging reporting of antisemitic incidents
The Agency pledges to assist national authorities in EU Member States in improving the recording of and data collection on antisemitism, including law enforcement authorities. The Agency will also work with these authorities and other bodies to encourage victims and witnesses to report antisemitic incidents to relevant organisations, so that they can seek justice and redress against perpetrators. The Agency will work with public bodies and civil society organisations to enhance their cooperation in all of these areas.
46. International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)
The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) is committed to fulfill its mandate as stipulated in the Stockholm Declaration (2000) and the 2020 IHRA Ministerial Declaration. Therefore, on the occasion of the Malmö International Forum, the IHRA makes three pledges that will provide practical responses to the pressing societal challenges of Holocaust distortion, education about the Genocide of the Roma and ensuring open access to archival material bearing on the Holocaust.
1. Holocaust distortion attacks the very heart of our democratic and open societies. It paves the way for Holocaust denial, conspiracy thinking, violent antisemitism and extreme forms of nationalism. Holocaust distortion does not stop at national borders, and countering it requires international cooperation. Therefore,
the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance and UNESCO pledge to jointly address rising Holocaust denial and distortion as a virulent form of contemporary antisemitism. We will develop resources and trainings to support policymakers, civil servants, journalists, and stakeholders from the field of education, to address Holocaust distortion in their respective professional environments.
2. Discrimination against Roma has existed for centuries. The neglect of the genocide of the Roma, carried out by Nazi Germany and its collaborators, has contributed to the prejudice and discrimination that many Roma communities still experience today. Anti-Roma discrimination, like any other form of discrimination, undermines the core values of our democratic societies. Therefore,
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the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance pledges to develop recommendations for teaching and learning about the genocide of the Roma.
These recommendations will provide policymakers and stakeholders from the field of education with an educationally sound framework for teaching about the genocide of the Roma, and help to increase awareness of this history as well as existing forms of anti-Roma discrimination in our societies.
3. Six million Jewish men, women and children were murdered in the Holocaust. More than one million are yet to be identified by name. Holocaust-related documents, that can help to identify victims as well as perpetrators, are scattered across the world, often not recognized as such in financial, business, and academic archives. Therefore,
the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance pledges to develop recommendations on identifying Holocaust-related materials, so that victims, survivors, and their descendants can reclaim their histories and their identities.
The recommendations aim to empower archivists, researchers, and civil society to identify, preserve, and make available archival material that will help us to better understand the history of the Holocaust.
47. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
OSCE participating States have repeatedly condemned anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance and discrimination, beginning with the Copenhagen Document of the Conference on Security and Co-operation Europe in 1990.
With the 2014 Basel Ministerial Council Declaration on “Enhancing Efforts to Combat Anti-Semitism”, participating States expressed their “concern at the disconcerting number of anti-Semitic incidents that continue to take place in the OSCE area and remain a challenge to stability and security” and called on ODIHR to “facilitate co-operation between governmental officials and civil society on issues related to anti-Semitism, including hate crime and Holocaust remembrance.”
Against the backdrop of the disquieting rise of anti-Semitism across the OSCE region, ODIHR will provide robust assistance to OSCE participating States and civil society to effectively address anti-Semitism in all its forms:
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• In the area of security, ODIHR pledges to build effective communication between law enforcement officials and Jewish communities to better address the security needs of Jewish communities and further improve governmental responses to anti-Semitic hate crimes.
• In the area of education, ODIHR pledges to address anti-Semitism by developing a new course and building on its existing tools and programmes.
• In the area of online anti-Semitism, ODIHR pledges to build the capacity of Jewish communities and civil society to engage with technology companies on matters of policy and regulation.
48. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
Throughout the year, UNESCO promotes education about the Holocaust around the world, recalling the universal importance of Holocaust remembrance and our global duty to teach and learn about this history. Furthermore, UNESCO is dedicated, in partnership with other international bodies, civil society organizations and governments across the globe to combatting antisemitism under all its forms, with focus on the role of education.
As we enter a new era of remembrance, in a world with ever fewer survivors of the Holocaust, UNESCO will expand its global programme on Holocaust education, strengthening the collective responsibility to remember, care for historic sites, promote education, documentation and research about the genocide of the Jewish people. UNESCO will also strengthen its engagement to address the alarming rise of antisemitism, hate speech and other forms of intolerance and discrimination, and to provide education authorities with the tools to tackle all forms of contemporary antisemitism:
Firstly, UNESCO pledges to advance the institutionalization of Holocaust education globally by developing programmes that resonate with local audiences and histories.
In partnership with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, and with the support of the Government of Canada, UNESCO will support Holocaust and genocide education initiatives worldwide, prioritizing countries in which Holocaust education is not advanced. To accompany the
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programme, UNESCO will develop further guidelines for policymakers and an e-learning course on addressing violent pasts through education.
Secondly, UNESCO pledges to advance education to counter the rise of antisemitism.
UNESCO commits to this by building the capacity of policymakers, educators, school leaders and young people through international, regional and national workshops to recognize and respond to antisemitism, conspiracy theories and all other forms of hate speech, in a framework of human rights and global citizenship education. Building on our guidance for policymakers and set of training curricula, UNESCO and the OSCE/ODIHR will jointly develop a free e-learning course for educators and staff in international organizations.
Thirdly, in partnership with the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), UNESCO jointly pledges to counter rising Holocaust denial and distortion as virulent forms of contemporary antisemitism.
UNESCO and IHRA will develop resources and training to support educators, policymakers, civil servants and journalists in addressing Holocaust distortion in their respective professional environments. The resources will supplement a guide and online tool to support teachers in strengthening the resilience of learners against Holocaust denial and distortion, developed with the United Nations and the World Jewish Congress.
Civil Society organisations
49. American Jewish Committee
1. AJC has been involved in fighting antisemitism around the world since 1906. We are delighted to share that extensive experience with any and all governments, as well as non-governmental institutions, that would like to draw upon it.
2. Knowing there is no overnight solution to antisemitism—alas, there is not yet a Pfizer vaccine against antisemitism—we will hold governments accountable for years to come, because this is a commitment that must be sustained over the long haul. There’s a millennia-long history to
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antisemitism. Consequently, attention and focus must remain on antisemitism not only today, but also tomorrow and the day after.
3. We share in the belief that Holocaust memory and education are absolutely essential to the fight against antisemitism. We also know the ultimate expression of understanding is to defend living Jews, and not only to mourn dead Jews.
4. For us, Israel, the nation-state of the Jewish people, is absolutely central to our belief in the wellbeing and security of the Jewish people. We will encourage nations to deepen their relations with Israel, and we will oppose all efforts to delegitimize Israel, isolate it within the community of nations, or deny the Jewish people their sovereign right to self-determination in their ancestral land.
50. Anti-defamation league
Pledge of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) to the Malmö International Forum on Holocaust Remembrance and Combating Antisemitism, 13 October 2021.
We pledge to share ADL’s digital education program about antisemitism education for students with partners in Europe and around the world. The program addresses the number one concern we hear from Jewish communities – that the general public doesn’t know enough about Jews and Jewish identity, and that knowledge vacuum is often filled by antisemitic stereotypes. The digital education program about antisemitism will be adapted for each Jewish community to reflect their history and the antisemitism challenges they face. Through the program’s relatable stories, students build knowledge, empathy, perspective and allyship.
51. B’nai B’rith International
B’nai B’rith International is dedicated to improving the quality of life for people around the globe, together with our over 100 000 members and supporters around the world. Since our founding in 1843, B’nai B’rith has spoken out against anti-Semitism and intolerance in all its forms.
We are proud to pledge our sponsorship of the None Shall Be Afraid program, which provides a way for individuals and local communities to foster tolerance and responsibility.
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Through None Shall Be Afraid, B’nai B’rith will continue to remind the world that hatred and violence against Jews is unacceptable and indifference has dire consequences.
In the wake of the utter devastation of the Holocaust, we witnessed the persistence of anti-Semitism across over the more than 70 years that followed Nazi rule. Collectively we learned that, far from being merely a threat to Jews, anti-Semitism erodes the very fabric of democratic societies.
We are committed to bringing about a society where “None Shall Be Afraid”. This is our pledge in response to the world’s oldest hatred.
On the occasion of the Malmö International Forum, we are promoting a personal pledge to respect others, as well as introducing essay and art competitions for youth. This pledge addresses the most fundamental issues being tackled by the forum: the importance of education, of combating Holocaust distortion, of promoting respect for human rights and dignity. It seeks to raise awareness of contemporary forms of anti-Semitism and invites signatories to disengage from discourses of difference.
The creative competitions are meant to stimulate engagement and to create a sense of responsibility among students. Communities are encouraged to promote the competition within their schools and youth groups. Young people are essential to the fight against anti-Semitism and hatred. Younger generations are at the heart of fostering Jewish life today.
Our message is one of perseverance: We continue to inform and advise policymakers, to speak out against Holocaust denial, distortion and trivialization, to unmask anti-Semitism stemming from double standards, delegitimization and the demonization of Israel – and to address rising online hate and extremism.
But combating anti-Semitism is everyone’s responsibility. We are committed to raising awareness and building understanding across every part of society.
We need everyone’s help in defeating the world’s oldest hatred, because everyone counts.
52. European Jewish Congress
The European Jewish Congress (EJC), the representative umbrella organisation of 42 national Jewish communities across Europe, welcomes
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the initiative of a concrete outcome document for the Malmö International Forum on Holocaust Remembrance and Combating Antisemitism.
This document, consisting of concrete pledges strengthening Holocaust remembrance and combatting antisemitism and racism, will inform joint efforts between governments and civil society and bring about tangible progress.
On this historic occasion, the European Jewish Congress pledges to:
• Continue its enduring task of preserving the memory of the Holocaust through the promotion of educational programmes and materials, visits to concentration camps, commemorative events and other activities.
• Continue organising annual high-level events honouring the memory of the victims of the Holocaust and combatting antisemitism, in cooperation with the European institutions and national governments.
• In particular, hold high-level international fora on Holocaust remembrance and renewing the fight against antisemitism every five years, in cooperation with the World Holocaust Forum Foundation.
• Gather, preserve, translate and disseminate the written and recorded testimonies of the survivors of the Holocaust.
• Engage with all relevant stakeholders to explore new and innovative ways to transmit the memory of the Holocaust to the young generation.
• Engage with all relevant stakeholders to explore ways to channel social media as a force for good in the fight against extremism, including through the use of influencers and counter-narratives.
• Promote the freedom to conduct academic research on the Holocaust, free from political interference.
• Support grassroots initiatives combating antisemitism, racism and all forms of intolerance as well as preserving and promoting the memory of the Holocaust through the European Jewish Fund.
• Strengthen resilience, security awareness and crisis management among Jewish communities and enhance cooperation with law enforcement
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authorities through the Security and Crisis Center by EJC (SACC by EJC).
• Continue gathering data and producing annual reports on contemporary manifestations of antisemitism worldwide to inform governments and civil society, in cooperation with the Kantor Center at Tel Aviv University.
• Promote the IHRA working definition of antisemitism, the IHRA working definition of antigypsyism/anti-Roma discrimination, and the IHRA working definition of Holocaust denial and distortion.
• Strengthen inter-religious and intercultural dialogue and cooperation to contribute to a democratic Europe based on peace, understanding and tolerance.
• Speak out against any and all forms of hatred and intolerance.
53. European Roma Rights Centre
We pledge to remember the panj shel mila – the 500,000 or more Romani people who, alongside Jews, were the only two peoples targeted in the Nazi’s final solution to rid the continent of our ancestors.
We pledge to commemorate the injustices done to us, and the further years of injustice done by Europe in the denial of the Romani Holocaust. For Roma, the Holocaust did not mean the end of hatred and discrimination against us. The ideologies of white supremacy which led to the indiscriminate slaughter of our families in the 1940s remained firmly embedded in European society, long after the liberation of the concentration camps. The legacy of the Nazi Race Laws, of the propaganda, the persecution, and the categorisation of Roma as “undesirable” lives on in Europe today: in every segregated community without water or electricity; in every Romani woman coercively sterilised from 1945 to 2012; in every Romani schoolchild segregated from her non-Roma peers, in every Romani person beaten to death at the hands of police officers just doing their job.
We pledge to disrupt this ideology. We pledge to agitate, to educate, and to litigate in every way we can to ensure that the horrors of the 20th century are not repeated in an increasingly illiberal and institutionally racist Europe. We pledge to fight until we are no longer necessary, and Europe’s Romani
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peoples are free to enjoy what most other European citizens take for granted: the freedom to live an ordinary life.
54. The International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA World)
During the Nazi regime, millions of persons were annihilated at the hands of a system and society that had been warped into compliant acceptance of hate.
Among those millions, are an estimated 100,000 persons who were, or were assumed to be, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or intersex and were arrested for violating laws against same-sex sexual conduct or for just being different. They were sentenced to prison, and some were sent to concentration camps.
People were marked with pink triangles, and policies were designed to ‘cure’ them through humiliation and forced labour. Inmates were subject to medical experimentation causing illness, mutilation, and death.
We now know these stories. But that wasn’t always the case. After the war, LGBTI survivors were initially not acknowledged. Often, they were repudiated by their families; some continued to be imprisoned because of continuing laws criminalising consensual same-sex conduct.
We are thankful for those who found the courage to break the silence. But memory is a fragile and precious thing, and most Holocaust survivors are no longer with us.
Their stories matter, especially now that we see nationalism and fascism on the rise again, always searching for enemies to scapegoat. These ideologies employ a strategy of targeting entire marginalized communities and today we face well-resourced and coordinated efforts to again weave seductive lies to the world, often on social media.
The communities targeted are often blurred into one almighty “other”. We witnessed this in 2019 when our office was vandalized twice with a stream of graffiti that blurred transphobia, with anti-semitiism, anti-Jewish conspiracy theories, and homophobia.
Hatred is a fire that spreads without distinction. We cannot just remain vigilant: we need to eradicate it together.
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Therefore, we pledge to:
• combat all forms of intolerance – online and offline – with our advocacy, research and communications work addressing the human rights violations faced by LGBTI persons
• challenge those that seek to normalize prejudice: fighting back misinformation with education on how LGBTI-phobia intersects with other forms of racism and intolerance
• provide positive examples of what inclusion, respect, tolerance, and diversity look like
• call for all governments and other holders of power to use their influence to tackle the underlying causes and consequences of intolerance
• be available to governments with our grass-roots expertise as they develop national responses to tackle the root causes of intoleranc
• continue to mark the International Day of Commemoration in memory of the victims of the Holocaust.
55. World Jewish Congress
The World Jewish Congress, under the leadership of President Ronald S. Lauder, represents more than 100 Jewish communities and organizations around the globe and acts as the principal voice representing the Jewish world, advocating on its behalf towards governments, parliaments, international, interfaith and other organizations. Since its founding in 1936, the WJC has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to combating antisemitism in all its guises.
We are currently witnessing an alarming rise in antisemitism across the globe. The growth of extreme far-right parties in Europe and a proliferation of anti-Zionist sentiment has contributed to an atmosphere in which many Jews are afraid to openly identify as such, and Jewish communities are frequently a main target for extremists. Antisemitism is still a deeply-rooted phenomenon in many liberal democracies, despite efforts by governments and independent organizations to tackle it. Antisemitism in all its forms must be combated vigorously by determined actions, including by governments,
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law enforcement, international organizations, civil society organizations, interfaith partners and social media companies.
The WJC pledges to cooperate with these stakeholders and others to fight antisemitism and related phenomena such as Holocaust distortion and denial while working actively to safeguard and protect Jewish life and ensure it can flourish for many generations to come.
Governments
The WJC believes that it is the primary role of governments to ensure the security and welfare of their Jewish communities, safeguard their dignity and safety and combat antisemitism in all its manifestations, including Holocaust denial and distortion. The WJC therefore pledges to work with governments to develop and implement national strategies to combat this millennia-old hatred. In order to address this scourge more effectively, decision and policy makers need to understand what antisemitism is. The WJC will continue to advocate and cooperate with governments to adopt and implement the working definition of antisemitism developed by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) and encourage states to become members of this important body.
The WJC maintains that strong legislation to combat antisemitism, hate speech and extremism remains one of the most important tools to deter and counter these plagues, both off and online. The WJC renews its commitment to work with lawmakers to enact such laws and hold governments accountable to ensure such legislation is enforced stringently.
Given the repeated attacks against Jewish individuals and communities, providing protection for Jewish institutions and houses of worship is paramount. The WJC will persist in its efforts to work with relevant authorities at all levels to protect and safeguard Jewish communities worldwide and defend their civil rights and religious freedoms.
Education also plays a critical role in the struggle against antisemitism and in sensitizing younger generations to the dangers of hate and extremism. The WJC will continue to encourage governments to develop educational systems which foster critical thinking, digital literacy, democratic citizenship education, as well as education about the Holocaust as well as other genocides to build bridges of understanding and high levels of empathy towards the “other”. Educational institutions should also focus on teaching
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Jewish history and culture, as well as recognizing the many contributions the Jewish people have made to the countries in which they live.
Special Envoys and Coordinators Combating Antisemitism
The World Jewish Congress pledges to continue convening international meetings of Special Envoys and Coordinators Combating Antisemitism (SECCA) to exchange views, share best practices and policies, and evaluate progress in the fight against antisemitism. The WJC will work with special envoys and coordinators to address antisemitism both in the domestic and international context and to seek consultations on the topic with other competent authorities in their countries and international organizations. The WJC will continue to call on all countries that have not yet appointed envoys or coordinators to monitor and combat antisemitism to promptly do so. The WJC will support envoy and coordinator efforts to address the security of Jewish communities, the improvement of data gathering on hate crimes, Holocaust education and education against antisemitism, online hate, neo-Nazi movements, and Holocaust denial and distortion in their respective countries.
Law Enforcement
The WJC pledges to expand its ‘Words into Action to Combat Antisemitism’ program with the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the European Commission Office of the EC Coordinator on Combating Antisemitism and Fostering Jewish life on monitoring and combating antisemitism and enhancing the security of Jewish communities. In addition, the WJC will work individually with law enforcement agencies in selected countries, through a series of round tables and workshops with the aim of achieving the required standards in the domain of combating antisemitism and hate speech.
International and Civil Society Organizations
The WJC pledges to strengthen its cooperation with all international and regional organizations, such as the Council of Europe, the European Union, the Organization of American States, OSCE, UNESCO and the United Nations, for our joint fight against antisemitism, hatred and intolerance of all kinds. We will continue and intensify our work with international partners on topics such as combating antisemitism and discrimination through education, countering Holocaust denial and distortion, curbing hate speech
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online, protecting the rights of minorities and promoting genocide prevention. At the same time, the WJC pledges to widen our partnership with civil society organizations on these topics and build alliances to increase our impact and effectiveness.
Interfaith Partners
The WJC will promote interfaith and inter-community collaboration and will work with leaders and partners of all faiths and beliefs to enhance understanding and to promote joint projects to educate against racism, discrimination, and extremism. The WJC pledges to spearhead dialogue between the three Abrahamic religions — Judaism, Islam and Christianity — and create opportunities for better understanding between religious leaders and their communities.
Internet Companies, Sharing Platforms, and Social Media
The WJC will further strengthen its cooperation with internet companies, sharing platforms, and social media to ensure that policies are in place to address the ongoing needs and changing circumstances related to combating antisemitism, violent extremism, Holocaust denial and distortion and other relevant issues.
The WJC will continue to collaborate with platforms and companies on improving the enforcement of related policies and will continue to monitor and report incidents via cooperative channels such as “trusted flagger” and “community partnership” programs.
The WJC will further enhance its efforts to promote educational content on sharing platforms and social media and will continue to promote the aboutholocaust.org website in cooperation with UNESCO on a wide variety of platforms as a tool for education about the Holocaust and for combatting Holocaust denial and distortion.
WJC will further engage with international, regional, and national organizations and governments to address the challenges of the spread of hate and antisemitism online and will increase its membership and involvement in relevant forums and networks.
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Jewish Communities
The WJC pledges to work tirelessly together with our affiliated communities to advocate on their behalf and in consultation with them to ensure that they can maintain and celebrate the Jewish religion, culture and heritage, all in accordance with local circumstances and needs. This includes defending religious practices integral to Jewish life, such as kosher slaughter (shechita) and circumcision (brit milah), preserving the memory of the Holocaust, as well as combating antisemitism. Of particular importance are the education of young people, the role of the media, and the action by police and the judiciary in bringing perpetrators of antisemitic crimes to justice.
Just as it did at its founding eighty-five years ago, the WJC pledges to continue to protect and defend Jews in their communities worldwide while upholding the dignity and human rights of all peoples.
Private sector
56. Facebook
With the scourge of antisemitism around the world, we recognize the role we can play to help fulfill the promise ‘Never Again’. Holocaust denial and distortion content is hate speech and has no place on our platforms. We remove it when we detect it or it is reported to us, and will continue to improve our enforcement of this important policy.
The removal of Holocaust denial and distortion is important but this alone will not fill the gap of the alarming level of ignorance about the Holocaust, especially among young people. Facebook is committed to helping our community learn about the events that led to the Holocaust and the genocide of one-third of the Jewish people.
Our partnership with the World Jewish Congress and UNESCO connects people on Facebook with authoritative information about the Holocaust at aboutholocaust.org. We are committed to expanding this partnership to include more languages with this information across the platform; we currently include 12 languages.
There are sadly so few Holocaust survivors left today and we pledge that the stories of the six million will be shared and remembered as we continue to
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dedicate resources, personnel and creativity to promote educational materials about the Holocaust on our platforms.
Our partnership with the Claims Conference supporting their It Started With Words campaign on our platform allows the voices of survivors to explain the origins of the Holocaust so that it will never happen again, and our support of Yad Vashem’s iRemember wall enables people around the world to remember the stories of the victims.
When we partner with March of the Living to promote their Let There Be Light campaign, we want to inspire hope to people around the world on November 9, the anniversary of Kristallnacht, that we stand together in the shared battle against antisemitism, racism, hatred and intolerance.
Facebook will continue to listen to the voice of the Jewish community and is committed to our dedicated partner organization engagement roundtables with representatives of the Jewish community around the world. We are also proud that our policy team has a dedicated Jewish Diaspora Policy Director.
As the internet continues to evolve, we are investing $50M in programs and research to determine how to build augmented and virtual reality in a responsible way. The Anne Frank experience on Oculus is an early example of how technology can help society remember and share stories in new ways. Looking ahead, we will ensure that Holocaust remembrance, education and work on antisemitism are reflected across our efforts to build a safer future.
57. Google & YouTube
We will continue to fight hate speech online through our policies, tools and programs, including new funding for governments and leading NGOs
We’re proud to be a part of the Malmö International Forum. Our pledge to the Forum, to our users, and the wider online community, is that we will continue to fight hate speech online through our policies, tools and programmes.
It is critical to remember the events of the Holocaust and to fight antisemitism today and we are committed to combatting hate speech, including hate speech targeting the Jewish community. Content inciting hatred or violence on the basis of someone’s membership of a protected group is not allowed on our products and services. We have a responsibility
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to provide safety to our users, but we balance that with respect for freedom of expression.
We are always working to improve. Across our products and services we are guided by our 4 Rs:
We remove content that violates our policies or local laws where we operate.
We reduce the spread of content that brushes right up against our policy line.
We raise up authoritative voices when people are looking for breaking news and information. And lastly, we reward trusted, eligible creators and artists.
We recognize the importance of working together with governments and civil society to address these issues, and that we have a shared responsibility to promote Holocaust education and combat antisemitism both online and offiline.
To further strengthen that effort, and building on our previous anti-hate work, today we are committing more than €5M from Google.org in monetary grants and in-kind ad donations to fight antisemitism and promote Holocaust education:
1. A €1 million cash grant commitment to nonprofits fighting antisemitism online. As part of this commitment, Expo foundation has carried out research together with HOPE not Hate and Amadeu Antonio Foundation to understand the growth and spread of antisemitism online in Europe, and these organizations will be educating other civil society actors about the results and learnings of the report.
2. The balance of more than €4 million ($5 million USD) in ad grants will go towards helping governments and nonprofits around the world combat antisemitism online and promote authoritative content through public campaigns about antisemitism and the Holocaust.
We’ll continue to work together to ensure that the world never forgets and we will continue to work together to fight hate speech and antisemitism online.
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58. TikTok
At TikTok, our priority is to provide a safe space for creative expression, with hundreds of millions of people around the world coming to our platform every day to be entertained and find joy.
Hateful behaviour is incompatible with our inclusive environment, and we’ll take all necessary steps to help protect our community from those who seek to spread hate.
We condemn antisemitism in all its forms, and we continually invest in our technology and teams as we work to keep any such content off TikTok.
We know education plays a critical role in striking out hate, which is why we partner with organisations so that people can hear from the Jewish community, learn about the Holocaust, and understand their role in fighting modern-day antisemitism.
We pledge to put our full strength behind keeping TikTok a place that is free of hate, and to harness the power of TikTok to educate our community as we join forces in the fight against antisemitism. In particular, we will commit to:
• Eliminate antisemitism on TikTok: We remove antisemitic content and accounts from our platform, including Holocaust denial or any other form of hate speech directed at the Jewish Community – but our work here is never complete. We will keep strengthening our toolbox for fighting antisemitic content and continue to work with organisations such as the World Jewish Congress to understand evolving trends and improve our strategies and processes.
• Elevate voices representing the Jewish community: We will expand our work to help NGOs and other civil society groups harness the full power of TikTok and find new, creative ways to share their knowledge about topics of importance to the Jewish community and take part in educational campaigns on TikTok.
• Educate our community: We will direct our community to educational resources, including content created by our partners, so that people can learn about the Holocaust, the Jewish community and modern-day antisemitism. We will do this all year round, as well as running campaigns to coincide with important moments such as Holocaust Memorial Day.
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Our goal is to eliminate hate on TikTok, and we are committed to that for as long as it takes.
Others
59. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
For the Malmö International Forum on Holocaust Remembrance and Combating Antisemitism, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum pledges to
1. Expand the translated resources of the Museum’s online content into critical languages, especially those for which authoritative information about the Holocaust may be limited (for example, Spanish, Arabic, Polish and Ukrainian, among others).
2. Through the Never Again Education Act, enhance the ability of the Museum to support all 50 US states by providing educational resources and professional development opportunities for communities that have local Holocaust centers and experts as well as underserved areas in order to strengthen the field of Holocaust education nationwide.
3. Encourage the development of Holocaust-focused institutions in other countries, particularly in the lands where the Holocaust occurred and where engagement with the subject remains uncertain or under threat.
60. Yad Vashem
Yad Vashem, the World Holocaust Remembrance Center, in Jerusalem, in support of worldwide efforts to ensure accurate and meaningful Holocaust remembrance, by all of humanity, and to effectively combat contemporary antisemitism, in all its forms, hereby issues the following pledges:
Pledge One
As the passage of time endangers the integrity and security of Holocaust memory, Yad Vashem pledges to invest substantial resources and expertise to significantly expand and enhance its already vast collections infrastructure upon the Mount of Remembrance in Jerusalem.
These efforts will be directed primarily towards:
Remember—ReAct 85 (89)
• The improved preservation Holocaust-era and Holocaust-related documents, artifacts and artwork
• The provision of technologically advanced means of worldwide public access to the preserved materials
• The development of supplementary tools to assist in the appreciation and integration of the preserved materials in coherent educational and communications contexts, including via social media
Pledge Two
As the meanings of the Holocaust for wide and varied societies, cultures and communities become ever more apparent, Yad Vashem pledges to invest substantial resources and expertise to geographically and culturally broaden its educational outreach frameworks, tools and activities. This includes dialogue, training and support for key influencers in such regions as Latin America, East Asia and Oceania, Sub-Saharan Africa, and indigenous communities worldwide. The widened scope of our activities in new areas and contexts must not and will not detract or limit extensive Yad Vashem activity in the existing core arenas of Holocaust remembrance.
Pledge Three
As we witness the alarming increase of hateful expressions and patterns of contemporary antisemitism, racism and xenophobia – in Europe, America and elsewhere – Yad Vashem pledges to devise, develop and implement new strategies and tools that integrate its existing approaches and tools in Holocaust education with social media and public diplomacy to combat current forms of antisemitism. This must and will be done without compromising the factual integrity of each content area and without blurring the substantive distinctions between them.
Pledge Four
Since genuine and effective Holocaust remembrance has always been and will always be rooted in authentic, comprehensive documentation and fact-based research findings, Yad Vashem pledges to expand existing research formats, framework and contacts and establish new ones, whether autonomously or together with corresponding institutions around the world, in regard to the Holocaust and to antisemitism.
Remember—ReAct 86 (89)
Annex
Participants at Malmö International Forum on Holocaust Remembrance and Combating Antisemitism, 13 October 2021
Countries
1. Albania – Prime Minister Edi Rama
2. Argentina – Ambassador Maria Clara Biglieri
3. Australia – Ambassador Kerin Ayyalaraju
4. Austria – Minister for Europe Karoline Edtstadler
5. Belgium – Ambassador Jean Deboutte
6. Bosnia and Herzegovina – Chairman of the Presidency Željko Komšić and Member of the Presidency Šefik Džaferović
7. Bulgaria – Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Zaritsa Dinkova
8. Canada – Prime Minister Justin Trudeau (speech live online) and Ambassador to Germany and Special Envoy to the European Union and Europe Stéphane Dion
9. Croatia – Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Gordan Grlić Radman
10. Cyprus – Ambassador Sotos Liassides
11. Czech Republic – Minister of Foreign Affairs Jakub Kulhanek 12. Denmark – Minister for Justice Nick Hækkerup
13. El Salvador – Vice President Felix Ulloa Jr
14. Estonia – Prime Minister Kaja Kallas
15. Finland – President Sauli Niinistö
16. France – President Emmanuel Macron (video message) and Special Ambassador for Human Rights, responsible for the international dimension of the Shoah, spoliations and the duty of remembrance Delphine Borione
17. Germany – Minister of State for Europe at the Federal Foreign Office Michael Roth
18. Greece – Deputy Prime Minister of the Hellenic Republic Panagiotis Pikrammenos
19. Holy See – Apostolic Nuncio James Green
20. Hungary – Minister for Families Katalin Novák
21. Iceland – Ambassador Hannes Heimisson
22. Ireland – Taoiseach Micheál Martin (speech live online) and Ambassador Austin Gromley
23. Israel – President Isaac Herzog (speech live online) and Minister of Diaspora Affairs Nachman Shai
24. Italy – Minister of Education Patrizio Bianchi
25. Latvia – President Egils Levits
26. Lithuania – President Gitanas Nauseda
27. Luxemburg – Ambassador-at-large for Human Rights Anne Goedert
28. Moldova – Ambassador Vitalie Rusu
29. Monaco – Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and cooperation Isabelle Rosabrunetto
Remember—ReAct 87 (89)
30. North Macedonia – President Stevo Pendarovski
31. Norway – Ambassador Aud Kolberg
32. Poland – Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Culture, National Heritage and Sport Piotr Gliński
33. Portugal – Minister of Foreign Affairs Augusto Santos Silva
34. Romania – President Klaus Iohannis
35. Russia – Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council of the federal Assembly Konstantin Kosachev
36. Rwanda – Minister of National Unity and Civic Engagement Jean-Damascène Bizimana
37. Serbia – Ambassador Dragan Momčilović
38. Slovakia – Prime Minister Eduard Heger
39. Slovenia – Ambassador Edvin Skrt
40. Spain – Minister of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation José Manuel Albares
41. Switzerland – State Secretary Simon Geissbühler
42. The Netherlands – Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations Kajsa Ollongren
43. Turkey – Ambassador Emre Yunt
44. Ukraine – Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal
45. United Kingdom – Lord Eric Pickles
46. United States of America – United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken (video message) and United States Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Brian McKeon
47. Uruguay – Ambassador José Luis Tejera
International organisations
1. Arolsen Archives – Director Floriane Azoulay (online)
2. Council of Europe – Secretary General Marija Pejčinović Burić
3. European Commission – President Ursula von der Leyen (speech live online) and Vice President Margaritis Schinas
4. European Council – President Charles Michel
5. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights – Director Michael O’Flaherty
6. Holocaust and the United Nations Outreach Programme – Manager Tracey Petersen (online)
7. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – Chairperson-in-Office Ann Linde
8. Secretariat of International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) Secretary General Kathrin Meyer
9. United Nations – Secretary-General Antonio Guterres (video message)
Remember—ReAct 88 (89)
10. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) – ADG/ED Stefania Giannini (speech live online) and Programme Specialist Karel Fracapane
11. High Representative for the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations Miguel Ángel Moratinos
12. United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief Ahmed Shaheed (speech live online)
Civil society organisations
1. American Jewish Committee – President Harriet Schleifer (speech live online) and Managing Director of AJC Europe Simone Rodan-Benzaquen
2. Anti-defamation league – CEO Jonathan Greenblatt
3. B’nai B’rith International – Director EU Affairs Alina Bricman
4. Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations – CEO William Daroff (speech live online)
5. European Jewish Congress – President Moshe Kantor
6. European Roma Institute for Arts and Culture – Deputy Director Anna Mirga-Kruszelnicka (speech live online)
7. European Roma and Travellers Forum – President Miranda Vuolasranta
8. European Roma Rights Centre – Chair of the Board Ethel Brooks (speech live online)
9. International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex World Association – Executive Director André du Plessis
10. World Jewish Congress – President Ronald Lauder
Private sector
1. Facebook – COO Sheryl Sandberg (speech live online) and Facebook Public Policy Director, Israel & the Jewish Diaspora Jordana Cutler
2. Google & YouTube – Vice President of global client & agency solutions in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) Pedro Pina
3. TikTok – Director of Government Relations and Public Policy for Europe Theo Bertram
Others
1. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum – Director Sarah J Bloomfield (online) and Deputy Director for International Affairs Robert Williams
2. Yad Vashem – Chairman Dani Dayan
3. Professor Yehuda Bauer
Remember—ReAct 89 (89)
The Swedish Royal Court
HM King Carl XVI Gustaf and HM Queen Silvia of Sweden
The Riksdag of Sweden
Speaker Andreas Norlén
The Swedish Government
1. Prime Minister Stefan Löfven
2. Minister for Education Anna Ekström
3. Minister of Foreign Affairs Ann Linde
4. Minister for Gender Equality and Housing, with responsibility for urban development, anti-segregation and anti-discrimination Märta Stenevi

==============================================================
https://euobserver.com/opinion/153174

Call by scholars: Stop instrumentalising antisemitism

By 54 SCHOLARS WORKING ON ANTISEMITISM AND RELATED FIELDS

BRUSSELS, 11. OCT, 07:26

We issue this call as scholars working in antisemitism studies and related fields.

On 13-14 October 2021, the leaders of the European Union and the United Nations and heads of state and government from many countries will meet at the Malmö International Forum on Holocaust Remembrance and Combating Antisemitism.

Swedish prime minister Stefan Löfven convenes this forum 21 years after the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, which resulted in the Stockholm Declaration, the founding document of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).

We welcome and support the declared purpose of the Malmö Forum “to jointly take concrete steps forward in the work on Holocaust remembrance and the fight against antisemitism”.

Antisemitism and all other forms of racism and bigotry pose a growing threat that must be fought most forcefully. We commend governments’ resolve and efforts in this regard.

At the same time, we issue a stark warning against the political instrumentalisation of the fight against antisemitism. In the interest of the integrity, credibility and effectiveness of that fight, we urge the leaders at the Malmö Forum to reject and counter this instrumentalisation.

A particular concern in this context is the “working definition of antisemitism” that the IHRA adopted in May 2016, in the aftermath of the 2015 Global Forum for Combating Antisemitism organised by the Israeli government.

Eleven “contemporary examples of antisemitism” have been attached to this IHRA definition, seven of which relate to Israel. These examples are being weaponised against human rights organisations and solidarity activists who denounce Israel’s occupation and human-rights violations.

They legitimise wrongful accusations of antisemitism, which serve as a warning for anyone voicing criticism of Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians. This has a chilling effect on free speech and academic freedom and compromises the fight against antisemitism.

Regrettably, this clear abuse of the IHRA definition and of the examples has so far not been acknowledged by governments and parliaments that have adopted it. More concerning, the European Union is working hard to implement the IHRA definition across multiple policy areas and to entrench it society-wide.

In January 2021, the European Commission published a “Handbook” for that purpose, which was harshly criticised by civil society stakeholders. Among other initiatives, the handbook promotes giving legal effect to the IHRA definition and cultivates it as a criterion to allocate or deny funding to civil society organisations. We fear this is a prelude to discriminatory and repressive policies.

On 5 October 2021, the European Commission presented the EU’s long-awaited “Strategy on Combating Antisemitism and Fostering Jewish Life”.

Like the aforementioned handbook, this strategy ignores the growing concerns about the shortcomings and instrumentalisation of the IHRA definition, as also raised by various stakeholders in the context of a public consultation launched by the Commission; including this academic expert submission, with an annex illustrating the instrumentalisation of the IHRA definition and a joint letter by 10 European NGOs and networks. In fact, the EU’s new strategy feeds these concerns.

With concern, we note that the political instrumentalisation of the fight against antisemitism and of the IHRA definition is being facilitated by coordinators and commissioners appointed by the European Commission and national governments.

In particular in Germany, this has created a toxic and intimidating atmosphere. We notice coordination with and reliance on lobby organisations shielding the Israeli government.

This political entanglement has a divisive and polarising effect, which undermines broad support for the fight against antisemitism and distracts attention from acute sources of antisemitism. It also contradicts the universalist spirit of the Stockholm Declaration, which is missing from the IHRA definition.

By contrast, an alternative definition of antisemitism launched earlier this year does carry this spirit: the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA).

The JDA was crafted by a group of scholars from the United States, Israel, Europe, and the UK, who have vast experience with the IHRA definition.

After more than one year of deliberations, the JDA was launched in March 2021. It has been endorsed by more than 300 scholars of antisemitism and related fields, including many heads of institutes in Europe and the US.

We encourage the leaders at the Malmö Forum to add the JDA to their policy toolbox and rely on it for guidance. Rooted in universal principles, the JDA is clearer and more coherent than the IHRA definition. Without any underlying political agenda, it offers guidance concerning political speech where the IHRA definition has created muddle and controversy.

We recommend the JDA also in view of prime minister Löfven’s statement, issued in anticipation of the Malmö Forum: “We must address Holocaust denial and antisemitism by protecting and promoting democratic values and respect for human rights”. The JDA reflects and respects democratic values and human rights.

For the sake of a concrete outcome of the Malmö Forum, the Swedish government has invited all participating delegations to present “pledges”.

We call on the leaders at the Malmö Forum to jointly pledge to reject and counter the escalating political instrumentalisation of the fight against antisemitism, which undermines democratic values and human rights and is causing grave harm to this fight.==============================================

Click to access b7602129dc4791bd47267b593f517caa.pdf

Call by scholars on global leaders at Malmö Forum on Combating Antisemitism
11 October 2021
We issue this call as scholars working in antisemitism studies and related fields.
On 13-14 October 2021, the leaders of the European Union and the United Nations and heads of state and government from many countries will meet at the Malmö International Forum on Holocaust Remembrance and Combating Antisemitism. Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven convenes this forum 21 years after the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, which resulted in the Stockholm Declaration, the founding document of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).
We welcome and support the declared purpose of the Malmö Forum “to jointly take concrete steps forward in the work on Holocaust remembrance and the fight against antisemitism”. Antisemitism and all other forms of racism and bigotry pose a growing threat that must be fought most forcefully. We commend governments’ resolve and efforts in this regard.
At the same time, we issue a stark warning against the political instrumentalization of the fight against antisemitism. In the interest of the integrity, credibility and effectiveness of that fight, we urge the leaders at the Malmö Forum to reject and counter this instrumentalization.
A particular concern in this context is the “working definition of antisemitism” that the IHRA adopted in May 2016, in the aftermath of the 2015 Global Forum for Combating Antisemitism organized by the Israeli government.
Eleven “contemporary examples of antisemitism” have been attached to this IHRA definition, seven of which relate to Israel. Several of these examples are being weaponized against human rights organizations and solidarity activists who denounce Israel’s occupation and human rights violations. They legitimize wrongful accusations of antisemitism, which serve as a warning for anyone voicing criticism of Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians. This has a chilling effect on free speech and academic freedom and compromises the fight against antisemitism.
Regrettably, this clear abuse of the IHRA definition and of the examples has so far not been acknowledged by governments and parliaments that have adopted it. More concerning, the European Union is working hard to implement the IHRA definition across multiple policy areas and to entrench it society-wide. In January 2021, the European Commission published a “Handbook” for that purpose, which was harshly criticized by civil society stakeholders. Among other initiatives, the handbook promotes giving legal effect to the IHRA definition and cultivates it as a criterion to allocate or deny funding to civil society organizations. We fear this is a prelude to discriminatory and repressive policies.
On 5 October 2021, the European Commission presented the EU’s long-awaited “Strategy on Combating Antisemitism and Fostering Jewish Life”. Like the aforementioned handbook, this strategy ignores the growing concerns about the shortcomings and instrumentalization of the IHRA definition, as also raised by various stakeholders in the context of a public consultation
launched by the Commission; including this academic
expert submission with annex illustrating the instrumentalization of the IHRA definition and a joint letter by ten European NGOs and networks. In fact, the EU’s new strategy feeds these concerns.
With concern, we also note that the political instrumentalization of the fight against antisemitism and of the IHRA definition is being facilitated by coordinators and commissioners appointed by the European Commission and national governments. In particular in Germany, this has created a toxic and intimidating atmosphere. We notice coordination with and reliance on lobby organizations shielding the Israeli government.
This political approach and entanglement has a divisive and polarizing effect, which undermines broad support for the fight against antisemitism and distracts attention from acute sources of antisemitism. It also contradicts the universalist spirit of the Stockholm Declaration, which is missing from the IHRA definition.
By contrast, an alternative definition of antisemitism launched earlier this year does carry this spirit: the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism (JDA). The JDA was crafted by a group of scholars from the United States, Israel, Europe and the UK, who have vast experience with the IHRA definition. After more than one year of deliberations, the JDA was launched in March 2021. It has been endorsed by more than 300 scholars of antisemitism and related fields, including many heads of institutes in Europe and the US.
We encourage the leaders at the Malmö Forum to add the JDA to their policy toolbox and to rely on it for guidance. Rooted in universal principles, the JDA is clearer and more coherent than the IHRA definition. Without any underlying political agenda, it offers guidance concerning political speech where the IHRA definition has created muddle and controversy.
We recommend the JDA also in view of Prime Minister Löfven’s statement, issued in anticipation of the Malmö Forum: “We must address Holocaust denial and antisemitism by protecting and promoting democratic values and respect for human rights”. The JDA reflects and respects democratic values and human rights.
For the sake of a concrete outcome of the Malmö Forum, the Swedish government has invited all participating delegations to present “pledges”. We call on the leaders at the Malmö Forum to jointly pledge to reject and counter the escalating political instrumentalization of the fight against antisemitism, which undermines democratic values and human rights and is causing grave harm to this fight.
Taner Akçam, Professor, Kaloosdian/Mugar Chair Armenian History and Genocide, Clark University
Jean-Christophe Attias, Professor of Medieval Jewish Thought, École Pratique des Hautes Études, Université PSL Paris
Leora Auslander, Arthur and Joann Rasmussen Professor of Western Civilization in the College and the Department of History, University of Chicago
Omer Bartov, John P. Birkelund Distinguished Professor of European History, Department of History, Brown University
Moshe Behar, Dr., Programme Director, Arabic & Middle Eastern Studies, School of Arts, Languages & Cultures, The University of Manchester
David Biale, Emanuel Ringelblum Distinguished Professor, University of California, Davis
Donald Bloxham, Richard Pares Professor of History, University of Edinburgh
Micha Brumlik, Professor Dr., fmr. Director of Fritz Bauer Institut-Geschichte und Wirkung des Holocaust, Frankfurt am Main
Jose Brunner, Professor Emeritus, Buchmann Faculty of Law and Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science, Tel Aviv University
Naomi Chazan, Professor Emerita of Political Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Bryan Cheyette, Professor and Chair in Modern Literature and Culture, University of Reading
Alon Confino, Pen Tishkach Chair of Holocaust Studies, Professor of History and Jewish Studies, Director Institute for Holocaust, Genocide, and Memory Studies, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Lila Corwin Berman, Murray Friedman Chair of American Jewish History, Temple University
Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi, Professor Emerita of Comparative Literature, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Hasia R. Diner, Professor, New York University
Chaim Gans, Professor Emeritus, The Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University
Sander Gilman, Distinguished Professor of the Liberal Arts and Sciences; Professor of Psychiatry, Emory University
Shai Ginsburg, Associate Professor, Chair of the Department of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies and Faculty Member of the Center for Jewish Studies, Duke University
Carlo Ginzburg, Professor Emeritus, UCLA and Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa
Amos Goldberg, Professor, The Jonah M. Machover Chair in Holocaust Studies, Head of the Avraham Harman Research Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Leonard Grob, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Fairleigh Dickinson University
Jeffrey Grossman, Associate Professor, German and Jewish Studies, Chair of the German Department, University of Virginia
Atina Grossmann, Professor of History, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, The Cooper Union, New York
Wolf Gruner, Shapell-Guerin Chair in Jewish Studies and Founding Director of the USC Shoah Foundation Center for Advanced Genocide Research; Professor of History, University of Southern California
Anna Hájková, Associate Professor of Modern Continental European History, Warwick University
Elizabeth Heineman, Professor of History and of Gender, Women’s and Sexuality Studies, University of Iowa
Didi Herman, Professor of Law and Social Change, University of Kent
Dagmar Herzog, Distinguished Professor of History and Daniel Rose Faculty Scholar Graduate Center, The City University of New York (CUNY)
Jonathan Judaken, Professor, Spence L. Wilson Chair in the Humanities, Rhodes College
Marion Kaplan, Skirball Professor of Modern Jewish History, New York University
Brian Klug, Emeritus Fellow in Philosophy, St. Benet’s Hall, Oxford; Member of the Philosophy Faculty, Oxford University
Claudia Koonz, Professor Emeritus of History, Duke University
Tony Kushner, Professor, Parkes Institute for the Study of Jewish/non-Jewish Relations, University of Southampton
Dominick LaCapra, Professor Emeritus of History, Cornell University
Ian S. Lustick, Bess W. Heyman Chair, Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania
Shaul Magid, Professor of Jewish Studies, Dartmouth College
Samuel Moyn, Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence and Professor of History, Yale University
Susan Neiman, Professor Dr., Philosopher, Director of the Einstein Forum, Potsdam
Derek Penslar, William Lee Frost Professor of Jewish History, Harvard University
Andrea Pető, Professor, Central European University (CEU), Vienna; CEU Democracy Institute, Budapest
Göran Rosenberg, Writer, Sweden
Michael Rothberg, Professor of Comparative Literature and Holocaust Studies, UCLA
Victoria Sanford, Lehman Professor of Excellence 2021-2024, Professor of Anthropology, Lehman College, The Graduate Center, The City University of New York (CUNY)
Raz Segal, Associate Professor of Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Stockton University
Joshua Shanes, Associate Professor and Director of the Arnold Center for Israel Studies, College of Charleston
David Shulman, Professor Emeritus, Department of Asian Studies, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Levi Spectre, Dr., Senior Lecturer at the Department of History, Philosophy and Judaic Studies, The Open University of Israel; Researcher at the Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University
Enzo Traverso, Professor in the Humanities, Department of History, Cornell University, New York
Peter Ullrich, Dr. Dr., Senior Researcher, Fellow at the Center for Research on Antisemitism, Technische Universität Berlin
Dov Waxman, Professor, The Rosalinde and Arthur Gilbert Foundation Chair in Israel Studies, Director of the UCLA Y&S Nazarian Center for Israel Studies, University of California (UCLA)
Yael Zerubavel, Professor Emeritus of Jewish Studies and History, fmr. Founding Director Bildner Center for the Study of Jewish Life, Rutgers University
Moshe Zimmermann, Professor Emeritus, The Richard Koebner Minerva Center for German History, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Steven J. Zipperstein, Daniel E. Koshland Professor in Jewish Culture and History, Stanford University
Moshe Zuckermann, Professor Emeritus of History and Philosophy, Tel Aviv University

===========================================================

https://www.facebook.com/groups/bashaaracil/posts/4551656721629976/
שיקו בהרAuthorג’ראלד עוד לא מסוגל לכתוב בעברית?ומדוע שלא תספרי כמה אייטמים הכניס בבמה הזו הימין הקיצוני לעומת המרכז הדמוקרטי? אין הרבה ציפיות מאשה שכל פרנסתה בנויה על התרת דם הסתה ושקר

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  ActiveDana Barnettשיקו בהראין שום התרת דם, הסתה או שקר במה שאני כותבת. כל מה שאני כותבת מבוסס על מה שמופיע ממילא באינטרנט. קשה להאמין שאתה מאמין לשקרים של עצמך.
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• שיקו בהרAuthorאינך עושה דבר למעט התרת דם. ומה את חושבת הוליד את ברוך גולדשטיין ויגאל עמיר אם לא אנשים דוגמתך ודוגמת ג שטיינברג?
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    ActiveDana Barnettשיקו בהראתה כל כך בור, זה לא יאמן. אין כל קשר בין העמותה שלי לעמותה של ג׳ראלד שטיינברג.
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  • שיקו בהרAuthorDana Barnett יש קשר הדוק בין שניכם לבין אלימות רצחנית מול לא יהודים ויהודים דמוקרטים (הפצצה בבית שטרנהל )
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    ActiveDana Barnettשיקו בהראין שמץ של אמת בדבריך. האמירות שלך הן הוצאת דיבה. תתנצל או שתתבע.
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  • שיקו בהרAuthorDana Barnett תתבעי
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  •  שיקו בהר Authorטוב גם ללמוד עם על מחוייבותך לזכות הדיבור והדעה
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    ActiveDana Barnettשיקו בהר אתה מעליל עלי עלילות דם בסגנון אנטישמי, אין לי שום כוונה להתייחס אל זה כאל דעה או זכות דיבור.
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23.12.21

Editorial Note

The Hebrew University Department of Sociology and Anthropology congratulated its member, Dr. Areej Sabbagh-Khoury, for winning the prestigious Guggenheim Scholarship.  Sabbagh-Khoury, a Palestinian citizen of Israel, has a long history of promoting the theory that Israel is a product of “settler colonialism,” which denies Jewish historical rights to the land.  As a critical, neo-Marxist scholar, she has castigated liberal and neoliberal economic policies for the more current problems of her community.

Her Guggenheim project, titled “Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Disintegration and Intracommunal Violence Among the Palestinian Citizens in Israel,” intends to discuss the issue of severe intracommunal crime and violence in the Arab society in Israel.  Indeed, the violence has attracted public attention in Israel and abroad.   The Israeli press compared Palestinian Israelis killed, a death toll that far exceeds the number in the Jewish community. Both the New York Times and the BBC reported on the phenomenon.

Sabbagh-Khoury notes in her proposal that Palestinian citizens of Israel have called for help from the state to the “growing intercommunal violence, from homicides to violence against women to organized crime.” 

But, true to her colors, she immediately reverts to her theory: “This crisis is impossible to understand without attention to the larger structural violence inflicted by a settler colonial state on its minority Palestinian citizens.”  For good measure, she also faults the neoliberal policies for Arab violence. The “violence within Palestinian communities in Israel has grown incrementally since the mid-1980s, alongside the implementation of neoliberal policies in Israel.” The neoliberal policies “have led to social transformations in Palestinian society: a Palestinian middle class has developed, and the bottom tier has become increasingly suppressed. Protection racketeering and violence against women are prominent violence plaguing cities and villages performed by Palestinians themselves.” 

Sabbagh-Khoury blames Israel. The “Israeli state practices of population management, including continued dispossession, surveillance, and attempts to suppress nationalist political organizations, have also dramatically shaped the contours of Palestinian life in Israel, especially following the 2000 Second Intifada.”

It seems as if Sabbagh-Khoury conflates between Arab citizens of Israel and the Palestinian non-citizens.  

Sabbagh-Khoury’s project then asks: “What is the relationship between Israeli state practices of political economic neoliberalization and colonization (in the forms of organized abandonment and dispossession), and intracommunal violence among the Palestinian society in Israel? What is the role of a settler state in managing violence among its minority population?”  

Answers to these questions are included in her previous work. In January IAM reported an article by Sabbagh-Khoury , who argued that “the 1948 Nakba was neither the beginning nor the end of a process of settler-colonial expropriation.”   In another article, Sabbagh-Khoury discussed Israel’s mixed cities of Arabs and Jews, that they “result of Israeli’s policies of settler colonialism” where the “Israeli establishment constantly strives to exclude Palestinians from these cities and to make their continued existence there difficult.”

Sabbagh-Khoury also proposes to discuss “Israel’s ongoing policy of Judaizing these cities, of exercising its control over them, and its attempts to remove Palestinians from them and erase them from their history. Because these cities have been absent as Palestinian cities… since the advent of the Nakba,” she wrote.   

However, ignoring the Palestinian-initiated wars against Israel absolves them from taking any responsibility. 

She also states that her project seeks to contribute to comparative and historical scholarships on “minoritarian violence, discovering what the Palestinians-in-Israel case can illuminate for other cases of intracommunal violence, especially those in settler colonial states.”    In other words, the project does not seek to investigate what triggers violence in Arab society and why Arab men insist on subjugating their women. Instead, the project wishes to discuss “settler colonial states” – a euphemism for blaming the West for Arab violence and failures.  

As a sociologist, Sabbagh-Khoury chooses to produce another meaningless report replete with critical, neo-Marxist jargon, which does nothing to advance solutions to the crisis.  Worse, this project is a thinly disguised effort to bash Israel.   

The Hebrew University and the Guggenheim Foundation should notice that valuable resources are being wasted on pushing outlandish theories that shed little light on contemporary problems.  Indeed, Israeli universities wish to help Arab scholars advance their careers, who, in return, bash Israel.

References:

Sociology & Anthropology HUJI סוציולוגיה ואנתרופולוגיה

16 December at 15:21  · ברכות לד”ר אריז’ סבאע’-ח’ורי על זכייתה במלגת גוגנהיים היוקרתית. את התקציר והשם המלא של ההצעה ניתן לקרוא כאן: Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Disintegration and Intracommunal Violence Among the Palestinian Citizens in IsraelAbstractSince the turn of the century, Palestinians in Israel have called for a significant response from the Israeli state to the growing intercommunal violence, from homicides to violence against women to organized crime. The declared crisis is impossible to understand without attention to the larger structural violence inflicted by a settler colonial state on its minority Palestinian citizens. By most accounts, non-political (i.e., non-nationalist) violence within Palestinian communities in Israel has grown incrementally since the mid-1980s, alongside the implementation of neoliberal policies in Israel. Together, these have led to social transformations in Palestinian society: a Palestinian middle class has developed, and the bottom tier has become increasingly suppressed. Protection racketeering and violence against women are prominent violences plaguing cities and villages performed by Palestinians themselves. Israeli state practices of population management, including continued dispossession, surveillance, and attempts to suppress nationalist political organizations, have also dramatically shaped the contours of Palestinian life in Israel, especially following the 2000 Second Intifada. But intracommunal violence is neither neutral nor natural, its origins never inevitable. The project asks the following: What is the relationship between Israeli state practices of political economic neoliberalization and colonization (in the forms of organized abandonment and dispossession), and intracommunal violence among the Palestinian society in Israel? What is the role of a settler state in managing violence among its minority population? The project seeks to contribute to the growing comparative and historical scholarship on minoritarian violence, discovering what the Palestinians-in-Israel case can illuminate for other cases of intracommunal violence, especially those in settler colonial states.

==============================================================
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/02/world/middleeast/israel-arab-crime-killings-police.html

Violent Crime Spikes Among Arabs in Israel as Officials Admit Neglect

Killings of Arabs by Arabs have soared in Israel. The prevailing assumption, an official said, was “as long as they are killing each other, that’s their problem.”

By Isabel Kershner

Oct. 2, 2021

TAIBEH, Israel — After a day of work in construction, Alaa Sarsour, 25, showered, dressed and walked the short distance to his friend’s pre-wedding henna party in a cobbled alley festooned with ribbons in the old heart of Taibeh, an Arab town in central Israel.

Suddenly, mid-celebration, a wild burst of bullets split the cool night air, hitting Mr. Sarsour and five other guests. Mr. Sarsour died in his brother’s lap, relatives said, apparently the victim of a simmering feud between the gunman — a friend of the groom who had been at the party moments earlier — and a member of Mr. Sarsour’s family.

The shooting last week was just one of at least 16 homicides in Israel’s Arab communities last month, and one of nearly 100 so far this year.

The killings — not by Israeli soldiers but by Arab criminals — account for about 70 percent of all Israeli homicides, though Arabs represent just over 20 percent of the population. The surging violence has shocked the country and put a spotlight on what the government acknowledges to have been decades of neglect of crime in Arab communities.

Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has described the violence as a “national blight” and will head a new ministerial task force to combat the problem that is set to meet on Sunday.

Omer Bar-Lev, who as Israel’s minister of public security oversees the country’s police force, decried what he said was “the prevailing assumption that as long as they are killing each other, that’s their problem.”

The spike in killings has spawned an “Arab Lives Matter” campaign. But unlike the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States, Arab leaders are begging for police action.

“Can the Israel police really not overcome a bunch of criminal gangs?” demanded Ayman Odeh, the leader of an Arab alliance in Israel’s Parliament, at a demonstration last week. “Of course it can, but to put it simply, it treats us as its backyard.”

The number of homicides within the Arab community has spiraled in recent years, from 58 in 2013, according to the police, to about 97 in 2020, and at least 98 so far this year. An Arab citizen of Israel is far more likely to get killed by a fellow Arab than by the Israeli police, and more Arabs have been killed by Arabs in Israel so far this year than have been killed by Israeli security forces in confrontations in the occupied West Bank, which receive much greater attention.

Fewer than a quarter of the cases have been solved, a symptom, critics say, of both police indifference and Arab distrust of the police.

Out of more than 3,300 shootings in Arab communities in 2019, only five percent resulted in indictments, which the police say is a result of difficulty in gathering evidence and locating suspects and witnesses.

In an impassioned Twitter thread the morning after the Taibeh wedding shooting, Mr. Bar-Lev, the minister of public security, blamed decades of government neglect for the problems of Arab communities, and declared combating crime there the central mission of his ministry and the police.

Arab leaders, experts and government officials attribute the spike in internecine violence mostly to the rise of well-armed Arab crime organizations involved in loan sharking and protection rackets, brutally enforced by ranks of unemployed, aimless youths eager to be foot soldiers for easy money.

But personal grudges, small land disputes between neighbors or even petty slights between schoolchildren add to the numbers, sometimes escalating into deadly clan vendettas. Guns have also been turned against women in cases of domestic violence and so-called “honor killings.”

Disputes easily turn lethal because Arab communities are awash in illegal weapons.

Estimates of illegal guns in Arab communities range from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands, though the Arab population of Israel numbers under two million. “Nobody really knows how to quantify it,” says Tomer Lotan, the director-general of the Ministry of Public Security.

Arab politicians and activists have organized mass protests calling for government intervention. Mothers of victims marched from the northern city of Haifa to Jerusalem last year and in recent weeks have staged protests near Mr. Bar-Lev’s house.

“Every day they make promises and plans, him included,” said Watfa Jabali, 52, a Taibeh shopkeeper and activist who lost a son to gun violence. “And we hear on the news about another murder and another and another.”

As the numbers have increased, the killings have only become more brazen.

A month ago, Anas al-Wahwah, 18, an outstanding student and youth volunteer with the Israeli ambulance service, was shot at close range at noon while waiting for his mother in a car in the center of Lod, a mixed Jewish-Arab town in central Israel.

In April, a woman, Suha Mansour, was shot dead at a beauty parlor she ran in Tira, five miles from Taibeh. One Saturday afternoon in June, a couple and their teenage daughter were killed while driving along a highway in northern Israel.

Many Arab citizens question how a technologically advanced country like Israel, which had the intelligence capabilities to pilfer nuclear files out of Iran and to round up six escaped Palestinian prisoners within a week, has been unable to break up a few local criminal gangs.

Some are skeptical of the authorities’ intentions, believing that they have deliberately let violence run amok in order to weaken the Arab minority in Israel, which largely identifies as Palestinian.

“It is all part of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” said Jamal Fattum, 47, a lawyer and social activist from the Arab town of Nahef, in northern Israel. “We are part of the Palestinian people, who have national aspirations.”

Mr. Fattum, who has helped organize protests against violence and government inaction, has at least 10 security cameras monitoring his upscale residence. But one night in April his family awoke to shooting at the house and a boom as their car went up in flames. A bullet pierced the thick, wooden front door and lodged high in his dining room wall.

Mr. Fattum said he had no idea who the masked assailants were or what they may have wanted, other than to silence him. The police have investigated but made no arrests.

But in many cases, victims refuse to cooperate.

Whether out of mistrust of the police, fear of revenge, or both, officials and experts say, witnesses and relatives of victims often stick to a code of silence. Some crime scenes are cleaned up before the police arrive.

In the case of the wedding party, a suspect was swiftly apprehended. But once the case comes to court, the father of the groom, Nasser Barabra, said, there would be no witnesses, even though the gunman was unmasked.

“We didn’t see anything,” said Mr. Barabra, a house painter. Speaking in his home a day after the family had gone from Mr. Sarsour’s funeral to what they said was a joyless wedding ceremony, he added, “Some people walk around with guns and some people walk around with fear.”

Distraught female relatives of the victim, mourning in a house nearby, claimed they did not know the identity of the gunman, who was a neighbor. They were scared, they said, and wanted no more trouble.

Successive Israeli governments have made promises and proposed plans of action. A commission including the directors of several ministries and Arab local council representatives studied the problem in 2020 and determined that the informal financial industry behind so much of the violence arose because Arabs have traditionally relied on a cash-based economy and often lack access to regular banking.

The lack of building permits and space for new housing in cramped Arab cities and towns has led to violent land disputes, and precludes obtaining mortgages or loans from banks, making Arab society vulnerable to loan sharks, extortion and ruthless debt collectors.

The illegal weapons flooding Arab towns are often stolen from the military or smuggled across the border from Jordan, according to the state comptroller, the government watchdog. Improvised weapons are manufactured in the West Bank, and airsoft pellet guns that can be ordered from Amazon have been adapted to fire real bullets, comptroller’s reports have said.

The military said it was working with the police and security groups to reduce the theft of weapons from its bases, and had improved surveillance measures. It reported 80 cases of stolen weapons in 2020 and 21 cases so far this year.

The burst of inter-communal mob violence that shook Israel last May has also served as a catalyst for more urgent action by the authorities, raising fears that the weapons could be turned against the Jewish public.

Mr. Lotan, of the Public Security Ministry, said the government had a detailed plan ready to put into action once the state budget is passed in November. It calls for recruiting an additional 1,100 police officers, legislative changes to deal more efficiently with economic crime, more use of technology and an improved witness protection program — all measures intended to improve access and trust in Arab communities.

Mr. Bennett has proposed enlisting the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security agency, in the campaign, though that has become a point of contention, with many people opposing using counterterrorism means against civilians.

“You need a tough hand against the organizations and the weapons,” Mr. Lotan said, “and in parallel, you need to continue to work on the broad social issues,” what he called the “huge inequality in all spheres.”

It is clear that more policing alone is not the solution. In nearby Tamra, when the police did act, it ended in tragedy.

One night in February, masked gunmen fired at a house in a densely populated residential area, telling the owner they would be back two days later to collect money, according to the town’s mayor, Dr. Suheil Diab. When they returned, one of them armed with an M16 assault rifle, a police SWAT team was waiting in ambush.

Bullets started flying. Across the street, Ahmad Hijazi, a nursing student who was visiting a friend, ran out when he heard cries for help and was shot dead. The friend’s brother, Muhammad Armoush, a doctor, followed him out, and was shot in the foot.

One of the gunmen was killed, another was severely wounded and arrested. A third escaped.

Dr. Armoush said he saw the police aiming for Mr. Hijazi and himself, apparently deeming them suspicious. Police investigators have not yet determined if it was their bullets, or those of the criminals, that hit Dr. Armoush and Mr. Hijazi.

Sitting out on his porch at dusk on a recent evening, above the street where the shootout happened, Dr. Armoush was emotional and exasperated.

“After what happened to us, I expected a change,” he said. “Then yesterday somebody goes to a wedding….”

Rawan Sheikh Ahmad contributed reporting.

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https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-58183954

The murderous crime wave sweeping Israel’s Arabs

By Yolande Knell
BBC News, Jerusalem

Published 13 August

Israel’s Arab minority accounts for about one-fifth of the population, but in recent years it has experienced the vast majority of the country’s murders.

In 2020, 97 Arab citizens were killed, compared to less than half of that in the Jewish community, according to a tally by the Abraham Initiatives group, a Jewish-Arab organisation which promotes positive ties between the two communities. So far this year, about 60 have been killed.

Most victims are young men but increasingly others are caught up in a violent crime wave linked to illegal guns, family feuds and organised gangs.

“It’s shocking… we used to think that for these criminals, women and children are the red line,” says activist Maisam Jaljuli from the organisation Mothers for Life. “It’s not the way anymore.”

There is a large padlock on the door of a beauty salon in Maisam’s hometown of Tira. It was run by her friend, 38-year-old Suha Mansour.

In April Suha, a mother-of-three, had two clients inside when she was shot five times at point-blank range by a hooded attacker. No arrests have yet been made.

“The police took the films of the security camera, but the police don’t know who did that until now, or they claim they don’t know,” Maisam tells me.

“I wonder if it’s a case of: ‘Who cares? They are Arabs, so let them kill themselves.'”

Breaking a stigma

As shocking as it sounds, Maisam’s attitude is far from unusual.

In theory, Israeli Arabs – or Palestinian citizens of Israel, as many prefer to be called – have equal rights with Jewish citizens, but they routinely complain of state discrimination.

Bereaved families and Arab officials claim that police inaction is one of the main reasons for the endemic violence plaguing their neighbourhoods.

“I went mad, it was like I had lost my own life, or lost my eyes. They killed my son, the only boy I had,” says an Arab mother in a northern Israeli town.

She is convinced that members of her in-laws’ family carried out the shooting, but police say there is no evidence to charge those she suspects.

“The police do nothing at all. They don’t care about this stuff happening in Arab communities,” she says, weeping.

According to a recent report by the Haaretz newspaper, Israeli police have only solved 23% of Arab murders this year, compared with 71% for the Jewish population.

The police will not confirm those figures, but insist they have nothing to apologise for.

“I’d like to break a stigma,” says Cdr Ygal Ezra, who heads a new Crime Prevention Department for Arab areas. “The police invest a lot in the Arab community.”

He says that in recent years, nearly 700 Muslim police officers have been recruited and more police stations have been built in Arab towns.

When I press him on the disparity in prosecutions between murderers of Arabs and Jews, he says that he and his colleagues are often up against distrust and a lack of co-operation.

“In a murder in an Arab community, you arrive at the scene and people might have washed the blood away or made the bullets disappear or hidden the killer,” Cdr Ezra says.

“Someone might take video evidence and hide it because he doesn’t want to get involved in that experience.”

Demand for action

The past year has seen a series of mass protests by Arab communities. The Mothers for Life group staged a six-day march from Haifa to Jerusalem. However, the misery has continued.

In Jaljulia, the living room of Siham Ades looks like a shrine to her 14-year-old son, Muhammad, an A-grade student who was shot dead in March. It happened while Muhammad was eating pizza outside his home with a friend, who was seriously hurt.

“Fifteen minutes after they left [the house], we heard shooting. We went out to check what was happening only to find Mustafa lying bloody on the ground. Then we couldn’t find Muhammad and I started screaming,” she recalls.

In Umm al-Fahm, I hear how an Arab doctor was shot dead driving his wife and newborn baby home from hospital. In the Galilee, a man and woman were killed along with their teenage daughter in a drive-by shooting. Their nine-year-old daughter was wounded.

Experts say that as police have cracked down on big Jewish Israeli mobsters in the past decade or so, organised crime has increasingly moved into Arab areas. Heavily-armed gangs run protection rackets and act as loan sharks, threatening and blackmailing people.

The current Israeli coalition government – which includes for the first time, an Islamist Arab party – has promised to act.

It has budgeted over a billion shekels ($310m; £225m) for a new plan to fight crime in the Arab community. Many say that must include tackling Israeli Arabs’ relative poverty.

“We want the Israeli government and responsible people to fight economically those organised groups, because if they do not destroy the economic infrastructure that they are building themselves on, nothing will change,” says Aida Touma Suleiman, an Israeli Arab member of parliament who sits in opposition.

Meanwhile, as politicians plan reforms, activists demand action, and police plead for co-operation, the stakes surrounding Israel’s Arab crime wave are getting higher.

In May, feelings of discrimination melded with a new round of conflict between Israel and Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip, to erupt in violent inter-communal clashes. Mobs of Arab and Jewish extremists went on the rampage in Israel’s mixed cities.

There were lynchings, properties were vandalised and religious sites desecrated. Some even warned of impending civil war.

With a sense that Israel’s inter-communal bonds are under threat, Maisam Jaljuli – the activist and friend of the late Suha Mansour – is calling on Jews and Arab citizens to unite to deal with the crime and killings.

“It’s very important for us, because we don’t think that this is an ‘Arab society or a Palestinian society inside Israel’ problem. It’s the whole Israeli problem,” she says.

“The whole Israeli society must be engaged. We all the time said that if you think that the violence and the murders will be only inside the Arab society, you are wrong: It soon will be also in the Jewish society.”  

16.12.21

Editorial Note

Last month, the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) Council passed a motion titled “The IHRA and Academic Freedom,” opposing the adoption of the widely accepted IHRA Definition of Antisemitism (IHRAWDA) at the Canadian universities and colleges.   

CAUT decried that “the Canadian federal government has adopted the IHRAWDA, along with provincial governments in Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick, and numerous municipal and provincial governments across Canada are considering the adoption of IHRAWDA.”

For CAUT, the “government adoptions of IHRAWDA can impact federal and provincial academic grants, scholarships and funding for projects that are seen to conflict with the IHRAWDA mandate to shield the state of Israel from criticism and charges of racism and colonialism.”  

According to CAUT, the IHRA definition “poses a significant threat to academic freedom at Canadian universities and colleges and has already been used on a number of occasions to censor and impede the academic freedom of teachers and researchers who have developed anti-racist and decolonial perspectives on the policies and practices of the state of Israel.”  CAUT explained that “the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Working Definition of Antisemitism labels as “antisemitic a broad range of criticisms of the state of Israel, particularly targeting decolonial and anti-racist critiques of the policies, structures, and practices of Israel.” 

This is a baseless accusation as the IHRA definition states clearly that “criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.”  However, the following should be considered examples of antisemitism: “Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust; Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations; Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor; Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation; Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis; Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis; Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.”

As CAUT stated, the Canadian Government adopted an Anti-Racism Strategy on 27 June 2019. The strategy is titled “Building a Foundation for Change: Canada’s Anti-Racism Strategy 2019–2022.” The fight against antisemitism is part of this strategy.  The resolution quotes the IHRAWDA: a “certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews.” Adding that “Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” The anti-racism strategy includes a footnote with a link to the IHRAWDA.

However, CAUT justifies its stand by publishing an article by Rebecca Gould, “Free speech and double standards,” in November 2021, which argues against adopting the IHRAWDA for limiting free speech. Gould is teaching in the UK, at the University of Birmingham, School of Languages, Cultures, Art History and Music, Professor and Professorial Research Fellow of Islamic World and Comparative Literature.  

Gould, is a close follower of the historian Arno Mayer, a self-proclaimed “left-dissident Marxist.”   Mayer, a German Jew who fled to the United States, has emerged as one of the most notorious revisionists of the Holocaust.  Rather than denying that the Holocaust, or his preferred term Judeocide, did not occur, Mayer claimed that Antisemitism was never a major drive in the Nazi ideology but rather a byproduct of its animus toward Bolshevism. 

More to the point, Mayer infamously argued that Jews and their collective being, the State of Israel, have used the memory of the Holocaust to block all criticism of Israeli politics.

Gould borrowed his words that the Holocaust had spawned a “collective perspective of ‘memory’ unconducive to critical and contextual thinking about the Jewish calamity.” By calling it “Jewish calamity,” it minimizes the scale of the Holocaust. The theory became popular among pro-Palestinian academic activists like Gould.  She complains that “Mayer’s protest has gone unheeded,” adding that the Holocaust “has sanctified the state of Israel and whitewashed its crime” [against the Palestinians].  For her, “the time has come to stop privileging the Holocaust as the central event in Jewish history.”  She goes further by stating that a “history of past Jewish suffering is unable to dictate the appropriate response to Jewish suffering, let alone to other peoples’ suffering… it is necessary to separate Jewish suffering from the Palestinian crisis. One tragedy does not license another. The Holocaust does not license the Israeli occupation. Nor does it license the bulldozing of Palestinian homes or the razing of Palestinian land.”

In Gould’s version, Palestinians are innocent victims of the Holocaust- empowered Israelis:  “As the situation stands today, the Holocaust persists and its primary victims are the Palestinian people.” 

While Gould’s pro-Palestinian arguments can be contested, however, Gould is Antisemitic according to the IHRAWDA clause, “Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.” It is not surprising that she advocates against the adoption of the IHRAWDA.

In its resolution, CAUT stated that “CAUT vigorously opposes antisemitism.” With the surge of Antisemitism on Western campuses, CAUT should distance itself from Antisemites and adopt the IHRAWDA to curb Antisemitism. Academics can criticize Israel without having to resort to Antisemitic tropes.  

References:

https://www.caut.ca/sites/default/files/motions_resolutions_for_caut_council_website-en.pdf

Motions from the 91st CAUT Council Meeting
Nov. 25-26, 2021
Agenda
Item #
MOTIONS/RESOLUTIONS MOTION OUTCOME
10. MEMBER RESOLUTION
#1
The IHRA and Academic Freedom
MOVER: AASUA
SECONDER: SGPPUM
MOTION:
WHEREAS CAUT wholeheartedly supports the academic freedom of university and college academic staff, and
WHEREAS CAUT wholeheartedly supports the academic freedom of university and college academic staff, and
WHEREAS CAUT vigorously opposes antisemitism, Islamophobia, anti-Palestinian racism, anti-Black racism, anti-Indigenous racism, and all forms of discrimination, racism, and hatred, and
WHEREAS antisemitism is a legally prohibited form of discrimination in Canadian human rights legislation, and 
WHEREAS the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Working Definition of Antisemitism [IHRAWDA] includes as antisemitic a broad range of criticisms of the state of Israel, particularly targeting decolonial and anti-racist critiques of the policies, structures, and practices of Israel, and
WHEREAS the IHRAWDA poses a significant threat to academic freedom at Canadian universities and colleges and has already been used on a number of occasions to censor and impede the academic freedom of teachers and researchers who have developed anti-racist and decolonial perspectives on the policies and practices of the state of Israel, and
WHEREAS the Canadian federal government has adopted the IHRAWDA, along with provincial governments in Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick, and numerous municipal and provincial governments across Canada are considering the adoption of IHRAWDA, and
WHEREAS government adoptions of IHRAWDA can impact federal and provincial academic grants, scholarships and funding for projects that are seen to conflict with the IHRAWDA mandate to shield the state of Israel from criticism and charges of racism and colonialism,
BE IT RESOLVED THAT CAUT opposes the adoption of IHRAWDA at Canadian universities and colleges. CAUT supports the academic freedom of its members and recognizes the need to safeguard the rights of scholars to develop critical perspectives on all states, including the state of Israel, without fear of outside political influence, cuts to funding, censorship, harassment, threats, and intimidation.

https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20211202-canada-academics-vote-to-reject-ihra-definition-of-anti-semitism/

Canada: academics vote to reject IHRA definition of anti-Semitism December 2, 2021 at 3:25 pm 

A major Canadian academic association representing more than 70,000 academic faculty and staff around the country has rejected the controversial International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s (IHRA) definition of anti-Semitism in an effort to protect academic freedom.

The motion adopted by the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT), states that it “supports the academic freedom of its members and recognises the need to safeguard the rights of scholars to critique all states, including the state of Israel, without fear of outside political influence, cuts to funding, censorship, harassment, threats, and intimidation.”

Human rights defenders across Canada have applauded the association’s move. It comes as hostile anti-Palestinian groups demand that governments and academic institutions in the western world should adopt the IHRA definition.

Leading this campaign in Canada is B’nai B’rith, an anti-Palestinian lobby group that has long pushed for the formal conflation of valid criticism of Israel with anti-Jewish bigotry. Last year it called for the expulsion of Professor Faisal Bhabha from Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto. Moreover, B’nai B’rith Canada has reportedly insisted that the government should only fund international humanitarian aid organisations that adhere to the flawed definition.

Critics argue that the IHRA definition is a blunt instrument and not fit for purpose in combating anti-Semitism. With seven of the 11 examples conflating anti-Semitism with criticism of Israel, it’s seen more as a political tool to crackdown on free speech about Israel rather than a credible definition to deal with racism towards Jews.

OPINION: Overthrowing Israel’s bogus definition of anti-Semitism

“Pro-Israel groups have repeatedly pointed to the IHRA definition as a tool that can be used by universities to shut down various forms of student activism, and specifically boycotts of Israel and Israeli Apartheid Week,” explained Michael Bueckert, vice president of Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East, to The Electronic Intifada. “They have also suggested that the IHRA should be applied to scholarship, and have tried to get professors fired for their criticism of Israeli policies or Zionism.”

CAUT’s motion is just the latest in a series of defeats for the pro-Israel lobby’s push to use the IHRA definition to censor scholarship on Palestinian rights in Canada. Last year, the Ontario Confederation of University Faculty Associations, which represents 17,000 professors and academic librarians in more than 30 faculty associations across the country, publicly rejected the province’s unilateral move to adopt the definition, calling it an abuse of power.

Applauding the motion, Independent Jewish Voices Canada (IJV) and the Academic Alliance Against Anti-Semitism, Racism, Colonialism & Censorship in Canada (ARC), said that it was “a crucial action to protect academic freedom and critical scholarship in Canada.”===============================================
https://westvanlibrary.ca/resource/canadas-anti-racism-strategy/

Canada’s Anti-Racism Strategy

From October 2018 to March 2019, the Government of Canada held engagement sessions across the country to gather input from Canadians, especially those with lived experiences of racism and discrimination, in order to help inform the development of a new federal anti-racism strategy. The input is summarized in What we heard — Informing Canada’s Anti-Racism Strategy.

• What We Heard Report
• Deepening Understanding, Developing Ideas: A Cross-Country Conversation on Anti-Racism
• Anti-racism resources
• Building a Foundation for Change: Canada’s Anti-Racism Strategy 2019–2022

====================================
https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/campaigns/anti-racism-engagement/anti-racism-strategy.html

Building a Foundation for Change: Canada’s Anti-Racism Strategy 2019–2022

On this page

• Foreword from the Honourable Pablo Rodriguez, Minister of Canadian Heritage & Multiculturalism
• Guiding principles
• Demonstrating Federal Leadership
  • A Whole-of-Government Approach: The Anti-Racism Secretariat
  • Building on the work we’re doing
• Way forward
  • Engaging Communities and Indigenous Peoples
  • Engaging Provinces and Territories
  • Engaging other Government Departments
• Empowering Communities
  • Introducing the Anti-Racism Action Program
  • Enhanced support for capacity building & promoting dialogue
  • Recognizing expertise
  • Encouraging innovation
• Building Awareness and Changing Attitudes
  • Public education and awareness
  • Indigenous focused approach
  • Addressing hate crimes & combatting online hate
  • Data and evidence
• Ensuring a lasting impact
• Terminology
• Appendix: examples of ongoing initiatives that contribute to addressing racism and discrimination

Building a Foundation for Change: Canada’s Anti-Racism Strategy 2019–2022[PDF]

AntisemitismAntisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.Footnote3Footnote3International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance “Working Definition of Antisemitism”. For further information, visit: https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/working-definition-antisemitism.

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https://www.caut.ca/bulletin/2021/11/commentary-free-speech-and-double-standards-0
NOVEMBER 2021

Commentary / Free speech and double standards

by REBECCA RUTH GOULD

On 1 October, David Miller was fired by the University of Bristol for his controversial statements about Israel. The reason for terminating his employment, the university said, was that ‘Professor Miller did not meet the standards of behaviour we expect from our staff.’ The behaviour in question consisted of words: contentious words with which many would disagree, but words nonetheless, words not directed against any specific individual and not conforming to any conventional definition of harassment, though respected colleagues have argued otherwise.

In 2017, while teaching at Bristol, I was accused of antisemitism after a student unearthed an article I wrote for Counterpunch four years before joining the university. One of the most appealing aspects of moving to the UK had been the space it seemed to offer me as an American for a less polarised debate about the occupation of Palestine. At Columbia University, where I received my PhD, there had been a fight over the tenure case of the Palestinian anthropologist Nadia Abu El-Haj in 2007. She was granted tenure two months later, but the row left an indelible mark on campus politics, especially in relation to Middle Eastern Studies.

In the UK, the adoption of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism by Theresa May’s government in 2016 emboldened those who would conflate antisemitism with criticism of Israel. The IHRA definition was cited by the student who complained about my article.

The university inquiry dragged on for months, during which I learned that institutions are leaned on from many directions when their staff members are accused of antisemitism. The ethical mandate to oppose antisemitism and other forms of racism does not figure nearly as high in their list of concerns as pressure from the government, the media and students. The complaint against me was dismissed, but I left Bristol soon afterwards with the distinct sense that justice had not been served. Palestinian perspectives were ignored in my case, and the suppression of Palestinian voices only increased after my departure.

Four years later, anti-Israeli activism isn’t the only controversial issue on campus. The University of Bristol Islamic Society complained that Steve Greer, a professor of human rights, was promoting Islamophobia during his lectures. The week after Miller was sacked – even though an independent report by a QC concluded that his comments ‘did not constitute unlawful speech’ – the university dismissed the complaint against Greer. With all the attention on Miller’s case, Muslim students found their discontent relegated to the sidelines and their concerns overruled.

Amid these efforts by liberal education administrators, Jews, Muslims and polemicists of all stripes to protect their ideological turf, a crucial fact is getting lost. When a university academic, who was hired to pursue his research and to articulate, publicly and without fear, the consequences of his research, is fired for doing precisely what he was hired to do, everyone suffers a blow. Miller’s dismissal makes it easier for other universities to act as Bristol did, even if on different ideological grounds. Everyone loses out when universities punish their employees for speaking what they consider to be 
the truth.

From this point of view, it doesn’t matter who is right or wrong in the debate over antisemitism on the left, or whether Miller’s thinking displays conspiratorial tendencies. What matters is that a freethinker has had his livelihood taken from him for expressing his views. That is a problem, not just for the fight against antisemitism, but for the idea of democracy.

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Rebecca Ruth Gould is the author of Writers and Rebels:  The Literature of Insurgency in the Caucasus. This commentary first appeared in the London Review of Books on October 12, 2021. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily CAUT.

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Birmingham University’s Prof. Rebecca Gould seems to identify as Jewish only when criticising efforts to fight antisemitism

BIRMINGHAM UNIVERSITY’S PROF. REBECCA GOULD SEEMS TO IDENTIFY AS JEWISH ONLY WHEN CRITICISING EFFORTS TO FIGHT ANTISEMITISM

A professor at the University of Birmingham is on record claiming both that she is Jewish and also that she is not Jewish.

Prof. Rebecca Gould, who previously taught at the University of Bristol, was one of numerous signatories to a letter calling on the German Government not to equate the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement with antisemitism. The signatories to the May 2019 letter all described themselves as “Jewish and Israeli scholars”.

Meanwhile, in a 2019 academic article titled ‘The Palestine Exception to Academic Freedom’, which she co-authored with fellow academic Malaka Shwaikh, Prof. Gould said: “I am not Jewish according to any widely accepted definition”.

Prof. Gould went on in that article to explain: “On my father’s side, I am of Jewish descent. My father’s ancestors were born in Lodz, in what was then the Pale of Settlement within the Russian empire and is now a part of Poland. They migrated to Australia in the nineteenth century, in search of new opportunities, before arriving in the US, where they became perfect capitalists, converted to Catholicism, and changed their name from the Jewish Goldstein to the gentile Gould to improve their economic prospects. Such is the extent of my ancestral link to Judaism.”

The discrepancy in Prof. Gould’s biography was brought to the attention of Campaign Against Antisemitism by a concerned member of the academic community. Prof. Gould has not responded to our request for comment.

Prof. Gould is apparently prepared to identify herself as Jewish in order to try to lend authority to a matter that impacts the Jewish community (an overwhelming majority of British Jews, for example, feel intimidated by tactics used to boycott Israel) but is much less certain of her Jewish identity on other occasions.

The academic article rightly notes that Campaign Against Antisemitism has criticised both Prof. Gould and her co-author, Dr Shwaikh, in the past. We previously exposed Prof. Gould as having written that “As the situation stands today, the Holocaust persists and its primary victims are the Palestinian people”.

We observed that Prof. Gould’s co-author, Dr Shwaikh, had made various deeply concerning statements, including that “If terrorism means protecting and defending my land, I am so proud to be called terrorist. What an honour for the Palestinians!”; marked Holocaust Memorial Day by tweeting that “The shadow of the Holocaust continues to fall over us from the continuous Israeli occupation of Palestine to the election of Trump”; claimed that “Zionism ideology [sic] is no different than that of Hitler’s”; and wrote that “Hitler did his deed and the Palestinians had to pay for it.” Dr Shwaikh previously claimed through her solicitors that the tweets, sent over a significant period, were the result of a hacking attack, but failed to substantiate her claim when challenged.
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https://www.counterpunch.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/vol-18-no-19.pdf
COUNTERPUNCH November 1-15, 2011

Volume 18 no 19

Beyond Anti-Semitism 

By Rebecca Gould “The last thing I want is to be called an ‘anti-Semite’,” an American friend confided, as we returned to Jerusalem after a daylong excursion to Hebron. We were gliding down the highway that stretched in front of us like a ribbon traversing the gaping darkness. I was so surprised by his words, offered in response to my question rega- rding why so many Israeli flags had to be hoisted above a road that cut through the heart of the Pal estini an territories, that I had to ask for clarification. “I can’t make Israelis the enemy,” he explained. “I live with them. I speak Hebrew better than Arabic. They are my friends:’ I was less surprised by the timing of these comments than by their content, for they marked the culmination to lengthy pronouncements evincing entirely different sentiments, as we traveled between the cave villages surrounding Hebron. As soon as Israel was behind us, I became the captive audience to his unceasing reflections on the injustices attending Israel’s occupation of Palestine, making up for many months of diplomatic silence. At every invitation, my friend was the first to point out that the greater weight of injustices lay on the Israeli side. This was a conflict, he said, marked by misinformation, deception, and fabrications of the past, and the winners were more culpable than the losers. “Israel exists only on subsidies:’ he repeated tirelessly, stressing the violence the state of Israel had introduced into the economy of the Levant. By contrast, Palestine was an “artificially underdeveloped economy” forced into economic depression by Israel’s draconian policies. And now, at the conclusion to a journey that had exposed me to a hitherto unknown aspect of an interlocutor I had believed to be unsympathetic to the Palestinian cause, he confessed his fear of being pegged as an anti-Semite. As we crossed the border into Israel, this confession seemed to mark a turn back to politics as usual. to silent complicity and diplomacy, and an infinite deferral of the mandate to speak the truth wherever it may lead. From a human perspective, my friend’s concerns were entirely legitimate. Indeed, they were shared completely by myself. Although I did not live in Israel, I received financial support from the same Israeli organization as did my friend . Like him. J had no interest in alienating anyone and no desire to acquire a reputation as a despiser of any group. However, no aspect of my question could have legitimated such labeling. That Israeli flags were posted at every single turn of a road that ran straight through Palestinian territory struck me as strange, given that Hebron had not been ceded to Israel after 1967. I wanted to know whether renegade settlers or the Israeli government were behind these unsolicited decorations. That my question evoked fears of the anti-Semitic label rather than a direct confrontation with the problem at hand reveals the power wielded by this ever-present accusation to steer conversation away from the occupation. From casual conversations to political debates. the specter of anti-Semitism constrains open discussion regarding the impact of Israeli policies on Palestinian lives, especially in what are known as Israel’s liberal publications. In a recent review of Han Pappe’s book, The Forgotten Palestinians: A History of the Palestinians in Israel, the Israeli left-wing newspaper Haaretz berated the Israeli historian, who was made to abandon his professorship at the University of Haifa for the University of Exeter in 2007, for lacking “any understanding or empathy for Jewish Israel’s sense of vulnerability and victimization:’ Pappe’s fatal flaw, according to the reviewer in Haaretz, was his failure to recognize Israel as a country that “has never enjoyed a moment when there was n’t somebody calling for its destruction:’ as though such a recognition should have modified whatever criticisms Pappe had to make of Israel today. Stated otherwise, Pappe had no legitimate right to critique Israel’s treatment of Palestinians residing within and outside the Green Line, unless he counterbalanced such complaints with a recognition of Jewish suffering. The evaluative strategy that holds an author responsible not for what he said but for what he didn’t and that calls him to account for not discussing matters that have at most a tangential bearing on his immediate subject does not stand up to the test of rigorous analysis. I submit that such compromised intellectual standards were only deemed adequate because of the special nature of the subject at hand, and because of the contemporary uses that are made of the long, and not always relevant, history of anti -Jewish hate. In a more objective discussion, Pappe’s work would have been read on its own merits, not for what it had to say about Jewish suffering, which was not its subject, but for what it had to say about Israel’s relation to Palestine. Underlying both Haaretz’s dismissal of Pappe’s scholarship as “unbalanced” and my fri end’s fears of being labeled an anti-Semite for the clarity with which he perceived the Pales tinian occupation are events in World War II Germany that, notwithstanding Palestine’s distance from this conflict, continue to infl uence the events in contemporary IsraelPalestine. As Zev Garber and Bruce Zuckerman have shown, Elie Wiesel did the most to popularize the use of the Greek term holokaustos (“entirely consumed by fire”) to translate the Hebrew shoah. Already 20 years ago, the historian Arno Mayer contested the use of the term “holocaust” in lieu of the shoah, because he recognized that this word had spawned “a collective prescriptive ‘memory’ unconducive to critical and contextual thinking about the Jewish calamity:’ Unfortunately, Mayer’s protests have gone unheeded. When the most religiously freighted term imaginable is used to describe a purely human tragedy, memory becomes an instrument of ideology rather than a means of connecting with the past. This problem is only exacerbated by the way “holocaust” implies divine ordinatio n. Defining the shoah vis-a-vis the Greek (and, incidentally, Christian) term for a sacrifice to God has helped make it available to manipulation by governmental elites, aiming to promote the narrative most likely to underwrite their claims to sovereignty. Claiming the Holocaust as a holy event sanctifies the state of Israel and whitewashes its crimes. As Mayer feared, it also forestalls objective critique of any group associated with those who were brutally “sacrificed” half a century ago. I n the face of this overwhelming fear of being labeled anti-Semitic and of promoting anti-Semitic values that haunts nearly eve ry discussion of the Isra elPalestine conflict, perhaps the time has come to stop privileging the Holocaust as the cent ral event in Jewish history. While it may be possible to construct a historically solid argument that Israel as a country, like the Jews as a people, has “never enjoyed a moment when there wasn’t somebody calling for its destruction,” such a his tory could only ever be the starting point for a post-Holocaust reality. Above all, a history of past Jewish suffering is unable to dictate the appropriate response to Jewish suffering, let alone to other peoples’ suffering, in the present or the future. No people’s past should be allowed to determine another people’s future. Against Moral Calculus Just as it is necessary to separate the past from the present in contemporary Israel-Palestine, so, too, it is necessary to separate Jewish suffering from the Palestinian crisis. One tragedy does not license another. The Holocaust does not license the Israeli occupation. Nor does it license the bulldozing of Palestinian homes or the razing of Palestinian land. To refuse the moral calculus that transforms Jewish suffering into a justification of Israeli oppression does not imply insensitivity to or obliviousness of what the Jews have faced over the course of their long, often devastating, history. Even less does it earn one the label of anti-Semite. Rather, it opens a post-Holocaust present to an ethics that looks beyond the “eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth” principle that has undergirded all three of the world’s most influential monotheisms – regardless of how they toss this label at each other, all have subscribed to such ethics in practice – at various moments in their history. Two wrongs do not make a right. Jewish suffering will never be appeased by making Palestinians pay the price for the world community’s silence half a century ago, when the Jews were being exterminated. The justification of silence regarding Israel’s illegal expansion in Palestine on the grounds that protest against this injustice could be perceived as anti-Semitic merely extends the lifespan of anti-Jewish prejudice. Two wrongs do not make a right, but one wrong, left unresolved and unhealed, often will fester and multiply, until other people suffer for crimes committed before they were born and in which even their ancestors had no share. Unfortunately, the moral calculus encapsulated in the “eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth” formula delimits the scope of political possibilities with respect to the Palestinian question in Israel today: a tragedy perpetrated on the Jewish people half a century ago by German powers, and sustained by broad Euro-American complicity, is made to justify, sometimes explicitly and at other times by implication, an occupation that violates international law. 1he Jews have been sinned against, the reasoning seems to run , so, now it is the turn of Israel to sin against the Arabs. If the Jews do not engage in violent, pre-emptive “self-defense;’ the logic continues, then they will face another extermination. In today’s topsy-turvy world, Israel is more likely to share strategic goals with Germany, a country that played a major role in creating the JeWish tragedy, than with Palestine, a country that participated in millennia of harmonious Jewish-Arabic coexistence prior to modernity. This peculiar turn of events has led Edward Said to speak paradoxically but cogently of “Zionism from the Standpoint of its Victims,” thereby suggesting that Zionism, an ideology that derives much of its force from the need to prevent the Jews from being victimized, has, in fact. produced more victims than victors. As Edward Said registered, when he argued that “the Jewish tragedy led di rectly to the Palestinian catastrophe,” the Palestinians are, in fact, linked to the Holocaust, although not in ways commonly recognized in the public sphere. The paradoxes do not end here, for, as Gilbert Achcar has pointed out in his recent provocative study, Arabs and the Holocaust, as “a colonial state born at the very moment in which the process of decolonization was first gaining strength,” Israel is a political anachronism. If Israel and Israel’s supporters wish to be remembered by history as the people who merely passed onto others the violence that was cruelly inflicted on them first, then the logic that makes Jewish suffering an obligatory preface to any discussion of Israel’s oppression is eminently justified. If they wish to be remembered as the people who used horrific suffering to fulfill the seemingly impossible yet honorable mandate of benefitting humanity, then another kind of resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and another language for reflecting on Israel’s politics, will have to be found. The Holocaust is Over – Avraham Burg, a former Knesset speaker has claimed in the title to his book. Burg’s bestselling book, which has caused a stir in Israel, bears the subtitle: We Must Rise From its Ashes. Burg is only partially correct. In addition to rising from the ashes of the shoah, Israel must find a way of not passing on the crime the Nazis introduced into the world onto the next generation of its citizens. If Israel can find a way to stop the cycle of bloodletting released into the world over half a century ago, then, even in an era weary of nations and the states that underwrite them, it will merit the world’s admiration. As the situation stands today, the Holocaust persists and its primary victims are the Palestinian people. A long road remains to be traveled, and much fear needs to be discarded before the ashes can be wiped away. CP

Rebecca Gould is assistant professor of literatures of the Caucasus and the Islamic world, Department of Asian & Slavic Languages & Literatures at the University of Iowa.

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https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3608988

The Palestine Exception to Academic Freedom: Intertwined Stories from the Frontlines of UK-Based Palestine Activism

“The Palestine Exception to Academic Freedom: Intertwined Stories from the Frontlines of UK-Based Palestine Activism,” Biography: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly 42(4): 752-73.

15 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2020

Malaka Shwaikh

St. Andrews University

Rebecca Ruth Gould

University of Birmingham; Harvard University – Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies

Date Written: May 23, 2020

Abstract

This autobiographical co-authored essay explores how hate speech wounds within the logic of the Palestine exception, whereby Israel-critical speech is subjected to censorship and silencing that does not affect other controversial speech. Three months after the UK government’s “adoption” of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism in 2016, we were subjected to a series of attacks in the media, in the public sphere, and in our workplaces in connection with our Palestine-related activism and criticisms of Israeli policies from years earlier. The crackdown on academic freedom that has overtaken UK universities since 2017 has been widely condemned, but rarely has this story been told from the vantage point of those who were targeted and censored. We document here in detail how the Palestine exception to free speech and academic freedom has damaged academic freedom within the UK and silenced Palestinian voices.

08.12.21

Editorial Note

On December 2, 2021, the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) 36 members voted on a proposal to advance, in early 2022, a BDS resolution to the full membership vote. The resolution endorses the 2005 Palestinian call for BDS. If ratified next year, the resolution would direct MESA to find ways to uphold the call for an academic boycott of Israeli institutions, “in alignment with the association’s mission to defend academic freedom, and in a manner consistent with MESA’s bylaws as well as relevant U.S. federal, state, and local laws.” MESA is calling for solidarity with the Palestinians as “they work to safeguard their human rights, including the right to education and academic freedom during their annual meeting.”

MESA’s mission to defend academic freedom and safeguard Palestinian human rights is highly hypocritical because it does not include Palestinian violations.

The Palestinian leaderships are notorious for abusing human rights. For example, on October 23, 2018, Human Rights Watch published a 149-page report titled “‘Two Authorities, One Way, Zero Dissent:’ Arbitrary Arrest and Torture Under the Palestinian Authority and Hamas.” It evaluated arrest and detention conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The report detailed over two dozen cases of people detained for no apparent reason beyond writing a critical article or Facebook post or belonging to the wrong student group or political movement.   Tom Porteous, deputy program director at Human Rights Watch said: “Twenty-five years after Oslo, Palestinian authorities have gained only limited power in the West Bank and Gaza, but yet, where they have autonomy, they have developed parallel police states… Calls by Palestinian officials to safeguard Palestinian rights ring hollow as they crush dissent.”

Also, Amnesty International’s report of 2020 stated that: “The Palestinian authorities in the West Bank and the Hamas de facto administration in the Gaza Strip continued to crack down on dissent, including by stifling freedoms of expression and assembly, attacking journalists and detaining opponents. Security forces in both areas used unnecessary and/or excessive force during law enforcement activities, including when imposing lockdown measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Torture and other ill-treatment of detainees were committed with impunity. Women faced discrimination and violence, including killings as a result of gender-based violence. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people continued to face discrimination and lacked protection. In the West Bank, authorities made widespread use of administrative detention without charge or trial. In Gaza, civilians continued to be tried before military courts. Courts in Gaza handed down death sentences. Palestinian armed groups in Gaza occasionally fired rockets indiscriminately into Israel. Two Israeli civilians were killed after lone attacks by Palestinian individuals.”

However, in support of the MESA boycott call, MESA President, Dina Rizk Khoury, Professor of History and International Affairs at George Washington University, who graduated from the American University of Beirut, said: “Since Palestinian civil society first called on the international community to engage in boycotts, divestment, and sanctions in order to pressure Israel to end its military occupation and other rights violations, our members have been engaged in thoughtful discussions about what it means to participate in academic boycotts, and other ways of showing solidarity with fellow scholars whose lives and livelihoods are under attack… Today’s vote clears a path for our full membership to collectively determine how we can do our part to support the academic freedom and education rights of Palestinian scholars and students, not to mention Israeli scholars facing attacks from their own government for criticizing its policies.” 

Rizk-Khouri is a long-time pro-Palestinian activist, as per the Spring 2001 newsletter of the Palestinian American Research Center (PARC) -“Promoting Palestinian Studies and Scholarly Exchange on Palestinian Issues.” Khouri and her colleague “have already jumped into action on PARC’s behalf, and we are delighted to have them on the steering committee.” The newsletter stated that “Khoury fully supports PARC’s goal to provide support to scholars in Palestinian studies.” She is quoted as saying, “There tends to be very little funding for work for Palestinian studies from other organizations in this country… I think an organization that deals with Palestinian issues and funds research in them is long overdue.” The newsletter noted that in addition to her academic interests, “Khoury, who is from Lebanon, is married to a Palestinian and maintains many connections in the region through family and friends.” In the newsletter, Rizk-Khoury and her husband Alfred Khoury are registered as founding members of PARC. Worth noting that PARC has been a partner organization of MESA since 2018.

MESA has been calling for the boycott of Israel for years and complained about Israel’s arresting Palestinian students in a letter of protest in July 2021. As reported by the media, the 45 students of Bir-Zeit University were members of a Hamas student organization. Some were in the midst of terrorist activities. Interestingly, the Palestinian Authority, fearing Hamas’s take over the West Bank, as happened in the Gaza Strip, tries to prevent it by performing arrests as well. The PA canceled the general elections for fears of Hamas’s win. But MESA’s politics will not criticize the PA. 

It cannot be ignored that the attacks on Israel by MESA and others go hand in hand with the rise of anti-Semitism on campus. 

A recent article by Abigail R. Esman, a freelance writer based in New York and the Netherlands, detailed the experience of students in the UK, the Netherlands, and Belgium:  In the UK, The Times newspaper declared last month that “antisemitic abuse on university campuses has reached record levels,” at 59 percent higher than in 2020. For example, one student at Glasgow University was told to “go gas herself;” another was sent a photoshopped image of her head in a guillotine.  Also important, a recent study in the UK revealed that only 52 percent of Brits knew the number of Jews killed in the Holocaust; other studies found that 10 percent of British students believed no more than 100,000 Jews perished. 

In the Netherlands, Jewish students on campus felt insecure at the University of Maastricht, as detailed in an interview with a Jewish student.  Also in the Netherland, in 2018, members of the campus chapter of Students for Justice in Palestine at the Vrij Universiteit (Free University) in Amsterdam, supported by far left group Revolutionaire Eenheid, invited Palestinian terrorist Rasmieh Odeh to speak.  Odeh participated in two 1969 bombings in Jerusalem which killed two Jewish students. Also in the Netherland, a recent survey conducted by the Anne Frank Foundation, found that 40 percent of Dutch students didn’t know that 6 million Jews were killed in the Holocaust.

In Belgium, a professor at the University of Maastricht told a Jewish colleague, “If you want to keep your job, don’t tell anyone that you’re Jewish and that you support Israel.” A Jewish student wrote about anti-Semitism in a student Facebook group, the responses were “Filthy cancer-Jew, I hope that they turn the gas chambers back on;” and “your stinking people will be destroyed.”   Another student found a swastika painted on his student housing door, and his mezuzah smashed.  The majority of his professors have signed up to efforts to boycott, divest, and sanction Israel. The student was told that “universities and student groups will only work with them if Jewish students turn against Israel and establish no links with Israel during joint events.”  Also in Belgium, the University of Gent released a statement in May, during the last escalation between Palestine and Israel, declaring “solidarity with the Palestinian people who, since 1948, have opposed a settler-colonial regime involved in ethnic cleansing … and apartheid.”  Thirteen hundred professors, researchers, and students signed the statement.

There is an unmistakable atmosphere of anti-Israel and anti-Jews sentiments on campus, mostly driven by Palestinians and their Arab peers. They ignore Arab and Palestinian human rights abuse and instead customarily target Israel.

Since the Palestinian call for a boycott in 2005, the delegitimization of Israel took another turn, and MESA is part of it.

References
https://mesana.org/news/2021/12/02/mesa-members-vote-to-advance-bds-resolution-to-full-membership-vote-in-early-2022

MESA Members Vote to Advance BDS Resolution to Full Membership Vote in Early 2022

• DECEMBER 02, 2021
• NEWS

NEWS UPDATE

December 2, 2021

Contact: secretariat@mesana.org

Middle East Studies Association Members Vote to Advance BDS Resolution to Full Membership Vote in Early 2022

Resolution Endorses Palestinian Civil Society’s Call for Solidarity As They Work to Safeguard Their Human Rights, Including the Right to Education and Academic Freedom

During their annual meeting, members of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) voted to advance a resolution endorsing the Palestinian call for solidarity in the form of boycotts, divestment and sanctions, or BDS, to a full membership vote in early 2022. The resolution was proposed by 36 MESA members based in the United States, Canada and Europe. If ratified next year, the resolution would direct MESA to find ways of upholding the call for an academic boycott of Israeli institutions in alignment with the association’s mission to defend academic freedom, and in a manner consistent with MESA’s bylaws as well as relevant U.S. federal, state, and local laws.

“Since Palestinian civil society first called on the international community to engage in boycotts, divestment, and sanctions in order to pressure Israel to end its military occupation and other rights violations, our members have been engaged in thoughtful discussions about what it means to participate in academic boycotts, and other ways of showing solidarity with fellow scholars whose lives and livelihoods are under attack,” said MESA President Dina Rizk Khoury. “Today’s vote clears a path for our full membership to collectively determine how we can do our part to support the academic freedom and education rights of Palestinian scholars and students, not to mention Israeli scholars facing attacks from their own government for criticizing its policies.”

The BDS resolution outlines ways that the Israeli government systematically violates Palestinians’ right to education. Some of the violations cited in the resolution include restricting the freedom of movement for Palestinians, attacking Palestinian educational institutions, harassing Palestinian students, teachers, and professors, and destroying Palestinian archival material.

The call for an academic boycott extends to Israeli institutions, which the resolution states, are complicit in Israel’s violations of human rights and international law through their provision of direct assistance to the Israeli military and intelligence establishments. The resolution also states that the boycott will not target individual students or scholars, and reiterates the right of individual MESA members to choose whether or not they wish to participate in an academic boycott.

For interviews or further information, please direct inquiries via secretariat@mesana.org

-End-

The Middle East Studies Association (MESA) is a non-profit association that fosters the study of the Middle East, promotes high standards of scholarship and teaching, and encourages public understanding of the region and its peoples through programs, publications and services.

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Click to access MESA_Resolution_regarding_BDS.pdf

Resolution regarding BDS
Whereas, Palestinian civil society issued a call in 2005 for boycott, divestment, and sanctions
(BDS) against Israel; and
Whereas, Members of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) have organized various
forums for discussion and debate of that call through MESA’s commitment to academic freedom;
and
Whereas, International intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations,
including Palestinian and Israeli monitoring groups, have documented and verified successive
Israeli governments’ systematic violations of the human rights of Palestinians living under Israeli
direct or indirect control; and
Whereas, Systematic violations include restricting freedom of movement for Palestinians;
isolating, undermining, or otherwise attacking Palestinian educational institutions; harassing
Palestinian professors, teachers, and students; harassing Israeli professors and students
criticizing Israeli policies; destroying, confiscating, or otherwise rendering Palestinian archival
material inaccessible; and maintaining inequality in educational resources between Palestinians
and Israelis; and
Whereas, Israeli universities are imbricated in these systematic violations through their provision
of direct assistance to the Israeli military and intelligence establishments; and
Whereas, The United States government has systematically shielded successive Israeli
governments from being held accountable for such violations and facilitated them through
unprecedented diplomatic, military, and economic support; and
Recalling that the BDS campaign against Israel is one that targets institutions and not individuals;
and
Recalling that MESA recognizes the right of scholars to academic freedom as well as the right of
scholars to choose whether or not to participate in an academic boycott;
Be it resolved that the majority of the MESA membership
(1) Endorses the 2005 call of Palestinian civil society for BDS against Israel; and
(2) Directs the MESA Board of Directors to work in consultation with the Committee on Academic
Freedom to give effect to the spirit and intent of this resolution, in a manner consistent with
MESA’s bylaws as well as relevant US federal, state, and local laws.

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https://events.eventact.com/AIS/33634/uploads/Statement_on_MESA_Resolution_on_BDS.pdf

AIS Statement on MESA Proposed Resolution regarding BDS
The Association for Israel Studies, as an affiliated society of MESA, is deeply concerned regarding
the proposed resolution in support of BDS.
The Association for Israel Studies is neither an Israeli association nor one that takes any
particular political stance on matters of Israeli policy or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The
AIS is committed to academic freedom, fundamentally the freedom to engage in the pursuit
of knowledge without fear of sanction. Membership in AIS has no ideological litmus test, and
members in fact reflect the full range of views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Many AIS
members are also members of MESA. We express our view, then, as an affiliated society
with a strong interest in and commitment to academic freedom.
The proposed resolution accuses Israel alone of violations of human rights. By charging
Israeli universities as being “imbricated in these systematic violations”, it casts a net of
collective and inescapable guilt over any citizen of Israel and ignores the broad range of
opinion and political stances articulated by members of the Israeli academic community. It
effectively calls for collective punishment for all who are thus guilty by association. While the language
of the proposed resolution claims that it will “target institutions and not
individuals”, it is clear that its primary impact will be precisely its effect on individuals,
including many individual members of MESA.
Although claiming to be operating in the spirit of “MESA’s commitment to academic
freedom”, this resolution in fact represents an effort to curtail and to suppress precisely that
freedom for any scholar associated with Israel or with Israeli academic institutions.
In short, If the proposed resolution in support of BDS is passed, MESA will have taken a
clear stance in opposition to academic freedom, and will have transformed itself from an
academic association committed to the free exchange of ideas to an ideological advocacy
organization in which only some ideas are permissible. The damage to MESA and to
academic activity in the field of Middle East Studies will be unambiguous and profound. We
call on the MESA membership to maintain the association’s commitment to academic
freedom and reject this discriminatory and censorious resolution.
Sincerely,
Prof. Arieh Saposnik
AIS President
Association for Israel Studies
University of Haifa | Department of Israel Studies
Eshkol Tower, 1407 |199 Abba Khoushy Ave. | Haifa, 3498838 | Israel
ais@aisisraelstudies.org | www.aisisraelstudies.org

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https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/boycotting-israel-middle-east-studies-association-197478

Boycotting Israel at the Middle East Studies Association
December 4, 2021

Individual Middle East scholars are of course free to their own opinions and approaches. But scholarly organizations endorsing discrimination is both a bad look and self-destructive, both morally and practically.

by Asaf Romirowsky Alex Joffe

The crisis in higher education, faculty, students, and administrations adopting ideological positions radically at odds from those of most Americans and in the process reshaping institutions, is becoming better understood.

But none of this is new. Another Israel boycott resolution being considered by the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) reminds us that the rot in higher education set in long ago and was focused, not surprisingly, on Jews and the Jewish State.

So deep is the rot that the association seems totally oblivious (or indifferent) to the fact that its ongoing endorsement of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaign, and attendant efforts to obstruct the containment of resurgent anti-Semitism on U.S. campuses, have effectively crossed the thin line between “normal” Israel-bashing and classical Jew-baiting.

Back in 2015, a MESA referendum approved a resolution which not only lauded the “calls for [anti-Israel] institutional boycott, divestment, and/or sanctions [BDS]” as “legitimate forms of non-violent political action” and deplored opposition to these exclusionary moves as an assault on the freedom of speech, but “strongly urge[d] MESA program committees to organize discussions at MESA annual meetings, and the MESA Board of Directors to create opportunities over the course of the year that provide platforms for a sustained discussion of the academic boycott and foster careful consideration of an appropriate position for MESA to assume.”

Now another resolution will be considered at their annual meeting this week the invitation for the annual meeting:

Resolution regarding BDS

Whereas, Palestinian civil society issued a call in 2005 for boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) against Israel; and

Whereas, Members of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) have organized various forums for discussion and debate of that call through MESA’s commitment to academic freedom; and

Whereas, International intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations, including Palestinian and Israeli monitoring groups, have documented and verified successive Israeli governments’ systematic violations of the human rights of Palestinians living under Israeli direct or indirect control; and

Whereas, Systematic violations include restricting freedom of movement for Palestinians; isolating, undermining, or otherwise attacking Palestinian educational institutions; harassing Palestinian professors, teachers, and students; harassing Israeli professors and students criticizing Israeli policies; destroying, confiscating, or otherwise rendering Palestinian archival material inaccessible; and maintaining inequality in educational resources between Palestinians and Israelis; and

Whereas, Israeli universities are imbricated in these systematic violations through their provision of direct assistance to the Israeli military and intelligence establishments; and

Whereas, The United States government has systematically shielded successive Israeli governments from being held accountable for such violations and facilitated them through unprecedented diplomatic, military, and economic support; and

Recalling that the BDS campaign against Israel is one that targets institutions and not individuals; and

Recalling that MESA recognizes the right of scholars to academic freedom as well as the right of scholars to choose whether or not to participate in an academic boycott;

Be it resolved that the majority of the MESA membership

(1) Endorses the 2005 call of Palestinian civil society for BDS against Israel; and

(2) Directs the MESA Board of Directors to work in consultation with the Committee on Academic Freedom to give effect to the spirit and intent of this resolution, in a manner consistent with MESA’s bylaws as well as relevant US federal, state, and local laws.

The irony that calls for academics to discriminate against an entire society is cast in terms of alleged infringements on academic freedom is equally blatant but is not especially new. Both overt hostility to Israel and anti-Semitism under the guise of anti-Zionism have for years dominated the field of Middle East Studies, a fact illustrated by the parade of anti-Israel vituperation on display annual at MESA conferences and its routine, almost United Nations-like, condemnations of Israel.MESA has thus gone from merely endorsing the call to boycott Israel to calling on its members to do so, and actively doing so itself. Israeli universities, among the most liberal (and multicultural) institutions in that society, are branded as human rights violators. Individual Israeli academics are not formally targeted but will be in reality, as MESA members evaluate job applicants, visiting speakers, grant proposals, and the like. The litmus test for MESA members, and Israelis, is blatant.

But intellectual intolerance is spreading rapidly in academia and American society. Witness the growing chorus of calls on and off campus, from faculty and students alike that there are “no two sides” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that the Israelis and supporters have no right to even be heard. This is one of the sources of “cancel culture,” smugly self-assured, willfully ignorant, and often resolutely racist.

Like most of academia, MESA seems largely impervious to criticism. But the damage being done is precisely to academia’s standing with society as a whole. As more faculty expose themselves as blindly hateful and anxious to judge, American society has reacted in horror. The collapse in the standing of the humanities and social sciences is matched by the actual collapse of those disciplines in terms of enrollments.

Across the board, from Middle East Studies to English, as academia has become strident, judgmental, and one sided, students and society have fled. An Israel boycott resolution that calls on an entire academic discipline to shun a single society is worse than a crime, it is a mistake. The exposure of Israel hatred and anti-Semitism within high school “ethnic studies” curriculums has caused equal shock and disillusionment.

Individual Middle East scholars are of course free to their own opinions and approaches. But scholarly organizations endorsing discrimination is both a bad look and self-destructive, both morally and practically.

Asaf Romirowsky is executive director of Scholars for Peace in the Middle East (SPME) and the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA), Alex Joffe is a senior non-resident scholar at the BESA Center at Bar-Ilan University.

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Middle East Studies Association to vote on BDS resolution next year

Middle East Studies Association to vote on BDS resolution next year

“Today’s vote clears a path for our full membership to collectively determine how we can do our part to support the academic freedom and education rights of Palestinian scholars and students, not to mention Israeli scholars facing attacks from their own government for criticizing its policies.”

BY MICHAEL ARRIA

DECEMBER 3, 2021

On December 2 the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) overwhelmingly voted to advance a Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) resolution at the beginning of 2022.

“Since Palestinian civil society first called on the international community to engage in boycotts, divestment, and sanctions in order to pressure Israel to end its military occupation and other rights violations, our members have been engaged in thoughtful discussions about what it means to participate in academic boycotts, and other ways of showing solidarity with fellow scholars whose lives and livelihoods are under attack,” said MESA President Dina Rizk Khoury. “Today’s vote clears a path for our full membership to collectively determine how we can do our part to support the academic freedom and education rights of Palestinian scholars and students, not to mention Israeli scholars facing attacks from their own government for criticizing its policies.”

The resolution was introduced by author, activist, and human rights attorney Noura Erakat. “93% of MESA’s membership voted to push this BDS resolution out of committee and to a full membership vote,” she tweeted. “This reflects a tremendous amount of collective labor and a cultural-political shift. There is no turning back regardless of how this plays out.”

MESA, which was founded in 1966, is the largest Middle East academic body in North America.

You can read the full text of the resolution below:

Whereas, Palestinian civil society issued a call in 2005 for boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) against Israel; and

Whereas, Members of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) have organized various forums for discussion and debate of that call through MESA’s commitment to academic freedom; and

Whereas, International intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations, including Palestinian and Israeli monitoring groups, have documented and verified successive Israeli governments’ systematic violations of the human rights of Palestinians living under Israeli direct or indirect control; and

Whereas, Systematic violations include restricting freedom of movement for Palestinians; isolating, undermining, or otherwise attacking Palestinian educational institutions; harassing Palestinian professors, teachers, and students; harassing Israeli professors and students criticizing Israeli policies; destroying, confiscating, or otherwise rendering Palestinian archival material inaccessible; and maintaining inequality in educational resources between Palestinians and Israelis; and

Whereas, Israeli universities are imbricated in these systematic violations through their provision of direct assistance to the Israeli military and intelligence establishments; and

Whereas, The United States government has systematically shielded successive Israeli governments from being held accountable for such violations and facilitated them through unprecedented diplomatic, military, and economic support; and

Recalling that the BDS campaign against Israel is one that targets institutions and not individuals; and

Recalling that MESA recognizes the right of scholars to academic freedom as well as the right of scholars to choose whether or not to participate in an academic boycott;

Be it resolved that the majority of the MESA membership

(1) Endorses the 2005 call of Palestinian civil society for BDS against Israel; and

(2) Directs the MESA Board of Directors to work in consultation with the Committee on Academic Freedom to give effect to the spirit and intent of this resolution, in a manner consistent with MESA’s bylaws as well as relevant US federal, state, and local laws.

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Click to access AEN-Statement-on-MESA-Members-Vote-to-Advance-BDS-12.3.21.pdf

AEN Statement on MESA Members Vote to Advance BDS
The Academic Engagement Network (AEN) writes to express its dismay at and opposition to the decision by members of MESA (Middle East Studies Association) taken during its recent annual meeting to advance a BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions) Resolution against Israel to a full membership vote in early 2022.
AEN is an educational nonprofit which organizes over 800 faculty members on more than 250 campuses across the U.S. to foster a rigorous study of Jewish identity and experience, promote academic freedom and free speech, and combat antisemitism. As an organization committed to open intellectual exchange and inquiry, we find it deeply ironic that this Resolution is being presented within the framework of MESA’s “commitment to academic freedom,” when BDS is, in fact, antithetical to this very principle and core value that defines the academy.
The endorsement of BDS will inevitably – and inequitably – discriminate against, exclude, and isolate Israeli scholars by singling out the Israeli academy for boycott. Indeed, the Resolution’s assertion that BDS targets only “institutions and not individuals” is untenable. The boycott of Israel’s universities cannot be meaningfully separated from the faculty and students who work, teach, and study in them. BDS is therefore more aptly described as a blacklist which punishes individual academics on the basis of their nationality, political views, and the policies and actions of their government.
We dispute the reasoning put forward to justify endorsing BDS against Israel. Proposed by 36 MESA members, the “Resolution regarding BDS” maintains a singular focus on Israel – and a deafening silence about the travesties committed by many other nations. It paints a picture of a monolithic Israeli academy malevolently hostile to Palestinians when in fact there is a wide range of opinions and many academics in Israel object to the Israeli government’s policies and actions. It accuses Israel alone of causing harm to Palestinian professors and students, ignoring how the academic rights of these scholars and students are severely restricted by the intimidation, harassment, and even violence routinely perpetrated by Palestinian governing authorities as well as radical societal groups. It asserts that Israeli universities are “imbricated” in the oppression of Palestinians when the reality is that Israel’s campuses are a model of diversity and coexistence, with Jews, Arabs, and others studying, researching, and teaching together. In fact, in the past decade the number of Palestinian Arab students in Israel’s higher education institutions has doubled.
At a transformational time in the Middle East and North Africa, when there is ever-more potential for new academic partnerships and exchanges between Israel and its neighbors, the endorsement of BDS will undercut potential opportunities for collaboration, dialogue, and mutual understanding in MESA across national, religious, and cultural divides. Furthermore, should this Resolution be ratified by the full membership in the coming year, it will be profoundly damaging to the association, which will have transformed itself from an academic association ostensibly committed to open intellectual inquiry into an advocacy group mandating political and ideological orthodoxies.
We urge MESA’s membership to reject this Resolution and to reaffirm its commitment to academic freedom and the free exchange of ideas.
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https://www.investigativeproject.org/9082/europe-jewish-students-face-anti-semitic-onslaught

Europe’s Jewish Students Face Anti-Semitic Onslaught

by Abigail R. Esman
IPT News
December 6, 2021

If there were a survival handbook for Jewish students at the universities of Europe, it would probably begin with this:

1. Tell no one that you’re Jewish
2. Condemn Israel as a terrorist, genocidal state
3. Get used to it.

This, at least, has been the experience of students at the University of Maastricht in the Netherlands, according to recent reports and an eye-opening interview with a Jewish student leader there. But students at universities in Belgium, France and the UK have faced similar forms of anti-Semitism on campus. The UK declared last month that “antisemitic abuse on university campuses has reached record levels” – a full 59 percent higher than in 2020. One student at Glasgow University was encouraged to “go gas herself,” according to the Times; another was sent a photoshopped image of her head in a guillotine.

And it’s not just students. As one professor at the University of Maastricht told a Jewish colleague, “If you want to keep your job, don’t tell anyone that you’re Jewish and that you support Israel.”

Speaking to the Dutch online newspaper Israel Nieuws, Maastricht student Ethan Gabriel Bergman described dozens of incidents at the school, including the administration’s decision to ignore International Holocaust Remembrance Day on the school calendar, noting only “Chocolate Cake Day,” which falls on the same date. This past May, as anti-Israel demonstrations rocked Europe, protesters at the university carried banners claiming that “all [Israel] wants to see is blood. Arab blood, as much as possible – blood, the more the better – blood, the main thing is that Arab blood is spilled,” as others repeated anti-Israel chants in Arabic.

Yet when a Jewish student wrote despairingly of this in a student Facebook group, the replies that came in were anything but supportive. “Filthy cancer-Jew, I hope that they turn the gas chambers back on,” one person wrote, and another: “your stinking people will be destroyed.”

Seeking disciplinary action, the student, who remains anonymous, reported the incident to university administrators. The response: Don’t you think you deserved it for being so unfriendly?

Bergman, too, has seen his share of Jew-hate. Earlier this year, he returned to his apartment in student housing to find a swastika painted on his door, and his mezuzah smashed to the ground. And the majority of his own professors, he told Israel Nieuws, have signed on to support efforts to boycott, divest, and sanction Israel (known as the BDS movement) – a trend that he, as a member of the European Jewish Association (EJA), has seen spreading internationally. The EJA itself, he said, has been told that “universities and student groups will only work with them if Jewish students turn against Israel and establish no links with Israel during joint events.” This, he said, amounts to telling Jews that they must support the BDS movement in order to be accepted by non-Jews.

Despite this history, when Holland’s Jewish human rights organization, Centrum Informatie en Documentatie Israel, asked the University of Maastricht to respond to Bergman’s interview, its board of directors denied knowledge of any of the incidents or trends he described. “Neither employees nor students have made complaints of any concrete instances of discrimination,” they stated.

Maastricht – one of Europe’s top 50 universities, with over 21,000 students – is also not the only university in the Netherlands with a rabid antisemitism problem. In 2018, members of the campus chapter of Students for Justice in Palestine at the Vrij Universiteit (Free University) in Amsterdam, supported by far left group Revolutionaire Eenheid, invited Palestinian terrorist Rasmieh Odeh to speak at the school. (Similar campaigns supporting Odeh, who participated in two 1969 bombings in Jerusalem – one of which killed two Jewish students – also took place at Harvard Law School in 2016.)

Meanwhile, in Belgium, the University of Gent released a statement last May declaring “solidarity with the Palestinian people who, since 1948, have opposed a settler-colonial regime involved in ethnic cleansing … and apartheid.” Thirteen hundred professors, researchers, and students signed the statement, according to Belgium’s Mondiale News.

Some of this anti-Israel mentality can be explained simply by demographics. Muslim students vastly outnumber Jewish students in both secondary schools and universities in Europe. Non-Muslim students have more exposure to Muslims, have more friends who are Muslim, and are more widely exposed to the viewpoints of their Muslim peers, who inevitably support Palestine. As Bergman points out in his interview, he is often the first Jew his fellow students ever meet.

But that doesn’t explain the full aggressiveness of the anti-Jewish hate on Europe’s campuses, nor does it explain the pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel sentiments of so many European professors. Alongside the rapid spread of misinformation via social media is the lack of real knowledge many young Europeans (and Americans) have of the Holocaust, let alone of the history of Israel and the Israel-Palestinian conflict. A recent study in the UK revealed that only 52 percent of Brits knew the number of Jews killed in the Shoah; other studies found that 10 percent of British students believed no more than 100,000 Jews perished. In a survey conducted by the Anne Frank Foundation, nearly 60 percent of Dutch students were aware that 6 million Jews were killed, but that left over 40 percent who don’t know.

What’s more, Holocaust survivor Regine Suchowolski-Sluszny, who regularly gives lectures in Belgian schools about her own experiences, told Israel Nieuws that teachers often come to her with questions about Israel and Palestine, attempting to compare the Nazi regime with Israel.

“They have little knowledge of the history or the actual situation in the Middle East,” she said. “It isn’t of interest to them, and so they go along with what they hear on TV.” Even the books they use, she said, are “far from objective.” The result: Belgium has one of the lowest views of Israel, and of Jews, in Europe. “It is not politically correct to openly support Jewish people,” Suchowolski-Sluszny noted. “And certainly not the state of Israel.”

At times, it goes further. In one instance, she said, a student told the school director, “I will not shake the hand of a Jewess.”

That young people across Europe continue to have either insufficient or inadequate understanding of the Holocaust and little real knowledge of the Israel-Palestinian conflict is causing many Jews to fear for their future, particularly in countries where, as in the Netherlands, anti-Israel protests frequently include Taliban flags and calls for the restoration of the Caliphate.

Moreover, the media, Suchowolski-Sluszny maintains – particularly social media – does not help. “Attacks on Jewish Israelis rarely appear in the news,” she said. “Only the reactions by Israel to the stabbings, the destruction, the rocket attacks from Gaza – they get the news [coverage]. When there is no real explanation of why, it just feeds the antisemitism … And the circle goes around again.”

IPT Senior Fellow Abigail R. Esman is a freelance writer based in New York and the Netherlands. Her new book, Rage: Narcissism, Patriarchy, and the Culture of Terrorism, was published by Potomac Books in October 2020. Follow her at @abigailesman.

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